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ABSTRACT 
REARTICULATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
ITS IMPACTS ON NATIONAL/STATE IDENTITY AND STATE SOCIETY 
RELATIONS IN TURKEY: 
THE CYPRUS CASE 
Kaliber, Alper 
P.D., Department of Political Science 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Orhan Tekelioğlu 
December 2003 
 
The central problematic of this dissertation is how, in what ways and to what 
extent ‘foreign’ political discourses and representations are instrumentalized by the state 
apparatus in the constitution and maintenance of domestic political order and state 
identity in a given polity. In that respect, this study assuming a dialogical interplay 
between internal and international political processes and structures aims to re-examine 
and problematize the Turkish official discourse on the Cyprus question. Doing this, it is 
intended for critically questioning the role and impact of those discourses in the 
reproduction of the state identity and the state society relations in Turkey.  
Despite an increasing body of contemporary literature on the question, there still 
exists an urgent need for a brand new approach critically examining Turkey’s official 
Cyprus discourse from the viewpoint of power/domination relations in Turkey. This 
dissertation considering the restrictions and weaknesses of the mainstream scholarship 
proposes a new conceptual/analytical framework and research agenda facilitating the re-
assessment of Cyprus question and its implications in restructuring and/or securing the 
domestic politics in Turkey.   
In this context, the main argument of this thesis work is that the modes in which 
the Cyprus question is discursively framed and/or represented by the Turkish state elite 
within domestic politics are inherent to the reconstruction of state society relations and 
state identity in Turkey. Drawing on the post-structuralist and constructivist IR theories, 
I do propose that the official and mainstream understandings coding and fixing the 
Cyprus dispute primarily as an issue of state’s security and ‘a national cause’ around 
which the unity and cohesion of Turkish society should necessarily be guaranteed has a 
two-fold function: First, they ensure the continual reorganization of Turkish political 
life in full conformity with the priorities and policy objectives articulated by the state 
elite. This grants them the power and capacity of inscribing the boundaries of the 
political space and disciplining the political imagination. Second, they ensure the 
maintenance of the state society relations in its conventional and hierarchical terms in 
such a way as to reproduce the former’s supremacy over and independence from the 
latter.  
 
Keywords: Cyprus, Turkish foreign policy, state identity, state society relations, 
securitization, national cause.  
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                                                               ÖZET 
 
TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASININ YENİDEN TELAFFUZU 
TÜRKİYE’DE ULUSAL/DEVLET KİMLİĞİ VE DEVLET TOPLUM İLİŞKİLERİ 
ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİLERİ: KIBRIS ÖRNEĞİ 
 
Kaliber, Alper 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yar. Doç. Dr. Orhan Tekelioğlu 
Aralık 2003 
 
Bu çalışmanın ana sorunsalı, verili bir siyasada dış siyasal söylem ve 
temsiliyetlerin iç siyasal düzenin kurulması ve idamesinde devlet aygıtı tarafından nasıl,  
hangi biçimlerde ve ne ölçüde araçsallaştırıldığı şeklinde formüle edilebilir. İç ve dış 
siyasal süreçler ve yapılar arasında diyalojik bir ilişkisellik olduğunu varsayan bu 
çalışma, Türkiye’de Kıbrıs konusundaki resmi söylemi yeniden irdelemeyi ve 
sorunsallaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bunu yaparken amaçlanan, Türkiye’de devlet 
kimliğinin ve devlet toplum ilişkilerinin yeniden üretilmesi süreçlerinde Kıbrıs 
sorununa ilişkin olarak benimsenen bu söylemin rol ve etkilerini eleştirel biçimde 
sorgulamak ve ortaya koymaktır.  
Kıbrıs meselesine ilişkin literatürün gittikçe genişlemesine karşın Türkiye’nin 
resmi Kıbrıs söylemini, Türkiye’deki iktidar/tahakküm ilişkileri açısından eleştirel bir 
incelemeye tabi tutacak yeni bir yaklaşıma hâlâ şiddetle ihtiyaç vardır. Ana akım 
akademik çalışmaların kısıtlarını ve zayıflıklarını dikkate alan bu tez, Kıbrıs sorununu 
Türkiye’deki iç siyasetin yeniden yapılanması ya da bu biçimiyle sürdürülmesi 
üzerindeki etkileriyle yeniden değerlendirmeyi olanaklı kılan yeni bir 
kavramsal/analitik çerçeve ve araştırma gündemi önermektedir.  
Bu bağlamda bu tez çalışmasının temel argümanı, Kıbrıs meselesinin Türk 
devlet seçkinleri tarafından iç siyasal alanda söylemsel olarak kurgulanış ve temsil 
ediliş biçimlerinin, Türkiye’de devlet kimliğinin ve devlet toplum ilişkilerinin yeniden 
inşa süreçlerine içkin olduğudur. Yapısalcılık-sonrası ve inşacı uluslararası ilişkiler 
kuramlarına dayanarak şunu öneriyorum ki Kıbrıs meselesini, etrafında milli birliğin ve 
bütünlüğün mutlaka tesis edilmesi gereken bir ‘milli dava’ ve devletin güvenlik sorunu 
olarak kodlayan ve sabitleyen resmi ve ana akım anlayışların iki önemli işlevi 
bulunmaktadır. Bu yaklaşımlar ilk olarak Türkiye’de siyasal hayatın devlet seçkinleri 
tarafından dile getirilen öncelikler ve siyasal amaçlarla tamamen uyumlu bir şekilde 
sürekli yeniden düzenlenmesini güvence altına alır. Bu da onlara siyasal alanın 
sınırlarını çizme ve siyasal tahayyülü disipline etme güç ve kapasitesini tanır. İkinci 
olarak bu anlayışlar, Türkiye’de devlet toplum ilişkilerinin geleneksel ve hiyerarşik 
yapısının, ilkinin ikincisi karşısındaki üstünlüğünü ve bağımsızlığını yeniden üretecek 
biçimde korunarak idamesini mümkün kılar.  
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Kıbrıs, Türk dış politikası, devlet kimliği, devlet toplum 
ilişkileri, güvenlikleştirme, milli dava.            
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CHAPTER I  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
For many in Turkey the landing of Turkish troops on Cyprus in July and August 
1974 amounts to the last episode of the play staged on this little and charming 
Mediterranean island of Cyprus. Those who deem the existence of two independent and 
sovereign states in the island as a sine qua non of any viable settlement for the Cyprus 
dispute “would accept Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s frequent statement that 
the issue was resolved in 1974.”1 Nevertheless as opposed to this ahistorical discourse 
that overlooks the historicity and complexity of the question, the connotations and the 
implications of the Cyprus issue are far more complicated in contemporary Turkish 
regional and global politics than it used to be in the previous decades. The myth built 
around its salience and uniqueness in terms of geo-strategy and geopolitics has rendered 
Cyprus one of the most stern and precarious fields of superpower rivalry during the 
years of bi-polarity. The increase of regional scale politics and actors in tandem with 
new supranational agents, i.e the European Union, soon after the collapse of the global 
East-West rivalry made the settlement of the Cyprus dispute much more problematic 
and significant. In the wake of the application of the Greek-controlled Cyprus Republic 
to the European Union for full membership in June 1990, the European Union began to 
be involved in the question as has never been in the past. This has rendered the issue far 
more important for the European continent to which Cyprus is politically, though not 
geographically, linked.2  
                                                 
1 Bahçeli, Tözün, “Turkey’s Cyprus Challenge: Preserving the Gains of 1974”, in Greek-Turkish 
Relations In the Era of Globalization, Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds.), 
(Massachusetts: Fidelity Press, 2001), p. 213.  
2 Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, in The European Union and the 
Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict Postmodern Union, Thomas Diez (ed.), (New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2002), p. 57.  
 2 
Finding a viable solution to the Cyprus dispute has turned out to be more and 
more decisive in the reconfiguration of the internal sociopolitical balances and power 
relations in Turkey, which is one of the major problematics of this thesis work. This is 
not only due to the link established among the resolution of the Cyprus problem, 
Turkey’s full membership to the European Union, and the amelioration of Turco-Greek 
relations in such a way as to ensure security and stability in Eastern Mediterranean. Yet 
more importantly, it stems from the strong impacts and implications of the reviving 
debates since the end of 1990s as regards the Cyprus question on restructuring the 
relations between ‘the ruling’ (the state) and ‘the ruled’ (the society) in Turkey. 
It is fair to propose that for Turkish citizens, the beginning of the 21st century is 
marked with the institutionalization of a gradual change of the rationale on which the 
state society relations in the country are founded. More interestingly, this paradigmatic 
change has been experienced not owing to the debates on domestic issues but rather due 
to the debates on issues traditionally thought to be pertaining to the sphere of foreign 
policy. The two fundamental subjects of those debates, in which divergent sectors of 
Turkish society were actively involved, were Turkey’s reviving accession process to the 
EU and the resumption of the negotiations regarding the Cyprus dispute under the 
auspices of the United Nations. Particularly the new UN proposals presented under the 
rubric of the ‘Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus 
Problem’ on 10 November 2002 set the Cyprus question high on the political agenda of 
the Turkish public opinion. These debates where conventional official and mainstream 
approaches were criticized ever extensively than before was a relatively recent but 
historically significant political experience from the viewpoint of democratization of 
state society relations in Turkey. It could easily be claimed at this juncture that the 
debates surrounding Turkey’s full membership in the EU and the Cyprus question have 
served to politicize the public sphere by paving the way to the articulation of civil 
 3 
societal demands differentiated from state-centered policy objectives, priorities, and 
interest calculations. It is mainly owing to those debates that ‘the political’ has been 
reinvented and Turkish socio-political order has been repoliticized. 
 It is fair to propose that how the Cyprus question is discursively framed and/or 
represented by the Turkish state elite within domestic politics should necessarily be 
included in the analyses on the processes though which the state identity and state 
society relations are (re)constructed in Turkey. For any social scientist searching for 
whether there exists any relationality between the reproduction of state identity and 
domestic political order and the modes in which foreign political issues are articulated 
and represented by the state elite, studying the Cyprus question yields ample insightful 
data. In this sense, a thorough analysis of the official discursive economy pertaining to 
the issue premised on the constant assertion of such concepts as ‘national interests’, 
‘national security’, ‘national cause’, ‘national unity and cohesion’, ‘geo-strategic 
importance’ is a source of great merit for the scholars questioning how and in what 
ways internal and international processes are intertwinedly operational in the shaping of 
state action and state identity. For it allows analysts to trace the implications of 
relationality between the national formation of the state and the international dimension 
of its behaviors.  
 
1.1. Major Problematic of the Dissertation  
The central problematic of this dissertation can be formulated as how, in what 
ways and to what extent ‘foreign’ policy discourses and representations are 
instrumentalized by the state apparatus in the constitution and maintenance of domestic 
political order and state identity in a given polity. In this context, the study assuming a 
dialogical interplay between internal and international political processes aims to re-
examine and problematize the Turkish official discourse adopted on the Cyprus 
 4 
question. In undertaking this, it is intended for critically questioning and unveiling the 
role and impact of those discourses in the reproduction of the state identity and the state 
society relations in Turkey in the manner that the power holders desire. Thus the 
dissertation incorporates foreign policy initiatives and discourses of the Turkish state 
into the dynamics forming and reforming the domestic political life and order. As such 
it seeks to search for to which extent the Cyprus question has a bearing on the 
sustenance of the state-centric structure of Turkish political modernity. In doing this, the 
dissertation urges the reader to reconsider the Cyprus question from the perspective of 
internal power relations by concentrating on its implications in restructuring and/or 
securing the domestic politics in Turkey.  
The dissertation treats state society relations as the fundamental area constantly 
reconfigured in accordance with the core characteristics of the domestic order and also 
as a discursive space through which these qualifications assigned to the regime are 
reproduced through multiple mechanisms. Thus the discursive and performative 
processes through which the core assumptions of the state identity are redefined are 
integral to and contingent upon the dynamics and practices framing and reframing state 
society relations within a given socio-political context. As regards foreign policy, the 
study refutes, from the inception, the conventional, statist and essentialist 
conceptualizations presuming it as an aggregate of bureaucratic activities and 
diplomatic procedures rationally conducted by the state to pursue pre-determined 
national objectives and to ensure ‘national security’ within necessarily anarchical 
international politics. The study, on the contrary, conceives foreign policy as inherent to 
state identity construction, functioning through disciplinary, exclusionary and 
securitizing discourses and performances of the state and through ‘othering’ strategies. 
Therefore, in this analytical framework foreign policy refers to a vital space through 
which the domestic society is persistently warned against internal and external enemies 
 5 
and informed about the indispensable characteristics of the state. The constant assertion 
of threats, dangers, insecurities, ‘inimical others’ through foreign policy across the 
public sphere serves to the securitization of those issues and leads to accumulation of 
more power in the hands of state apparatus. Thereby this dissertation attaches utmost 
importance to the problematization and full exploration of the security language that the 
Turkish state elite has used as to the Cyprus question.                      
 
1.2. State Identity As A Discursive Artifact: Foreign Policy As A Disciplinary 
Practice and “One of Its Constitutive Elements”3    
 As the final and most perfect form of political institutionalization, the nation 
state is accorded inevitability and naturalness by the teleological episteme of the realist 
International Relations (IR) paradigms. The nation state is taken for granted as an 
autonomous actor, sovereign presence, ontologically pregiven entity having, once 
settled, completed and coherent identity. However as the critical IR scholarship clearly 
indicated, states are entities in permanent need of reproducing themselves and the core 
assumptions of their identity. To this view refusing to take states as a priori given 
and/or the only natural and objective form of political community, “states are (and have 
to be) always in process of becoming”4.  
 The concept of identity has begun to be widely used by both critical and 
mainstream IR scholarship from the 1990s on parallel to the strengthening of the post-
positivist approaches within the discipline. These critical studies were aiming at 
deciphering and deconstructing ontological and epistemological presumptions, 
ideological formations behind cultural representations and discursive structures in 
international political theory. As such, beyond the psychological analysis the concept of 
                                                 
3 Bach, Jonathan P.G., Between Sovereignty and Integration: German Foreign Policy and National 
Identity After 1989, (Munster, Germany: Lit Verlag; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 56.  
4 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity, rev. ed. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 12.  
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identity has increasingly attracted IR scholars as an area of study “treated as a soft 
concept during the Cold War years.”5  
 As for the state identity, it has both an internal dimension (“it is what binds the 
group together”) and an external dimension (situating the state with respect to others)6. 
Thereby state identity includes (1) the aggregate of images, set norms, narratives and 
the core characteristics of the state that are expected to be shared by the large majority 
of the society; and (2) “the self placement of the polity within specific international 
context. Those contexts consist mainly of the constellation of states, international 
institutions and historical experiences within which a state is embedded.”7 As Banchoff 
stated, evidences concerning the identity of any state can be gleamed from a wide range 
of sources such as “the legal norms that govern foreign policy (…), the dominant 
images preferred in its media, the standardized text books”8, the oral and written 
declarations of official figures across the political spectrum, the explanations of party 
leaders in press conferences and in other settings, and the parliamentary debates. These 
are all the discursive and representative instruments through which the state identity is 
constantly reproduced that should necessarily be assessed together with the concrete 
actions of the state in internal and external political realms.          
 In realist IR theory, foreign policy is conceptualized as the conduct of series of 
diplomatic practices by the state elite to pursue pre-determined national objectives and 
interests and to ensure ‘national security’. In the conventional discourse, the sphere of 
foreign policy refers to the external orientations and rational choices of self-interested 
states towards others within an anarchic interstate system. By the same token, foreign 
policy is portrayed as a vital battlefield where the domestic society namely citizens are 
                                                 
5 Yılmaz, Eylem, The Role of Foreign Policy Discourse in the Construction of Turkey's Western Identity 
During the Cold War, unpublished Master’s thesis, (Ankara: Bilkent University, 2002), p. 11.  
6 Bhanchoff, Thomas, “German Identity and European Integration”, European Journal of International 
Relations, 5/3 1999.   
7 Ibid., p. 68.  
8 Ibid., p. 68-9.  
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safeguarded against violence, anarchy and uncertainty necessarily proceeding from 
international politics and where national defence and security are maintained vis-à-vis 
external enemies.  
On the other hand, within the last two decades various critical studies 
positioning themselves away from the essentialist and reductionist nature of 
conventional IR theory engendered novel opportunities for the discipline to transcend its 
long-standing inertia. These studies, some of which critically interrogate the state-
centricism of the discipline, dedicated themselves to posit a more comprehensive and 
adequate conceptualization of state, ‘foreign’ policy and international politics. These 
critiques, be they positivist or non-positivist, shifted the focus of the theory onto the 
processes where internal and international political structures reciprocally framed each 
other. As opposed to the realist school, in which “the domestic is clearly demarcated 
from the international sphere”9 the intertwinedness of these two realms has constituted, 
to a large extent, the core and content of the new critical research agenda.  
This new research avenue intends to question how and to what extent the ways 
in which ‘foreign’ policy issues are articulated are functional in building a fixed and 
coherent national/domestic identity. Therefore within the dissident literature ‘foreign’ 
policy is theorized not as “the external view and rationalist orientation of a pre-
established state, the identity of which is secure before it enters into relations with 
others”10. But rather it is conceptualized as exclusionary practices “in which resistant 
elements to a secure identity on the “inside” are linked through a discourse of “danger” 
with threats identified and located on the “outside””11. In this analysis ‘foreign’ policy 
refers to a series of political practices through which external and internal ‘others’, 
                                                 
9 Diez, Thomas, “The Imposition of Governance: Transforming Foreign Policy Through EU 
Enlargement”, COPRI 2000, IIS Working Papers, accessible at 
http://www.copri.dk/publications/workingpapers.htm., p. 6.  
10 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity, p. 51. 
11 Ibid., p. 68. 
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endangering the pre-supposed identicalness between the state and the society, are 
specified and declared by the state apparatus. Thus, the specific rhetoric used by the 
state elite to define the threats and dangers with which the domestic society is faced is 
integral part of foreign policy articulations as a constitutive element in state identity 
construction. Conceptualized in this way, ‘foreign’ policy constitutes one part of 
governance “as a structure that governs the behaviors of those embedded in it in the 
socio-political realm”12. Thereby ‘foreign’ political initiatives of the state apparatus and 
the modes in which they are represented in domestic politics are inherent to the 
reproduction of both state identity and domestic order.  
State society relations constitute the fundamental sphere in which the unique 
characteristics of the domestic political life and order are shaped and reshaped through 
interactions between the state and the national ‘social formation’ in which it is 
embedded. In this sense, critical IR scholarship draws our attention to the 
functionalization of foreign political issues in regulating and reinscribing this vital space 
in the manner that power holders desire in a given polity. The classical paradigms 
conceptualize those relations as relations between a completed agent (the state) and its 
social/national formation13 occurring within a definitely bounded political space. 
Whereas in the post-structuralist IR theory state society relations correspond to a 
structure continually transforming and discursively and performatively reconfigured 
through disciplinary mechanisms. 
This analytical framework gains profound importance in critically assessing 
Turkey’s Cyprus policy and the discourse, which conceives the dispute as a source of 
imminent/existential threat and as ‘the national cause’ of Turkishhood. The analytical 
tools and insights presented by the dissident post-structuralist literature provide this 
                                                 
12 Diez, Thomas, “The Imposition of Governance”, p. 6.  
13 Alford, Robert R., “Paradigms of Relations Between State and Society”, in The State Critical Concepts 
Volume I, John A. Hall (ed.), (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 63-76.   
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dissertation with the prospect of re-examining the official discourse concerning the 
Cyprus issue. A re-examination by placing special semphasis on the implications and 
manifestations of this discursive totality in the maintenance of state identity and state 
society relations in Turkish political landscape. 
  
1.3. The Aimed Contributions and Originality of the Dissertation 
The conventional Turkish foreign policy writing, the state and security-centricist 
essence of which is indubitable, analyzes foreign policy with respect to the rational 
choices and external initiatives of the Turkish state towards others in international 
politics. In this literature the analyses on Turkey’s foreign policy issues are generally 
limited with a mere chronological account and description of events.14 Among other 
weaknesses of the mainstream scholarship on Turkish foreign policy is its failure to 
conceptualize the intertwined nature of internal and external political processes, 
discourses and representations and the significance of this intertwinedness in system 
reproduction. In this sense, the conventional literature on the Cyprus question has never 
seemed to be enthusiastic enough to pose the critical question of ‘what could be the role 
and functions of the Cyprus issue in the reproduction of the inner political balances in 
Turkish political landscape?’ The literature, in turn, has not deemed it necessary to 
problematize the fundamental premises of the official and mainstream discourses on 
Cyprus by contextualizing them in internal power relations.  
Instead of critically assessing the modes in which the Cyprus issue is articulated 
and represented by the political and bureaucratic establishment, it adopts the official 
state line particularly if such a ‘national cause’ is at stake. It is prone to accept the 
                                                 
14 These characteristics of conventional IR scholarship in Turkey can easily be observed in the edited 
volumes aiming to include all the crucial issues of Turkish foreign policy. For instance see: Bal, İdris, 
Yirminci Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası, (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2001), Gönlübol, Mehmet, 
Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), Oran, Baskın, Türk Dış 
Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Volume 1-2, (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınları, 2001), Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994).  
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official Cyprus discourse, in a priori fashion, as reflecting objective and unquestionable 
realities. The author of this thesis work is of the opinion that the mainstream scholarship 
on Cyprus has not only replicated the basic tenets of the official discourse in ‘academic’ 
sense but also has substantially contributed to its reproduction as the hegemonic Cyprus 
discourse in Turkish domestic politics.  
Therefore despite an increasing body of contemporary literature on the question, 
there still exists an urgent need for a brand new approach critically examining Turkey’s 
official Cyprus discourse from the viewpoint of power/domination relations in Turkey. 
That ‘foreign’ policy is deemed not only as external initiatives of the state towards 
others but as a socio-political practice and part of governmental structure will open up a 
new prospect for a much more comprehensive and inclusive analysis on our issue of 
Cyprus. This dissertation taking into account all the restrictions and weaknesses of the 
mainstream scholarship mentioned below proposes a new conceptual/analytical 
framework and research agenda facilitating the reexamination of official and popular 
Cyprus discourses in Turkey. This reexamination assuming a dialogical interplay 
between internal and external political processes is bound to focus on the impacts and 
implications of the Cyprus question on the relations between ‘the ruling’ and ‘the ruled’ 
in the country.  
In this context, I do propose that the official and mainstream understandings 
coding and fixing the Cyprus dispute primarily as an issue of state’s security and ‘a 
national cause’ around which the unity and cohesion of Turkish society should 
necessarily be guaranteed has a two-fold function: first, they ensure the continual 
reorganization of Turkish political life in full conformity with the priorities and policy 
objectives articulated by the state elite. This grants them the power and capacity of 
inscribing the boundaries of the political space and disciplining the political 
imagination. Second, they ensure the maintenance of the state society relations in its 
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conventional and hierarchical terms in such a way as to reproduce the former’s 
supremacy over and independence from the latter. This dissertation which aims at 
introducing a power perspective to the problematic, perceives the Cyprus issue not 
solely as a foreign policy problem but a domestic issue through which internal political 
balances are reconstructed. It is in here that its contribution to the studying of both the 
state society relations and the state identity in Turkey lies. This is where the uniqueness 
and originality of the study can be found.     
This study is not an attempt to simply renarrate the relatively recent history of 
the Cyprus dispute as has been the general tendency among Turkish and Greek scholars 
through specifying such benchmarks as the conquest of Cyprus by the Ottoman, the 
foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, the 1974 interventions, and the involvement of 
the EU in the conflict. Thus, this dissertation is not problem-driven but rather interested 
in exploring the Cyprus issue from a number of theoretical angles by particularly 
drawing on discourse analysis. The general tendency in the literature is to inscribe the 
criteria of a viable solution to this prolonged conflict by proposing conditionalities 
prioritizing the objectives and considerations of the Turkish ‘side’. However, this study 
is not inspired by such a problem-solving approach. Yet it is intended for presenting a 
discursive map of the official and mainstream academic narratives on Cyprus drawn up 
within a process of more than last five decades.   
The study further seeks to draw attention to the role and significance of external 
dynamics in the sustenance of Turkish political modernity as a state-oriented process. 
Of the basic hypotheses put forward in this dissertation is that the conventional and 
mainstream IR scholarship in Turkey replicates and diversifies the basic tenets of the 
statist outlook in ‘academic’ sense as regards Turkey’s foreign policy issues. On the 
other side, the literature on Turkish modernization lacks attention to the foreign political 
sources and dynamics of Turkish economic and political modernity emerging and 
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developing as a state-sponsored and state-based project. In the same vein, it is also 
inclined to exclude the outer dynamics from its analyses on the nature of the relations 
between ‘the ruling’ and ‘the ruled’ in Turkey, the evolution of which is deeply 
embedded in that of Turkish modernity. The paradigms belonging to this literature, 
therefore, do not attach due importance to the role and impact of Turkish state’s foreign 
policy initiatives and discourses in the reproduction of the state-centric character of 
Turkish politics and modernization. This dissertation associating Turkey’s official 
Cyprus discourse with the maintenance of the monolithic and statist structure of Turkish 
modernization is of great merit and significance in this sense.       
 
1.4. Methodology 
Should we restate Sanjoy Banerjee’s argument, even though it is not possible to 
associate every discourse with “a corresponding practice, every practice has a 
corresponding discourse.”15 This study, benefiting from the method of discourse 
analysis, intends to decode the main tracks of the discursive map of the official and 
mainstream approaches to the Cyprus question surviving since the beginning of 1950s 
up to the present time. In attaining this goal, the study will particularly focus on specific 
historical stints where the Turkish public opinion was mostly preoccupied with the 
Cyprus problem such as the second half of 1950s as the years when the Cyprus issue 
was declared as a ‘national cause’, the mid-1970s, namely the years of Turkey’s 
military intervention and international/intercommunal attempts toward solution and the 
early years of the new millennium in which foreign policy has appeared as the main 
dynamic underlying the reconstruction of socio-political structure in Turkey particularly 
through the Cyprus question and Turkey’s full membership in the European Union.  
                                                 
15 Banerjee, Sanjoy, “The Cultural Logic of National Identity Formation Contending Discourses in Late 
Colonial India” in Culture & Foreign Policy, Valerie Hudson (ed.), (Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner 
Publishers, 1997), p. 31. Cited in Eylem Yılmaz, The Role of Foreign Policy Discourse in the 
Construction of Turkey's Western Identity During the Cold War, p. 5.    
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The dissertation does not limit discourse analysis solely with official 
declarations and other written and oral statements of political figures and party leaders. 
A wide range of resources such as academic and non-academic books and materials, 
journals and magazines, memoirs, leaflets, brochures published by various associations 
and student unions, posters and internet web sites have been scanned and utilized 
throughout the dissertation16. Various oral and written statements of Rauf Denktaş, the 
President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), throughout the long 
history of the Cyprus dispute have also been included in the analytical scope of the 
study. For, his approach and rhetoric as regards the Cyprus question, which are 
constantly disseminated by Turkish media in a way as to deeply influence the public 
debate, is in full conformity with those of the Turkish bureaucratic and foreign policy 
establishment. “The policy that I have been pursuing is designated together with 
Turkey, found its expression in joint declarations signed by the Presidents of the two 
states and is approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the National 
Security Council.”17 What is more, some specific themes broadly articulated by Turkish 
civilian and military state elite within the context of the question such as Turkey’s 
geopolitical rights over Cyprus, its security concerns and vital interests in the Eastern 
Mediterranean have always occupied a central position in Denktaş’s speeches and 
formal declarations.  
 
1.5. A Brief Outline of the Dissertation 
This study is divided into eight chapters. The introductory chapter is allocated to 
concisely explain the major problematic, the aimed contributions, originalities, the 
methodology and the content of this dissertation.  
                                                 
16 It should immediately be stated that unless the name of the translator is mentioned, the translations 
made from Turkish sources are mine.   
17 Denktaş, Rauf R., “Türkiye’nin Hakları Önde”, Radikal 8 November 2003 (the translation belongs to 
Esra Kaliber).  
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The central task of the second chapter is to discuss and problematize how state 
identity, foreign policy and state society relations are theorized within the neo-realist 
paradigm of International Relations and in neo-Weberian historical sociology as its 
critique. With regard to neo-realism, the chapter suggests that this mainstream discourse 
of IR discipline, due to its state-centricist and monolithic essence, fails to conceive and 
theorize both the precise nature, historicities, and specifities of the nation state and its 
complex relations with other states, international organizations and the domestic society 
in the age of global politics. As for the neo-Weberian historical sociology, the chapter 
reaches the conclusion that notwithstanding its success in incorporating into the 
analytical enterprise internal specifities, historicities and unique characteristics of the 
state and implications of those in its international behaviors, the neo-Weberian attempt 
disregards the role and significance of ideological forms, discursive and representative 
practices of the nation state in the constitution and maintenance of the domestic order 
and its identity.   
The third chapter deals with the poststructuralist account of IR theory trying to 
develop a new politics of epistemology which is neither essentialist nor foundationalist. 
This dissident literature aiming to decode the vital relationality between material 
existence of objects and their discursive and representative construction radically 
differentiates itself from the critical or mainstream modern approaches in its theoretical 
inquiry. I do propose in this chapter that the attempt of poststructuralism to 
reconceptualize state and foreign policy could create novel opportunities in examining 
foreign policy articulations of the state and its impact on the constitution and 
maintenance of the domestic regime within a given polity. In the chapter I will also try 
to remind the securitization/desecuritization debate with the prospect that reexamining 
Turkey’s official Cyprus policy and the corresponding discourse with the insights 
 15 
provided by this debate will yield new opportunities to reflect on its implications on the 
state society relations in Turkey. 
     The burden of the fourth chapter will be to scrutinize three main paradigms 
problematizing Turkish modernity- namely, sociological, bureaucratic and state centric 
and political economy based understandings. These paradigms, which have made 
substantial contributions in understanding and explaining Turkish modernity, will be 
delineated by giving primacy to their analyses as regards Turkish state identity and its 
relations with the domestic society. This chapter mainly suggests that even though all 
these paradigms employ different conceptual tools and analytical frameworks, they have 
a tendency of explaining the development of Turkish modernity and the evolution of 
relations between ‘the ruling’ and ‘the ruled’ by recognizing an unconditional primacy 
and supremacy to internal dynamics. By assuming domestic and foreign policies as 
entirely distinct structures they do not adequately address the foreign political 
initiatives, discourses and representations of the state while analyzing the core 
characteristics of Turkish modernization and politics.            
The objective of the fifth chapter can be said to shed some light on the historical 
background within which the Cyprus issue has turned out to be a multi-partite 
international question. However, it does not offer a mere historical account of this 
prolonged conflict. It intends to explicate how specific events and phenomena are 
historicized and narrativized by the authors favoring Turkish official and mainstream 
argumentation on Cyprus. Even if limited, this chapter aims at contributing to the 
analytical agenda of the dissertation by laying special emphasis on the continuities 
within this discursive positioning. 
The sixth chapter is dedicated to examining the Turkish official discursive 
economy approaching the Cyprus issue from a state-centric security perspective. In this 
respect I will first reveal various ways of securitizing the issue at stake within its official 
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representation by drawing on formal and informal statements and/or other sources 
extracted from different historical epochs of the Cyprus dispute.  With reference to Neo-
Weberian historical sociology the chapter will also assess the centrality assigned to the 
geopolitical and geo-strategic position of the island of Cyprus within security-based 
official and mainstream approaches.  
  The seventh chapter intends to explore the ways in which the Cyprus issue was 
functionalized in the reproduction of the domestic/national identity, national cohesion 
and unity by the bureaucratic and political establishment in Turkey. The chapter will 
primarily try to illuminate the historical context in which the Cyprus question has been 
adopted as ‘the cause of Turkish nation’ around which maintenance of the national unity 
is necessarily required. It will secondly deal with the problematic of ‘the other’ with 
respect to the official and mainstream rhetoric relating to the Cyprus dispute. In this 
sense, the study aims at revealing how and in what ways these rhetorics have been 
instrumental in specifying and declaring communism, communists, Greece and the 
Greek minority in Turkey as the ‘inimical other’ of the Turkish nation. In this context, 
the declaration of the Cyprus issue as a ‘national cause’, anti-Greek riots of 6-7 
September 1955, the expulsion of Greek minority in the years of 1964-65, and the anti-
communist struggle of the 1950s and 1960s will be put under scrutiny. 
In the concluding chapter it will first be concisely addressed what kinds of roles 
and functions were ascribed to the sphere of ‘foreign’ policy in order to reinscribe the 
boundaries of ‘the political’ in Turkish post-1980 security regime. In this part of the 
dissertation, it will also be proposed that the Turkish mainstream scholarship on the 
Cyprus question has more often than not contented itself with replicating the official 
state line rather than problematizing it. However the chapter arrives at the conclusion 
that in the new millennium the debates on ‘foreign’ policy matters have a potential to 
reintegrate the Turkish society into the political sphere as a real political subject. Hence 
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any attempt to desecuritize the Cyprus issue in such a way as to integrate it into the 
political processes will substantially contribute to the democratic transformation of the 
state society relations in Turkey. 
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                                             CHAPTER II 
THEORIZING THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
AND ITS CRITIQUES 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The debates revolving around the state and its conceptualizations have occupied 
a substantial place within the discipline of International Relations (IR) particularly since 
the 1970s. In fact, as Migdal stated “over the course of twentieth century” various social 
scientists “from Weber (1964) and Gramsci (1971) to Almond and Verba (1963) and 
Skocpol (1979)”1 have concentrated on interrogation of both the formation of the state 
and its position relative to non-state actors within internal and international politics. 
Nettl’s article entitled ‘State As A Conceptual Variable’2 published in 1968 has also 
made remarkable contributions to the revitalization of theoretical interest in these 
debates. This article taking for granted the state as a foundational category of meaning 
was aiming to develop a state-based approach in social sciences in an attempt to analyze 
social facts and realities. On the other side, numerous historical sociologists such as 
Theda Skocpol, Anthony Giddens, and Michael Mann have initiated another theoretical 
enterprise with the aim of recalling the state back to the analytical plane. Their primary 
concern was to reconstruct the central status of the state vis-à-vis the neo-realist 
paradigm restricting its international agential capacity with the structural conditions of 
the ‘anarchic’ inter-state system.  
The emergence and development of the recent critical discourses, (i.e. feminism, 
poststructuralism, and post-colonialism) have stirred up debates regarding the state 
                                                 
 
1 Migdal, Joel S.,  “Studying The State”, in Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, (eds.), 
Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997). 
2 Nettl, J. P., “State As A Conceptual Variable”, World Politics, 20,4 (1968), pp. 559-92. 
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within the IR discipline. The growth of the critical literature has led to the 
problematization of the state, its nature, its source of legitimacy, its ontological and 
epistemological status, the stability of its identity, and so forth. As such, the way in 
which the state has been conceptualized has appeared as a litmus test distinguishing 
conventional and critical understandings within the international political theory. It 
could be claimed that examining the state conceptualizations of these theoretical 
positions by considering the differentiations among them would elucidate their general 
analytical and methodological attitudes. For, such an attempt would make possible 
raising of three crucially important questions on the nature of those theories. These are:  
(1) whether they are essentialist, privileging one category of meaning in analyzing the 
social relations and their reproduction3; (2) whether they are foundationalist, assigning 
an ontological and epistemological priority and validity to certain pregiven facts without 
making them the objects of theoretical enquiry, (3) whether they are reductionist 
attributing one variable or a group of variables an absolute determinacy capacity over 
and independence from the others. It should be added that a thorough conceptualization 
and comprehension of international relations and foreign policy processes necessitate an 
adequate theoretical and historical account of the state.4 Such a necessity would 
naturally encourage one to search for more closely how and to what extent the state is 
incorporated into the International Relations theory.  
In this context, the main purpose of this chapter could be described as to 
examine how the state, its core characteristics and agential capacities in both internal 
and external political domains are approached and theorized within the neo-realist 
paradigm of International Relations and in neo-Weberian historical sociology as its 
critique. This theoretical chapter shall delineate these positivist mainstream and critical 
                                                 
3 Keyman, Fuat E., Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of 
International Relations, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997). 
4 Ibid., p. 55. 
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IR discourses in three different analytical planes: These could be cited as (1) ontological 
and epistemological level, (2) degree of international agential capacity assigned to the 
state and the conceptualization of foreign policy, and (3) degree of international 
autonomy attributed to the state in domestic politics and its relations with the society.  
In this respect, the first part of this chapter will be dedicated to how the state, 
foreign policy, and the sphere of state society relations are conceptualized in the neo-
realist school of International Relations. This section begins by drawing attention to the 
very paradox that even though neo-realist paradigm essentially treats the state as the 
central and primary category of meaning, the fundamental unit of analysis and as the 
key actor of international politics, it does not need to raise theoretical questions about 
the precise nature and basic characteristics of the state. This conventional approach 
conceives foreign policy as purely state-centric and security-focused phenomenon and 
naturalizes the configuration of state society relations in accordance with the state’s 
institutional priorities, objectives and security understanding. This section reaches the 
conclusion that the state-centricist and hence essentialist and monolithic nature of neo-
realism suffices to conceive and theorize neither historicities, and specifities of the 
nation state nor its complex relations both with other states, international organizations 
and the domestic society in the age of global politics. 
The second part of the chapter will be allocated to the neo-Weberian historical 
sociology the main task of which is to reintroduce the category of agency with the 
purpose of ‘bringing the state back in’ the analytical domain. The first and second wave 
historical sociology and their reflections on IR theory will be discussed and 
problematized without overlooking their strengths and limitations. This section arrives 
at the conclusion that the neo-Weberian attempt is successful in incorporating in the 
analytical enterprise internal specifities, historicities and unique characteristics of the 
state and the role and implications of those in its international behaviors. Yet it can still 
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be spoken of a substantial theoretical hole; that is the role and significance of 
ideological forms, discursive and representative practices of the nation state in the 
constitution and maintenance of the domestic order and its identity.  
 
2.2. Conceptualization of the State in the Realist Paradigm 
 
2.2.1. Ontological and Epistemological Level 
A myriad of critical studies set out their analyses on the conceptualization of the 
state within the realist and the neo-realist paradigms by always pointing out to this very 
paradox: even though within the traditional international political theory, the state is 
assigned a centrality and primacy as a category of meaning, it has a tendency toward 
denying and rejecting the possibility of theorizing the state. Although the state is 
accepted as the fundamental unit of analysis by the realist discourses, its historicity and 
specifities are not taken into account. It will be possible to speak of some other 
manifestations of this paradoxical attitude whilst explicating the realist 
conceptualization of the state in a more detailed manner in the ensuing pages. It will be 
observed that this paradox, in fact, does not conflict with the reductionist and 
essentialist nature of the realist tradition. On the contrary, it is the cause and product of 
this tradition.  
Epistemologically and methodologically speaking, the state represents the point 
of departure in the analyses of the realist paradigm on international politics. Thus the 
state, of which the pregiven nature is not questioned, occupies the status of being the 
basic unit of analysis. This analytical posture of realism that was more evident 
throughout the Cold War years spontaneously renders the state “as the key to 
comprehending the operation of the international system, its structure and its 
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fundamental characteristics.”5 If Waltzian neo-realism is left aside, to a certain extent, it 
would be more apparent that we face with a theoretical context where all the other units 
of analysis are downgraded and subjugated vis-à-vis the state. So, the endeavor of 
understanding, and the act of producing knowledge on the sub-national, national, and 
international facts and phenomena, from the very outset, begin and remain under the 
shadow of a reductionist and exclusionary methodology. As Richard Ashley argued, in 
realist paradigm “the state is viewed as the ‘essential actor’ whose interests, power, 
decisions, practices, interactions with other states define and exhaust the scope and 
content of international politics as an autonomous sphere... There is no political life 
absent of state, prior to state or independent from state.”6 In this theoretical construct, 
the existence and maintenance of international politics are assumed as totally dependent 
on the presence of nation states since the content and boundaries of the international 
politics are conditioned and sustained by the interactions among them. In this respect, 
the primary concern of the international political theory is fixed as the analysis of 
behaviors of states toward others struggling for national interests (maximization of 
national power) within an anarchic environment. In this epistemology, such issues as 
national interests, security concerns, and institutional priorities of the states are also 
treated as pregiven facts and objective conditions imposed by international anarchy. 
Such givenness, and thereby unquestionability serve to consolidate and normalize the 
idea that internal and international political processes are shaped and reshaped by states’ 
own interests, needs and priorities.  
The ramifications of the realist epistemology are also bound to be observed in 
understanding and explaining internal politics. The production and reproduction of the 
domestic political structure is conceptualized in accordance with the pregiven 
institutional identity of the state. To sum up, in the realist epistemology, the nation state 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 56. 
6 Ashley, Richard K., “Three Modes of Economism”, International Studies Quarterly, 27 (1983), p. 470. 
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is accorded a status of givenness and being the only privileged unit of analysis. At the 
ontological level, the privileged status of the state as the unitary rational actor within 
political history is reproduced by the realist paradigm within a linear interpretation of 
history where the nation state refers to the highest degree of political 
institutionalization. What is more, the natural evolution and progress of humankind and 
politics have inevitably necessitated the emergence and development of the nation state 
and the inter-state system constituted and determined by interactions among these 
absolutely sovereign subjects. This inevitability and naturalness assigned to the nation 
state as the final and perfect stage of a given evolutionary process, from the very outset, 
precludes it from being rendered object of any theoretical enquiry. As Rob Walker 
reminds us “although the state has long been the central category of international 
political theory, its precise nature remained rather enigmatic.”7  For this reason, one 
might witness a representative and discursive essentialism, where the theorization of the 
nature of the nation state and the sources of its autonomy from the domestic society are 
rejected in a priori manner.  
It is rather conceptualized as an ontologically pre-given entity and an 
uninterrogated totality. As Keyman clearly puts it “in this context, the state does not 
need to be theorized, because it speaks for itself – just as the facts do in positivism. 
Thus, the state is taken for granted, no theoretical question is raised about its precise 
nature, as well as about the basic characteristics of the social formation in which it is 
embedded.”8 In such an ontological attitude the states, of which interests, and objectives 
are pre-determined and defined, are conceptualized as rational actors taking the most 
appropriate decisions. They are also viewed as unitary subjects having acquired the 
necessary consensus for implementing those decisions. In that theoretical fiction, states 
                                                 
7 Walker, R.J.B., “The Territorial State and The Theme of Gulliver”, International Journal, 39 (1986), 
pp. 531-532. 
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that have similar interests and objectives are conceptualized as homogenous units 
“operating within a determinist mechanical system”9 like the billiard-balls or black-box. 
Therefore in realist discourse, like the nation states themselves their specifities, unique 
differences, and historicities are not made object of any theoretical and critical enquiry. 
The significance of these specifities and differences in evaluating internal and 
international political processes are denied and/or glossed over by the conventional 
systemic and non-systemic IR theory. This, in turn, results in attributing a coherent, 
frozen, and pre-given identity to the state. As Keyman correctly argued in this formula 
the state remains as a decision-making subject, “an external object, untheorized fact and 
ahistorical entity.”10 Therefore what we come across is a theoretical framework claming 
its state-centeredness, where the state itself is excluded from the analytical plane. 
From the ontological point of view, it can be argued with some degree of 
accuracy that like other positivism-rooted theories of social sciences, the realist tradition 
is prone to universalize the nation state, which is, in effect, unique to the historical 
development of Western societies and the political institutionalization inherent to 
Western modernity. Following this logic, the nation state is taken for granted as the sole 
natural and objective form of the political institutionalization, which is, beyond all 
doubt, prevalent for all societies. This claim to objectivity grounded on the given 
characteristics, in itself, represents an analytical enterprise based on a subjective and 
exclusionary ontology which legitimizes and privileges certain ways of understanding 
and explaining at the expense of others. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Walker, R.J.B., “The Territorial State, The Theme of Gulliver”, p. 531-32. 
10 Keyman, Fuat E., Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of 
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2.2.2. Conduct of Foreign Policy and the International Agential Capacity of the 
State 
To begin with, it would be elucidating to our purpose to remind a well-known 
fact. The spheres of internal and international politics (as the spheres of hierarchy and 
anarchy respectively) are totally isolated and differentiated from one another within the 
realist paradigm by using simplification as a method of clarification. For instance, 
“Waltz insists that the empirical complexity or reality must be simplified and reduced 
down to one key factor.”11 Conceptualization of domestic and international politics as 
spaces having absolute boundaries makes operational a reductionist discourse premised 
on given binary oppositions. This is the point where McKinley and Little’s 
contributions appear to be more relevant. “The analytical tools of domestic politics are 
deemed by realists to be neither appropriate nor desirable for international 
phenomena.”12 As it could be apparently seen the essential difference and 
uncompromising separation constructed between domestic and international political 
structures begin in tandem with the process where the analytical investigations and the 
efforts of producing knowledge regarding those domains are initiated. As Hoffman puts 
it, the absolute division between internal and international politics is regarded as “the 
starting point of any valid theory of international relations.”13  
The state of nature among men is a monstrous impossibility ... governments 
establish the conditions for peace (and are) at the same time the precondition of 
society. The state of nature that continues to prevail among states often produces 
monstrous behavior but so for has not made life itself impossible.14  
 
However, the theorization of domestic and foreign politics within the framework 
of binary oppositions could not only be expounded with the reductionist and 
                                                 
11 Hobson, John M., The State and International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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simplificationist tendencies of the conventional international political theory. For, the 
primary function of this conceptualization is to mask the given status ascribed to the 
state as the only autonomous subject within internal and the sole decision maker in the 
external political processes. The realist paradigm, in turn, ventures to conceal reciprocal 
relationality between the hierarchic domestic and anarchic international politics, which 
ensures their reproduction. As much as the reproduction of ‘the domestic’ and ‘the 
international’ continues, such division will also reproduce itself. 
So long as humanity has not achieved unification into a universal state, an 
essential difference will exist between internal politics and foreign politics. The 
former tends to reserve the monopoly of violence to those wielding legitimate 
authority, the latter accepts the plurality of centers of armed force.15  
 
Following this argumentation, the state as a sovereign and autonomous actor within the 
internal politics is the only power that could reconcile the conflicting groups or parties 
and could put an end to the state of nature within the domestic society. Drawing on 
Bartelson “internal sovereignty is legitimitized with reference to what is externalized at 
the moment of birth, without ever being abolished wholesale.”16  To presume that the 
only way of dealing with the external state of nature in which “the struggle for power is 
universal in time and space”17 is to acknowledge absolute sovereignty of state authority 
within a given territory: “In any case, whether departing from man’s sinful nature or the 
corruption of the social bond, the logic of sublimation moves in the same direction and 
creates the same difference and ethical hierarchy between the domestic and the 
international.”18 
In respect of this theoretical approach, foreign policy is conceptualized as 
external behaviors of the nation state toward others within the anarchic inter-state 
system. It is presupposed that the state’s survival within the state of nature inherent to 
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the nature of international politics is totally contingent on its power and authority to 
exhaust the state of nature in domestic politics. Therefore, the state’s claim both to full 
sovereignty within domestic politics and to be the sole decision-making subject within 
international politics are more or less guaranteed within an essentialist theoretical 
construct. “It can be argued in this respect that the equation of the state with the 
decision-making process constitutes the essence of the realist view of the state,”19 which 
is imbued with potential autonomy and independence from domestic society.  
Foreign policy initiatives of nation states as rational and unitary actors are 
conceptualized with reference to both the international agential capacity accorded to 
them and the structural conditions of the inter-state system. The degree of international 
agential capacity ascribed to the state by different theoretical positions conditions their 
ability to “determine policy or shape the international system free of international 
structural constraints.”20 Hobson, at the very beginning of his analysis, emphasizes the 
necessity of making distinction between Waltzian neo-realist conception of the state and 
that of the classical realists’. To him, there exist “two clearly differentiated realisms and 
two distinct theories of the state.”21 This difference does not emanate from their 
different epistemological and methodological stances but rather from the discrepant 
degree of international agential power that they attach to the state. At this point, Hobson 
criticizes the neo-realist theoretical posture for being parsimonious. Although it assigns 
the state high domestic agency (institutional autonomy from the society), neo-realism 
has the inclination of confining it within the constraints of international politics, since, 
in reality, the state is imbued with no international agency. To Hobson, “for neo-
realism, states are in effect ‘ passive bearers’ (Träger) of the international political 
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structure”22 whereas in classical realism, nation states as the political formations 
possessing varying domestic agential capacity, through different historical epochs all 
have “at all times (albeit to varying degrees) sufficient levels of international agential 
power to shape the inter-state system.”23 A similar difference and even contrast are 
brought into agenda by Richard Ashley between the ‘emancipatory realism’ and 
‘technical neo-realism’. Ashley argues that in latter theoretical position, states imbued 
with no international agential capacity have no choice other than technically adapting to 
the requirements of the international anarchic system.24   
 
2.2.2.1. Waltzian Neo-Realism and ‘Passive-Adaptive State’  
Waltz strives to conceptualize the state and its international agential capacity by 
constructing dualities demarcating the internal and international political domains from 
each other. In this theoretical construct, hierarchy as the ordering principle of domestic 
politics is produced and reproduced through authority exercises of the state deplete with 
full authority and sovereignty within a given territory. It is this hierarchy that makes 
likely cooperation, harmony, and thereby solidarity in between the units (i.e. the 
individuals). Division of labor, based on the specialization of the individual units so as 
to increase interdependency and reciprocal trust between the members of domestic 
society, could only be established and maintained, should the state of nature be 
overcome and the security problem be totally sorted out by the state authority. As 
opposed to this, anarchy as the ordering principle of inter-state system does not allow 
for the foundation and the sustenance of such cooperation and division of labor which 
would necessitate the specialization, functional differentiation, and thereby 
interdependence among the units (i.e. the nation states). For this reason, states are taken 
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for granted as homogenous and more importantly ‘like units’ responsible for the 
fulfillment of similar national objectives and interests.  
Thus while they differ greatly in terms of capability, functionally they are all 
alike – that is, they are all sovereign, having a centralised political system with a 
legitimate monopoly of violence and rule-making, and are not subject to a higher 
political authority either domestically or internationally.25  
 
As a consequence, their histories and specificities are not deemed worth theorizing by 
the realist and neo-realist approaches. In the absence of any higher coercive authority 
that could eliminate the state of nature, states are assumed as entities in the permanent 
need of ensuring their security and as residing in a competitive anarchic environment. It 
is this competitiveness and anarchy that lead the state forcibly to adapt to the “self-help” 
which is defined by Waltz as a system where “those who do not help themselves (i.e. 
adapt), or who do so less effectively than others will fail to prosper, will lay themselves 
open to dangers, will suffer.”26  
It can be deduced from all these clarifications that within the realistic discursive 
totality, the state of nature, “associated with occurrences of violence”27 by Waltz among 
the units of inter-state system, is frozen within an ahistoric theorization and is 
contemplated as a process persistently reproducing itself. It is presumed in a priori 
fashion that in the absence of a world state, similar to that of Hobbes’ Leviathan, “there 
is nothing to prevent the inter-state conflict from recurring”28. In this state of nature, 
taken for granted as a fact that already existed, there could not be any long-run 
interdependency and even cooperation among the states, which would inevitably make 
them vulnerable. 
At this juncture in order to explicable the nature of the state of nature, another 
analogy is coined by Waltz.  
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Just as the market emerges as a result of the spontaneous actors of individuals 
and firms (who do not seek order but only self-interested personal gain), so the 
international political structure emerges out of the spontaneous actions of self-
interested states pursuing their own selfish national interests. But, once formed, 
the international system constraints the actors (i.e. the states).29  
 
Following the footsteps of Bartelson, “within this logic, order grows out of disorder, 
harmony out of conflict.”30 Should we quote from Waltz, “order may prevail without an 
orderer; adjustments may be made without an adjuster; tasks may be allocated without 
an allocator.”31  
Although, at first glance, the state of nature, in which insecurity and anarchy are 
institutionalized, seems to be to the detriment of states, from theoretical point of view, it 
serves to the consolidation of their status of being the only legitimate decision-making 
subject in foreign policy matters. This theoretical fiction, named by Bartelson as “logic 
of sublimation”32 delegitimizes the active involvement of other non-state actors (i.e. 
different social groups) within the decision-making processes regarding foreign policy 
issues. The socializing effect of the individual anarchy forces states to be homogenous 
and ‘like units’ that have similar objectives and interests. If we return to our analogy, 
just as the structure of the market system, the structure of inter-state system is shaped 
and reshaped through the competition of selfish units (nation states) and with the 
‘invisible hand’ of anarchy. Therefore, such an anarchy, which is reproduced through 
the spontaneous actions of the competing states, once formed just as in the market 
system33, begins to determine and constrain the behaviors of the actors, namely the 
nation states. Hence, a theoretical enterprise comes into sight where anarchy is 
recognized as the primary independent variable in the analysis of foreign policy 
initiatives of the states. In effect, in such a theoretical framework, international agency 
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of the state is confined to the requirements of conditions imposed by the anarchic inter-
state system, although they have high domestic agential capacity.  
[So] for Waltz the international political structure selects out states according to 
whether their behavior conforms to anarchy (i.e. the requirement of military 
survival), rewarding those who conform with survival or even great power, and 
those who do not with decline, defeat or extinction.34  
 
It would not be wrong to claim that in Waltzian anarchy-centric reductionism, states are 
imbued with no international agential power that could contribute to the formation and 
reformation of international politics and/or to mitigate the constraining logic of anarchy. 
In such an argumentation, states’ success in pursuing their national goals of maximizing 
their power is assumed as totally dependent upon their adaptability to the circumstances 
imposed by international politics. Within the realist discourse, the states’ success is also 
associated with its ability to emulate the hegemonic power. That the state is not viewed 
as an independent variable and agent which has a saying in the structuring and 
restructuring of the international political system is, in fact, another tenet underlying 
Waltzian argument that we do not actually need a theory of the state. If we are to speak 
of the international in which all the relations that constitute and reconstitute it are given, 
and if we are to speak of the nation state, of which interests, objectives, characteristics, 
and identity are also pre-determined, Waltzian rejection of any possibility and necessity 
of a theory of the state turns out to be easy to comprehend. According to neo-realism, 
another factor determining and constraining the foreign policy initiatives of nation states 
is the necessity to emulate the successful practices of the system’s leaders. In this 
respect, Waltz argues that “[a]s in economics, competitive systems are regulated by the 
‘rationality’ of the more successful competitors... Either their competitors emulate them 
or they fall by the wayside.”35 Accordingly, the states who do not imitate the leading or 
hegemonic states in order to minimize the relative power gap stemming from the 
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anarchical power differentiations are condemned to weaken and even perish eventually. 
Various IR scholars such as Ashley, Walker and Griffiths and as well as Hobson affirm 
that a distinction be made between the classical realism and its neo-realist version as to 
their conceptualization of the state. While the neo-realists, particularly Waltz, accuse the 
classical realist approach of being reductionist in the sense that it ventures to explicate 
the whole system through its parts, according to these authors the agential quality of the 
state is more clearly recognized within the classical realist statism.36 In the classical 
approach, the state is situated as an independent agential variable domestic changes of 
which have a more deterministic impact on the structuring and restructuring of 
international politics. Thus, in sharp contrast to neo-realism, it is accepted that changes 
in the natures of the units (i.e. a possible reduction of the state’s domestic agential 
power) directly lead to fundamental changes in the structure of international politics. 
More so, a strong corollary is established between the domestic and international 
agential capacity of the state, according to which a possible decline in the former would 
forcibly result in a decrease in the latter. Although this relationality, which would be 
addressed later in a more detailed manner, attributes more capacity and effectiveness to 
the state in order to resolute inter-state conflicts and to mitigate the logic of anarchy, 
anarchy still constitutes the basic character of international politics, by which the 
actions of the individual state are regulated. 
 
2.2.3. Domestic Agential Power of the State and Its Relations with the Society    
States are endowed with absolute domestic agential power and unproblematic 
institutional autonomy vis-à-vis non-state actors by almost all scholars pertaining to the 
realist school within the discipline of the IR. In this respect, state society relations are 
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comprehended as a sort of space where institutional priorities, needs, and objectives of 
the state are satisfactorily met and its autonomy from the rest of the society is 
constituted and maintained in such a way as to ensure its homogenous and unitary 
‘nature’ within the structure of inter-state system. Therefore, the way in which state 
society relations are analyzed serves to institutionalize the independence of the state as 
the only legitimate decision-making subject, within a potentially autonomous “political 
sphere characterized by the state action and state power”37, from the social formations 
to which it belongs. Many realists claim a direct relationality between the maintenance 
of the absolute internal sovereignty and the sustenance of the state’s international 
agential capacity. Within this logic, the absolute institutional autonomy provides states 
with high international agency, both to deal with the inter-state conflicts and to 
minimize the relative gaps stemming from the anarchic structure of international 
relations. To illustrate, to Morgenthau, the construction of balance of power that could 
overcome international anarchy “could best be achieved where state’s domestic agential 
power was high.”38 For him, the establishment of fundamental social norms which 
constitutes and maintains such balance of power operating across the international 
society is also closely related to the degree of domestic agential capacity of the states. 
These social norms could be materialized only through high domestic agential power 
ensured by the well insulation of the state apparatus from the rest of the society. For 
Gilpin, in turn, states that have low or moderate domestic institutional autonomy vis-à-
vis other social actors would inevitably face with difficulties or limitations in 
maintaining its interests and objectives in the international realm. “Thus, high domestic 
agency enables the state to better conform to inter-state competition under anarchy, and 
hence grow stronger; low domestic agency undermines the ability of the state to develop 
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its power base, leading to great power decline.”39 The consolidation of the state’s 
institutional autonomy and domestic agency are also of utmost significance for it to 
surpass a set of internal and external fetters that could jeopardize its relative positioning 
within the inter-state system. Following this logic,  
under conditions of low domestic agency, these non-political fetters undermine 
the state’s position in the system; under conditions of high domestic agency such 
fetters can be overcome, enabling the state to expand its power base. These 
fetters comprise technological diffusion, internal social fetters and high 
international military costs.40  
 
It should immediately be emphasized that the conventional international political theory 
needs to problematize neither domestic nor international capacities of the state by taking 
for granted the legitimacy of its sovereignty rights within a given territory and social 
context. For the realist analytical enterprises the givenness of sovereignty considered as 
a defining property of the state by many, prevents, from the outset, rendering state 
society relations object of theoretical enquiry. As such, those relations are 
operationalized as the processes of constructing and reconstructing the subjugation of 
the society to the state apparatus.  
In the realist discourse, another mechanism ensuring the absolute domestic 
agency of the state as a unitary actor both in the internal and external realms is to 
highlight the indivisibility of state sovereignty. According to this understanding, “two or 
more entities – persons, groups of persons or agencies – cannot be sovereign within the 
same time and space.”41 This necessary indivisibility of sovereignty is conceived as a 
legitimate instrument through which the unitary nature of state agency is reproduced 
within both internal and international politics.  
[I]n any state, democratic or otherwise, there must be a man or a group of men 
ultimately responsible for the exercise of political authority. Since in a 
democracy that responsibility lies dormant in normal times, barely visible 
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through the network of constitutional arrangements and legal rules, it is widely 
believed that it does not exist, and that supreme lawgiving and law-enforcing 
authority, which was formerly the responsibility of one man, the monarch, is 
now distributed among the different co-ordinate agencies of the government, and 
that, in consequence no one of them is supreme. Or else that authority is 
supposed to be rested in the people as a whole, who, of course, as such cannot 
act.42  
 
The indivisibility and unquestionability of the state’s sovereignty are achieved by 
transforming it to the collective will of the political community which is produced and 
reproduced through the society’s “organic unity by virtue of social cohesion and 
national loyalty.”43 At this juncture, the modern nation state’s sovereignty rights and 
interests are absolutely insulated from the interests and actions of the personalized 
sovereign.44 Due to this collectification/depersonalization of the state’s sovereignty “we 
are entitled to conceive of state as a ‘collective personality’ being capable of  ‘thought 
and choice’ ”45 on behalf of the whole society. 
 
2.3. Neo-Weberian Approach: Historical Sociology of The State 
It is a gainsaying that 1980s could be cited as interrogation years for the neo-
realist paradigm and its primacy status within the discipline of IR. During those years, 
numerous critical studies aiming at unearthing limitations, inadequacies and weaknesses 
of the neo-realist paradigm in analyzing both the national and international political 
structures and processes began to be published successively. Those criticisms coming 
from both the inside and outside of the international political theory successfully 
revealed the reductionist and essentialist ontology and epistemology of the realist 
tradition by deciphering and/or deconstructing its empiricist, positivist and ahistoric 
nature. Secondly, these dissident works have also achieved to pave the way for the 
incorporation of many critical theories of different social science disciplines into the IR 
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theory. In this regard, the critical works of scholars of comparative politics, political 
economists and historical sociologists have made substantial contributions to the 
overcoming of the theoretical lackings and impasses of the conventional understandings 
and discourses. 
The theoretical attempt coming from Neo-Weberian historical sociology, which 
strove to develop a state-centric model and to “elevate the concept of the state to the 
center of contemporary political discourse,”46 have a very distinctive place among them. 
The scholars such as Theda Skocpol, Micheal Mann, Anthony Giddens by indicating 
the undertheorized nature of the state within the neo-realist paradigm and also the 
reductionism of the society-centric approaches, i.e. Marxism, liberalism, have initiated a 
novel theoretical enterprise. Their central objective could be defined as to reintroduce 
“the category of ‘agency’, by which the state as an institutional agency is theorized 
through a historical analysis of interactions between structures and agencies.”47 More 
so, vis-à-vis the structural functionalism, and instrumentalism of the conventional 
approaches, the prior task of these historical sociologists was determined as ‘bringing 
the state back in.’ This neo-Weberian attempt, which Hobson divides into two as ‘the 
first’ and ‘second wave’ will be addressed below both in terms of its similarities and 
distinctions with the conventional international political theory.  
 
2.3.1. Ontological and Epistemological Level   
As emphasized by many scholars, (i.e. Ferguson and Mansbach, Halliday) the 
realist IR theory has reached an impasse regarding the theorizing of the state48 due to its 
ontological and epistemological limitations. Among these limitations that led to the 
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increase of the critical studies aiming to present an adequate account of the state are:  
a lack of a theory of the state and an exaggeration of ‘structure’ to the detriment 
of ‘agency’; an inability to theorize the integrated nature of global politics; given 
the assumption that there is fundamental separation or dichotomy between the 
international and national realms; a lack of a theory of international change; and 
a static, ahistorical approach.49  
 
By taking into account all these inadequacies and restrictions, the neo-Weberian 
historical sociology has striven to develop analytical means of a new theoretical 
framework incorporating the specificities and historicities of the state into the spheres of 
analytical inquiry. In this respect, such issues as origins of the state power, sources of its 
legitimate institutional autonomy, international dimension of state behaviors have been 
perceived as indispensable elements of theoretical investigations. 
In ontological and epistemological terms, the neo-Weberian historical sociology 
sets out its analysis by emphasizing institutional autonomy and agential capacity of the 
state having its own life and history which cannot be reduced to any other factor. For 
instance Giddens insistently highlights the fact that 
both capitalism and industrialism have decisively influenced the rise of nation 
states, but the nation state system cannot be reductively explained in terms of 
their existence. The modern world has been shaped through the intersection of 
capitalism, industrialism and the nation state system.50  
 
Such an approach does not deny the interactions between the rise of capitalism and 
nation state; however it denies the presumption that nation states are the products of 
capitalist development. Accordingly, Skocpol proposes that “[j]ust as the capitalist 
development has spurred transformation of states and the international state system, so 
have these ‘acted back’ upon the course of capital accumulation within nations and 
upon a world scale.”51 As evident from this quotation the neo-Weberian attempt places 
emphasis on the need to examine the emergence and rise of different entities, structures 
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or processes within the historical contexts unique to them. Besides, such an approach 
does not invite an epistemology in which these institutions and structures are made the 
object of theoretical inquiry as formations totally isolated and independent from one 
another. The reciprocal interrelatedness between the emergence and rise of those i.e. 
capitalism, industrialism, and modern nation state constitutes a very fertile research 
avenue for the epistemology which is that of historical sociology.  
This conception of history also calls for an epistemological stance which is not 
founded on uni-linear and reductionist inferences foregrounding one single factor but 
rather should be premised on the discontinuities and intertwinedness among different 
processes and other variables. This non-evolutionary interpretation of history rescues 
Giddens from the realist reductionism, where the rise of modern state is conceived as 
inevitable and natural end result of the progressing human civilization and urges him 
search for the sources upon which modern state bases its legitimate power. This fashion 
of conceptualizing history also allows Giddens to evaluate discontinuities, divergences 
and ruptures within modernization process.52 As it was stated before, the rejection of 
foregrounding one single factor in explicating socio-political changes is another feature 
of the historical sociology. “There are four institutional clusterings associated with 
modernity: heightened surveillance, capitalistic enterprise, industrial production and the 
consolidation of centralized control of the means of violence. None is wholly reducible 
to any of the others.”53  
In epistemological terms, another contribution of the neo-Weberian approach is 
to reintroduce the category of agency overlooked within the structuralist account of 
social theory as well as of the conventional IR theory (particularly in Waltzian neo-
realist systemic understanding). This epistemological posture aims at giving primacy to 
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the agency over the structure in analyzing the socio-political relations and change. It is 
this rediscovery of the state that provides the base for the neo-Weberian analysis to 
radically alter the structural deterministic theoretical positions. This it does by making 
the state an epistemological object that has to be studied in its own right. In this respect 
the basic questions with which the state-centric model deals could be stated as (1) under 
which historical circumstances the nation states emerged and gained their institutional 
autonomy so as to act independently as an agent both in domestic and international 
politics and (2) what the specifities of nation states are that make them influential in 
shaping and reshaping of history.  
In this sense, the state-centric model can be said to constitute an agency 
problematic, which aims to rescue social theory from its subordination to the 
structuralist and functionalist orthodoxies that have constituted the 
epistemological basis of the society-centric theories of the state.54  
 
This emphasis on the category of agency rescues, in turn, the IR theory from the neo-
realist reductionism premised on the system reproduction and the functionalist account 
of the state.  
However, the neo-Weberian state-centricism (particularly the first wave 
Weberian movement by Hobson’s terminology) involves a set of risks which pave the 
way for new reductionist and essentialist inclinations. First, the state-centric model 
aiming at recalling the concept of the state to the analytical plane has a privileged and 
inadequately problematized status in the analysis of the emergence and rise of the 
modern politics and society. Moreover, the possibility of reification of the state’s 
institutional capacities at the expense of other factors could be noted as a highly serious 
danger before the historical sociological theory. In line with Keyman’s argument it 
could be proposed that “the model and the agency problematic it develops, while 
escaping functionalism and arguing for the necessity to recognize the specifity of the 
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state, eventually constructs an institutionally essentialist theory of the state.”55 The 
historical sociological epistemology assigning causality and determinacy to the roles 
and functions of the state runs the risk of reproducing the reductionist inferences of the 
systemic understandings or society-centric theories of the state in another way. For 
instance,  
in the state-centric model, although it is suggested that changes in civil society 
cannot be explained without due reference to the state, changes in the state are 
accounted for without taking into account civil society. At the level of 
representation, this means that civil society is ‘represented by’ the state, but not 
vice versa.56 
  
However, the constitution and reproduction of any social system could not be 
reductively expressed only due to the institutional agential capacities of the state but 
rather by virtue of its relations with the social formation in which it is embedded. As 
Jessop correctly argued against the state-centric model,  
if modern society is not unitary nor a functional totality, then there can be no 
single center from which its reproduction is secured. Instead the very possibility 
of reproduction arises from the configuration or the condensation of political 
forces in a given time, and in that sense it is without guarantees and a priori 
determinants.57 
 
This theoretical presumption of the state-centric model giving primacy to the state in 
analyzing the reproduction of the modern society takes it for granted as a coherent self 
at the ontological level whereas it does not need to problematize, as is the case in the 
realist IR theory, the process in which the state identity was constituted and maintained 
through various discursive, representational and performative mechanisms. The neo-
Weberian historical sociology is also inclined to reduce political power only to the state 
power in such a way as to consolidate its privileged ontological status to the detriment 
of civil society. By doing this, it reproduces the conventional understanding of politics 
and civil society where the political struggle for power within domestic society was 
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reductively theorized only with reference to the political and economic phenomena. 
“However politics contains struggles over structures of meaning, as well as, over the 
process of construction of collective identities, both class and nonclass.”58 But the 
ideological and discursive aspects of these struggles and its impact on the state society 
relations are omitted by the state-centric model. It should be stated that this institutional 
autonomy and a coherent self accorded to the state in a priori fashion could be cited as 
the most important commonalities between the realist and the neo-Weberian school. 
Furthermore, the neo-Weberian interpretation of history, where the state is generally 
assumed as the principle point of reference, prevents it from constituting a radical 
challenge and critic to the realist paradigm adopting the similar modes of analysis in IR 
theory.  
Secondly, the question of the production and reproduction of state identity 
within the national social context to which the state belongs are not attached due 
importance by the scholars of historical sociology. As indispensable and even the very 
foundation of the statehood, the analysis of state identity and its discursive, 
representative and performative reproduction, and its significance within poweer 
relations are not also accepted as the object of an any critical examination and remained 
unproblematized. While the state-centric model recognizing the state absolute domestic 
agential capacity vis-à-vis other social groups it does not need to theorize the reciprocal 
relationality between the constitution and maintenance of state identity and state society 
relations. As a result, the model reproduces the reductionist and essentialist stance of the 
society-centric theories of the state. With respect to IR theory as numerous scholars 
have correctly argued the state-centric attempt could not fully achieve to go beyond the 
empiricist and positivist nature of the realist tradition and to exceed its limitations and 
                                                 
58 Keyman, Fuat E., Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of 
International Relations, p. 80. 
 42 
inadequacies.59                                                                                      
The main proposition central to the neo-Weberian state-centric model and its 
incorporation into the IR theory is the idea that any theoretical inquiry must begin with 
the recognition of state’s specifities within a historical context.  
A significant alteration in the conditions of human social existence comes about 
with the invention of ‘history’. From then on the circumstances of social 
reproduction are themselves reflexively monitored in an effort to influence the 
form institutions assume. I take this to be the main feature that separates 
organizations from other types of collectivity.60  
 
This persistent emphasis on the specificity and historicity of the state as an institutional 
agent aims to distinguish its historical evolution from that of other social and/or global 
structures, and processes such as industrialism and capitalism. According to Keyman, 
Skocpol, for instance, conceives the state “as an institution, a social actor, and a set of 
bureaucratic apparatuses. State policy and structure should not be derived from social 
structures, but should be considered in their internal specificity, which stems from their 
historical and spatial dimensions.”61 The emphasis on the spatiality of the state 
representing its territorial basis within Skocpol’s theory is of merit due to two reasons: 
first Weber’s famous definition of the state as an organization claiming to have a 
legitimate monopoly of power and coercion in a given territory is incorporated within 
her theoretical enterprise. Accordingly, Giddens determines the three elements of the 
state inscribed in Weber’s definition as below: “(1) the existence of a regularized 
administrative staff able (2) to sustain the claim to the legitimate monopoly of control of 
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the means of violence and (3) to uphold that monopoly within a given territorial area.”62 
However it should be stated that Giddens criticizes Weber as he attributed specific 
characteristics of the modern state to the all forms of state in such a way as to minimize 
the differences between the traditional and modern states63 at the ontological level. 
Secondly, the adoption of Weberian view, which conceives the state as a territorially 
bounded organization functioning within legally defined boundaries, provides for the 
historical sociological attempt the possibility of developing an analytical interest to the 
international dimension of state action. This analytical interest both establishes a 
strongest linkage between the historical sociology and the IR theory and also converges 
it with the realist paradigm. For, to propose that the geopolitical framework of the state 
which antedated the emergence and spread of capitalism provides the state with  the 
opportunity of acting as an independent agent is to explicitly accept, like realists, that 
states should be regarded as actors having both internal and external sovereignty.                                    
 
2.3.2. Conduct of Foreign Policy and the International Agential Power of the State 
Such scholars as Fred Halliday, Jarvis, Hobson, Hall, Hobden, Seabrooke 
venture to integrate the state theory of the Weberian historical sociology (WHS) into the 
IR theory in order to get a more adequate account of the state, and thereby international 
politics. Of the central aims of this theoretical enterprise is to problematize the absolute 
distinction prescribed in between the internal and international realms within the realist 
discourse by indicating the intimate relations between these two. In this regard, it is 
worth noting Skocpol’s analytical inferences seeking to trace the implications of the 
intertwinedness between the national social formations of the state and international 
dimensions of its actions.  
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In Skocpol’s conceptualization the state is represented as a fully sovereign 
administrative apparatus having a legitimate monopoly of power and coercion within a 
given territorial totality. By drawing on Max Weber, Skocpol claims that states function 
in relation to both their own territories and the boundaries with other states. For this 
reason, an adequate account of the state recognizing its specifities necessitates in-
tandem analysis of the internal and global conditions that state actions shape and are 
simultaneously shaped by them. To Skocpol,  
the state is fundamentally Janus-faced, with an intrinsically dual anchorage in 
class-divided socio-economic structures and an international system of states... 
the international system as a transnational structure of military competition was 
not originally created by capitalism. Throughout modern world history, it 
represents an analytically autonomous level of transnational reality- 
interdependent in its structure and dynamics with world capitalism, but not 
reducible to it.64  
 
In effect for Skocpol, the significance of the geopolitical circumstances (namely 
restrictions and/or opportunities) is not only limited to indicate the Janus-faced nature of 
the state. It is also functional in the definition of internal and international dimensions of 
the state agency. In line with Keyman it could be argued that for the neo-Weberian 
historical sociology  
the geopolitical framework of state action preexisted capitalism, and allowed the 
state to act as an independent actor. It is the territoriality of state action that 
makes the state operate outside and above civil society, that makes it clear that it 
preceded capitalist development, and that gives the state its own history.65  
 
Mann, in turn, emphasizes the unique place of geopolitics in theorizing state 
action by maintaining that  
[g]eopolitical organization is very different from the other power organizations 
mentioned so far. It is indeed normally ignored by sociological theory. But it is 
an essential part of social life and it is not reducible to the ‘internal’ power 
configurations of its component states.66 
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This persistent incorporation of geopolitics into the state theory is strategically 
important for historical sociology to reveal that the state is a nation state, which the 
society-centric models (i.e. liberalism and Marxism) have failed to comprehend. 
Another point overlooked by these society-centric approaches is the internality of the 
international relations “to the process of the very constitution of the modern state as 
nation state.”67 For this reason, the analysis of international dimension of the state 
action is treated as a kind of prerequisite for an adequate account of the structure of the 
state and its territoriality within the neo-Weberian approach. This is the point where the 
significance of Hintze’s analysis lies. According to him, there exist two crucially 
important factors determining “the real organization of the state. These are, first, the 
structure of social classes, and second, the external ordering of the states- their position 
relative to each other, and their over-all position in the world.”68  
However, Hobson adamantly criticizes Skocpol with reproducing the systemic 
reductionism of the neo-realist discourse as she privileges the logic of anarchy to the 
detriment of the state’s international agential capacity. With respect to this 
reductionism, he states that “as with Waltz and Gilpin Skocpol reduces the state to the 
international political system such that the state is discounted (albeit unwittingly) as 
analytical independent variable.”69 Furthermore for Hobson “like Gilpin and Waltz, 
Skocpol subscribes to a ‘passive-adaptive’ theory of the state, in which the state’s 
principle task is to adapt, or conform to the logic of the international political system 
and international military conflict between states.”70 Accordingly, military exigencies of 
international politics, which is conceptualized as anarchic as in the case of the realist 
tradition, constitute the global context where the state’s international agency is 
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constrained. By considering the very foundational place of the international anarchy, in 
Skocpol’s approach, Hobson even accuses her of “throwing or ‘kicking the state back 
out’, thereby stripping the state of international agential power”71 The preponderant 
position of international anarchy as an autonomous analytical category within 
Skocpolian theoretical territory could also be deduced from her statements below:  
[t]he international state system as a transnational structure of military 
competition was not originally created by capitalism. Throughout modern world 
history, it represents an analytically autonomous level of transnational reality- 
interdependent in its structure and dynamics with world capitalism, but not 
reducible to it.72  
 
Another conspicuous similarity between the systemic approach of neo-realism 
and Skocpol’s theoretical enterprise is observable with regard to the conceptualization 
of the domestic agency of the state as an intervening variable which enables or hinders 
their adaptability to the conditions of international politics. Within this theoretical 
construct, in which the international anarchy is presumed as the basic causal variable, 
the state’s adaptability and conformity to the military requirements of the inter-state 
system have been changing mainly owing to its varying domestic agential capacity. In 
this sense, high domestic agential power that could be defined as the ability of 
overcoming the domestic socio-economic fetters would result in high adaptability and 
conformity to the military exigencies of international politics. On the other hand, the 
insufficient institutional autonomy from the society would naturally bring 
maladaptibility, and thereby failure to conform to the logic of anarchy. To Skocpol, 
maladaptive states are not just punished through defeat in war but also social revolution 
in the internal politics.73 It could be argued that the international agency accorded to the 
state, in other words the conduct of foreign policy initiatives independently as an 
autonomous actor, in Skocpol’s approach is discussed due to its ability to conform to 
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anarchy. Thus, it is highly difficult to claim that she has succeeded to reintroduce the 
category of agency to the analytical domain but she has rather reproduced the 
structuralist account of the neo-realist paradigm “In essence, for neo-realists and 
particularly for first-wave WHS scholars, the state turns out to be little more than a 
transmission belt through which geopolitics reshapes and reconfigures state structures 
and state-society relations.”74 For this reason, exclusively the first-wave WHS leaving 
up its promise to go beyond the impasses of the conventional IR theories with respect to 
the conceptualization of the state represents for many a pathway back into neo-realist 
cul-de-sac.75  
To overcome these impasses, a new theoretical enterprise is initiated within 
historical sociology to go beyond the neo-realist conception of state. The major 
objective of this second-wave WHS is to fulfill the incomplete project in which the state 
is “genuinely ‘brought back in’ as a power source that cannot be reduced to any singular 
exogenous logic.”76 In this context, the simplificationist logic of the neo-realist 
paradigm, which singles out one key factor (namely the international anarchy) in 
explaining the state’s international agency is replaced by the second-wave WHS with 
‘multicausality’ considering the intertwindness among multiple variables as 
interdependent power sources. In the same vein, the third principle of the second-wave 
WHS cited as ‘multispatiality’ is dedicated to dissolve the primacy of the anarchic inter-
state system in analyzing the state’s foreign policy initiatives. Therefore, it is asserted 
that “the various spatial levels- sub-national, national, international, and global- all 
affect and structure each other, such that none are self-constituting but are embedded in 
each other.”77 
Thus the agent and the structure (the state and international politics) both of 
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which have partial autonomy, reciprocally shape and reshape each other. In such a 
theoretical construct, of which the primary goal is to resolve the agent structure 
dichotomy, all power actors are deemed interdependent and necessary for the existence 
of the other. States are conceptualized as the “agents which not only constitute other 
power actors and domestic and international structures, but are simultaneously 
constituted by them.”78 In this regard, Hobson proposes the replacement of “the state 
duality of ‘international anarchy’ and ‘sovereignty’” with “a ‘dynamic duo’”79 between 
these two.     
It is also contended that there exists a symbiotic relationship between the 
domestic and international agential capacities of nation states. Within this formula, the 
deeper the state’s embeddedness within the social formation to which it belongs, the 
higher governing capacity (domestic agency) it gains; the higher domestic agency the 
state has, the more its international agential capacity becomes. For instance Hobson, 
while developing his theoretical enterprise named as the ‘structurationist synthesis of 
the agent and structure’ emphasizes the importance of the state’s domestic specifities in 
explicating its foreign policy initiatives and the structural circumstances of the 
international political economy.80 Despite all these efforts embracing the internal 
specifities of the state and the global economic and political relations in analyzing the 
state’s foreign policy, there still exists a missing point referring to a substantial 
theoretical lacuna. This is the role and significance of the ideological forms and 
discursive practices of the nation states in the constitution and reproduction of the 
political order. It also fails to deal with the question of how foreign policy functions in 
the constitution of the state identity. For example, Skocpol, while defining geopolitics 
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as a sphere where the institutional autonomy of the state from domestic society is 
reproduced, she does not need to theorize the discursive and performative constitution 
of this autonomy. However one should not deny the success of this theoretical attempt 
in bringing to the analytical plane “the reciprocity between the nation state as the state 
of a modern-capitalist society and the constitution of international relations”81 which 
refers to a set of geopolitical, economic and social processes. The emphasis on the 
international dimension of state behavior also allows the neo-Weberian approach to 
incorporate the historicities and specifities of the state to the domain of critical inquiry 
and also to indicate the discontinuities, ruptures and divergences within this unique 
historical context. As a consequence, WHS “can be said to provide a reading of IR 
debates on the concept of the nation state as an institutional socio-spatial organization.”  
The state-centric model, on the other hand, should not overlook the fact that the 
international politics could not be reduced to inter-state relations as in the case of the 
realist paradigm. While the state is called back as the unit of analysis, it should not be 
reified and exaggerated at the expense of other agencies (international organizations) or 
structures (global socio-economic relations).  
 
2.3.3. Domestic Agential Power of the State and Its Relation with the Society   
It would not be an exaggeration to claim that for many neo-Weberain 
sociologists such as Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann, the ways in which the state 
society relations are framed and reframed and the sources of state power and its 
institutional autonomy constitute the most fertile research avenue. Even though the 
sources of state power are conceptualized in divergent ways, state society relations are 
often understood as a sphere where the institutionally differentiated nature of the 
modern state and its absolute insulation from the domestic society are constructed and 
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maintained. “It is this institutional separation from society which is thought by most 
Weberians to be the source of autonomous state power.”82 For Halliday the 
consideration of the conceptual differentiation between the state and society is required 
to save the state from being a ‘troublesome abstraction’. It is assumed that such an 
approach could also pave the way for new research avenues in which the vital 
relationality between the international dimension of state action and the process of 
configuration and reconfiguration of state’s institutional autonomy in domestic politics. 
By problematizing this vital relationality, Halliday questions  
why and how participation in the international realm strengthens or weakens 
states, why and under what circumstances it permits states to gain autonomy and 
act independently vis-à-vis the social formations they govern, and under what 
conditions states become less or more responsive to, and representative of their 
social formations precisely because of their international role.83  
 
Halliday introduces three crucially important conceptual distinctions to make the 
IR theory develop in such a way as to conceive and theorize the state structure and 
actions in a more accurate manner. The first distinction is drawn between the state 
representing an ensemble of coercive, administrative apparatuses and the society 
composed of various different political groups with varying political power, wealth and 
skills who wish to access to this administrative body. The second distinction could be 
observable in between the state and government and aims to deconstruct the 
conventional approaches in the IR theory treating them as identical entities. In this 
context, Halliday’s problematic strives to  
separate the ‘ensemble of administrative apparatuses’ from ‘the executive 
personnel formally in position of supreme control’ in order to refute the 
assumption that the state represents society as a whole, and also to show that in 
certain circumstances elements within the state may resist or actively oppose the 
policies of government.84 
  
                                                 
82 Hobson, John M., The State and International Relations, p. 201. 
83 Keyman, Fuat E., Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of 
International Relations, p. 64. 
84 Ibid., p.65. For a more comprehensive account of the issue, see Fred Halliday, “States and Society in 
International Relations”, Millennium 16 (1987): 215-36. 
 51 
By the third distinction, which is in between the state and nation, Halliday ventures to 
erode the so-called unproblematic unity assumed by the traditional international 
political discourse between these two. The fundamental questions which Halliday deals 
with are to what extent the national states could represent the nation and could 
constitute a national territorial totality. These questions are posed for the 
problematization of presupposed ethnic homogeneity and political representivity 
accorded to the state-society complexity by the conventional approaches. By drawing 
on Charles Tilly’s text on the emergence of nation state in Europe85, Halliday asserts 
that the origin of the modern state could be found in coercion and extraction “both 
against the populations subjected to states and against rivals.”86 He also attaches 
importance to the interrogation of ideological and organizational function of the state 
for the consolidation of its autonomy from the society. State’s strategies aiming at 
constituting national consciousness, national ideologies and national economics should 
also be investigated in an attempt to explicate “how states govern and administer their 
own populations and territories, impose control on societal relations, and produce 
effects in the constitution of those relations.”87  
As Keyman argues although the problematique and research avenue developed 
by Halliday provide useful insights to theorize the structure of the state and its relations 
with civil society, the two substantially important questions remain unanswered within 
his theoretical enterprise. First, Halliday’s problematic does not deal with the analysis 
of the relations of state and power which is integral to the formation of the state as an 
institutional administrative apparatus. The central characteristics of the process in which 
the modern society and modern politics were constituted could be cited as the second 
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matter which is not involved within Haliday’s state-centric model. The concept of 
power which is so central in theorizing domestic and international agential capacities of 
the state as a Janus-faced entity should absolutely be object of any critical inquiry. 
Thus, it could be claimed with some degree of accuracy that Michael Mann’s theoretical 
attempt including historical, spatial analysis of the concept of power yields proper 
means of problematizing the sources of state’s institutional autonomy by focusing on 
the concept of power. Mann’s understanding of power, which is not reductionist, not 
only provides him the opportunity of analyzing the state’s distinct identity but also 
rescues him from conceptualizing society as unitary and as an organic totality. For him,  
societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial 
networks of power as institutional  means of attaining human goals. These 
networks are defined as ideological, economic, military, and political power 
relations that constitute sociospatial and organizational means of social control 
of people, materials, and territories.88   
 
Mann, with the aim of problematizing the specific power of the state, begins his 
analysis by making distinction between its despotic and infrastructural powers. The 
former upon which the conventional state theories have focused refers to “the range of 
actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized 
negotiation with civil society groups.”89 However, it would not be wrong to state that 
the latter which is often omitted within these standard models is attributed more 
significance by the scholar to analyze the complexity of state society relations. The 
notion of the infrastructural power of the state allows Mann to evaluate the states 
embeddedness within the social context since it reveals “the capacity of the state to 
actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions 
throughout the realm.”90 Contrary to the conventional understandings giving primacy to 
the state’s despotic power, and handling state society relations through binary 
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oppositions and viewing them as entities within a zero-sum contest Mann establishes a 
corollary between the governing capacity of the state and its ability to be able to reach 
into society. In this formula the more infrastructural reach into society, the more 
effective and direct governmental capacity. In the same vein, in Mann’s state-centric 
model the state’s domestic agency is closely related with its embeddedness within its 
social formation.  
The author, on the other hand, indicates three important factors by which the 
state gains autonomy. These could be cited as the “necessity of the state”, “multiplicity” 
of its functions, and its “territorial centrality.”91  He argues that throughout history the 
constitution and maintenance of the complex and civilized societies are necessarily 
dependent on the existence of a central, binding and rule-making authority. The need for 
building an order and social cohesion in which the protection of life and property are 
insured requires the foundation and the sustenance of monopolistic organization. Due to 
this notion, Mann accepts the ‘necessity’ as the mother of the state power. Secondly, the 
‘multiplicity’ of the state’s functions consolidates its institutional autonomy as a both 
domestic and international actor. It is this ‘multiplicity’ which impels the state to get 
involved in an multiplicity of relations with the other collective actors (i.e. the domestic 
social groups, international organizations, other nation states). Mainly owing to this 
involvement the state obtains a maneuvering ability which, in turn, constitutes “the 
birthplace of state power.” Precisely due to two reasons Mann places emphasis on the 
significance of the territoriality of the state. 
On the one hand, it provides a theoretical basis for Mann to criticize the society-
centric understanding of the relative autonomy of the state vis-à-vis social 
classes and groups. On the other hand, it allows Mann to conceptualize state 
autonomy and state power within the context of geopolitics.92  
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To sum up, by making use of all these factors mentioned so far the state is enabled to 
act independently from the civil society as an autonomous actor.  
Anthony Giddens is another neo-Weberian sociologist, whose theory of the state 
is grounded on the concepts of power and domination. Along with agency and structure, 
power as an elementary concept refers to a prerequisite the existence of which is sine 
qua non of being an agent.  
To be a human being is to be an agent – although not all agents are human 
beings – and to be an agent is to have power. ‘Power’ in this highly generalized 
sense means ‘transformative capacity’, the capability to intervene in a given set 
of events so as in some way to alter them.93 
 
In Giddens’ terminology, the nation state as an “institutional clustering” and 
organization derives its power from its ability to monitor and affect the circumstances of 
social reproduction and even to alter them.94 It is this ability of the organizations that 
distinctively separates them from the other types of collectivity.  
An organization is a collectivity in which knowledge about the conditions of 
system reproduction is reflexively used to influence, shape or modify that 
system reproduction. All forms of state administrative bodies are organizations 
in this sense ... in modern nation states, however, the reflexive monitoring of 
system reproduction is much more highly accentuated than in any preexisting 
form of state and, in addition, ‘organization’ characterizes many other aspects of 
social life.95  
 
According to Giddens, for the reproduction of the modern society the nation state 
appropriates its power from two different resources – the allocative and the 
authoritative. The first of these could be defined as “dominion over material facilities, 
including material goods and the natural forces that may be harnessed in their 
production. The second concerns the means of dominion over the activities of human 
beings themselves.”96 Contrary to conventional liberal and Marxist understandings, 
Giddens stresses the significance of the authoritative power that makes the nation state 
                                                 
93 Giddens, Anthony, The Nation State and Violence: Volume Two of A Contemporary Critique of 
Historical Materialism, p. 7. 
94 Ibid., p. 12. 
95 Ibid., p. 12. 
96 Ibid., p. 7. 
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more capable in establishing a direct and close ruling over the population than its 
predecessors. However, instead of overestimating the authoritative resources, he rather 
prefers to draw our attention to the varying relations between these two forms of 
sources in the constitution of social system and dynamics of social change. 
The modern nation state as a “power container” agent employs a combination of 
these resources for the maintenance of the social system, in other words, the modes of 
domination in which the relation s of autonomy and dependency between actors or 
collectivities of actors were reproduced in favor of the state. For Giddens one of the 
distinctive characteristics of the modern state is the high surveillance technologies that 
it owns. Due to this high surveillance, the modern state gains the capacity of regulating 
and manipulating all kinds of activities (including the conduct of daily life) of its 
subjected population “across wide spans of time and space.”97 It could be distinguished 
two types of surveillance as the accumulation of coded information and the 
establishment of supervision mechanism by the central authority. The first kind of 
surveillance is initiated by the state “to administer the activities of individuals about 
whom it is gathered. It is not just the collection of information, but its storage that is 
important here.”98 The recording technologies of modern times (i.e. cameras, tapes, 
discs) along with the conventional recording methods (i.e. writing, oral) are all 
functioned as a storage device by the state. The second type of surveillance is that of 
direct observation and control imposed by the superordinates on the subjected 
population, which is exclusively enhanced within clearly bounded settings in public 
sphere.  
In order to better understand how Giddens conceives the modern state and its 
dynamic relations with the domestic social formation, it could be elucidating to apply 
Bob Jessop’s schema concisely analyzing his views on the issue:  
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For Giddens the rise of the modern state is associated with (a) a centralist legal 
order, (b) centralised administration, (c) a centrally organized taxation system, 
articulated with a rational monetary system, (d) major innovations in military 
organization reflected in the international state system and the separation of 
external military force form internal policing, (e) the development of the modern 
nation in conjunction with the nation state, (f) the development of 
communication, information, and surveillance possibilities, (g) internal 
pacification through the disciplinary society, and (h) the development of 
democracy in the sense of a pluralistic polyarchy and citizenship rights – as the 
reciprocal of the enhanced surveillance and ideology of the general interest 
involved in the modern state.99 
 
However, Giddens’ approach to the modern state and society has a reductionist nature 
mainly owing to his account of the reproduction of the social system. First, he singles 
out one key factor – namely nation state in reproduction of modern society by either 
excluding the determinacy of other factors (i.e. cultural processes, socioeconomic 
relations) or subjugating them to a secondary position. If modern society is not unitary 
and an unproblemetic totality with a coherent self, how its reproduction could be 
secured or administered from one single center? In order to eschew this reductionism, a 
new analytical perspective has to be developed in which the interconnectedness between 
numerous factors are asserted in analyzing the system reproduction. By doing so, the 
state-society distinction appearing as another analytical within Giddens’ theory could 
also be exceeded. The significance of the specific articulations of the states, economy, 
society, and also the ideologically and discursively constructed nature of the state 
society relations should also be embraced within this novel effort. This is where the 
post-structuralist account of state and state identity has provided useful insight both for 
the critique of the modern accounts of the state and society and to radically alter them. 
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CHAPTER III 
POSTSTRUCTURALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
As discourse is about limits and dangers, about the presumed boundaries 
of political possibility in the space and time of the modern state, theories of 
international relations express and affirm the necessary horizons of the modern 
political imagination (…)1 
 
(…) It is the crucial task of both breaking with these presumed 
boundaries and extending the horizon of the modern political imagination that 
critical theory undertakes.2 
  
The last three decades of the twentieth century have increasingly witnessed a 
vastly ardent and fertile debate within almost all social science disciplines. In tandem 
with the claims of modern social disciplines to objectivity and universality, the 
modernity itself was problematized and opened to perpetual discussion. The critical 
interrogation of the modernist and positivist ontological and epistemological postures 
also provided a proper base by which the modes of understanding, explicating and 
representing of the present and past were subjected to critical inquiry. Particularly the 
endeavors to analyze the nature of the contemporary times have divided the social 
scientists roughly into two camps. For some analysts the present was signifying the end 
of the constitutive features of modernity and its pretentious promises. They tacitly 
declared “the end of history”, “the end of the social”, “the end of the grand meta-
narratives” such as liberalism and Marxism, and “the end of mode of production.”3 
However, others strove to develop a post-Enlightenment defense of modernity against 
these ‘endist’ discourses by stating that we are still experiencing the modern times and 
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conditions in which the organizing principles of modern society and politics in tandem 
with the nation state did not undergo any deep-rooted alteration.   
The field of IR theory has also been drastically influenced from this modernity 
versus postmodernity debate. For many scholars the publication of Ashley’s article 
entitled ‘The Poverty of Neo-Realism’ has constituted a vantage point both for the 
entrance of postmodern approaches to IR theory and also for the creation of the 
“postlate-modern discourse of world politics.”4 The poststructuralist, feminist, and post-
colonialist critique have all presented novel, exciting opportunities to deconstruct and 
even alter the conventional international political discourses having inadequacies and 
inaccuracies in assessing these recent socio-political and global developments. Such 
scholars as David Campbell, James Der Derrian, Rob Walker, Michael Dillon and 
Cynthia Weber have all ventured to expatiate the inclusion/exclusion and disciplinary 
practices, and the foundationalist and essentialist nature and logic of the positivist 
rationalist theories (such as liberal realists and Marxist account of IR).5   
This chapter will focus on the post-structuralist theory of International Relations 
trying to develop a new politics of epistemology and interdisciplinary research avenue 
for the full comprehension of state, foreign policy and international politics. The 
poststructuralist attempt on which this dissertation bases its hypotheses aims to draw 
our attention to the role and significance of specific articulations, subjective, 
interpretative processes, modes of representations in analyzing state identity, its foreign 
policy discourse and state society relations. Within the dissident literature ‘foreign’ 
policy is conceived not as the external and rational initiatives of the state “the identity of 
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which is secure before it enters into relations with others”6. But rather it is 
conceptualized as exclusionary, disciplinary, and securitizing practices of the state 
integral to the reconstruction of its identity and the domestic political order. I do 
propose in this chapter that this reconceptualization of state and foreign policy could 
create novel opportunities in examining foreign policy articulations of the state and its 
impact on the constitution and maintenance of the domestic regime within a given 
polity.  
After expatiating the poststructuralist account of foreign policy and state 
identity, the chapter will deal with the concept of security as a “speech act” and as 
never-ending project of the modern state. This section will be dedicated to discuss and 
reveal the specific role that foreign policy representations have played within 
securitizing discourses and practices of the state. In this respect, it is suggested that in 
creating a world of ‘others’ through constant articulation of threat and danger state 
functionalizes foreign policy as an instrument of securitization in an attempt to secure 
the domestic political regime. Thereby in the concluding part of the chapter I shall 
remind the securitization/desecuritization debate introducing a wider agenda to 
understand and explain the complex issue of security. I am convinced that this new 
agenda raising critical questions about the very nature of security and securitization will 
make substantial contributions to our main task of reexamining Turkish official and 
mainstream discourses on Cyprus.       
 
3.2. Toward A New Politics of Epistemology   
Drawing on Keyman the central objectives of this poststructuralist theoretical 
enterprise could be listed in the following manner: (1) to introduce and to decipher the 
inclusion/exclusion practice of the conventional international political theory 
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functioning through strategies of ‘othering’ and also punishing the internal and external 
‘others’; (2) to review the ‘logocentric’ characteristics of IR theory “in the sense of 
privileging modern white male Cartesian identity as its modus operandi”7; (3) to reject, 
from the very outset, all hierarchical explanations and regulations; (4) to encourage 
difference over identity, fragmentation over totality, heterogeneity over homogeneity 
and ambiguity over certainty; (5) to expose and to deconstruct the binary oppositions 
and dichotomies with which modern positivist theories operate; (6) against the claims of 
the rationalist schools to objectivity and universality, to unmask their subjectively and 
ideologically established epistemological stances by referring to the power-knowledge 
relations; (7) to refuse and alter the reductionist tendencies of the realist paradigm 
confining the scope of politics within the domain of modern state and also perceiving 
the IR merely by making reference to the power politics shaped and re-shaped  through 
the interactions among these nation states; (8) to develop an anti-foundationalist 
strategy in which no “ontological, epistemological or ethical absolutes” are accepted in 
order to emancipate both the social relations and their analysis “through radical 
democratization” by “the recognition of difference.”8   
 
3.2.1. Theory As Political Intervention  
An interesting, distinctive characteristic of the poststructuralist analysis that 
could also be named as ‘the dissident thought’ is its adoption of the theory, in itself, as a 
‘praxis’. How things are conceptualized as objects of theoretical inquiry are integral to 
their historical, linguistic, social and political constitution. Hence the theory and/or 
scientific discourse as “part of the social formation”9 which it attempts to delineate 
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amounts to a political involved in the remolding of this very social formation. The post-
positivist IR scholarship reveals the political nature of the act of theorizing by rejecting 
“the dominant assumption that theory “corresponds” to the external reality which it 
represents”10. The positivist paradigms of International Relations, i.e. liberalism, neo-
functionalism, classical Marxism, claims objectivity by distancing themselves from the 
phenomena, realities and instances under analysis. Whereas the poststructuralist 
approach incorporates the analytical discourse and the act of theorizing in the 
discursive, historical reproduction of things and phenomena. For instance, the 
articulation of any dispute political in nature as vitally important or an existential threat 
to the national survival, namely its securitization, in the analytical discourse is integral 
to the process through which the dispute is securitized.  
In the same vein, the conventional IR theories taking for granted the 
international as an objective reality having a pregiven ontological status and hence 
independent realm of existence reproduce, in analytical sense, the modern conception of 
history: the conception where the nation state appears as the only fully sovereign and 
even transcendental subject. Thus the critical IR literature treats epistemology also as a 
discursive framework “by which truth claims are made about reality”11 and as a political 
deed by which any subjective conception and mode of understanding and explaining is 
elevated to the status of objective reality. As Keyman concisely put it 
epistemologies operate: (i) with their own discursive practices, (ii) their own 
“truth” claims (whether scientific or power oriented), and (iii) their own mode of 
representation of “reality” (whether historically constructed or ontological), and, 
therefore have necessary political consequences12.   
 
Therefore, for the emancipation of social relations, the democratization of social theory 
is necessarily required in such a way as to refute the recognition of a primary and 
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privileged status to any single identity ontologically and epistemologically. Thus, the 
dissident thought enthusiastically ventured to develop a new ‘politics of epistemology’, 
which is neither foundationalist nor essentialist. While trying “to increase our 
understanding of world politics” the dissident IR discourse has not contented itself with 
problematizing presumptions, epistemic absolutes and given ontological categories on 
which the classical and neo-realist paradigms based their analyses. Thus the critical 
literature has deemed it necessary “focusing on the ontological and epistemological 
issues of what constitute important or legitimate questions and answers for IR 
scholarship, rather than on the structure and dynamics of international system per se.”13 
 By this new epistemology, the dissident literature aims to draw our attention to 
the role and significance of the specific articulations, the subjective interpretative 
processes and the modes of representations both in elevating any single concept to the 
center of the political discourse and in transposing the subjective conditions to the level 
of objective reality. This epistemological strategy cannot be disregarded and is 
innovative precisely because of two reasons: “first, it enables one to resist the imposed 
boundaries and the disciplining knowledgeable practices of power, both which 
constitute an order of “truth” in international relations theory.”14 Second, it focuses on 
the discursive practices within IR theory constraining our imagination of contemporary 
politics within definitely bounded settings (i.e. power politics, national interest and the 
state’s security priorities.).  
By promoting difference over identity, and replacing the subject/object duality 
with intersubjectivity, the postmodern literature paves the way to conceptualize varying 
relations within multiple actors having “no ontological status apart from the various acts 
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which constitute”15 their reality. For instance, against the neo-realists and Weberian 
sociologists privileging international anarchy or the state agency in the reproduction of 
modern po1itics, the dissident thought probe into the sources of this reproduction in 
almost all fields in which individuals and all kinds of institutions, political or normative 
take place. As it could be remembered, in contrast to the realist paradigm’s 
deterministic and structuralist account of the state, the neo-Weberian approach has 
reintroduced the category of agency by making the state an epistemological object that 
has to be analyzed within its peculiar historical context. However, in analyzing the 
system reproduction, the state is unproblematically assigned a primary and autonomous 
role at the expense of others in such a way as to reproduce the realist kind of 
reductionist inclinations.  
In doing so, it takes as its unit of analysis a national social formation, deals with 
it in a nonstructuralist manner, and concentrates its attention on the structure, 
capacities, power, and policies of the state in that formation. Thus, it offers an 
account of international relations by defining them as an inter-nation state 
system. However, the structure of international relations is so complex that it 
cannot be reduced to inter-state relations.16  
 
As it could be deduced also from this quotation, state-centricism of the historical 
sociology has a tendency to constrain the scope of the political by the agency of the 
state as an “epistemologically autonomous and rationally acting subject”17 with a stable 
identity. Whereas, the poststructuralist discourse totally rejects to attribute the state a 
pregiven and pre-discursive identity and a coherent self, but rather it problematizes the 
discursive and ideological constitution of the state sovereignty as uncontested and 
natural phenomenon by decentering it. As a from of resistance to the essentialist ways 
of understanding and explaining, this epistemological stance includes to imagine  
(1) new political spaces, particularly those formerly relegeted to ‘civil society’; (2) 
novel political practices, especially those that resist fetishizing the capture of the 
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state power; (3) new ways of knowing and being, especially those that resist a 
metaphysics of inclusion and exclusion; (4) new forms of political community, 
especially those that resist spatial reification; and (5) new ways of acting across 
borders, so as to make connections between the claims of humanity as such and the 
claims of particular people.18 
 
For this reason, the dissident literature takes as a primary task to unfold the hidden 
essence of the modern international political discourses in which the state is imbued 
with full sovereignty and uninterrogated legitimacy. It radically differentiates itself from 
the critical or mainstream modern theories in its critical inquiry aiming to decode the 
vital relationality between material existence of objects and their discursive and 
representative construction within a given cultural, lingual, historical context. For 
example, while the modern social theory assigns the state a self-evident quality (the 
ability to speak for itself), an independent realm of existence, the dissident 
epistemology refutes the givenness of state sovereignty outside of and prior to 
discourse. Against the materially reductionist modernist epistemology, presuming the 
present conditions as the objective conditions of being, poststructuralism takes into 
account the relationality between the material existence of things and the modes in 
which they are represented within specific historical epochs.  
David Campbell, while introducing his interpretative approach, lays particular 
emphasis on the indispensability of the interpretation in the articulation of things19 such 
as danger, threat, security, and national interests. The objective of such emphasis is to 
eliminate the materialistic reductionism of the rationalists’ theoretical positions 
attaching objects an existence “independent of ideas or beliefs about them”20 and 
reducing events and phenomena only to material causes. By problematizing 
intersubjective interpretations, specific articulations, and representations the critical 
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epistemology aims at drawing our attention to the very relation between power and 
knowledge. At the center of this new “politics of epistemology”21 lies the notion that 
things cannot be comprehended by attributing them a value-free essence that can be 
abstracted or excluded from the relations of representation and discursive space. The 
dissident literature assuming “the existence of a “causal” relation between the 
representing and represented” claims that how things are articulated, interpreted is 
inherent to the reproduction of power relations. Thus it concentrates on the way 
in which the discursive effect of the representation occurs within the realm 
whereby human agents are in a position to convey a meaning to the represented. 
At stake is the investigation of the role “discourse” plays in the process of 
production of knowledge about the reality under representation22. 
 
However, it should immediately be stated that the poststructuralist analysis does 
not implement a methodology in which the category of discursive is reified and 
exaggerated to the detriment of nondiscursive although they are often criticized as 
giving primacy to the former over the latter. Whereas the dissident epistemology 
refuses, from the outset, the existence of such distinction in between the discursive and 
nondiscursive realms, it searches for the unfolding of how the concepts are 
functionalized within any discursive and representative context, which is not free from 
specific historical conditions. “What is denied is not that ... objects exist externally to 
thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as 
objects outside of any discursive conditions of emergence.”23  
At the ontological level, the post-positivist critical scholarship refutes to 
recognize the nation state as a pregiven entity and transhistorical subject the legitimacy 
and sovereignty of which cannot be questioned. Thereby the dissident IR literature 
insists on the need for de-ontologizing the concept of the nation state and on the 
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necessity of deconstructing the ontological status conferred on it by the realist school. 
De-ontologizing the nation state means to situate it within history by addressing and 
problematizing the discursive and performative context whereby its characteristics, 
identity and legitimate sovereignty are constituted and sustained. To de-ontologize the 
nation state also means to reject any given/objective characteristics and 
naturalness/inevitability assigned to it and to problematize its identity “as either a 
textual or a discursive construction”24. 
For post-positivist IR scholars the space where such discursive construction and 
reconstruction is achieved through disciplinary and exclusionary practices is the 
modernity itself. Thereby they constantly argue the idea that international relations as a 
discipline has to transcend its modernist episteme. 
International Relations is a discipline concerned with observing how the 
political project of leaving out the modern emerged and how it continues to 
operate globally. I am concerned with how we might outlive the modern 
politically. I think of outliving here as surpassing the modern political 
imagination not merely surviving its dareliction25. 
 
Unless the modernist epistemological and ontological posture of the conventional 
international political theory is purged, its monolithic, exclusionary essence 
universalizing and naturalizing the Euro-centric conception of the human subject, the 
political, the state, the international (the modern self) will continue to outlive. As such it 
would not be possible to critically scrutinize the core assumptions about the modern 
nation state and international relations taken for granted as ontological categories.              
In the light of these theoretical clarifications, it could be claimed that the 
poststructuralist research avenue is dedicated to unfold and problematize the 
discursively, performatively, representatively constructed nature of the state with a 
pregiven and coherent identity. Therefore, instead of taking the state as a finished entity 
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with a coherent self as in the case of realism and partially historical sociology, it focuses 
on the discursive and performative processes where the state identity, and thereby its 
legitimate sovereignty and institutional autonomy are produced and reproduced through 
disciplinary mechanisms. Such epistemological posture also offers substantial 
opportunities to the dissident thought to reconceptualize the foreign political initiatives 
of the state, which is integral to the constitution and maintenance of state identity. It is 
this internality of foreign policy to the process of building and rebuilding the state as a 
sovereign presence and even as a transcendental subject which would be the burden of 
the subsequent part of the chapter.  
 
3.3. Reconceptualizing Foreign Policy and State Identity 
In the neo-realist IR theory, foreign policy is conceptualized as external 
orientations of nation states towards others, which is also shaped and reshaped by the 
requirements imposed by the anarchic international politics. Furthermore, foreign policy 
is represented as a bridge linking these sovereign actors in such a way as to secure the 
givenness and stability of their identities. In this paradigmatic framework, internal and 
international political processes and the ways in which they are analyzed are deemed as 
antonymous to each other. Foreign political initiatives of the state are analyzed in such a 
way as to emphasize and reproduce its “autonomy from and the externality to domestic 
politics.”26 Accordingly, international relations are assumed as relations between 
atomized and completed states with fixed and already established identities.  
This ontologically privileged status accorded to the state which is constituted 
and reproduced through the specific articulations of foreign policy (i.e. diplomacy, 
international politics and so on) is subjected to an influential critical analysis by various 
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dissident scholars with the aid of genealogical method27. Thus, poststructuralists begin 
by deconstructing the conventional understandings of the rationalist IR theories 
attributing the state an unproblematic, self-evident, tautological presence. Whereas, 
critical scholars advocate to reorient “analysis from the concern with intentional acts of 
pregiven subjects to the problematic of subjectivity”28 and reject the presence of 
prediscursive, primary and coherent state identity.  
States are never finished as entities; the tension between the demands of identity 
and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the 
performative nature of identity can never be fully revealed. This paradox 
inherent to their being renders states in permanent need of reproduction: with no 
ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their 
reality, states are (and have to be) always in process of becoming. For a state to 
end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive 
foundations; stasis would be death.29  
 
Hence the discourse of primary and stable state identity aiming at consolidating the 
status of the state as a sovereign presence within international politics should be 
problematized by revealing its constructed nature through renewed processes. In the 
dissident literature, the state identity like all other collective or individual identities is 
conceptualized as “tenously constituted in time ... through a stylized repetition of acts” 
and realized “not through a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition.”30 
 By the same token, constructivist scholar Thomas Banchoff highlights the fact 
that state identity has both an internal dimension (“it is what binds the group together”) 
and an external dimension (situating the state with respect to others)31. Thereby state 
identity includes (1) the aggregate of images, set norms, narratives and the core 
                                                 
27 Some bright examples of this genealogical method in IR and social theory could be listed as Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities, revised edition, (London: Verso, 1991); David Campbell, Writing 
Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity; James Der Derian, Anti-Diplomacy: 
Spies, Terror, Speed and War, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992); Jens Bartelson, A Geneology of 
Sovereignty; Michael Dillon, Politics of Security.   
28 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity, p. 8. 
29 Ibid., p. 12. 
30 Butler, Judith, Gender Trouble: Feminism and The Subversion of Identity, (New York: 1990), pp. 140-
41, 145. 
31 Banchoff, Thomas, “German Identity and European Integration”, European Journal of International 
Relations 5/3 September 1999.   
 69 
characteristics of the state that are expected to be shared by the large majority of the 
society; and (2) “the self placement of the polity within specific international context. 
Those contexts consist mainly of the constellation of states, international institutions 
and historical experiences within which a state is embedded.”32 Thereby state identity, 
which is articulated by the political figures and official representatives of the state 
before both national and international audiences does not have a fixated essence and 
monolithic structure, can embrace multiple and even contrasting discourses in the 
course of different historical stints. Depending on global politics and/or on internal 
power relations certain motives of state identity (modern, western, secular, powerful, 
unitary and so forth) can be more accentuate when compared with other attributes. 
 In the same vein, “any national foreign policy discourse include some 
contrasting and normative historical perspectives. For a given state identity to be of 
analytical use, however, it must be shared within and across the parties aspiring for 
state power.”33 Therefore the task of pinpointing the content of state identity primarily 
necessitates exploring major themes, views and ideas frequently articulated across the 
public sphere within a given polity. There can be cited a large variety of sources from 
which evidences illuminating the content of state identity can be extracted: “the legal 
norms that govern foreign policy” 34, the articles of the constitution, images and news 
fabricated in visual, printed and electronic media, the standardized school books, the 
oral and written statements of official figures across the political spectrum, the 
explanations of party leaders in press conferences and in other settings, formal 
declarations by the official and military institutions of the state and the parliamentary 
debates. These are all discursive and representative instruments through which the state 
identity is constantly reproduced that should necessarily be assessed together with the 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 268.  
33 Ibid., p. 269.  
34 Ibid., pp. 268-69.  
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concrete actions of the state in internal and external political realms.   
David Campbell in his book Writing Security United States’ Foreign Policy and 
the Politics of Identity tries to explicate the inherence of foreign policy initiatives of the 
state to the constitution and maintenance of state identity, thereby “the very self and 
domestic order” by presenting a genealogical analysis of the concepts of foreign and 
security. By doing so, he deciphers the conventional approach to foreign policy, which 
conceives it as a “state-centric phenomenon in which there is an internally mediated 
response to the externally induced situation of ideological, military, and economic 
threats.”35 However, this new research avenue is rather interested in questioning how 
and to what extent the ways in which foreign policy issues are articulated is functional 
in building a fixed and coherent domestic/national identity. Therefore within the 
dissident literature foreign policy is theorized not as a result of state’s actions but rather 
as one of fundamental determinants of the “renewed process of normative statecraft”36 
with the concern of fixing the domestic political community. Nonetheless the functions 
of the foreign political performances and discourses of state authority are not limited to 
that of imposing the fixed meanings of sovereignty, identity and so on. As Campbell has 
correctly argued “the boundaries of a state’s identity are secured by the representation 
of danger integral to foreign policy.”37 
Whereas the articulation of danger and calculation of threat are not based on 
objective conditions but rather dependent on subjective interpretative processes in 
compliance with the security discourses generated by the state. 
While dependent on specific historical contexts, we can say that for the state, 
identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which 
resistant elements to a secure identity on the “inside” are linked through a 
discourse of “danger” with threats identified and located on the “outside”. The 
outcome of this is that boundaries are constructed, spaces demarcated, standards 
of legitimacy incorporated, interpretations of history privileged, and alternatives 
                                                 
35 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity, p. 36. 
36 Hobson, John M., The State and International Relations, p. 160. 
37 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity, p. 3. 
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marginalized.38  
 
Thus it is impossible to think foreign policy neither as external to the constitution of 
state identity nor as a bridge between the pre-established nation states. But instead it is 
an exclusionary process operating through the imposition of boundaries demarcating 
“inside and outside, us and them, domestic and foreign, and the sphere of citizen 
entitlements and that of strategic responses.”39 Therefore, foreign policy as a specific 
type of boundary drawing practice between ‘the self’ and ‘the foreign other’ is so 
central to the constitution of state as a sovereign actor both in internal and international 
politics. In this sense, foreign policy necessitating the existence of a large scale 
organized and rational bureaucracy is a means unique to modern politics leading to the 
concentration of social power in the nation state. Thus it is also integral to the creation 
of a particular understanding of history so as to increase the national ‘consciousness’ 
and loyalty within a given social formation.  
In order to better analyze how the foreign political actions and discourses of the 
state are functional within its exclusionary and disciplinary practices, Campbell 
proposes to make a careful distinction between two understandings of foreign policy:  
The first is one in which “foreign policy” can be understood as referring to all 
practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion (possibly figured as 
relationships of otherness) that constitute their objects as “foreign” in the process 
of dealing with them. In this sense, “foreign policy” is divorced form the state as 
a particular resolution of the categories of identity and difference and applies to 
confrontations that appear to take place between ‘a self’ and ‘an other’ located in 
different sites of ethnicity, race, class, gender, or geography. These are the forms 
of “foreign policy” that have operated in terms of the paradigm of sovereignty 
and constituted an identity through time and across space. Operating at all levels 
of social organization, from the level of personal relationships through to global 
orders, “foreign policy” in this sense has established conventional dispositions in 
which a particular set of representational practices serves as the resource from 
which are drawn the modes of interpretation employed to handle new instances 
of ambiguity or contingency... In other words, the first understanding (“foreign 
policy”) has provided the discursive economy or conventional matrix of 
                                                 
38 Ibid., p. 68. 
39 Connolly, William E., Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 201. 
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interpretations in which the second understanding (Foreign Policy) operates. The 
second understanding- Foreign Policy as state-based and conventionally 
understood within the discipline- is thus not equally implicated in the 
constitution of identity as the first understanding. Rather, Foreign Policy serves 
to reproduce the constitution of identity made possible by “foreign policy” and 
to contain challenges to the identity that results.40  
 
As it would be clearly seen from this lengthy quotation both “foreign policy” and 
Foreign Policy rather than being the external orientations of the pregiven states as 
finished entities are intertwinedly operationalized as a social practice in the 
(re)production of the subjugation of the society to the state through subjective 
articulations of danger, foreign, and security. It is this discourse of security by which the 
autonomy of the state is secured, which is of great merit for the purposes of this thesis 
in analyzing the role and impact of foreign political discourses and performances of the 
state on the relations of the ruling and the ruled in Turkey.41 Thus the poststructuralist 
re-theorization of foreign policy makes also possible the reconceptualization of state 
society relations as a sphere where the legitimacy of state sovereignty and supremacy 
are tenuously constructed and reconstructed performatively, discursively, and 
representatively. This reconceptualization of state society relations within the dissident 
literature will be the issue of the successive part of the chapter.  
 
3.4. Reexamining State Society Relations As A Continual Security Project of The 
State  
Identity is an inescapable dimension of being. No body could be without it. 
Inescapable as it is, identity- whether personal or collective- is not fixed by 
nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior. Rather, identity is 
constituted in relation to difference. But neither is difference fixed by nature, 
given by God, or planned by intentional behavior. Difference is constituted in 
                                                 
40 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity, p. 68-9. 
41 However, as regards the issue of security Bill McSweeney criticizes Campbell for overstating the 
cognitive dimension of state identity and thus omitting the “essential material feature of all questions of 
security and identity-formation. This concerns the place of interests in the perception of security and in 
the management and transformation of xollective identity.” See McSweeney, Bill, Security, Identity and 
Interests A Sociology of International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 126.  
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relation to identity.42  
 
Identity/difference problematic introduced into the IR discipline by the dissident 
literature places its particular emphasis on the state’s activities to fix and stabilize the 
domestic society within strictly constructed boundaries as an organic totality. It is 
assumed that such confinement of society to a pre-established political identity stems 
from the fact that the state is in a permanent need of finding a proper ground upon 
which to base its legitimacy and monopoly of power. What is suggested here is that the 
state could not be viewed unproblematically as representative of the domestic society or 
‘nation’ as in the case of modern international political theories. On the contrary, in 
order to terminate this tension states have to create an illusion based on unproblematic 
identification of the state with the society. As a product of, in constructivists’ terms, 
“successful normative statecraft” or with Cynthia Weber’s terms, the process of 
“writing the state”43 this illusion is predicated on in position of a unified, harmonious, 
homogenous domestic political community which is “imagined”44. 
In the conventional approaches to state and nation, it is presupposedly argued 
that nation has a prior, prediscursive essence on which the state was founded with an 
indubitable and full sovereignty. A presupposition of this essence which implies the 
existence of an unproblematic and unitary collective identity legitimizes the state and its 
subsequent internal and external actions. Various recent critical studies have manifestly 
indicated that “the state more often than not precedes the nation: that nationalism is a 
construct of the state in pursuit of its legitimacy.”45 Thus, the constitution of the 
domestic political community as a unified and completed collectivity, and a coherent 
self serves to the representation of the state as the natural signifier of this imagined 
                                                 
42 Ibid., p.9. 
43 Weber, Cynthia, Simulating Sovereignty, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
44 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
(London: Verso, 1983). 
45 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity, p. 11. 
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unity. As in the case of state identity, the constitution of domestic political identity is 
not achieved once and for all, instead through a renewed process of normative statecraft. 
As various dissident scholars have asserted, in order to stabilize the political identity 
within internal society, states arbitrarily create artificial distinctions or draw absolute 
boundaries between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’46. In such a distinction while ‘inside’ refers to 
the realm of peace, order, security and harmony, which are realized through the absolute 
state authority; ‘outside’ corresponds to the realm of necessity, violence, insecurity and 
anarchy. This illusive division is operationalized via the discourse of security and 
specific articulation of danger inherent to foreign policy. This is the exact point where 
the vital paradox of the nation state could be said to lie, which is lucidly explained by 
David Campbell as follows:  
Should the state project of security be successful in terms in which it is 
articulated, the state would cease to exist. Security as the absence of movement 
would result in death via stasis. Ironically, then, the inability of the state project 
of security to succeed is the guarantor of the state’s continued success as an 
impelling identity. The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is 
thus not a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of 
possibility.47  
 
As underlined in this quotation, nation states are in permanent need of recreating an 
illusion constituting a world full of dangers, threats, insecurity for the state and its 
citizens. In this conception ‘the outside’, which is presupposedly imagined as a realm 
consisting of rival and hostile states, is represented as a source of insecurity and 
existential threats precisely due to its very nature. Thus international politics refers to 
the realm of consistent violence necessitating the readiness of the state in military terms.  
The building of such a world image through which the dangerous, the menacing 
                                                 
46 A thorough analysis of this notion can be found in Richard Ashley, “Living In Borderlines: Man, 
Poststructuralism and War”, in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro (eds.), International/Intertextual 
Relations, (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 300-13; Walker R. B. J., Inside/Outside, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), chapter 8; Bartelson, Jens, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Weber, Cynthia, Simulating Sovereignty, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), chapter 1. 
47 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity, pp. 12-3. 
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and the anarchic are externalized or presumably accepted as the characteristics of ‘the 
outside’ is possible only via the strategies involving “an evangelism of fear.” In this 
respect Campbell’s argument that “the discourses of danger that were pivotal to the 
church- where the fear of death disciplined lives via the promise of salvation”48 were 
reproduced by the state in its modern version is quiet striking. The modern state 
apparatus desiring to secure the maintenance of internal power relations disciplines the 
domestic society via ‘modern’ dangers emanating from the chaotic interstate relations 
and via the fear of returning to the state of nature. In this imagining the state “as the 
immortal God” refers to the only power that may challenge these dangers and fears and 
that may realize security for its society. Hence the church’s ‘pre-modern’ promise of 
salvation is replaced by the state’s ‘modern’ promise of security. However, as indicated 
above materializing this promise totally exposes the state with the danger of losing the 
ground legitimizing its sovereign presence. Thereby states in effect do need a 
securitizing foreign policy discourse in which all foreign political issues are “presented 
as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the 
normal bounds of political procedure.”49 As it will be discussed more comprehensively 
in the ensuing pages the operation of securitization necessitates the use of a specific 
rhetoric by the official and political elite vis-à-vis the domestic society. Owing to state-
based functioning of modern politics the sphere of foreign policy is bound to be quite 
open to this rhetoric through which socio-political problems are elevated to the status of 
existential/imminent threats.    
Conceptualized in this way ‘foreign’ policy is integral part of the processes 
framing ‘man’ (and the domestic society) “in the spatial and temporal organization of 
                                                 
48 Ibid., p. 61. 
49 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security A New Framework For Analysis, (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), pp. 23-4. 
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the inside and outside, self and other: i.e., in the “state.””50 In this analysis ‘foreign’ 
policy refers to a series of political practices through which external and internal 
‘others’, endangering the pre-supposed identicalness between the state and the society, 
are specified and declared by the state apparatus. The very operation of these practices 
“frames the domestic society in whose name they claim to be operating through their 
claim to know the source of threats to domestic society and “man.””51 Thus foreign 
policy constitutes one part of governance “as a structure that governs the behaviours of 
those embedded in it in the socio-political realm”52. 
 
3.4.1. Negation of Difference 
In order to stabilize domestic political order states implement various 
disciplinary practices premised on the construction of a world of ‘others’ appearing as 
threatening the security of both the state itself and the society which is thought as 
identical to it.  The security of this permanent insecurity by which the fixed meaning of 
state sovereignty and political identity is produced and reproduced is totally dependent 
on the existence of both internal and external others. “States tend to create the 
appearance of a threatening ‘other’, against which the ‘self’ is defined negatively. In 
constructing an ‘other’ that appears threatening, the state is able to confer the 
appearance of unity upon the ‘self’ – i.e. a domestic population.”53  
The construction of self and other as antonymous categories to each other within 
this logic of representation functioning via binary oppositions signifies the passage from 
difference to identity. For the insurance of a coherent and unified political identity- 
namely the self - the different is determined and negated through othering processes. In 
                                                 
50 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity, p. 62 
51 Ibid., p. 62. 
52 Diez, Thomas, “The Imposition of Governance: Transforming Foreign Policy Through EU 
Enlargement”, COPRI, IIS Working Papers 2000, p. 6 accessible at 
http://www.copri.dk/publications/workingpapers.htm.  
53 Hobson, John M., The State and International Relations, p. 159.  
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the last analysis, the negation of difference in favor of a given identity is for the sake of 
eliminating the other, which is “alien, foreign, and perceived as a threat to a secure 
state.”54 At this point it should immediately be noted that the act of negation includes 
also drawing boundaries within domestic society where the internal others are silenced, 
marginalized, punished, and are declared as ‘deviant’. In this context, post-structuralists 
have a tendency of analyzing state society relations by foregrounding the repressive 
mechanisms and othering strategies employed by the state apparatus. 
 
3.5. Securitization/Desecuritization Debate  
 
Securitization/desecuritization debate introduced in the literature by Ole Wæver 
and his colleagues in late 1980s not only provided innovative insights to transcend the 
uni-dimensionality of traditional security studies but also facilitated raising of new 
questions regarding the nature of state-society relations for social scientists. What’s 
aimed by this new approach is “to set out a comprehensive new framework for security 
studies” through which the precise nature of security can be rendered the object of 
analytical inquiry. While traditional state-centered security studies equate security with 
the issues of high politics (the issues concerning the military sector, use of force, war and 
strategic calculations) this new approach questions “the primacy of the military element 
and the state in the conceptualization of security.”55 They sought to implement a new 
research agenda within the discipline of International Relations both to offer more 
satisfactory answers to old questions (“what is and what is not a security issue?”) and 
also to raise new questions about the nature of the issue of security (“how issues become 
securitized?” and how can “the relevant security dynamics of the different types of 
security on levels ranging from local through regional to global”56 be located?). Within 
                                                 
54 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity, p. 36. 
55 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security A New Framework For Analysis, p. 1.  
56 Ibid., p. 1.  
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the scope of this thesis work, without addressing the criticisms directed by this new 
approach at the classical and neo-realist conceptualization of security I will rather deal 
with the nature of securitization as a discursive technique/mechanism of governance 
applied by the state elite. In this context, it would be our main purpose to explore the 
ways in which the Cyprus issue has been heavily securitized by the Turkish bureaucratic 
and political elite. It could be proposed with some degree of accuracy that problematizing 
Turkey’s official Cyprus policy within the context of securitization/desecuritization 
debate will yield new prospects to ponder upon the implications of the Cyprus issue in 
Turkish domestic politics and particularly the state identity and the state-society relations 
in Turkey.  
Wæver and his colleagues by introducing “a new agenda of security and politics”57 
through which “the processes of securitization and desecuritization”58 are problematized, 
in effect, repoliticize the term ‘security’ itself, which the conventional approaches and 
their classical critiques have failed to do so. For an adequate problematization of these 
processes they formulated the questions of the new research avenue as 
 when, why and how elites label issues and developments as “security” problems; 
when, why and how they succeed and fail in such endeavors; what attempts are 
made by other groups to put securitization on the agenda; and whether we can point 
to efforts to keep issues off the security agenda, or even to de-securitize issues that 
have become securitized?59         
 
In Wæver’s reconceptualization security refers to a “speech act”60 through which an issue 
is represented or discursively framed “either as a special kind of politics or as above 
politics”61. It follows from the above analysis that security is a self-referential practice 
precisely because “it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue- not 
                                                 
57 Wæver, Ole, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, in On Security, Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998), accessible at 
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html.  
58 Ibid., p. 36.  
59 Ibid., p. 36.  
60 Ibid., p. 34.  
61 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security A New Framework For Analysis, p. 23.  
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necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as 
such a threat.”62 
 In this sense securitization can be defined as a disciplinary practice and/or 
mechanism whereby issues are “presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency 
measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”63 
Thereby securitization necessitates the use of specific “rhetoric of existential threat” 
through which issues are dramatized as the issues of “supreme priority”64 by the 
securitizing actor, which is all too often the nation state. Thus the use of this specific 
rhetorical structure/tool “raising a specific challenge to a principled level” implies that 
all necessary means would be used to block that challenge. And, because such a 
threat would be defined as existential and a challenge to sovereignty, the state 
would not be limited in what it could or might do. Under these circumstances, a 
problem would become a security issue whenever so defined by the power 
holders.65     
 
The lesson that these explanations convey reminds us two crucially important 
facets regarding the nature of security: first, securitization as an “intersubjective 
process”66 does not necessarily imply the existence of a real threat to sovereignty or 
survival of the state; but rather it is realized through subjective threat perceptions and 
calculations articulated by the securitizer. However, as Wæver and his colleagues put 
forward, the word ‘subjective’ cannot be adequate to define the process of securitization 
on the grounds that “whether an issue is a security issue is not something individuals 
(read securitizer) decide alone.”67 Success of any attempt to securitize an issue is totally 
contingent upon the existence of an audience accepting and tolerating all the acts of the 
securitizer that are not otherwise legitimate.  
                                                 
62 Ibid., p. 24.  
63 Ibid., pp. 23-4.  
64 Ibid., pp. 24 and 26 respectively.  
65 Wæver, Ole, “Securitization and Desecuritization”.  
66 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security A New Framework For Analysis, p. 30.  
67 Ibid., p. 31.  
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Nevertheless, as a critique I should state that these scholars have left  a substantial 
hole in their account and do not unequivocally explain whether a loud articulation of an 
approval by an audience is necessary to assume that the conditions of such an acceptation 
have fully occurred. Even though they concede that securitizing move is realized through 
either coercion or consent and is achieved through negotiations between the securitizer 
(read political elite) and the audience/society, they are not clear regarding the nature of 
these negotiation processes through which approval for securitization is acquired. For 
instance, they do not adequately problematize the share and place of imposition and 
manipulation in obtaining such an acceptance by the securitizing agent. At this juncture it 
can be proposed that as in the case of Cyprus question the issues are successfully 
securitized through various legal and political mechanisms ensuring the silence of the 
obedient. Thereby approval is not necessarily preceded by a process of free discussion 
but rather is identified with the absence of an explicit opposition to the securitizing 
move.  
The second quality of securitization foregrounded in Wæver’s conceptualization 
(is more important from the viewpoint of our purposes and) relates rather to the identity 
of the securitizer. To Wæver, “security is articulated only from a specific place, in an 
institutional voice, by elites.”68 This means that securitization as a speech act and/or a 
discursive and performative process is utilized as a technique of governance since by  
“naming a certain development a security problem, the "state" can claim a special right, 
one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites.”69 At this 
juncture, Wæver argues that the political issues are securitized by “power holders” for 
their “specific, self-serving purposes.” Therefore, securitization as a means of 
maintaining control and hegemony is inherent to the power/domination relations within a 
given polity; thereby it cannot be thought outside of the processes whereby state society 
                                                 
68 Wæver, Ole, “Securitization and Desecuritization”. 
69 Ibid., p. 34.  
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relations are reconfigured in its conventional and hierarchical terms. When the 
functioning of foreign policy in Turkey is deemed as a disciplinary practice drawing the 
legitimate boundaries of ‘the political’, this aspect of securitization gains more and more 
relevance in analyzing Turkish politics and in particular state society relations in Turkey.  
Should we define securitization as a means of de-politicization whereby the issues 
are coded as existential and urgent threats and excluded from “the normal bounds of 
political procedure”, desecuritization refers to “the shifting of issues out of emergency 
mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere.”70 When in a 
given polity state elite securitizes an issue, it takes it out of the political sphere by 
attributing it urgency and vitality. This means that the issue born into the spheres of ‘the 
existential’ “should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt 
with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues.”71 In sharp contrast to this, 
desecuritization can only be achieved only if the issues are re-politicized in such a way as 
to “move them out of this threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere.”72 
Hence a symbiotic relationship can be presumed between desecuritization and 
democratizing processes the consolidation of which can be ensured through both 
widening of the political sphere and also an increased level of political participation 
within a given socio-political context. In this sense, our subsequent task will be to 
address Turkey’s Cyprus discourse, which displays securitizing traits. However, before 
examining how the Cyprus issue is articulated and securitized in the official 
representation, it will be useful to briefly focus on foreign policy as a securitizing 
practice.73                
                                                 
70 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security A New Framework For Analysis, p. 4.  
71 Ibid., p. 29.  
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state. At this juncture, it is also worth noting Wæver’s discussions on the possible outcomes of 
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3.6. Conclusion: Foreign Policy As A Securitizing Practice  
 
Between man and man we live in the condition of the civil state subjected 
to laws; between people and people, we enjoy natural liberty… Living at the 
same time in the social order and in the state of nature, we suffer from the 
inconveniences of both without finding security in either of them74.   
 
[M]odern man is stuck within a système mixte, subjected to tyranny on the 
inside, and aggravated by the security dilemmas coming from the outside75.  
 
As it was revealed in a detailed manner in this chapter of this dissertation, the 
post-structuralist IR theory treats foreign policy as one of the main disciplinary and 
exclusionary discourses of the state premised on the creation of a world of ‘others’: a 
world consisting of external and internal enemies threatening the security of the state 
and the national social formation to which it belongs. Foreign policy as a discursive and 
representative totality whereby those enemies, menaces and dangers are specified and 
constantly announced to the domestic society has generally been the sphere where 
securitizing practices of the state apparatus have most frequently been observed.  
Traditionally foreign policy is deemed as “state-centric phenomenon” and an 
area of bureaucratic competence requiring technical know-how to challenge the external 
“ideological, economic and military threats.” This conventional account marginalizing 
the domestic society from debates and decision-making mechanisms on foreign policy 
issues paves the way for the successful securitization of those by the state elite as the 
securitizing actor. The post-structuralist scholars are converging on the idea that 
questions political in nature are dramatized as existential and imminent threat, namely 
securitized, with the aim of inscribing and restricting the political imagination and at the 
                                                                                                                                               
“internationalization or Europenization” on the “national identifications” and/or domestic cultural 
identities. Wæver, Ole, “Securitization and Desecuritization”.   
74 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, L’État de Guerre, in C.E. Vaughan, (ed.), Political Writings, vol. 1, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1915), p. 304 cited in Bartelson, Jens, A Genealogy of 
Sovereignty, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 194.  
75 Bartelson, Jens, Genealogy of Sovereignty, p. 194.  
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final instance ‘the political’ itself.76 To them, foreign policy issues are securitized by the 
political establishment to secure the domestic order, internal power relations and the 
reproduction of core characteristics ascribed to the state. By drawing on Wæver it may 
be suggested that the act of securitization and hence depoliticization has a bearing on 
the constitution and maintenance of state society relations as the relations of subjugation 
and dominance. For it is geared towards preventing the society from being a real 
political subject vis-à-vis the state apparatus.      
Securitization which is not implying the existence of a real threat or danger but 
rather premised on subjective perceptions, specific modes of articulations and 
representations is a process continually repeated vis-à-vis the domestic society. Thus 
securitizing discourses and practices, threat perceptions and calculations of the state 
apparatus never expires especially if foreign policy is at stake. As David Campbell 
correctly argued the existence of vital and fatal threats against national sovereignty and 
survival are “guarantor of the state’s continued success as an impelling identity.”77 
States need grand-narratives to figure at all times on the agenda prioritizing their 
security needs, concerns and objectives which would never satisfactorily be met. Thus 
the persistent articulation of dangers, risks and threats with which the state is faced in 
the international ‘arena’ does not constitute a threat to its survival in real sense; on the 
contrary “it is its condition of possibility.”78 
The author of this study is of the opinion that anyone trying to comprehend the 
complex relationality between the domestic politics, security regime, and foreign policy 
discourses of any given nation state should not skip over the relevant analysis of Carl 
                                                 
76 For a more exhaustive account see Dillon, Michael, Politics of Security: Towards a Political 
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Schmitt, who is a relatively old but a very modern thinker79. Unlike his post-structuralist 
successors, to Schmitt securitization of foreign policy matters and even ‘the political’ 
itself by the state is a necessity emanating from the very nature of modern politics. He is 
inclined to conceptualize politics as a space, which is fundamentally based on and 
shaped through the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and ‘friend’ and ‘foe’. In 
Schmittian analysis this main distinction as “the operational codes of” the contemporary 
interstate system and of “the sovereign states of Western and Central Europe”80 is 
accepted as ontologically given, an unchanging fact as far as state’s foreign policy is 
concerned.  
To Schmitt each political collectivity and/or state should “be permanently 
prepared by strong foreign security and defence strategies to be able to face the constant 
threats”81 emanating from the “inimical others.” “Therefore the ultimate function of the 
political in Schmitt conceptualization is to set and maintain the boundary distinction 
between the societies and to protect the common identity, security and existence of a 
certain society against the threats coming from outside the geographical possessions of 
the state.”82  
Taking into account all these theoretical debates the burden of the subsequent 
part will be to discuss and problematize Turkey’s official security discourse concerning 
the Cyprus question. In this sense, the modes in which the issue is heavily securitized by 
the Turkish state and political elite via the use of a specific rhetoric will be delineated in 
a comprehensive manner. 
                                                 
79 For an excellent review of Schmitt’s ideas on such issues as ‘the political’, liberalism, sovereignty, the 
friend-foe distinction and the state see Cem Deveci, “Faşizmin Yorumsanması yada Carl Schmitt’in Saf 
Siyaset Kuramı”, in Liberalizm, Devlet, Hegemonya, E. Fuat Keyman (ed.), (İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 
2002), pp. 32-88.  
80 Poggi, Gianfranco, The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1990), pp. 10-11.  
81 Karatekelioğlu, Petek, The Impact of the European Union on the Modern Nation-State, Unpublished 
Master’s Thesis, (Ankara: Bilkent University, 2000), p. 12.  
82 Ibid., p. 12.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
MAIN PARADIGMS PROBLEMATIZING TURKISH MODERNITY 
AND THEIR CRITIQUES 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The Turkish modernization, the first implications of which could be traced back 
to the end of the eighteenth century, is a process including deviancies and contradictions 
that render a linear and ahistoric reading inadequate and meaningless. Even if it is 
generally identified with Westernization, modernization was, at the very beginning, 
conceived as a requirement of a defense strategy and a means of survival against the 
West for the Ottoman state. Not surprisingly, serious and systematic modernization was 
initially institutionalized within the field of military and education as in the case of 
other Middle Eastern countries since the only impetus behind those reforms was ‘saving 
the state’ as an institutional structure. The prior applications of Western methods in 
these two fields made substantial impacts on the emergence of a powerful military and 
civil bureaucracy and intelligentsia,1 who would lead the modernizing efforts both in the 
Ottoman polity after Tanzimat and also in the early years of the Republican era.  
By the end of the nineteenth century, the struggle between the traditional and 
modern institutions, values and ideas spilt over every field of domestic public sphere. In 
tandem with 1923, modernization as the founding paradigm of the Republicanist 
discourses and performances gave rise to drastic changes in the process through which 
                                                 
 
1 For a detailed reading on the emergence and historical evolution of this bureaucratic intelligentsia 
(Kalemiye) and the Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Âli), see Findley, V. Carter, Bureaucratic Reform in the 
Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte, 1789-1922, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). The book 
provides an alternative reading of the late Ottoman era (where the political modernization and 
dismantling co-existed) by focusing on the Sublime Porte as the core institution of the Ottoman 
bureaucracy. For a brief summary of the mentality of this bureaucratic intelligentsia in Tanzimat period, 
see also Çetinsaya, Gökhan, “Kalemiye’den Mülkiye’ye Tanzimat Zihniyeti”, in Cumhuriyete Devreden 
Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyetin Birikimi, Mehmet Ö. Alkan (ed.), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
2001), pp. 54-72.  
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the state identity and state society relations in Turkey were constructed. Concomitantly, 
Turkish political modernization was evolving from the strategy of the Ottoman state for 
survival against the West to the founding ideology of the Turkish Republican state 
foreseeing contemporarization by taking part within the Western society. At this point, I 
shall propose that in both cases the exclusion and ‘protection’ of the ‘domestic’, the 
‘inside’ from the ‘foreign’ and the ‘outside’ constituted the very basis of the 
governmentality in Turkey. Furthermore, in the latter period the inscription of the 
domestic society including the formation of new ‘man’ described by David Campbell as 
not only “individuals or national types but also the form of the domestic order, the 
social relations of production, the various subjectivities to which they give rise, the 
groups (such as women) who are marginalized in the process, and the boundaries of 
legitimate social and political action”2 were also embedded in these exclusionary 
policies. Thereby, drawing on Campbellian terminology, modernizing policies and 
discourses of the Turkish Republican state aiming at the transformation and 
restructuring of the society have continued to function as a ‘double exclusionary 
practice’.     
The main task of this chapter is to discuss the main arguments of the three basic 
paradigms that have made substantial contributions in understanding and explaining 
Turkish modernity. These approaches that could be cited as the sociological, 
bureaucratic and state centric, and political economy based understandings will be 
elaborated on by notably reflecting on their analyses regarding the state identity and 
state society relations throughout Turkish modernization process. Secondly, the 
commonalities among these paradigms assuming the domestic and foreign politics as 
distinct structures from each other will be emphasized since it is of great significance in 
clarifying the central aim and contribution of this dissertation. At this juncture, the 
                                                 
2 Campbell, David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity, 
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 63. 
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chapter foregrounds the notion that the literature on Turkish modernization lacks 
attention to the role and impact of external factors while analyzing the emergence and 
development of Turkish economic and political modernity. In the same vein, literature 
on Turkish modernization lacks attention to the foreign political sources and dynamics 
of Turkish economic and political modernity emerging and developing as a state-
sponsored and state-based project. The literature is prone to exclude the outer dynamics 
from its analyses on the nature of the relations between ‘the ruling’ and ‘the ruled’ in 
Turkey the evolution of which is deeply embedded in that of Turkish modernity. For 
instance the literature does not attach due importance to the significance of the state’s 
foreign political initiatives and discourses in reproducing the state-centricist character of 
Turkish politics and modernization. In this context, the chapter finally proposes that a 
multifaceted assessment of Turkish political modernity and the state identity 
necessitates: 
1. making reference to all internal and external political processes, while 
explaining the state-centricist and state-oriented structure of Turkish 
modernization, in this respect  
2. searching for the role and impact of the Turkish state’s foreign political 
initiatives, discourses and representations in the reproduction of its core 
characteristics and the domestic order; and thus 
3. evaluating the intertwined character of domestic and foreign political processes 
and their interactions instead of demarcating them in absolute boundaries. 
 
Turkish modernization process, in which historical changes within the political, 
economic, and cultural life of the society are embedded, has been a very efficient area 
of study for a long time for various social scientists coming from divergent schools and 
disciplines. The continuities and discontinuities in the state structure and the ruling 
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tradition shaping the state society relations, which can be read directly parallel to the 
development of such process, have also occupied a prominent position in these works. 
In this perspective, the three basic paradigms engaged in the analysis of Turkish 
political modernity will constitute the focal point of this chapter. 
 
 
4.2. The Sociological Based Approach 
The sociological based understanding adopted by such scholars as Şerif Mardin, 
Niyazi Berkes, and Tarık Zafer Tunaya gives priority to the sociological and socio-
political tools in analyzing Turkish modernization and its impact on the restructuring of 
the state identity and state society relations. The protagonists of this paradigm generally 
propose that those who want to probe into the issue at stake should primarily expatiate 
the distinctive features of Turkish politics. For instance, while presenting relations 
between the center and the periphery (the state and the society) as a key to explain 
Turkish polity, Şerif Mardin assigns strategic importance to making a comparison 
between the Turkish and Western European experiences in the centralization of the state 
authority3 within social structure since this discrepancy in the centralization of the state 
power eventuated in the constitution of state society relations in different manners. 
According to this approach, in the West the centralization process that has given rise to 
the modern nation state entailed a series of confrontations (that is conflict and 
consensus) between the peripheral and central powers whereas in the Turkish politics 
(both in Ottoman and Republican era) we can rather speak of a uni-dimensional 
confrontation which has merely appeared as a struggle between these two. This struggle 
surviving even after the modernization process of more than a century is defined by 
Mardin as the foremost social rupture constituting the very basis of Turkish polity.4  
                                                 
3 Mardin, Şerif, “Center Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish Politics?”, Daedalus, 102 (1973), p. 169.  
4 Ibid., p.170.  
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According to Keyman, Mardin, as the first social scientist to problematize the 
Turkish modernization with respect to modernity5, adopts a multi-faceted analytical and 
epistemological methodology allowing for the conceptualization of the historically and 
discursively constructed nature of modernization. Beyond the essentialist, functionalist 
and reductionist inferences of classical modernization paradigms, he yields a 
comprehensive analysis of Turkish political modernity without disregarding the very 
dynamic and controversial relationality among its social, economic and cultural 
dimensions6. Classical modernization discourses propound an evolutionary transitional 
process furthering stage by stage within a linear period of time where all traditional 
institutions of the social entity would be marginalized and thrown out of history. In line 
with argumentation, foundation of the nation state and national economy, sustenance of 
economic development, increase in industrialization and urbanization would naturally 
trigger the replacement of traditional establishments and values with the modern ones. 
Such reductionist theorization could conceptualize adequately neither the differentiated 
modes of modernity experienced in different historical and socio-political contexts nor 
the complicated and multidimensional relationality between ‘the traditional’ and ‘the 
modern’ having remarkable manifestations in both symbolic terms and everyday life of 
the society. The impasses and illusions of this paradigmatic positioning are surpassed in 
Mardin’s theoretical investigations feeding on diverse resources. Considering the 
purpose and content of this thesis work, I shall content myself with discussing his views 
on three crucial analytical planes. These are the foundation of the Turkish nation state, 
the center periphery relations and finally the opposition in Turkey.   
 
                                                 
5 Keyman, E. Fuat, “Şerif Mardin, Toplumsal Kuram ve Türk Modernitesini Anlamak”, Doğu Batı, 16 
(2001), p. 16. 
6 Ibid., p. 15. 
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4.2.1. Foundation of the Turkish Nation State  
Whilst discussing the role and status of the Turkish nation state in Mardin’s 
analysis of Turkish political modernity, we again face with a multidimensional 
perspective analyzing the dynamics of governmentality in Turkey through which 
privileged positioning of the state within social structure and its relations with other 
social groups are designated. For Mardin, since the history of modernization is neither 
the history of absolute ruptures nor the history of continuities, the Republican era 
conceptualized with the foundation of the Turkish Republic as a literal nation state and 
the Westernizing Kemalist will and discourse behind it should also be historicized with 
its conflicts and compromises with the Régime Ancien. As Fuat Keyman states such 
way of theorizing the Republican era could rescue us from the unidimensionality of the 
classical modernization paradigms foreseeing an evolutionary and linear transitional 
process from the traditional to the modern and not allowing to conceptualize ruptures, 
deviancies, and inconveniences within it. This approach could also indicate that in the 
eyes of the founders of the new nation state the Turkish Westernization refers to an 
adamant project of political modernity in which the traditional hierarchy between 
governmental institutions and social groups was maintained in the new form of state.  
In light of these introductory remarks, it could be proposed that in Mardin’s 
approach to Turkish modernity, the foundation of the Turkish nation state represents a 
‘dual act of drawing boundaries’ through which the legitimate ground of the Kemalist 
modernizing reforms is established. This dual initiation has also served as one of the 
main pillars of the new ideology according to which the norms, principles, and moral 
values of the modernizing reforms were also installed by the Republican staff. In this 
respect, the boundaries demarcating the Republican era and its nation state from the 
Ottoman Empire and its polity on one hand, and the political, social, economic, cultural, 
and ethical limits and boundaries of Turkish Westernization as a project of political 
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modernity and nation building on the other were drawn by the new state elite. This 
initiation which has a dual capacity of determining the conditions of both the old and 
the present rendered the state the only legitimate and sovereign subject of the 
modernization process. This privileged status vis-à-vis the society has facilitated the 
maintenance of the traditional hierarchy between governmental institutions and other 
social groups in which the existence of an autonomous public sphere from the state is 
disallowed. Thus, the Ottoman ruling tradition in which peripheral forces were excluded 
from decision-making mechanisms has been sustained this time by making the whole 
society the object of the ideals and actions of the central elite since the members of the 
society were not conceived as conscious and voluntary participants of the modernization 
and Westernization efforts but rather as a mass to be manipulated for the ideals of the 
Republic. 
  In contrast to the Ottoman era the Republican state has not striven to preserve 
the status quo with its all institutions but it aimed at constructing a brand new order in 
which there was no place for rival political figures. In this respect, the ideals of the 
Republicanist staff such as the modern nation, “national identity”, and “general will to 
Westernization”, which in fact did not exist, were accepted in a priori manner as 
already present and part of the social and political reality83. The Kemalists who assigned 
the state the mission and right of modernizing the society formulated and implemented 
their policies and discourses on the basis of such presuppositions, which has been 
reflecting, for Mardin, its utopian characteristic as dominant figures in the restructuring 
of the state. This utopianism also helped the creation of a proper ground on which 
ideological expectations of the new elite of the center were legitimized through the 
replacement of the traditional institutions, norms and values with modern 
establishments.  
                                                 
83 Mardin, Şerif, Türkiye’de Din ve Siyaset, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), p. 65.  
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In Mardin’s analysis the Republicanist period with its aforementioned 
specificities represents an absolute separation from the Ottoman polity. Besides, 
endeavors to materialize the objectives of transforming and modernizing the society 
have paradoxically induced the reproduction of the traditional hierarchy between the 
state and society. Due to this reproduction of tradition in a new form of state, 
Republican period also implies a radical reorganization of Ottoman heritage for the 
author. 
To sum up, Mardin interprets the foundation of the Turkish nation state and the 
modernizing Kemalist ideology and the will of contemporarization behind it as a 
“project of modernity”. He strives to expatiate the complex relations of this project with 
the Ottoman era within a certain understanding of history84 allowing the 
conceptualization of continuities and ruptures which co-existed in the transition from 
the Ottoman to the Republican polity. Such way of defining the Republican era where 
contrasts and contradictions are intertwined is of great merit to explicate the specific 
aspects of Turkish modernization both as a project of political modernity and as a 
practice of ruling. Concomitantly, while the objective of socializing the citizens of the 
new Republic in accordance with the norms and principles of political and cultural 
modernity was determined as the mission and basis of the state of the Turkish Republic, 
the endeavors to realize this objective have paradoxically induced the reproduction of 
the traditional hierarchy between the state and the society. 
 
4.2.2. The Center and Periphery 
Şerif Mardin in his article “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish 
Politics?” first published in 1973 provides very useful insights in analyzing the 
conditions of structuring and restructuring of Turkish politics in which the roles and 
                                                 
84 Keyman, Fuat E., “Şerif Mardin, Toplumsal Kuram ve Türk Modernitesini Anlamak”, p. 16.   
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status assigned to the central and peripheral forces (governmental institutions and social 
groups) are designated in accordance with a definite ruling tradition. This ruling 
tradition institutionalizing the duality of the center and the periphery has survived as a 
dominant figure both in the Ottoman and the Republican polities throughout the history 
of Turkish modernization. Even though, at first glance, the analysis of Turkish political 
system and thereby the modernization process within the context of this duality could 
seem inadequate and limited, this kind of conceptualization helps significantly to gain a 
fuller perspective ‘about the Turkish governmentality.’ This approach is also relevant in 
exploring how the center periphery relations have been constructed throughout the 
history of Turkish modernization. The article also searches for how and to what extent 
the reciprocal impact of the evolution of the Turkish modernity and the construction of 
the state society relations could be employed as an analytical tool in addressing the 
restructuring of Turkish politics. 
In this article, Mardin begins with indicating the historical and structural 
differences even oppositions of the Ottoman and Western experiences as to the 
constitution of the center and its relations with the periphery, which deeply affected the 
evolution of modernity in those societies. For him, to establish a fuller perspective as 
regards the Turkish political system and thereby the modernization process, it is needed 
to make a comparison with the Ottoman and Western institutions that present structural 
contrasts to each other85. In Mardin’s terminology 
the forces that shape the state in the West seem to vary significantly from those 
that shape the Ottoman state before modernization set in. Because of its feudal 
antecedents, the process of centralization that create the modern state included a 
series of confrontations leading to compromises with what may be called the 
forces of the periphery: the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers, and later, 
industrial labor.86  
 
                                                 
85 Mardin, Şerif, “Center Periphery Relations”, p. 169. 
86 Ibid., p. 170. 
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Both in late Ottoman and the Turkish Republican polity the traditional distance between 
the center and the periphery fed on the way in which the modernizing reforms were 
conducted by the central authority. As the author puts it, while in the West 
modernization was achieved through a series of confrontations where each time the 
integration of the periphery forces to the center of the political system was obtained, in 
the Turkish case those confrontations always occurred as a unidimensional and a major 
conflict between the state elite and social groups that created “the most important social 
cleavages underlying Turkish politics during the more than a century of 
modernization.”87  
In the same vein İlkay Sunar in his book of State and Society in the Politics of 
Turkey’s Development begins his analysis on the evolution of Turkish economic and 
political modernization by comparing and contrasting “Western feudalism and the 
Ottoman patrimonial rule”.88 He argues that the Medieval European politics was 
characterized by tensions and conflicts among the feudal lords who “try to expand their 
immunities and to establish themselves as rulers in their own rights” and the secular 
kings who “attempted to limit the political power of social estates through enforced 
subordination.”89 Thus the Medieval European political landscape was shaped and 
reshaped by the constant struggles between “the efforts of kings to offset the drive of 
social estates towards local autonomy on the one hand, and the typical response of these 
feudal estates that sought to enlarge their existing guarantees and privileges on the 
other.”90 Whereas the “patrimonial system” of the Ottoman Empire has never witnessed 
a constant struggle of that kind between the central authority and the peripheral forces 
                                                 
87 Ibid., p. 170. 
88 Sunar, İlkay, State and Society in the Politics of Turkey’s Development, (Ankara: Ankara University 
Faculty of Political Science Publication, 1974), pp. 3-11.  
89 Ibid., p. 3. 
90 Ibid., p. 3. 
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in such a way as to completely determine the speed and nature of the Ottoman/Turkish 
modernization.    
Another distinction foregrounded in the sociological based paradigm between 
the classical Ottoman order and West European feudalism is related to the degree of 
autonomy that society has acquired vis-à-vis the state authority. According to this 
analysis while in the pre-modern European politics autonomy of social groups was 
secured through various civil guarantees recognized to the peripheral forces against the 
royal authority91 these “rights and the immunities enjoyed by local communities … 
were absent in the Ottoman Empire”92. As Mardin clearly indicates mainly owing to the 
absence of such kind of rights and guarantees allowing the development of autonomous 
social groups, the Ottoman polity was characterized by the lack of Western type civil 
society institutions93. However it would be an exaggeration to claim that the subjects 
(reaya) remained totally undefended vis-à-vis exercises of the state apparatus precisely 
because the power and authority of the Sultanate was limited with the “millet system”, 
the divine law (shariah) and the necessity of being just and equitable towards its 
subjects. It was the obligation of the Sultan (Padishah) as “God’s trustee” “to dispense 
justice (adalet) and to administer welfare (hisba)”94 and to take all the measures for the 
sustenance of the conventional socio-political order and its institutions. What is more, 
as it would be more clear in the course of this chapter the Ottoman bureaucracy both in 
the pre-modern and in the transitional periods never avoided to establish multi-faceted 
patronage relations with different socio-economic groups and the relevant institutional 
structures guaranteeing the maintenance of these relations in the manner that the power-
holders desired. While securing the reproduction of these patronage relations “a main 
                                                 
91 Bendix, Reinhard, “Social Stratification and the Political Community”, in Philosophy, Politics and 
Society, Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), p. 213.  
92 Sunar, İlkay, State and Society in the Politics of Turkey’s Development, p. 4. 
93 Mardin, Şerif, “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire”, Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 11/3, (June 1969), p. 264. 
94 Sunar, İlkay, State and Society in the Politics of Turkey’s Development, p. 6.  
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concern of the state was to ensure that each individual remained in his own class; this 
was regarded as the basic requisite for politico-social order and harmony.”95          
The millet system situating the Ottoman palace at an equal distance from almost 
all ethnic and religious communities granted those groups a relative degree of 
autonomy96 particularly as regards their internal affairs. While examining the 
differences between the Ottoman paradigm of order and the European feudalism as pre-
modern political systems İlkay Sunar concisely summarizes how the state society 
relations and the status of different socio-economic groups vis-à-vis the state were 
reconfigured within the Ottoman politics:  
Nevertheless it is true that what made the Ottoman Empire different from 
Medieval Europe was a model of society in which social relationships and 
institutions were sustained by the direction imparted by the state. It was political 
authority which held together and defined the limits of society as a whole. 
Political authority penetrated the social sphere of life in such a way that society 
was subsumed under the state, and economic life was closely supervised by the 
ruler. No irrevocable immunities existed for the reaya (subjects). In short there 
were no privileged or immune estates which could act independently of the 
political center based on property rights, corporate personality, or the autonomy 
of towns.97  
 
Mardin and his various colleagues draw our attention to the intertwinedness and 
parallelisms between the constitutive dynamics of modernizing programs and those of 
state society relations. The recognition of the autonomous status of the peripheral forces 
in the West during “those confrontations” whether leading to “compromise” or conflict 
or even to the “victory of one side over the other”98 paved the way for their involvement 
in the political system. On the contrary, exclusion of peripheral forces from the center 
has always caused the growth of the mutual suspicion between the state and society in 
Turkey. Throughout the modernization process this mutual suspicion, which is one of 
                                                 
95 İnalcık, Halil, “The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey”, in R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow (eds.), 
Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 97.  
96 Gibb, H.A.R., and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, (London: Oxford University Press, 
1957), Volume I, Part II, Chapter XIV.  
97 Sunar, İlkay, State and Society in the Politics of Turkey’s Development, p. 5. 
98 Mardin, Şerif, “Center Periphery Relations”, p. 170. 
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the central reasons of the estrangement of the center and the periphery from each 
other99, has survived and constituted the limits and the conditions of participation of the 
peripheral forces in the policy making mechanisms.  
According to Mardin, the whole responsibility of the estrangement and 
cleavages between the center and the periphery belongs to the state itself as it does not 
recognize the legitimacy of the peripheral forces’ identities and their symbolic and 
cultural differences. “The state’s claim to political and economic control was bolstered 
by its title to cultural preeminence. Relative to the heterogeneity of the periphery, the 
ruling class was singularly compact; this was, above all, a cultural phenomenon.”100 
This cultural heterogeneity of the periphery was perceived particularly by the 
Republicanist staff as a danger to its unity and sovereignty. It was also an obstacle for 
the building of an organic and homogenous nation that would be identified with the 
ideal of the modern nation state. The peripheral forces were always seen as a mass that 
should be modernized and rationalized by the ruling elite in accordance with its 
pretentious modernization project predicated on the construction of a ‘modern’ self: a 
modern self leaving aside the traditional institutions, values and way of life and 
internalizing a new Weltanshauung in full conformity with the state’s modernizing 
reforms. Thereby, the cultural dimension of the traditional conflict between the center 
and the periphery is not less important and non-negligible than the political aspect. 
Should we quote from the article  
on the one hand, the entire mechanism of the state was permeated by the myth of 
the majesty of the Sultan (later in the first years of Republic this was replaced by 
the majesty of Atatürk); on the other hand, there were restrictions placed on the 
common mortal’s access to the symbols of official culture. For much of the 
population, nomad or settled, rural or urban, this cultural separation was the 
most striking feature of its existence on the periphery.101  
                                                 
99 Ibid., p. 183 and ff. 
100 Ibid., p. 173. 
101 Ibid., p. 173. 
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According to the author, the center-periphery polarity as “an extremely important 
structural component of Turkish politics perpetuated during the history of 
modernization in Turkey”. In this polarity defining the core characteristics of Turkish 
polity the periphery was represented “as a two-faceted entity”:   
the periphery as made up of primordial groups, and as the periphery as the center 
of a counter-official culture. Both were bêtes noires of the Young Turks and of 
the Kemalists. But the policies of the modernizers, as well as fortuitous 
developments, worked to highlight the second facet of peripheral identity.102     
 
4.2.3. The Opposition in Turkey 
It is non-deniable fact that the governmental rationality and the ruling tradition 
in Turkey the evolution of which is interrelated with that of modernity, opposition has 
been more often than not perceived by the power-holders as the ‘threatening other’ 
against which the fundamental characteristics of the domestic regime and the society is 
defined negatively. Thus the processes through which the state identity and the state 
society relations have been reconstructed in Turkey embrace also the reconstruction of 
the opposition. Furthering the analysis one step more, one should argue, in conformity 
with Şerif Mardin, that the boundaries within which the opposing groups have been 
forced to remain constitute also the boundaries of the political in Turkey. Within the 
regime the role assigned to the opposition is not to surpass those demarcating ‘the 
legitimate’ from ‘the illegitimate’, ‘the legal’ from ‘the illegal’. For this reason finding 
out how the opposition is perceived and represented would make significant 
contribution to the analysis of peculiar inner dynamics of Turkish politics. In this 
context, it is also strategically important to decipher the functioning of the political 
mechanisms controlling and neutralizing the opponent both as a means and consequence 
of the practice of ruling through which the state identity is stabilized. 
                                                 
102 Ibid., p. 187. 
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Mardin in his article ‘Opposition and Control in Turkey’ delineates the modes of 
construction of the relationship between the governmental elite and the opposing groups 
throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. He is interested not only in theorizing 
the issue in political terms but also in searching for the social origins of intolerance 
against the different and the opponent in the country103. As such, the major objective of 
the author is to explore the variables of the common attitude towards the opposition 
mirrored both by the representatives of the central and the peripheral groups. The article 
is also of significance in the sense that it indicates the reciprocal relationality between 
the evolution of political modernity and the exclusion and elimination of opposing 
movements from the political system. 
If the opposition is defined as a mechanism having the ability of both limiting 
the absolute authority of the political power and of proposing and producing alternative 
policies, it could be claimed that there never existed such an opposition within the 
Ottoman polity.104 However this Western type of conceptualization of the opposition 
could preclude attaining a full perspective regarding the special status of some 
mediatory institutions situated on the borderline in between the center and the 
periphery. For instance, the ideas of ulema, who was under the safeguard of the religion 
could not be easily eliminated when they were in conflict with the central authority. 
Again as Mardin puts it, extremities of absolutism could have been restrained through 
an arduous balance institutionalized between the Sultan, the janissaries, the ulema, and 
the Kalemiye (the bureaucratic class).105 Besides, it should be noted that intolerance 
against the opposition groups articulating their criticisms and alternative opinions 
against the central authority could be remarked throughout the whole Turkish 
modernization history beginning with the late Ottoman era. For instance, when the 
                                                 
103 Mardin, Şerif, “Türkiye’de Muhalefet ve Kontrol” in Türk Modernleşmesi Makaleler 4, Mümtazer 
Türköne and Tuncay Önder (eds.), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), pp. 190-93. 
104 Ibid.,  p. 179. 
105 Ibid.,  p. 179. 
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attitude and actions of Kalemiye, strengthening throughout the nineteenth century as the 
nucleus of the bureaucratic class, which would conduct the modernizing reforms are 
analyzed vis-à-vis the opposing and peripheral forces, the same scene is bound to be 
faced with. Like the Sultans and Young Turks of the early twentieth century, the 
members of this modernizing bureaucratic class always identified the opposing groups 
and their criticisms on the government’s specific policies with betrayal to the state. This 
identification was intended for rendering the legitimacy and legality of the opposition 
debatable and interrogated106. As a method of ruling this identification was also 
functionalized by the state elite of the new Republic to establish a political hegemony 
and to exclude the opposing and peripheral forces from the governmental institutions.  
For Mardin, all the opposing currents in the political history of modern Turkey 
were always accused in the same way as they posed a threat to the national unity and 
even to the territorial integrity and hindered the conduct of the modernizing reforms107. 
Such kind of accusation on the one hand eased the removal of the opponent groups from 
the political sphere and on the other paved the way for the government to maximize its 
objectives. More interestingly, Mardin’s sociological analysis regarding the everyday 
life indicates that although there has not been a satisfactory body of reliable studies, the 
widespread and close control is one of the endemic characteristics of the Turkish 
nation.108 The author also maintains that the intolerance towards the different can be 
witnessed in almost all social strata. Besides, the intolerance against the deviancies 
feeds on a perpetual fear of disintegration kept alive at national level. There has been a 
functional relationship in between this fear and the widespread control serving as a 
practice of ruling both at local and national level. The intolerance and estrangement, 
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which are noticeable as a fundamental feature of center/periphery polarity in Turkish 
politics, have a “more deep-rooted and diffused social basis than assumed”109. 
 
 
4.3. The Bureaucratic and State Centric Approach 
The second paradigm foregrounding a state-centric analysis ventures to address 
and problematize the Turkish political modernity and the “legitimacy formula” through 
which the core characteristics of Turkish politics are defined. By capturing the attention 
to the extremely “strong state tradition” in Turkey, Metin Heper searches for the 
unfolding of the historical roots of the privileged and primary status allocated to the 
bureaucracy vis-à-vis other political figures and, in institutional terms, the state vis-à-vis 
the society. For him contrary to the Western European experience, the intolerance of the 
state elite toward the emergence of any politically influential and autonomous social 
groups both within the Ottoman and Republican polities together with some other 
factors such as the proliferation of praetorianist tendencies rendered the bureaucracy the 
dominant agent in Turkish modernization. The protagonists of this paradigm generally 
imply that the performances and discourses of these elites including the civilian and 
military bureaucratic establishment are geared toward consolidating their status within 
the regime as the only class having the transformative capacity to restructure the socio-
political order. 
The state-centric approaches ascribing the state an autonomous and independent 
status vis-à-vis other institutions within the sociopolitical structure have proved their 
durabilities in the literatures of various disciplines ranging from international relations 
to political science. In those studies, the state, as the most important unit of analysis, has 
been attached an ontologically given and epistemologically primary status. Presumed as 
a unitary and rational actor and sometimes even a transcendental subject, the state has 
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the ability and capacity to determine and manipulate the conditions through which 
politics is reproduced. Here lies the main source of autonomy and supremacy assigned 
to the state vis-à-vis other agents. According to Nettl, who is among the prominent 
figures of the state-centered theoretical enterpreses, the autonomy implies the qualities 
that render the state a distinct sector enjoying independence in fulfilling its structural 
functions. Sovereignty refers to its capacity to determine and realize the common goods 
and objectives both for and on behalf of the society. Furthermore, the state is theorized 
as an institution determining the common interest independent from the society rather 
than as a societal and/or economic formation.110  
As far as the Turkish political history is concerned, those state-centric analyses 
can be substantiated through Metin Heper’s studies focusing on the bureaucratic class as 
the champion of the modernizing reforms and the “strong state tradition” in Turkey. It is 
fair to propose that the bureaucratic intelligentsia has a central focus in Heper’s reading 
of the Turkish political history as its alliances and political struggles with other groups 
have a capacity to determine the conditions of Turkish political structure, and thereby 
the development of democracy and state society relations in Turkey. In this section of 
the chapter, I shall particularly focus on his theoretical investigations on the status of the 
bureaucracy and its constant desire to occupy and even constitute the locus of stateness. 
In this context, examining the linkage established by Heper between the consolidation 
of the bureaucracy’s central and autonomous position within the system and of the 
transcendental nature of Turkish state will be of great merit when the aimed 
contributions and objectives of this chapter are considered.  
According to Özman and Coşar111 the fundamental issue problematized in 
Heper’s studies is how the dynamics of Turkish politics are conditioned by a definite 
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form and mentality of the state. Thus, he aims at elucidating the main characteristics of 
the ‘strong state tradition’ in Turkey and its legitimacy formula through which the state 
society relations are constructed. For instance, the distinction he makes between the two 
different articulations of the state “as a generalizing idea embodying rationally-
formulated norms and values” can be said to gain great significance in this perspective:  
first the state as an integrating idea seeking to unify the disparate elements of 
society around the norms and values in question; and second the state as an 
legitimizing idea- only that political power which is exercised according to the 
said norms and values is legitimate.112  
 
With respect to this distinction it should also be noted that the center periphery polarity 
used by Mardin as a key to Turkish polity is replaced in Heper’s studies by the polarity 
in between the state elite and the political elite.  
 
4.3.1. The Locus of Stateness 
For Heper, the structural and historical conditions that produce this polarity in 
different contexts are of central importance to explore the dynamics of Turkish political 
system. This re-evaluation of Mardin’s center periphery distinction in the perspective of 
state centric theorization provides him the means of transition from the social cultural 
dimension to the political cultural dimension.113 In Heper’s terminology, the center 
(locus) of stateness refers not only to the political sphere surrounded by the civil and 
military bureaucratic elite and intelligentsia but also to the sphere in which basic norms 
and principles of politics are established and implemented.114 To Heper, the elite of the 
center in an attempt to construct and consolidate their primary status within the Turkish 
polity have always striven to keep the political life under their control so much so that 
alternative political figures (especially if they claim to represent the periphery) have 
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been perceived as a threat to the modernizing reforms. In this regard, the political 
struggle between the state elite representing the state’s modernization project and the 
political elite asserting the traditional values and the impact of this struggle on the 
structure of the state in Turkey have constituted the main trail of Heper’s analysis on the 
historical development of Turkish politics. Heper drastically mentions that after the 
death of Mustafa Kemal, for the maintenance and consolidation of its position within 
the system, the state elite has induced a transformation in formulating the norms and 
principles of Atatürkist thought. In this sense, throughout Atatürk’s lifetime these were 
defined as the techniques of discovering the truth, afterwards its bureaucratized version 
was put into force by the civil servant based on the strict ideological phrases 
legitimizing and securing its central position in Turkish polity. Reconstruction of 
Kemalist principles in such dogmatic way also helped the state to keep the political 
sphere under its absolute control and to act as both the ethical and political subject of 
Turkish modernization. In Heper’s terminology, the center, in which the sovereignty of 
the state is institutionalized and the legitimate and legal boundaries of ‘the political’ are 
drawn, corresponds to the concept of ‘the locus of stateness’. Heper points to the 
parallelism in between the political forces who occupy the locus of stateness and the 
structural conditions of Turkish political system, which impinge upon one another 
reciprocally. It may be surmised that the close examination of the impact of this 
interaction on the state society relations in Turkey throughout the Republican history 
could also provide us a new analytical plane regarding the issue since the characteristics 
of the political forces who constituted the center have deeply influenced those relations.  
Heper strives to analyze the history of Turkish political modernity through a 
periodization based on the changes of the political forces dominating the political 
center. In accordance with this periodization, in the Ottoman polity the locus of 
stateness oscillated between the Sultanate and the bureaucracy particularly in the late 
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Ottoman era, where modernizing reforms were accelerated. Throughout this period, the 
bureaucratic class followed a consistent policy to exclude the Sultanate from the locus 
of stateness with the purpose of weaking the Palace within the Ottoman polity. During 
the War of Independence the Grand National Assembly, defined by Mustafa Kemal as 
the only genuine representative and a concrete symbol of the national will, functioned 
as the locus of stateness. In the period of 1923-38 (beginning with the foundation of 
Turkish Republic and ending with the death of Mustafa Kemal) the Presidency 
constituted the locus of stateness. In the subsequent period of 1938-50, the locus was 
fulfilled by the civil servant involving the Republican People’s Party political 
bureaucracy. With the 1950 parliamentarian elections in which the Democrat Party 
acquired the overwhelming majority, the political struggles to occupy and control the 
center gained a determinacy capacity in structuring and restructuring of the Turkish 
political system. It can be claimed with some degree of accuracy that in the period of 
1950-60 the duality in between the state and the political elite pointed to by the author 
in various cases sharpened but did not lead to a change in the perception and exercise of 
the political power as in the case of state centric governing mentality. Subsequently, the 
1960 military coup symbolizes the institutionalization of the military’s determinacy 
position in Turkish political life. While the political restructuring in Turkey after 1960s 
which was performed unilaterally by the state elite placed the civil bureaucratic elite 
and later the presidency (directly) and the military (indirectly) at the core of the state, in 
several European countries the re-equilibration efforts were carried out by the elected 
representatives of the social groups, attenuating the role of the state apparatus.115 In 
consequence, within the transitional period of 1960-72 the military and the civil 
bureaucracy co-existed in the center of Turkish politics. Nevertheless, from 1972 
onwards the military’s weight and influence within the state have gradually increased. 
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In the subsequent period, the 1980 military coup and the 1982 Constitution 
institutionalized the occupation of the locus of stateness by the military and the 
presidency the first implications of which could be traced back to the 1961 Constitution 
and constitutional amendments in the following ten years. In accordance with this kind 
of periodization, the fundamental duality determining the structural conditions of 
Turkish polity could also be read as a polarity in between the political forces 
constituting the locus of stateness and the ones remaining outside and/or excluded from 
it. When the political groups remaining outside the center (read the periphery) could not 
reach it or when they could not internalize the social and political norms and values 
established by the state elite (read the center), this polarity and the conflicts embedded 
in it have grown increasingly.  
 
4.3.2. The Modernizing Kemalist Reforms             
Heper sets out his analysis on the modernizing Kemalist reforms by establishing 
a linkage between the French Revolution of 1789, which was conducted by the 
bureaucratic elite, and the Turkish case. In replacing l’état c’est moi with national moi 
(a sovereign general will)116 however; in Atatürk’s mind the creation of new man in 
accordance with the national moi is not directly the duty and the responsibility of the 
Turkish people “who have lost their capacity of taking the initiative because of the long 
centuries of the Sultan’s personal rule”. Thus, activating the potential of Turkish people 
and elevating them to the level of contemporary civilization was institutionalized as the 
basic mission of the Republican state.117 Until ordinary Turkish people attained a certain 
level of consciousness within the process of Westernization, “it was an obligation on the 
part of all the members of the Grand National Assembly, and all other elites- to 
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enlighten the people and help them make progress.”118 Under these circumstances, the 
locus of stateness was designated as the Turkish Grand National Assembly, holding all 
administrating powers in its hands, but not civil bureaucracy towards whom Mustafa 
Kemal had deep distrust and suspicion during the years of the War of Independence. 
Heper maintains that even after the war was over, and Ankara government was 
established, the civil bureaucracy displayed a dual characteristic. On one hand, there 
were many young and pro-nationalist bureaucrats coming from the Sublime Porte loyal 
to the traditional values of the Old Regime.119 The pro-nationalist and modernist wing 
of the civil bureaucracy has always perceived the latter both as a danger to the 
modernizing reforms and in opposition to themselves.120 Henceforth, once the Ankara 
government was established, more effective and permanent measures were taken to 
eliminate the Sublime Porte wing of the civil servants, who were blamed by Mustafa 
Kemal for undermining the national effort during the initial stages of the War of 
Independence.121 
During the early years of the Republican era, the role and status assigned by 
Mustafa Kemal to the civil bureaucracy within the new state structure is concisely 
summarized by the author as follows:  
Atatürk opted for a Hegelian state- one that would safeguard the general interest 
without overwhelming civil society. However, he rejected, in the Turkish case, 
one integral element of the Hegelian state- ‘the absolute class’, or civil 
bureaucracy – as the guardian of the general interest. For the civil bureaucracy 
he revived an Ottoman tradition by adopting the idea of the machine model. For 
Atatürk the civil bureaucracy was a lesser part of the governmental machine- a 
mere instrument (kâbil-i istimal bir cihaz).122   
     
Parallel to the efforts of the government to reorganize and keep the civil servant under 
its tight control, the political party bureaucracy of the Republican People’s Party 
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gradually strengthened and began to act as if part of the apparatus of the Republican 
government.123  
In the 1927 (The Republican People’s) Party convention it was decided that the 
officials administering social, political, economic, and cultural agencies, as well 
as the village headmen, could be appointed only with the approval of the party’s 
inspectors. And the party set up a far-reaching organization alongside the civil 
bureaucracy, which could both control the bureaucracy and deprive it of some of 
its potential functions.124 
 
According to Heper, Mustafa Kemal faced with a crucial dilemma regarding the civil 
bureaucracy. On one hand, he tried to organize it functioning as a machine like 
institution, on the other he wanted them to be champions of the modernizing reforms 
and of “a substantively value system namely Atatürkist thought.”125 For this reason, the 
locus of stateness remained under the shadow of Presidency along those years. 
However, with İnönü’s presidency (1938-50) the bureaucratic intelligentsia began to 
gain a larger place126 and a more influential status within Turkish polity. According to 
Aydemir, the factor leading to such a situation can be seen as İnönü’s determination to 
concentrate all powers in government rather than in the political party.127  
Heper finds out a parallelism between the rise of civil bureaucracy within two 
decades following the 1920s and the transformation of the ‘Atatürkist Weltanschauung’ 
par excellence into an ideological totality. Concomitantly, as stated elsewhere, while in 
the early years of the Republic the Kemalist modernizing reforms were defined as the 
techniques of finding out the truth guiding the society to a higher level of civilization, 
they were loaded with “substantive meanings”128 with the fulfillment of the locus of 
stateness by the bureaucratic intelligentsia. The objective of this bureaucratized version 
of Atatürkist thought, as a political manifesto is to legitimize and consolidate its central 
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role and position within Turkish polity. As they did not have Atatürk’s charisma, they 
needed such a well-organized and strictly defined political formulae and to “take upon 
themselves the responsibility of carrying it out.”129  
Heper additionally claims that there has been a strong proclivity among the 
members of the bureaucratic intelligentsia, who attributed themselves the mission of 
Westernizing Turkey, to hold the modernistic attitude for their own sake. The 
reconstruction of Atatürkist outlook in a bureaucratized form based on strictly 
modernizing and quasi-chauvinistic discourses could also be evaluated in this context. 
He also highlights the significance and even necessity of making a distinction between 
the state traditions that may be traced back to Mustafa Kemal’s lifetime and be 
attributed to the bureaucratic intelligentsia. This differentiation sourced from the 
bureaucratic deviancy becomes evident particularly in the perception of transcendental 
nature of the state. In the former case, it is imagined that the mission, assigned to the 
state elite and intelligentsia- that of leading Turkish society in the course of 
Westernization and modernization, continues until the people could gain the capacity of 
conducting the process on their own. Therefore, elitism and transcendentalism were 
conceived just as transient means of reaching and surpassing the contemporary 
civilization whereas they were perceived by the civil servant as an end in itself. Karpat 
notes that the political orientation of the bureaucratic intelligentsia was based on “the 
idea that the intellectual should be the guide of the masses instead of opening avenues 
for their development.”130 Heper maintains that the civil servant who wanted to secure 
its central status preferred to promote transcendentalism and to structure the state 
system on a bureaucratic version of Kemalist principles functioning also as an 
exclusionary practice vis-à-vis the political elite claiming to represent the peripheral 
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groups. This bureaucratic élan perpetuating the transcendental nature of the state 
provides them the proper ground on which they could constitute the locus of stateness 
as the sole power at least for a definite period of 1938-1950.  
Concomitant with the increase of transcendentalism and centralization of the 
state power some structural changes occurred within Turkish politics concisely 
summarized in the statement below cited by Heper from Lewis: “After the death of 
Atatürk there was deterioration. In the hands of lesser men than himself, his 
authoritarian and paternalistic mode of government degenerated into something nearer 
to dictatorship as the word is commonly understood.”131 This statement implies a period 
characterized by the ‘transient transcendental’ nature of the state where the legitimate 
and legal boundaries of all sorts of activities were inscribed by the bureaucratic 
intelligentsia. The subordinate status of the economics vis-à-vis the politics; and also of 
the economic activities vis-à-vis the high interests of the state articulated by those elites 
constitute another particularistic aspect of this period. In this context, the constitution 
and perpetuation of the state society relations in accordance with the statist paradigm 
and discourses outlined above were assumed as a principal and immediate task by the 
bureaucratic establishment. On the other hand, Heper’s emphasis on the cooperation and 
co-optation between the members of the academic and bureaucratic intelligentsia 
particularly in the period of 1945-1960 and during the elaboration of 1961 Constitution 
vis-à-vis the political figures claiming to represent the expectations of the people is 
eminently striking. The most profound distinction among this alliance and the political 
elite could be substantiated through their perception and notion of democracy. At this 
point it will be relevant and elucidating to have a glance at Heper’s writings on the 
issue.  
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4.3.3. Democracy In Turkey 
The author conceptualizes the difficulties of democracy in Turkey by making 
reference to the ‘strong state tradition’ and the duality between the political and state 
elite that is embedded in this tradition132 since the conflicting situation among these two 
parties deriving from their different perceptions and expectations related to the 
democracy have a transformative capacity in restructuring the socio-political system in 
Turkey. To summarize roughly, the state elite conceives democracy as ‘rationalist 
democracy’ achieved through negotiations targeting to find out the common good for 
the society. In rationalist democracy the political elite is expected to be well-educated 
and knowledgeable politicians preoccupied with the long-term interests and coming 
generations instead of forthcoming elections.133 Thus the democratic regime is 
maintained through the rational decisions and actions of those well-educated political 
actors implementing the best polities for the country. Therefore rationality and 
responsibility are conceptualized as the sine qua non of the smooth functioning of the 
democratic processes.  
On the contrary, the political elite foregrounds the priority of the national will 
vis-à-vis the necessities of the raison d’état articulated through the state centric interest 
calculations, thus rendering the autonomy and independence of the state apparatus 
debatable within the social order. In such perception of democracy the term 
‘responsibility’ is replaced with the term ‘responsiveness’ that could be defined as 
sensitivity towards the demands and expectations of the people. Özman and Coşar state 
that the horizontal and vertical dimensions defined by Giovanni Sartori as the two legs 
of the democratic system are explanatory concepts in Heper’s writings on democracy. In 
his conceptualization the vertical and horizontal dimensions refer to responsibility and 
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responsiveness respectively.134 To Heper, should the balance between these two 
dimensions be established, a viable democracy could exist and consolidate. In other 
words, the viability of a democratic regime is contingent on the compromise between 
the state elite, determining the public interest and conscience beyond and above the 
public and taking democracy as an end in itself, and the political actors, targeting to 
come to power to realize the interests of the social groups they claim to represent.135 
The author declares the political elite responsible for the absence of such balance and 
compromise on the grounds that they cannot deduce the necessary lessons from the past. 
Therefore, the full establishment of democracy in Turkey can be achieved only when 
the political elite has internalized democracy understanding and the responsibility 
consciousness of the state elite.                 
 
4.4. The Political Economy Based Approach  
  The scholars of the third paradigm such as Çağlar Keyder, Korkut Boratav, 
Gülten Kazgan, and İlkay Sunar, generally coming from the Marxist tradition draw on 
the world system and dependency theories to develop their analyses on the Turkish 
modernity within the perspective of the political economy. They search for how and to 
what extent the economic means and implications (such as the distribution of means of 
production and income among the social classes and their power and ability to influence 
the decision-makers) have had a bearing on structuring and restructuring the Turkish 
political system and the state itself. Çağlar Keyder in his book State and Class in Turkey 
after evaluating the distinctive functioning and characteristics of the traditional Ottoman 
land system which differs from European feudalism, tries to find out the parallelisms 
between the dismantling of this system and changes in the relations of the central 
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authority with the periphery in the late Ottoman era, which would also have its imprint 
on the polity in the early Republican period. In this regard, he also focuses on the 
economic policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki) aiming 
at eliminating the possible rival classes vis-à-vis the bureaucratic elite by nationalizing 
the bourgeoisie and changing the owners of the means of production. This theoretical 
position problematizing the Turkish modernization history and the economic and 
ideological conditions restructuring the political order throughout this process benefits 
from the analytical means of political economy. Doing this it ventures to unfold the 
relationality between the economic mode of production and the reproduction of the 
social origins of politics.  
For the economics-based scholars of this paradigm the World System Theory136 
provides a fertile ground in which the emergence and spread of world capitalism is 
presumed as the primary and independent variable in analyzing Turkish political 
modernity. They prefer to read Turkish modernization history in two different contexts: 
first the peripheralization of Turkish social formation due to the integration with world 
capitalism and second the efforts of the bureaucratic class to reestablish its control and 
hegemony over the production and redistribution processes of the economic surplus. In 
this context, determination of the nature of class structures and struggles inherent in the 
mode of production and the role of those in restructuring of the political regime due to 
conjunctures of world capitalism could be indicated as the central subject matters in this 
paradigm. 
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It is generally accepted that in Western Europe the transition from the feudal to 
the capitalist mode of production was accompanied by the replacement of the pre-
modern social and political institutions with the modern ones from the sixteenth century 
onwards. The world system theory even implies that the nature and institutionalization 
of modernism as a form of social development unique to the West are integral to the 
development and spread of capitalism. Concomitantly, the political formations of the 
European feudalism with limited sovereignty and authority over the community that 
were inadequately institutionalized and centralized transformed into centralized and 
crystallized modern nation states as an outcome of world capitalism stretching into the 
sixteenth century.137 
However, in societies where the transition to the capitalist mode of production 
occurred in a totally different context, the transformation of social relations and 
constitution of modern politics introduced, one might say, a more complicated and 
distinctive progress in conjunction with their specifities. The World System Theory and 
the literature on peripheral development address the political modernity experienced in 
those societies with respect to their incorporation in world capitalism and finds out an 
intertwinedness between economic peripheralization and political modernization. As 
such, the relationality between the mode of production and of surplus extraction and the 
ideological reproduction of the political system that are not independent from the 
conjuncture of global capitalism constitutes the main analytical domain for the 
protagonists of this paradigm, where the unique and distinctive features of Turkish 
political modernity and economic system could be problematized. For this reason, they 
generally prefer to set out their analyses by focusing upon the peculiarities of the 
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Ottoman economic and land system differentiating it from the European pre-capitalist 
order.  
In this regard Keyder, in his book State and Class In Turkey, foregrounds the 
two historical facts determining the socioeconomic origins of Ottoman/Turkish political 
modernity. The first one is the absence of large-scale land ownership that could 
challenge the central position of the bureaucratic class within the state structure as the 
sole power expropriating the economic surplus and the second is the expulsion of the 
ethnically differentiated Ottoman bourgeoisie, which left the bureaucratic elite 
unrivalled in “directing and controlling the state centered socioeconomic 
transformation.”138 These, in effect, indicate that the social division of labor within the 
Ottoman setting, and to a certain extent in the Republican period, was being organized 
not mainly due to the economic criteria or market relations but rather to the perpetuation 
of the traditional political balances in such a way as to ensure the dominance of the state 
over all social groups.   
The Ottoman economic order, in which slavery or serfdom identified with 
European feudalism did not exist, hinged upon the protection of small and independent 
peasantry from which the necessary surplus was extracted. The existence of an 
agricultural and land tenure system never tolerating the autonomous and large-scale 
land ownership was deemed necessary by the state for the maintenance of the power 
relations specific to Ottoman polity. In the Ottoman economic order all arable land was 
assumed as the property (mülk) of the Sultan yet the right of usufruct was granted to the 
subjects (reaya) under certain circumstances.  
In practice, the state, as the regulator of the economy, apportioned the 
control of the land to military gentry (sipahi) who had shown extraordinary feats 
of courage under circumstances of war. The function of this gentry was to 
collect taxes from the peasantry and, in return, provide the state with armed 
troops (cebeli) in times of war. As military gentry they were members of the 
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ruling center; however, as benefice (timar) holders, they performed social and 
economic roles. Benefices were not hereditary; since they were granted they 
could also be appropriated. Although a part of the benefice was allocated for the 
sipahi’s use, his main task was the collection of taxes, fees and the provision of 
armed troops. The sipahi could not encroach upon the reaya’s right to usufruct, 
but neither was the reaya free to utilize the land as he wished. As in all spheres 
of production, producers were subordinate to the needs and the political 
coordination of the Empire. Production, in this sense, was for use, and not for 
exchange on a formally free market. In agriculture, the sipahi was the agent of 
this system of overall coordination.  
In trade and commerce the subordination of the merchants to the political 
coordination of the Empire was also a fact139.  
 
As it can be deduced from this lengthy quotation from Sunar, the relations of production 
and redistribution in the Ottoman order were organized by the central authority such 
that it enabled the state’s active involvement and intervention in the socioeconomic life. 
For the ruling elite the only way to preserve its privileged position within the 
sociopolitical structure was the sustenance of the state’s close control and oversight 
over all economic and commercial activities. As it would be more apparent in the pages 
to come the will and strong enthusiasm of the bureaucratic establishment to keep the 
economic sphere under its control is a phenomenon observable in the whole phases of 
the Ottoman/Turkish modernization process. Furthermore in such periods as the early 
years of the Republican era the control and manipulation of all economic activities and 
actors by the state apparatus was assumed as indispensable for rebuilding the state’s 
autonomy and supremacy vis-à-vis the society. To sum up the authors of this paradigm 
often converge on the idea that the absence of an independent or semi-independent 
economic life from the central authority and of groups “which crystallized around 
economic interests and which were ultimately shaped by the market situation as 
classes”140 within the Ottoman paradigm of order can be explained due to two reasons: 
the instrumentalization of the economic sphere first in the maintenance of state society 
relations as the relations of subjugation and dominance and second in the reproduction 
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of domestic power relations in order to secure both the economic interests and 
politically dominant position of bureaucracy within the system.            
Should the control and domination of the state functionaries over the production 
and redistribution processes as well as the nature of social classes be closely examined, 
it could be deduced that “the Ottoman order was constructed upon the Byzantine and 
Eastern Roman precedent.”141 In the classical Ottoman order the social stratification and 
division of labor were based on the presence of the two main classes absolutely 
differentiated and even alienated from one another mainly owing to their rule and status.  
In this system the basic relation of surplus extraction was that which obtained 
between the peasant producers and the bureaucratic class. The peasants’ surplus 
was extracted in the form of taxes, and redistributed within the bureaucracy. 
Certainly a small part of the surplus thus extracted was spent on establishing the 
conditions for economic reproduction: maintenance of a road network, hydraulic 
projects, and the like. The larger part of the surplus, however, went towards the 
state functionaries’ consumption and luxury expenditure.142  
 
As long as the Ottoman state expropriated the adequate proportion of the surplus and 
kept all the commercial activities under its control, the survival of the classical 
economic system securing the independent status of the small peasant vis-à-vis the local 
potentate (ayan) could be achieved. Hence any ideological and economic challenges to 
the traditional balances of Ottoman polity were perceived by the central bureaucracy as 
a menace to their political status and economic revenues.  
Throughout the Ottoman modernization history, these challenges afflicting the 
political structure emanated from both internal and external dynamics that became 
increasingly apparent within the processes of incorporation with world capitalism. 
İslamoğlu and Keyder propose that this process the implications of which could be 
traced back to the seventeenth and even to the late sixteenth century was experienced in 
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different parts of Ottoman land within different spells of time.143 Kazancıgil also argues 
that the transformation process of the historical Empire to the modern nation state is 
closely related to the peripheralization of the autonomous Ottoman social formation 
with the impact of capitalist world economy.144 However, he further asserts that 
conceptualization of Turkish modernization leading to the foundation of Turkish nation 
state only due to the external dynamics and disregarding the specifities of Ottoman 
social formation would fail to provide an adequate analytical basis.145  
Declining of the Ottoman rule due to various reasons such as strengthening of 
the peripheral notables in such a way as to jeopardize both independent peasantry and 
the unchallenged position of the bureaucracy extracting the economic surplus, decrease 
in the non-agrarian based incomes of the center due to the shift in trade routes in 
Europe, cease of territorial expansion, replacement of traditional fief system with tax-
farming system accelerated in tandem with the integration with world capitalism. 
Throughout the process the development of market-oriented production of commodities 
threatened the absolute dominance of the Palace over the production and distribution 
processes. The lengthy quotation below from Keyder concisely summarizes the new 
balances between the central authority and the centrifugal tendencies before the 
modernizing reforms were put into force by the bureaucratic elite to recentralize the 
state power: 
in the eighteenth century, in fact, Ottoman lands did come under the increasing 
domination of local notables who controlled the tax-farming hierarchy. These 
local notables lived in the provincial centers, content to extract the agricultural 
surplus from the independent peasantry. Under the collective name of ayans they 
extended their influence beyond the countryside as they attempted to regulate the 
urban economy as well. During the latter half of the eighteenth century ayan 
councils in provincial capitals began to function as urban patriciates, deciding 
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not only an internal trade and guild permits regulating the economy, but also on 
urban revenues and expenditures.146 
  
In the meantime the growing market-oriented agricultural production through the 
penetration of world capitalism into the Ottoman economic structure nurtured the 
peripheral endeavors seeking for the political influence both by forging alliances with 
the local officials of the central authority and by upholding some secessionist desires.  
By the early 19th century “the power of local magnates (ayan) had so grown that 
the state was forced to sign a contract with them”. With this agreement (Sened-i İttifak) 
"what the local ayan secured was the recognition of their local autonomy at the expense 
of the sultan’s authority.”147 Nevertheless the signing of such a bill motivated 
particularly the pro-Western and secular wing of the civil bureaucracy to accelerate its 
modernizing and centralizing program under the name of ‘saving the state’. With these 
reforms encouraged and, in some cases, even imposed by the Western powers, the 
bureaucratic establishment intended both to reestablish and consolidate the authority of 
the center over the provinces and also to reconstruct the traditional surplus extraction 
system through which its privileged relations with the producers was protected. At this 
point it will be elucidating to look through Sunar’s analysis to better comprehend the 
19th century Ottoman politics witnessing continuous struggles between the centralizing 
bureaucracy and the local forces. Sunar takes the signing of 1808 Sened-i İttifak as the 
“beginning of a peculiar dialectic between centralization and localization.”148 To him, 
the peculiarity of this dialectic stemming from the fact that “each centralizing response 
to local autonomy” conducted under the name of “reform and progress”149 as a move 
toward modernization was contributing to the erosion of power and authority of the 
ruling elite. “The reforms were essentially a conditioned response to the challenge of 
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the West and the decline of the Empire. But policies that were drawn with the explicit 
purpose of unifying the Empire had a way of contributing to the breakdown of the 
political center and hence the breakdown of the patrimonial system itself.”150  
It should also be noted that parallel to the Ottoman integration into the European 
capitalism and penetration of market relations into the Ottoman society, this paradox of 
the ruling elite manifested itself as has never been the case in the previous periods. For 
instance the revolt of Muhammed Ali (the former ayan of Rumelia and the governor of 
Egypt), who was defeated with the British support in return for crucial economic 
concessions, ostensibly exemplifies this paradox. This event on the one hand constituted 
a new stage from the viewpoint of modernizing and centralizing efforts of the 
bureaucracy and on the other accelerated the peripheralization of Ottoman economy 
within world capitalism eventually leading to the strengthening of the peripheral forces. 
The Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Commerce of 1838151 through which various concessions 
were granted to Britain is defined by Keyder as “the first important step in 
institutionalizing the Empire’s integration into the political-economic logic of European 
capitalism.”152 The Treaty 
removed all monopolies, allowed British merchants to purchase goods anywhere 
in the Empire and imposed duties of 5 per cent on imports, 12 per cent on 
exports, and 3 per cent on transit. It was to apply to all parts of the Empire, and 
specifically to Egypt, where Muhammed Ali had to set up an elaborate system of 
monopolies. Other European powers soon acceded to the Convention153.   
 
This Treaty that paved the way for some other European countries in gaining similar 
commercial privileges rendered the Ottoman territory a kind of a free trade area open to 
the extraterritorial interventions of the Great Powers, which, in turned contributed to the 
strengthening of non-Muslim traders. The European powers aiming at liberalizing the 
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Ottoman economic order “were interested in the free flow of European manufactured 
goods into the Ottoman markets, as well as the free flow of Ottoman primary products 
into the European markets”154. In order to secure this flow of goods and raw materials 
Europeans forced the Ottoman state to enact laws and other relevant regulations 
including Tanzimat reforms and the 1858 new Land Code, leading to irrevocable 
transformations in the Ottoman socioeconomic structure. The capitulatory exterritorial 
trade grants which were to be used by the Palace bureaucracy to diversify the state’s 
revenues paradoxically helped to accelerate the dismemberment of the Empire and also 
its peripheralization within the European order. The frequent use of capitulations 
inevitably led to the “creation of a counter source of power, economic in nature, against 
the power and the authority of the Ottoman regime itself.”155                
This early, gradual and orderly insertion into the European state system, 
through which a new ‘modern’ faction within the bureaucracy defined and 
legitimated itself against a previously dominant one, might provide a clue to 
explaining the generally more accommodating behavior of Ottoman civil 
servants when compared with, for example, Chinese antagonism, or Japanese 
revanchism towards Western penetration. In the Ottoman Empire the secular 
bureaucracy accepted and justified their adhesion to European models and 
principles in the name of progressive reformism. They welcomed the 
institutionalization of economic integration into Western capitalism as a victory 
over the retrograde tenets of old Ottoman statecraft.156  
 
Keyder implies that both the secular faction of the civil bureaucracy in the late 
nineteenth century and their successor, the Young Turks identified their reformism with 
”the European paradigm of social progress.”157 They were the champions of freedom 
and progress against the absolutist and arbitrary rule of the Sultan. The author reads the 
pro-European and pro-modern attitude of those with respect to the struggles with the 
Sultanate and the reestablishment, dominance and the autonomy of the state mechanism 
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perpetuating this privileged position of the civil bureaucracy as the principal 
intermediary of incorporation with world capitalism within the social structure.  
 
4.4.1. Expulsion of the Ethnically Differentiated Bourgeoisie                     
Throughout the deepening of integration with European inter-state system and 
the world economy, the increase in volume of trade with Europeans especially from 
1830s to the world depression of 1873 caused the proliferation of market relations and 
thereby the growth of market-oriented production. According to the political economy 
based paradigm, the penetration of market relations and the commercialization of 
agriculture exercised two transformative effects on the Ottoman/Turkish modernization. 
First, the Ottoman economy turned out to be “a subordinate and responsive part to the 
needs and demands of the “self-regulating” global market”, which induced its 
transformation “from a form of political (redistributive) economy to a dependent market 
economy, along with, of course, the institutional and social changes which accompanied 
such transformation.”158 Second a new intermediary class forming “the principal links 
between European markets and local producers”159 emerged the members of whom 
belonged to non-Muslim communities. European traders’ unwillingness to work with 
Muslim merchants because of various political and cultural reasons drove them out of 
the field and provided a privileged status to non-Muslims. By the dawn of the 
nineteenth century these ethnically differentiated merchants, who settled in such port 
cities as Istanbul, Izmir and Salonika, constituted the class of compradors achieving to 
expropriate a substantial proportion of the economic surplus. “Foreigners and Christian 
populations of the Empire created, advanced and seized these opportunities on account 
of their economic (lower taxes) and political (extraterritorial) status.”160  
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In the paradigm of political economy the drastic changes and differentiation of 
the ideological attitudes and economic mentality of the Committee of Union and 
Progress cadres are also evaluated with the emphasis on the conjuncture of European 
inter-state system and capitalist penetration. Although the Young Turks ascended to 
power within a position defending liberal thought and equal rights for the minorities and 
also tolerating the increasing involvement of Western powers in the Ottoman economy, 
particularly in tandem with the Balkan Wars in which secessionist tendencies of non-
Muslim bourgeoisie and British backup behind it became apparent, they immediately 
began to pursue nationalist policies in economic, cultural and political realms in the 
absence of inter-state constraints on bureaucratic policy-making during the war years. 
The government took a series of measures to eliminate the autonomous bourgeois class 
having the potential of endangering both the hegemonic status of the bureaucracy and 
the geographical integrity of the state. The creation of a ‘national economy’ (milli 
iktisat) and a national bourgeoisie was also supported by the prominent Turkist authors 
such as Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura, who were influential in the formulation of the 
CUP’s economic policies161. The then leader of the CUP, impressed by the German 
policies for nationalizing the economic sphere were converging on the idea that unless 
the foreign and the non-Turk (gayri Türk) elements were kicked out of the economic 
space the loss of new lands and even of Anatolia could not be prevented and the 
survival of “Turkish nation” could not be achieved162. As Kızılyürek correctly pointed 
out nationalization and Turkification of the economic sphere turned out to be an 
indispensable and indivisible part of the project aiming at transforming the Ottoman 
Empire to the Turkish nation state163.          
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In this context, especially from 1913 onward the government attempted to build 
up a new class of Turkish Muslim entrepreneurs dependent totally on and loyal to the 
bureaucratic desires and the territorial integrity of the state. The policies of the 
Committee of Union and Progress such as the unilateral abrogation of the capitulatory 
privileges, the institutionalization of the new protectionist trade regime bringing the 
foreign firms under Ottoman judicial system and text legislation, the exclusion of the 
ethnically differentiated bourgeoisie from the economic scene in favor of Muslim 
traders could be assessed in this regard. Not unlike the subsequent Republican political 
elite, for the CUP leaders the creation of a surrogated bourgeoisie in need of their grace 
was of greatest significance from the perspective of the unchallenged dominance of the 
state elite over the productive processes in such a way as to perpetuate the supremacy of 
the state apparatus. Since the officials of the CUP government saw an interdependency 
between the neutralizing the minorities and ‘saving the state’, they began to implement 
a policy of ethnic destruction and exclusion which was effective from 1915 to 1923 and 
led to a substantial erosion in the heterogeneity of the population before the modern 
nation state was founded. In the period stretching from 1914 to 1924 due to various 
reasons such as ravages of the war (lasted for Turks until 1922), Greeks’ voluntary 
and/or forceful immigration dramatically changed the demographical landscape that 
would constitute the territorial boundaries of the Turkish Republican state. According to 
the statistical data collected by Keyder from diverse resources164, whilst prior to the 
World War I the minorities constituted approximately 18% of the population, in 1924 
nearly just one out of every 40 persons was minority belonging. 
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What this drastic development indicates is that during the war years Turkey lost 
most of its commercial class, such that when the Republic was formed, the 
bureaucracy found itself unchallenged. Whatever remained of the bourgeoisie 
was too weak to constitute a class with an autonomous stance against the 
bureaucracy.165      
 
Kazancıgil proposes that the basic contradiction constraining the transformation of 
Ottoman Empire into a modern nation state lies at the bureaucratic attitudes towards the 
peripheral powers. Although the patrimonial state bureaucracy extracted the necessary 
income to conduct a consumption-oriented life style from the centrifugal groups (such 
as mültezims (tax-farmers), ayans, merchants and manufacturers), it always precluded 
those from attaining political power, and this in turn retarded the institutionalized of the 
political modernity in Turkey.166 Kazancıgil put forward that the Tanzimat can be 
interpreted in two different perspectives: first as the endeavor to accommodate the 
superstructure of the Ottoman social formation to the needs and circumstances of 
capitalist world economy and the interstate system; and second as the effort of 
increasing state’s revenues through the consolidation of the central control over the 
periphery.167 The state elite always desired to behave in accordance with the basic 
principle in the institutionalization of classical Ottoman order defined by Kazancıgil as 
the non-transformationality of the economic wealth to the political influence.        
  
4.4.2. Foundation Of The Modern Turkish State 
Following the footsteps of Kazancıgil, the transformation of the traditional 
Ottoman Empire into the modern nation state can be interpreted as the accommodation 
of the peripheralized Ottoman social formation to the conjunctures of capitalist world 
economy and inter-state system.168 Such assessment establishing a linkage between the 
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peripheralization and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire also implies that the 
historical evolution of world capitalism gave rise to the foundation of Turkish nation 
state. For the author, Kemalist cadres were aware of the fact that the only way to 
maintain political independence within the conjuncture of world capitalism was the 
foundation of a modern state allowing the development of a strong civil society based 
on market economy so much so that the establishment of a Western type of modern 
bourgeois state was a matter of life and death for Turkey. Even though it may 
theoretically seem possible the constitution of the new state and social order in 
accordance with norms and principles other than the capitalist kind, in real terms this 
was quite far from being realized mainly owing to two reasons: first, the constitution of 
the state and political regime opposing to the Western model was contrary to the system 
of values of the political elite of the time and secondly, it was totally dependent on 
challenging the Turkish peripheral status within the framework of world capitalism, 
which was impossible throughout the period. İnsel propounds that the economic policies 
adapted by the Republican state elite were not reflecting only the economic preferences 
of the state but rather they were utilized as a means of intervention vis-à-vis the society 
which was to be modernized.169 The author also implies that as far as the objectives and 
effects of those policies leading to the active involvement of the state in production and 
redistribution processes were concerned, it could be noted that they substantially 
contributed to the restructuring of social relations by the modernizing clique. 
Furthermore, the central aim of this active involvement of the state in economy during 
the early years of the Republic was to ensure the close control of the state over the 
society. As one of the prominent elements of the project of political modernity and 
nation building, the Republican state strove to create a national economic life the 
legitimate boundaries of which are drawn by the state itself in such a way as to serve 
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solely to the raison d’êtat.170 In this respect, The State Enterprises Adjudications, a Law 
For The Encouragement of Industry, and Customs Tariffs were used as the strategic 
means of realizing this objective. İnsel conceptualizes control of the state over the 
economic structure in the following manner: Economics is perceived as a peril that 
could erode the state’s central authority insofar as it had the potential of generating 
conflicts and feeding centrifugal proclivities. In this case, there is only one remedy for 
those who desired both to realize “national development” and to eliminate those 
“dangers”: the economics ought to be formed by the state itself and also be regulated 
firmly by the state apparatus. Korkut Boratav, in his book ‘Etatism in Turkey’, 
exemplifies the state interventionism in economics in the early years of Turkish 
Republic by focusing on the monopoly rights of the state over iron and sugar production 
and the running of ports.171 What is more, regarding particularly the production of 
strategic goods for the state and public interest, the private and foreign entrepreneurs 
have always faced with extensive restrictions which were pertaining not only to the 
period of 1932-1938 identified with etatism. 
İnsel also proposes that the national economics, which was firmly manipulated 
and totally kept under control by the state, could be interpreted as one of the techniques 
for the civil and military bureaucracy to perpetuate the patrimonial state tradition. The 
creation of a bourgeois class working totally dependent on and owing its existence to 
the state was the most important means of control over the economics from inside by 
the state.172 The formation of an economic life the actors of which were not in a 
conflicting position with the ideals and desires of the bureaucratic intelligentsia was of 
vital importance for the maintenance of the political stability through which the state’s 
undebatable supremacy over other social groups was institutionalized. This is a 
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corollary of the essential relationality established in between the maintenance of the 
state’s central status in economics and its political permanency. According to İnsel, Ş. 
S. Aydemir, who was one of the most vigorous defenders of the etatist economic 
policies, clearly explicated the dimensions embedded in etatism beyond economics in 
his following statement: “Etatism, for us, is the reappearance of the ex-regime of the 
militarized nation under the circumstances and necessities of modern times.”173   
 
  4.5. Conclusion: A Critique Of the Paradigms Problematizing Turkish Modernity 
As stated in its introductory part, this chapter was allocated to probe into three 
main paradigms problematizing Turkish economic and political modernity- namely, 
sociological, bureaucratic and state centric and political economy based understandings. 
These paradigms were rendered the object of theoretical inquiry by especially focusing 
on their analyses and inferences concerning the relations between ruling and the ruled 
in Turkey throughout the modernization process. While expatiating the three main 
theoretical positions I limited myself with the writings of authors who are of Turkish 
origin such as Şerif Mardin, Metin Heper, Çağlar Keyder, and İlkay Sunar. 
It is a non-deniable fact that all these theoretical investigations have made 
substantial contributions to the problematization of Turkish political and economic 
modernity. They all, by giving priority to different analytical tools and conceptual 
frameworks in dealing with the issue, have presented remarkable data for the 
exploration of the distinguished features and peculiarities of Turkish modernization. 
The multi-layered analytical enterprise of particularly the sociological approach has a 
bearing on the creation of a literature making possible the conceptualization of the 
controversies, deviancies, and tensions of modernization process in Turkey.   
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It is fair to propose that even though those three paradigms could be situated in 
different analytical frameworks, they share a common ontological and epistemological 
posture that can be qualified as more crucial than their differences. I attach profound 
importance to the full appreciation of those commonalities restricting and even, in some 
cases, fixing their theoretical interrogations. In this context, this critical concluding 
section is dedicated to; 
1) address the common ontological and epistemological foundations on which 
those paradigms based their analyses by remaining loyal to the research agenda of this 
dissertation and 
2) recontemplate on the possibility of a brand new approach to Turkish modernity 
placing due emphasis on the external political dynamics and the foreign policy rhetoric 
of the state while conceptualizing the state centricist nature of the domestic regime and 
the modernizing reforms in Turkey. 
The three main approaches problematizing Turkish modernity base their 
analyses on a definite logic of explanation. Even though they specify their research 
avenues by utilizing analytical insights of different social science disciplines such as 
sociology, comparative politics and political economy, they produce the same logic of 
explanation feeding on similar ontological and epistemological presuppositions. Those 
approaches treat the state, in ontological terms, as a pregiven entity and in epistemic 
level assign it the status of the only privileged and sovereign subject of Turkish 
modernization history. As an outcome of this approach, the state is essentially accepted 
both as the basic unit of analysis and as the fundamental point of reference. The 
political economy based understanding does not constitute an exception to this. Even 
though this paradigm ventures to explain modernization of Ottoman social formation 
with respect to its incorporation into the world capitalism, it delineates this process 
mostly within the context of Ottoman state’s relations with the Western powers. In the 
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same vein, in Mardin’s analysis the concept of the ‘center’ and in Heper’s terminology 
the ‘locus of stateness’ are used generally interchangeably with the state and accepted 
as the vantage point in their analytical deductions on Turkish modernity.       
In the scholarship on Turkish modernization the state is conceived as an 
empirically observable, institutionally pregiven and completed entity “the identity of 
which is secure before it enters into relations with others.”174. Thus in the literature 
where a coherent identity is attributed to the Turkish state, its precise nature, the 
sources of its autonomy and legitimacy are not rendered the object of theoretical 
inquiry. Even though these paradims especially the first and the third ones (the 
sociological and economy-based understandings) critically approach practices and 
policies of the ruling elite and/or state apparatus vis-à-vis the society, they do not 
evaluate the discursive, performative and historical construction of the former’s 
supremacy over and autonomy from the latter. In such conceptualization the state to 
which is accorded the role and status of being a unitary and rational actor is presumably 
accepted as the only sovereign subject of Turkish modernization history. Such 
analytical and methodological posture engenders a very important analytical limitation 
for the paradigms addressed in this study: the analysis of Turkish modern political 
history within a state-oriented perspective by giving primacy to the state’s 
performances vis-à-vis other agents or social groups. It could be claimed with some 
degree of accuracy that in the sociological paradigm these drawbacks and limitations 
are surpassed, to a greater extent, through the detailed sociological observations and 
inferences of Şerif Mardin regarding both the every day life and the macro-politics in 
Turkey. For instance he presents a multifaceted analysis of how the relations between 
the ruling and the ruled in the country are constructed by focusing on different aspects 
(such as sociopolitical, cultural) of the center-periphery duality in Turkey.  
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Whereas, in the second paradigm, in which the objectives, interests and the 
actions of the ruling elite are taken as the fundamental point of reference, a pure state- 
centric reading of Turkish modernization history is provided. The political struggle and 
strife between the bureaucratic establishment and the political elite and the 
manifestation of this struggle in the structuration of the state can be cited as the main 
trails of Heper’s analysis as regards Turkish modern politics. The political economy 
based approach acknowledging the class struggle and the mode of production and 
redistribution of the economic surplus as independent variables adopts the same 
reductionist logic of explanation in which the state is conceived as the bearer subject of 
the Turkish modernization history. All these paradigmatic approaches by taking the 
state as ontologically pregiven totality and unproblematic unity posit that the state has a 
prediscursive and coherent identity and hence they fail to conceptualize the historical, 
performative and discursive construction of Turkish state as a modern nation state. 
In line with this essentialism the scholarship on Turkish modernization has a 
tendency of analyzing the relations between the ruling and the ruled from the 
perspective of Turkish state’s initiatives as the very agent of the political modernity. 
They do not need to create a new rhetoric where Turkish society can speak on behalf of 
itself as a real and historical subject instead of being only passive bearer of the state’s 
performances. State society relations constitute the fundamental sphere in which the 
unique characteristics of the domestic political life and order are shaped and reshaped 
through interactions between the state and the national ‘social formation’ in which it is 
embedded. The paradigms of Turkish modernity conceptualize those relations as 
relations between a completed agent (the state) and its social/national formation 
occurring within a definitely bounded political space. Whereas states as unavoidably 
paradoxical and never finished entities always have to produce and reproduce that so-
called stable identity through various mechanisms. This perpetual act of reproduction is 
 132 
applied in accordance with its claims to territorial integrity, national unity and, in some 
cases, national homogeneity. Thus, problematizing the dynamics of state society 
relations the evolution of which is interrelated with that of modernization in Turkey 
necessitates; 
1) the rejection of any ontological and epistemological status accorded to the state 
beyond the various acts determining its reality and conditions of existence and 
2) the conceptualization of state identity by considering its performative, 
discursive and representative construction within a definite historical and spatial 
context.  
These paradigms also strive to understand and explain the state centricist nature 
of Turkish modernity by giving primacy to the inner dynamics. This is due to the fact 
that the internal and international politics are deemed as distinguished structures 
separated from each other with absolute boundaries. Hence these political structures 
having their own specifities are assumed as the objects to be covered within different 
research avenues. Mainly owing to this analytical and methodological reductionism, 
they are inclined to marginalize the impacts of the outer dynamics in the Turkish 
modernization process and the state identity construction. The literature on Turkish 
modernization lacks attention to the foreign political sources and dynamics of Turkish 
economic and political modernity emerging and developing as a state-sponsored and 
state-based project. In the same vein, the literature is prone to exclude the outer 
dynamics from its analyses on the nature of the relations between ‘the ruling’ and ‘the 
ruled’ in Turkey the evolution of which is deeply embedded in that of Turkish 
modernity. For instance the literature does not attach due importance to the significance 
of the state’s foreign political initiatives and discourses in reproducing the state-
centricist character of Turkish politics and modernization. However, as previously 
indicated in this dissertation, foreign policy is not only an external relationship that the 
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state initiates towards others in international society yet more importantly it is part of 
the governmental structure  “that governs the behaviors of those embedded in it in the 
socio-political realm.”175 This conception of foreign policy urges us to reexamine the 
national foreign policy rhetoric of Turkish state as a social and disciplinary practice by 
which it rules the society. As David Campbell puts it, foreign political discourses and 
representations premised on the constant articulation of danger, threat, national interests 
and national security are both integral to state identity-making and functional in 
securing the standards of this identity. They are also operational in specifying the 
criteria of being allowed into the political center, of being marginalized and excluded 
from the political domain and public life. Especially in the contexts where securitizing 
and nationalistic dose of the state’s foreign policy rhetoric is high, foreign policy is 
functionalized by the state elite in neutralizing the opposition and/or certain sectors of 
the domestic society. Re-examining Turkish state’s foreign policy rhetoric from this 
perspective can present a new analytical plane for the full exploration of why Turkish 
political modernity displays state-centricist traits. If the state society relations are 
deemed as the fundamental sphere in which statist structure of Turkish political 
modernity is produced and reproduced, this new analysis taking into account foreign 
policy gains paramount importance.  
To various analysts in the maintenance of the state society relations in its 
conventional and hierarchical structure the sphere of ‘foreign’ policy has at all times 
had a distinctive role to play in Turkey. Within the Republicanist tradition ‘foreign’ 
policy has been perceived as a vital sphere in pursuit of Turkey’s national interests and 
security goals, requiring technical know-how and expertise. In most cases ‘foreign’ 
political actions of the state have been portrayed as its endeavors to ward off external 
threats directed against its unity and integrity. Thus in the official discourse ‘foreign’ 
                                                 
175 Diez, Thomas, “The Imposition of Governance”, p. 6.  
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policy refers to a battlefield to be entrusted only to those cognizant of its peculiar rules 
and techniques. In the Republicanist tradition the only group having this special 
knowledge and skill is assumed as the Turkish bureaucratic establishment. Thereby this 
conventional account leaves the formulation and conduct of ‘foreign’ policy to the 
monopoly of a relatively small state elite and restricts as much as possible the 
intervention of the political figures in decision making processes on foreign policy 
issues. It is expected from the political figures (namely party leaders, MPs and other 
politicians) to behave in accordance with the pre-determined ‘state policies’ without 
criticizing their substance. This approach placing ‘foreign’ policy above politics, in 
turn, limits the participation of the society and its elected representatives in both the 
debates and decision-making processes on foreign policy matters.176 As a matter of fact, 
moving foreign policy issues out of the political sphere at least until the recent years 
exerted a narrowing effect on Turkish politics and consolidated a definite understanding 
of political modernity in which the political is equated with and reduced to the state’s 
institutional objectives, interests and security concerns. Therefore, it is fair to suggest 
that the sphere of foreign policy has become operationalized in drawing the legitimate 
boundaries of Turkish politics. Thus a full exploration of the statist essence of Turkish 
modernization project necessitates the inclusion of the state’s foreign policy initiatives 
and discourses in the analytical agenda.            
By considering all these analytical remarks, the chapter finally proposes that a 
multifaceted assessment of Turkish political modernity and the state identity which is 
neither reductionist nor essentialist necessitates: 
                                                 
176 As another important factor preventing the occurance of large scale social debates on foreign policy 
issues, the state based thinking of the Cold War years should be cited. Throughout the Cold War era the 
imagination of an existential communist threat stemming from Turkey’s ‘imminent’ neighbor the Soviet 
Union aborted the chances of assessing foreign policy beyond the state-based security concerns.     
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1. making reference to all internal and external political processes, while 
explaining the state-centricist and state-oriented structure of Turkish 
modernization, in this respect  
2. searching for the role and impact of the Turkish state’s foreign political 
initiatives, discourses and representations in the reproduction of its core 
characteristics and the domestic order; and thus 
3. evaluating the intertwined character of domestic and foreign political processes 
and their interactions instead of demarcating them in absolute boundaries. 
I hope that this dissertation problematizing the Cyprus dispute and particularly the 
modes in which it is articulated in Turkish politics from the perspective of state society 
relations in Turkey can be a source of inspiration for forthcoming studies meeting all 
these requirements toward a brand new and comprehensive analysis of Turkish 
modernization.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
LONG-LASTING HISTORY OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE 
       TURNING POINTS AND DISCURSIVE POSITIONS 
 
 
 
5.1. Centrality of History in the Cyprus Question  
 
Any scholar studying on the Cyprus issue shall soon notice the fact that history, 
or more precisely, the act of writing history is assigned centrality and unique 
importance by all the actors involved in the issue. The Cyprus dispute, where multiple 
identities conflict with and overlap each other, has all too often been among the 
fundamentals of the rhetorical structure devised by those parties. Even remembering 
and reminding the past as an inherent part of identity construction have turned out to be 
the fundamental determinants of the inter-identity strives and discourses.  
The “image of communion” mobilized in nationalism is not fixed. It is 
continuously negotiated through the interweaving of the past with the present in 
a battle for control of a national popular memory, which is constructed 
reciprocally through the interaction of dominant and subordinate public 
representations of the past private memory. This site of combat between 
dominant, subordinate and private memories forms a terrain of struggle for the 
creation of shared meanings in the constitution of a national cultural identity1.  
 
The divergences among the right wing nationalist parties/Denktaş leadership and the 
left-leaning opposition parties as regards their visions of Turkish Cypriot community’s 
identity as a ‘purely Turkish’ or a ‘purely Cypriot’ one “has been most evident in the 
construction of folklore, literature and representations of the past.”2  
Thereby the deed of writing history, which can be conceptualized as ‘the mode 
of historicizing’, inscribes simultaneously the limits and boundaries of the analyses as 
                                                 
1 Killoran, Moira, “Nationalisms and Embodied Memory in Northern Cyprus”, in Vangelis Calotychos 
(ed.), Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community (1955-
1997), (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p. 161. 
2 Ibid., p. 161. For a more elaborate analysis of the role of folkloric and linguistic elements in identity 
construction see Moira Killoran, “Hallelujah There Is No God But Allah”: State Formation and Identity 
Contestation in North Cyprus, Master’s Thesis, (The University of Texas at Austin, Department of 
Anthropology, 1989); Moira Killoran, Pirate State, Poet Nation: The Poetic Struggle over ‘the Past’ in 
North Cyprus, PhD Dissertation, (The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Anthropology, 1994) 
and Mehmet Yaşın, Kıbrıslıtürk Şiiri Antolojisi, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1994).  
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regards the present in the bulk of texts ranging from academic studies to official 
declarations. The inscription of the present through historiography makes a very 
historicist but, in fact, ahistoric discourse dominant in those texts through which the 
other party to the dispute is represented as ‘a historical enemy’ and an ‘existential 
threat’ to its survival. 
Fear here is the keyword, as both sides in Cyprus perceive themselves as 
endangered minorities: the Turkish Cypriots as a minority on the island and the 
Greek Cypriots as the minority in the area, given Turkey’s proximity and the 
presence of Turkish troops in the north. Past experiences gives ample 
justification for such fears3. 
 
For instance in official declarations by both Northern Cypriot leadership and the 
Turkish political and bureaucratic elite, the attacks and massacres of pro-Enosist Greek 
Cypriots and the encumbrances experienced by Turkish Cypriots, i.e. being forced to 
live in enclaves, are constantly imprinted on the public and private memories. On the 
other hand, Greek Cypriots “remember and point to the 1964 Turkish preparations and 
threats of invasion which the famous Johnson letter averted, the subsequent bombings 
of Greek Cypriots by Turkish planes, and the dislocation, missing and dead of the 1974 
Turkish attack.”4 
With regard to the Cyprus dispute the intense articulation of a specific and 
subjective interpretation of history particularly by the elites of the two sides has two 
critical functions in the process of national/political identity construction: glorification 
of its own nation and demonizing of the other. Through a very historical but ahistoric 
discourse “one’s own nation is conceptualized as a transhistorical essence of enduring- 
even eternal- national characteristics,”5 which are fixed and already completed. This 
approach either ignores the historically, performatively constructed nature of national 
                                                 
3 Papadakis, Yiannis, ‘Enosis and Turkish Expansionism: Real Myths or Mythical Realities’, in Vangelis 
Calotychos (ed.), Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable 
Community (1955-1997), (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 71-72.    
4 Ibid., p. 72.  
5 Ibid., p. 74.   
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identity in interaction with other identities or “anthropomorphizes nations and states as 
persons with set characters.”6 “Self-glorification and the demonisation of the enemy 
make some characters appear as the ‘goodies’ of the hi(story) while the others are, 
inexorably, the ‘baddies.’”7 
Another reason which made remembering and reminding the past (the discourse 
of history) so central to the Cyprus problem is related to its inherence to the national 
historiography in the so-called Motherlands. The Cyprus conflict is represented both as 
part of a greater historical enmity between these two and as a proof of the expansionist 
intentions and inclinations of the other side. The lengthy quotation below provides a 
succinct illustration of Greek and Turkish accounts of history:  
In the Greek case the story goes as follows: our glorious Byzantine 
Empire was destroyed by the invading barbaric Turkish tribes and, fallen from 
its previous grandeur, it has become the present small Greek state after the 
expulsion of the Greek population in 1922. The Turks lurk in search of more 
Greek lands, as their threats in the Aegean and Western Thrace show and as the 
1974 invasion of northern Cyprus and the expulsion of its Greeks to the south 
proves. In the Turkish case the scenario is reversed: in the liberal millet system 
of the glorious Ottoman Empire it was the treacherous Greeks, who despite their 
privileged position, stabbed us in the back by first revolting against us, gradually 
capturing more and more territories, to attack even the heart of Anatolia in 1922 
in the name of the Megali Idea, so inciting the ‘Rums’ of Cyprus for enosis 
which is what they tried to bring about with the 1974 coup8.  
 
As such in the dominant nationalistic discourses of the Motherlands the Cyprus history 
refers to the magnitude and imminence of the threat ‘the other’ (the historical enemy) 
poses to the nation. Identification of the dispute with the defeats and grievances of the 
past paradoxically consolidates its current popularity and graveness in the contemporary 
politics of those countries. As a consequence, an ethno-centric and exceedingly 
historicist interpretation of Cyprus history overlooking the historical specifities of the 
dispute turns out to determine the scope and content of the discursive field and 
constitutes the epistemic conditions behind the mainstream analysis. The act of writing 
                                                 
6 Ibid., p. 73.  
7 Ibid., p. 74.  
8 Ibid., p. 70.  
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history as a process from which the Cyprus people themselves are excluded has always 
been inherent to the inscription of national history in Turkey and in Greece. To put it 
differently, the Cypriots who are expelled from the analysis as a historical subject are 
rendered passive bearers of a history inscribed by the others. Such authors as Mehmet 
Hasgüler, Mehmet Yaşın and Tanıl Bora converge on the idea that this mode of 
historicizing the Cyprus issue is very functional in imposing and securing the limits of 
the national/political identity in the ‘Motherlands’. In such a discursive economy either 
Enosis or partition-oriented practices of understanding and explaining the Cyprus issue 
premised on certain ontological and epistemological presumptions are privileged. This 
either/or logic feeding on binary oppositions or intractable dualities gives constant 
emphasis to the ethnic differences rather than the identity of Cypriotness.                  
The declaration of the other side as a ‘historical enemy’ vis-à-vis the national 
unity and survival necessitates attributing “an unchanging evil intention” to the other 
party emanating from “the enemy’s character”9 itself. More importantly, the narrative 
operating through demonizing of the other side to the dispute “is presented as a key 
imperative code of history, which denies contingency, and in effect, history itself.”10           
Thus it would not be an exaggeration to state that history as a constitutive 
element of “competing nationalistic rhetorics”11 also conditions the epistemic 
boundaries of the visions of the parties on the nature and structure of the unified social 
body that they imagine for the whole Cyprus community. “This embodied remembrance 
of history is an appeal to a form of knowledge that is visceral and therefore “natural” 
and outside of intellectual challenge”12.        
 
     
                                                 
9 Ibid., p. 73.  
10 Ibid., p. 73.  
11 Killoran, Moira, “Nationalisms and Embodied Memory in Northern Cyprus”, p. 160.   
12 Ibid., p. 160.  
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5.2. Historical Background   
One of the reasons, perhaps the principal reason, for the Cyprus dispute 
is each side’s intense historical memory and conviction that history has done it 
an injustice. It is not the record of history that is so important as the elements of 
it that each side accentuates to justify its own present position. Any relative 
newcomer to the study of the Cyprus conflict may well feel the need then for a 
broad view of the history of Cyprus and the Cyprus conflict.13 
 
This chapter of the thesis not only aims at addressing the historical process 
through which Cyprus has turned out to be a multi-partite international question. As I 
have stated before, my intention is not to give a chronological account of the events but 
rather is to make the readers familiar with the historical context in which Cyprus issue 
has been shaped and reshaped through various factors. It should immediately be stated 
that while tracing the historical development of the Cyprus issue I shall foreground 
particularly the aspects of the issue closely related to the conditions by which the state 
society relations and the state identity in Turkey are reproduced. This chapter intends to 
reveal how the political developments as regards the Cyprus dispute both inside the 
island and at the international level were understood and articulated in Turkey’s official 
and mainstream discourses. By placing particular emphasis on such turning points as the 
foundation of the 1960 Cyprus Republic, the famous Johnson letter, Turkey’s military 
intervention of July-August 1974, and more recent developments i.e. Kofi Annan’s plan 
and subsequent debates, the chapter is dedicated to highlight the continuities and 
ruptures in Turkey’s official discourse, which is not by and large different from that of 
the Denktaş leadership. In this dissertation how the historical development of the 
Cyprus dispute was represented and articulated within Greek Cypriot and Greek 
nationalistic discourses is rarely touched upon since the study is mostly interested in the 
                                                 
13 Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, in Cyprus The Need for New Perspectives, Clement H. 
Dodd (ed.), (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1999), p. 1.   
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impacts and implications of the dispute on Turkish domestic politics14. This section of 
the thesis work is drawn up with the prospect that the Cyprus history will be re-written 
with a stance which is neither ethno-centric, essentialist nor reductionist.            
 
5.2.1. The Pre-Modern Times     
In various academic texts the history of Cyprus is traced back to the 13th century BC 
when the first settlers coming from the Aegean colonized the island. It is generally 
affirmed that in the course of long centuries the “nations who controlled Anatolia or the 
North African coast and wished to be dominant in the Mediterranean had all wanted to 
add Cyprus to their list of possessions.”15  It is accepted in a priori fashion that the 
island has always remained geographically and strategically important in all historical 
epochs. This kind of generalization indeed serves to consolidate the idea that the island 
has still been preserving its geo-strategic status in contemporary international politics. 
During a remarkable part of its history, Cyprus remained under the rule of 
Roman and Byzantine Empires as a semi-independent province. Even though by the end 
of third century AD Christianity achieved dominance in tandem with Greek language 
and culture on the island, “the Cypriots successfully fought to maintain the 
independence of their church and thus became one of the oldest autocephalous churches 
of the Eastern Orthodox churches.”16 By the 16th century Cyprus was of greatest 
importance for Venetians both as a trading post and a military base against the 
                                                 
14 For a critical account of the dispute from the viewpoint of Greek history see Michael Attalides, Cyprus, 
Nationalism and International Politics, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979); Constantine Melakopides, 
The Cyprus Problem in Greek Foreign Policy, in Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution, Norma 
Salem (ed.), (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 71-90; Yiannis Papadakis, “Enosis and Turkish 
Expansionism: Real Myths or Mythic Realities?”, in Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity, and 
Experience in an Unimaginable Community (1955-1997), Vangelis Calotychos (ed.), (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1998), pp. 69-87. For an evaluation of the Cyprus issue from the perspective of the 
emergence and development of Greek nationalism see Niyazi Kızılyürek, Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs, 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp. 29-143.        
15 İsmail, Sabahattin, 20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences, (İstanbul: 
Kastaş Ltd. Co. Publications, 1989), p. 12. 
16 Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 2. 
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Ottomans. The conquest of the island by the Ottomans in 1571 led to drastic changes in 
the socio-political structure and the demographic composition of the island. Among 
these radical changes are the abolition of serfdom for indigenous people, weakening of 
linkages of the island with the West to a large extent, and settling of a great number of 
peasants and artisans transferred from Anatolian land to almost all regions of the 
island.17 That the Ottomans “treated the Greek Orthodox community as a largely self-
governing religious group or millet”18 ensured the strengthening of Orthodox clergy 
within the extensively heterogeneous ethnic structure of the island. The year 1821, 
when the Greek uprising for independence against the Ottoman rule commenced, is 
generally coded in the texts, sympathetic to Turkish thesis, as the onset of serious 
frictions between the Turkish and Greek or the Muslim and Christian populations of the 
island. 
 
5.2.2. The Cession of the Island to Britain and Subsequent Developments: The 
Modern Times 
In Berlin Conference of 1878 the island was rented out to Britain by the 
Ottomans in return for signing a treaty of alliance vis-à-vis the Russian threat. Through 
this cession qualified by many as fraudulous19 the British seized the island conceived as 
‘the key to Western Asia’ by them20. Turkish historians and scholars generally converge 
on the idea that the cession of the island to Britain remarkably increased political 
mobilization among Greek Cypriots, who desired the unification with the independent 
‘mainland’ Greece (Enosis). On 5 November 1914, soon after the Ottoman Empire was 
                                                 
17 Ibid., p. 2. For the details of mass population movements after the conquest of Cyprus by the Ottoman 
see Ioannides, Christos P., In Turkey’s Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish 
Province, (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, Publisher, 1991), pp. 27-28. However it should be noted that 
the book is more sympathetic to the established Greek views.    
18 Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 2. 
19 Uslu, Nasuh, “Kıbrıs Sorunu”, in 21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası, İdris Bal (ed.), (İstanbul: 
Alfa Yayınları, 2001), p. 263. 
20 Kızılyürek, Niyazi, Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p. 214.  
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involved in the World War I in alliance with Germany, Britain announced the 
annexation of Cyprus21, which was later recognized by both Turkey and Greece in the 
Treaty of Lausanne signed on 24 July 1923. Turkey’s formal acceptance of the 
permanent cession of the sovereignty of the island to Britain is explained by Turkish 
authors either in terms of the necessity of the international balances of power of the time 
or as a result of the peaceful foreign policy adopted by the founders of the Turkish 
Republic. Accordingly, the Turkish state elite giving primacy to the conduct of the 
modernizing reforms in domestic politics consented to relinquish the island to Britain in 
order to preclude emergence of new crises in foreign relations.22  
The 1920s marked, for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the rising of 
nationalistic inclinations in such a way as to compound the ethnic and religious division 
on the island. On the Greek side the mounting of nationalistic ambitions manifested 
themselves with the intense articulation of the demands for Enosis and of the 
antagonism towards the British colonial rule.23 On the Turkish side a new intelligentsia 
opposing to the pro-British stance of the traditional and pious ruling elite24 began to 
strengthen and make their voice heard. These young intellectuals inspired by the 
Kemalist regime of the newly founded Turkish Republic desired the implementation of 
the modernizing reforms on Cyprus as well.25 In 1931 there occurred one of the most 
striking revolts in the history of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots “encouraged by the Greek-
Orthodox Church, resorted to violence and revolted against” the British colonial rule “in 
                                                 
21 Ertekün, Necati M., The Cyprus Dispute and The Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
(Nicosia: K. Rüstem & Brother Publisher, 1984), p. 1.  
22 Uslu, Nasuh, “Kıbrıs Sorunu”, p. 263.  
23 Kızılyürek, Niyazi, Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs, pp. 219-20.  
24 Ibid., p. 218.  
25 For the details of the impacts of the Kemalist reforms on the young Cypriot Turkish intellectuals see 
Niyazi Kızılyürek,  Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs, pp. 218-20. Furthermore, within Turkish Cypriot 
community the process of the replacement of the Ottoman-Islamic identity by Turkish ethnic identity can 
also be followed in the same book pp. 209-244.    
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the cause of Enosis”26. After the oppression of this uprising the colonial rule considered 
taking measures necessary to curb the nationalist movements in both Turkish and Greek 
Cypriot communities. 
The early years after the World War II witnessed the strengthening of the leftist 
movements, particularly the pro-Soviet communist AKEL in Greek Cypriot community. 
During this period besides the Orthodox Church, AKEL members were among the 
vehement protagonists of Enosis at least until the leftists were defeated in Greek civil 
war; whereas Turkish Cypriot intellectuals and leaders were in favor of maintaining the 
status quo since they conceived the continuation of the British rule as the only way of 
preventing Enosis.27 “‘Maintenance of the Status Quo’ was how we baptized our cause. 
We did not even want to envisage that someday Britain would abandon the island. 
Unaware of changing state of affairs we cherished friendship blindfoldedly for the 
British.”28 As a matter of fact, the colonial administration adopted the strategy of 
utilizing and manipulating the reactions of Turkish Cypriots to Enosis by encouraging 
their political mobilization and organization vis-à-vis the Greek majority.29 According 
to Kızılyürek, Britain also contributed to the rise of nationalist campaigns concerning 
the Cyprus issue in Turkish domestic politics during late 1940s.30 
However until mid-1950s the existence of a Cyprus problem for Turkey was 
persistently rejected by the ruling parties and the state elite. Even until the foundation of 
the independent Cyprus Republic in 1960 the question was conceived as “an internal 
affair of Britain”. For these political and bureaucratic figures, who were “satisfied with 
                                                 
26 Ertekün, Necati M., The Cyprus Dispute and The Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, p. 
2.  
27 Denktaş, Rauf R., Rauf Denktaş’ın Hatıraları, 10th volume, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 2000), pp. 
64-65 
28 Ibid., p.227. (emphasis original) Translation belongs to Esra Kaliber.  
29 Kızılyürek, Niyazi, Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs, p. 232.  
30 Ibid., p. 233. 
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the British presence on the island”31 the maintenance of the status quo was going to 
impede both the Greekification of the island and its takeover by the pro-Sovietic 
communists. On 13 October 1948 the then Foreign Minister in the Republican People’s 
Party (RPP) cabinet explicitly declared in the Turkish Grand National Assembly that 
“for Turkey there is not a Cyprus problem as such.”32 In the same vein, on 25 January 
1950 the then Foreign Minister in the RPP government Necmettin Sadak in an interview 
published in Kim magazine stated that  
there is not a Cyprus problem as such. I had clearly told it to journalists long 
time ago. For, Cyprus is today under the British sovereignty and rule and we are 
convinced that Britain is neither intended nor inclined to surrender Cyprus to 
any other state.33  
 
The Foreign Minister of the Democratic Party government, which came to power in 
1950 general elections, Fuat Köprülü also took the stance in favor of the maintenance of 
the British rule in Cyprus by declaring on 20 August 1951 that “we do not see any 
reason for a change in the status quo in Cyprus; but if there would be a change our 
rights have to be respected.”34  
However, particularly with the plebiscite organized by the Orthodox Church in 
Cyprus and perceived by many Turks as a step toward achieving the ultimate aim of 
Enosis35, the nationalist and Panturkist authors and political figures, associations and 
student unions became more directly involved within the issue. For them the official 
discourse denying the presence of the Cyprus question in Turkey’s political agenda was 
unacceptable. The keen interest and affinity of these circles in the Cyprus issue will 
expansively be explored in the sixth chapter of the thesis. It suffices at this juncture to 
specify that Cyprus was thought to set the proper ground for the rearticulation of Pan-
                                                 
31 Bölükbaşı, Süha, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 29, No. 3, July 1993, p. 
507. 
32 Ibid., p. 508. 
33 Erim, Nihat, Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs, (Ankara: Ajans Türk Matbaacılık, no date), 
p. 115.  
34 Bölükbaşı, Süha, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, p. 507. 
35 İsmail, Sabahattin, 20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences, p. 42-43.  
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Turkist aspirations as well as the calls for anti-communist struggles36. What is more, the 
newly emerging situation in the island after this plebiscite of the Greek Church 
appeared as a timely opportunity for the nationalist and Panturkist circles to reorganize 
themselves politically, who were swept away from the political scene with the defeat of 
Germany in the World War II.                          
  In 1949 the Greek Orthodox church with the initiatives of ‘Bishop of Kition, 
Makarios’ decided to organize an open plebiscite regarding the unification of the island 
with Greece in order to bring the demands for Enosis to the agenda of international 
community. The organization of such plebiscite aggravating the mutual lack of 
confidence among the two communities is analyzed by various Turkish authors within 
the context of the domestic political balances and power relations within Greek Cypriot 
population.  
Makarios who had perceived that this plebiscite would give him an advantage in 
the elections for the Archbishopric, was leading this movement. There would be 
no obstacles between Makarios and the Archbishopric if he could prevent AKEL 
from monopolizing the Enosis efforts by conducting a successful plebiscite 
under the supervision of the church. Also the Greek Cypriot left would be 
prevented from acquiring a dominant position in the Greek Cypriot politics. In 
fact when faced with the Church’s reaction, AKEL would have to step 
backwards by canceling its plebiscite and telling the people to support the 
plebiscite organized by the Church.37  
 
In the plebiscite, which lasted one week, 95.73% of the Greek Cypriot population voted 
in favor of Enosis. The results, which arose fervent reactions among the nationalist 
circles in Turkey, were announced by Makarios sending delegations to various capitals 
in Europe and to the United States. “After the successful conduct of the plebiscite 
Makarios easily won the elections for the Archbishopric and thus became the religious 
and political leader of the Greek Cypriot people.” 38   
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5.2.3. The Internationalization of the Cyprus Dispute and Its Repercussions in 
Turkish Politics 
In the wake of the Greek Civil War the newly founded right-wing government 
“became a firm and persistent advocate of self-determination for the island and for 
Enosis.”39 In parallel with the endeavors of the Greek Cypriot leadership headed by 
Makarios to internationalize the question on 16 August 1954, Greece formally applied 
to the United Nations with the aim of having the issue incorporated in the agenda of the 
General Assembly. After the approval of a committee recommendation by the General 
Assembly the issue was open to discussion in the Committee by 14 December 1954. 
The draft resolution prepared by the Committee was adopted by the General Assembly 
as the resolution no 814(IX) after a series of arduous discussions.  
The General Assembly, 
Considering that, for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a 
resolution on the question of Cyprus, 
Decides not to consider further the item entitled ‘Application under the auspices 
of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples in the case of the Island of Cyprus.40 
 
During the debates on the Committee resolution in the General Assembly the British 
delegation, claiming the Cyprus issue to be its own internal affair, based its thesis on the 
incompetence of the UN to discuss such an issue. The delegation also emphasized the 
strategic necessity to maintain the British sovereignty over the island, which was 
recognized also both by Turkey and Greece with the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Britain 
advocated the unacceptability of the application of the principle of self-determination 
for Cyprus on the grounds that it meant the transference of a part of British territory to 
another UN member.41 
                                                 
39 Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 4. 
40 UN General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth Session, 447th Plenary Meeting, p. 96. 
41 For the full text of the British delegate Selwyn Lloyd’s speech see ibid., pp. 52-55. 
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The Greek delegation, who approached the matter as one of freedom and human 
rights, foregrounded the colonial nature of British rule over the island under which the 
Cypriot people did not want to live.  Thereby, for them the application of the 
internationally accepted principle of self-determination should have been considered in 
the context of the Cypriots’ indispensable democratic rights and freedoms. The Turkish 
UN delegate Selim Sarper delivered speeches drawing attention to “the geographic, 
ethnic, historical and economic”42 factors justifying Turkey’s interests on Cyprus 
throughout the discussions both in the Committee and before the General Assembly. He 
also expressed Turkish support to Britain as regards the incompetence of UN to discuss 
the subject pertaining to British domestic affairs. Throughout the debates Sarper 
articulated a common distrust shared by the government and the nationalist circles in 
Turkey by pointing out that “the Greek version of self-determination for Cyprus that is 
Enosis was vigorously opposed by 100.000 Turkish citizens of the island.”43 Even 
though the resolution no 814 of the General Assembly postponing the discussions on the 
application of self-determination to Cyprus provoked resentment and anger in Greek 
public opinion against the United States and the United Kingdom, the resolution was, in 
effect, appreciated by the Greek government in the sense that it amounted to the 
acknowledgement of the international character of the Cyprus question.  
However, the Greek efforts to internationalize the matter by bringing it to the 
agenda of international forums confronted with unfavorable and vehement reactions 
particularly on the part of the nationalist and pan-Turkist circles in Turkey. In the 
meetings organized by the nationalist associations and student unions the Greek 
attempts were harshly condemned and Menderes government was called upon to pursue 
a more active and involved Cyprus policy. In many Turkish dailies such as Hürriyet, 
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43 Ibid., p. 174. 
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Vatan, Zafer and Yeni Sabah numerous successive articles were published 
concentrating on the Greek threat targeting the presence of Turkishness on Cyprus. The 
intensive emphasis on Turkishness prepared the ground on which the Cyprus issue was 
declared as a “national cause (milli dava)”. Parallel to the condensation of a 
nationalistic atmosphere in the domestic politics, the reluctance of the Menderes 
government to pursue an aggressive and clearly defined Cyprus policy began to erode 
by the summer of 1954. The government, in contrast to its previous stance, devised a 
new foreign political discourse imbued with nationalistic motives and emotions. The 
radical change in government’s Cyprus policy encouraged by Britain as well, “who 
wanted to use Turkish opposition as a counterweight to enosis”44 is generally 
narrativized by Turkish authors as a convergence between the official stance and the 
Turkish public opinion or as responses of the political leaders to the public demands and 
sentiments.  
In asserting Turkey’s rights over Cyprus, however, Turkish leaders were also 
responding to public opinion. In Turkey, it could be taken for granted that the 
prospect of any change in the sovereignty of Cyprus, and especially 
developments concerning the status and security of the Turkish community, 
would be of considerable interest to the public at large. Governments felt the 
pressure of public opinion to act in protection of the national interest. Thus, 
beginning with anti-enosis demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara in 1950 to 
protest the Greek-Cypriot enosis plebiscite of the same year, it was Turkish 
public opinion that led the campaign of opposition to enosis. These, and similar 
manifestations of keen domestic interest in Cyprus in later years have had a 
substantial impact on the way governments have responded to developments on 
the island.45  
 
The national discourse produced and reproduced by the leaders of the nationalist 
associations and student unions and various prominent columnists, all of whom enjoyed 
organic ties with the political authority was instrumental for the state and political elite 
to ensure national unity and cohesion in Turkey. What is more, as Tözün Bahçeli 
conceded there existed some authors arguing that “the Menderes government exploited 
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the issue domestically by encouraging nationalist sentiment to support its tough stance 
over Cyprus.”46 The significance of the Cyprus issue in the reproduction of the 
nationalist discourses legitimizing the government’s policies shall be dealt with in a 
more comprehensive manner in the ensuing pages.  
Returning to our latest issue, before the London Conference convened in 29 
August 1955 “Greece once more applied to the UN asking to have the matter included 
on the agenda for the tenth session of the General Assembly.” Whereas “this time the 
Committee recommended against the inclusion” and the General Assembly decided to 
refuse “to bring the question for discussion.”47 Parallel to the increase of tension on the 
island in 1955, Britain intensified its diplomacy encouraging Turkey to partake in the 
Cyprus negotiations as a concerned party. As a concrete corollary of that diplomacy, 
Britain invited Turkey and Greece to London to negotiate the issue on the table in a 
tripartite conference. Meanwhile, it should be born in mind that during the UN 
negotiations in 1954 and the subsequent years the United States, in turn, bolstered the 
British policy of reaching a solution among the concerned parties of the question since 
it held the idea that adoption of any UN resolution on the issue could inflict Turco-
Greek relations so detrimentally that it could destabilize NATO’s southeastern flank. As 
a matter of fact, 1959 settlement (namely the London/Zurich Treaties) can be 
considered as the outcome of the intra-NATO efforts to attain a solution on Cyprus 
within Western family.  
As to the Turkish domestic politics, a few days after Greece had raised the issue 
at the United Nations “a national seminar” was organized in Istanbul by the European 
Youth Campaign and the Turkish National Student Federation (TNSF) (Türk Milli 
                                                 
46 Ibid., p. 64. Here Bahçeli presents as the example of this approach the work below: Paul B. Henze, 
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Talebe Federasyonu) to “discuss the concept of the European Union.”48 However, in the 
course of the meeting where Turkey’s major newspaper editors and the TNSF 
leadership participated the debates on the Cyprus issue took the limelight mainly owing 
to the recent Greek application to the UN. “… [T]he participants deduced to form an 
association to advance the Turkish cause in Cyprus. They named the association The 
Cyprus is Turkish Committee.”49 In October 1954 the Committee acquired a legal status 
with the name of thr ‘Cyprus is Turkish Society’ (Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti), which 
would assume a very significant role to play in the reproduction of a Cyprus-oriented 
nationalist discourse in Turkey during the second half of 1950s.  
Another factor which led the Cyprus-oriented political mobilization to gain 
prominence in Turkish politics can be cited as the launching of the EOKA (Ethnike 
Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, or the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) 
military campaign on 1 April 1955. The Greek authors insistently state that at least at 
the beginning the EOKA campaign only targeted the British colonial rule on Cyprus; 
but not the Turkish community at all. For them the central reason flaring up the bi-
communal armed strife on the island is the support lent by Turkey to the British colonial 
administration. The main objective of EOKA led by general Grivas were formulized as 
“to force the British to grant Cyprus the right to self-determination which was bound to 
lead to Enosis or union with Greece.”50 General George Grivas “adopted the nom de 
guerre “Digenis”, the name of a Byzantine hero who became legendary, and 
subsequently became known as George Grivas-Digenis.”51 It could be proposed that the 
intensification of EOKA military campaign waged with the accompany of an anti-
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colonial discourse speeded up the British endeavors to utilize Turkey as a means of 
exerting pressure vis-à-vis Greece and the Greek Cypriots.  
In this context, by the end of August 1955 Britain invited Turkey and Greece to 
London for a Tripartite conference “to attempt to solve the Cyprus problem – thus 
marking the beginning of Turkey’s active participation and reversing British policy of 
excluding Athens and Ankara from the politics of the island.”52 Even though it did not 
prove successful, Britain and Turkey appreciated it as a step forward for their respective 
theses. That is, for Britain the conference revealed vis-à-vis the world public opinion 
that it is not the only party that dragged the Cyprus conflict out. On the other hand, for 
Turkey the conference meant the official recognition of its status as a concerned party 
by the other two. In the analyses congruent with the pro-Greek thesis, Turco-British 
collaboration at the UN negotiations and in the London conference is generally noted as 
the beginning of the formation of the Anglo-Turkish alliance vis-à-vis Greece and the 
Greek Cypriot community.  
Meanwhile in Turkey, before and during the London conference the Cyprus is 
Turkish Committee enthusiastically worked out to disseminate the rumor that on 28 
August 1955 the Greek Cypriots would execute a massacre against Turkish Cypriot 
community. In those days when the news of massacre prompted a fervent reaction 
within Turkish public opinion, the nationalistic accent in the government’s discourse 
relating to the Cyprus policy has become more and more evident. For instance, the 
acting Prime Minister Adnan Menderes after convening with the executive board of the 
Cyprus is Turkish Committee explicitly declared, “Cyprus will never be the Greeks’.”53 
Various mass-circulated papers such as Hürriyet, Istanbul Ekspres, Vatan (Istanbul 
daily) and Zafer (the mouthpiece of ruling Democratic Party) initiated to wage a 
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vigorous campaign against both the Greek Cypriots and Makarios (particularly EOKA 
and the communists) and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul. It is worthy of 
noting especially Hürriyet’s campaign against the Greek Orthodox Patriarch 
Athenagoras54 and Istanbul Ekspres’ news about the bombing of Atatürk’s house in 
Selonika. These news and campaigns which would be touched upon in a more detailed 
manner in the sixth chapter of the dissertation triggered an anti-Greek and anti-
communist atmosphere in Turkey in such a way as to strengthen and re-legitimize the 
nationalist and pan-Turkist political movements in Turkey. As it would be delineated in 
the following pages the news on the bombing of Atatürk’s house publicized by Istanbul 
Ekspres with a special edition served to prepare the ground for the 6-7 September 1955 
riots against the Greek minority in Istanbul and Izmir. Across the Mediterranean Sea, on 
the island of Cyprus “in the fall of 1955, the British authorities formed the “Auxiliary 
Police Force” and the “Mobile Reserve Force”, both manned exclusively by Turkish 
Cypriots. The objective of these two forces, totaling 3,000 policemen, was to fight along 
with the British against the EOKA movement.”55 The establishment of these 
supplementary police forces by the British administration is interpreted by both Turkish 
and Greek analysts as a manifest of the British ‘divide and rule policy’ “setting one 
community against the other.”56  
In 1956 the Menderes government changed its initial policy of supporting the 
maintenance of the status quo in Cyprus namely the continuation of the British colonial 
rule and, if not possible, returning the island to Turkey. The government with the 
encouragement of the then international political circumstances began to articulate the 
partition of the island in between the conflicting parties as “the last concession that it 
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and the Turkish nation could make.” Whereas, for Greece and the most part of Greek 
Cypriots, who did not wish to be distanced from the ultimate goal of Enosis, partition 
was unacceptable as much as the continuation of the British administration on the 
island. Meanwhile, due to the escalation of the tension on the island, the British 
authority decided to send Archbishop Makarios to exile on Seychelles on 9 March 1956. 
A few days later Makarios had been sent to exile, Britain initiated a diplomatic 
undertaking to bring the matter to the agenda of the United Nations under the title of 
“Greek support for terrorism on Cyprus.”57 As Faruk Sönmezoğlu stated “this was a 
sign that British policy had changed and she would no longer argue against 
internationalization of the problem.”58   
Another significant alteration regarding Britain’s Cyprus policy by 1956 
occurred in her former attitude of totally rejecting the application of the principle of 
self-determination for the island. This policy change was overtly expressed by the 
British Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Lennox-Boyd during the discussions on 
the Radcliffe Plan in the Parliament as follows:  
When the time comes for this review, that is when these conditions have been 
fulfilled, it will be the purpose of Her Majesty’s Government to ensure that any 
exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the 
Turkish Cypriot community, shall in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be 
given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her 
Majesty’s Government recognizes that the exercise of self-determination in such 
a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options.59    
 
On the other side, until the end of 1958 Greek diplomacy was preoccupied with posing 
the matter, in international forums and during the United Nations discussions, as that of 
in between Britain and the people of Cyprus. Doing this, Greece was aiming at 
eliminating “Turkey as a concerned party entitled to participate in the discussions of the 
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issue.”60 However it should be born in mind that from the second half of 1950s then on, 
the international power politics imposed by the “Cold War” have become more and 
more involved in the question. 
 
5.2.4. The Involvement of NATO powers in the Issue and the Foundation of the 
Cyprus Republic 
The major NATO powers were concerned with the increasing rapprochement 
between the Greek Cypriot leadership and the Warsaw Pact countries and with the non-
aligned states. They intensified the pressure on Turkey and Greece for reaching an 
immediate settlement to the question, which would primarily satisfy NATO’s security 
needs and expectations. As a matter of fact, a ‘Gentlement Agreement’, which was to be 
unveiled later, had been reached between Turkey and Greece besides the founding 
treaties of the Republic of Cyprus. According to this agreement concealed at that time, 
both Turkey and Greece undertook to endorse the leaders of the two sides (namely the 
Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities) against the communists and to encourage the 
Cyprus Republic to become member of the NATO.61   
As a consequence of the pressures exerted by the major NATO powers, in 
December 1958 the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers began to negotiate the issue at 
the United Nations. At the end of these talks which continued throughout January 1959, 
the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers Menderes and Karamanlis achieved to draw out 
“the outlines of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus dispute.” The agreement 
reached by the Turkish and the Greek governments in an unexpectedly short period of 
time “was announced in a joint Graeco-Turkish communiqué issued on 11 February 
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1959.”62 The British government was ready to accept any agreement signed between 
these two on the dispute on the condition that “it could maintain sovereign British bases 
and a military presence in the island. It was only then that Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
leaders were fully brought into the picture.”63 As it would be more apparent particularly 
Makarios was quite reluctant to sign the Zurich Accords, which was therefore defined 
as “essentially an imposed settlement”64 excluding and “neutralizing ethnopolitical 
goals of Enosis and partition”65 of the island. Throughout those negotiations they also 
framed the basic elements of the new Cyprus Republic’s constitution based on the equal 
partnership of the two communities in Cyprus. With the settlement “in the event of a 
breach of the provisions of” the Treaty of Guarantee “Greece, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom” as the guarantors of the newborn Cyprus state undertook both “to ensure 
observance of those provisions” and “to take action” jointly or unilaterally “with the 
sole aim” of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Cyprus.”66 Although the Menderes government was criticized for having abandoned 
partition in Cyprus by the main opposition Republican People’s Party and some other 
political figures, public opinion makers (columnists, student union leaders and the 
nationalist associations) made successive declarations in support of the government’s 
new policy. “[I]n general there was considerable agreement with the government’s 
characterization of the Zurich-London Accords as a victory for Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriots.”67 First, Enosis was prevented and the Turkish Cypriots gained the right of 
veto over the administrative issues. “Furthermore, the Turkish community became a 
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partner of the new Cypriot state with substantial legal safeguards to ensure the 
protection of its rights.”68  
Nevertheless, it should be stated in parentheses that scholars working on the 
Cyprus issue converge on the idea that the independence and sovereignty of the newly 
emergent Cyprus state assured by the “1960 Accords” and its constitution was quite 
restricted and fragile69 on the grounds that the survival of the new Republic was 
contingent upon both the behaviors of and the relations among the external powers 
particularly Turkey and Greece. Moreover, rather than the identity of Cypriotness 
“ethnic considerations” dominated “not only the process through which the settlement 
was reached but also its content.”70  
 
5.2.5. The Crackling of The Republic of Cyprus and Subsequent Developments  
Even though both Enosis and partition were banned with the Constitution of the 
Cyprus Republic proclaimed on 16 August 1960, the ‘motherlands’ have become more 
and more involved within sociopolitical and cultural life in the island. As Joseph S. 
Joseph pointed out “education, religion, culture, language, history and military ties”71 
were operationalized in the constitution and maintenance of the “ethno-political gap” in 
between the two communities. “During the 3 years’ duration of the co-founder 
partnership state of the Cyprus Republic”72 the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leadership 
attached importance to the strengthening of their linkages with the nations of which they 
assumed to constitute an inalienable part.  
The internal affairs of the two communities were regulated by provisions based 
on the premise of historical, linguistic, cultural, religious, and educational unity 
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with Greece and Turkey. The two communities were distinguished vis-à-vis each 
other with references to their Greek and Turkish origin, language, culture, and 
religion.73  
 
For instance as to the field of education, “harmonization of the educational systems of 
the two Cypriot communities with those of their motherlands came into effect after the 
declaration of independence.”  
Since education in Cyprus was segregated, the two communities maintained 
separate schools in which teachers and textbooks imported from the motherlands 
were used to socialize the young Cypriots into Greek and Turkish cultural 
patterns, religious beliefs, social values and ethnic ideals.74  
 
What is more, the Constitution of the Cyprus Republic comprised numerous 
provisions restricting the sovereignty rights of the new state from the outset and 
hampered “the smooth functioning of its government.”75 To illustrate, it was accepted 
that the basic articles of the Constitution could not be amended. The first article of the 
Constitution stipulated “The State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic 
with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President being Turk 
elected by the Greek and the Turkish communities…”76 The Constitution recognized 
both to the President and the Vice-President the right of veto on the issues “concerning 
foreign affairs, defense and security.”77     
In consequence, both the Turkish and Greek sides began to increasingly 
articulate their misgivings and suspicions about the 1960 Accords. The Greek side 
believed that the Founding Treaties of the Cyprus state which were “colonial in nature” 
and imposed upon them by the great powers exerting intense pressure denied their right 
to rule the island as a majority. The preservation of the two military bases over which 
Britain had the sovereignty right as enshrined in the Treaties was harshly criticized by 
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the Greek anti-imperialist left. On the other hand, the Turkish side was bothered with 
the non-implementation of the Treaties’ provisions fully or even their deliberate 
violation. As to the Turkish domestic politics, along with the ongoing debates as regards 
the Cyprus issue after the 1959 Settlement, the leader of the main opposition party  
(Republican People’s Party) İsmet İnönü criticized the government with not achieving 
the partition of the island as an independent Cyprus state, which as a UN member could 
constrain Turkey’s ability to maneuver in future crises.78  
Whilst searching for why the new Cyprus Republic called by Clerides as the 
“reluctant republic” could not survive as a legitimate body embracing the two 
communities in the island, his following remarks are worthy of noting:  
… [I] wish to explain why I have referred to the Republic of Cyprus as the 
reluctant republic. It is because neither the Greek Cypriots, nor the Turkish 
Cypriots wanted or fought for the independence of their country. The Greek 
Cypriots wanted or fought to unite Cyprus with Greece and the Turkish Cypriots 
to unite it with Turkey, or at least to divide it between Greece and Turkey.79  
 
Besides, the first coalition government led by İnönü, who came to power after the 
military coup of 27 May 1960, continuously declared that it would remain loyal to the 
founding treaties of 1959. As Melek Fırat pointed out in this spell of time the least 
desirable deed for Turkey was the outbreak of a discord with Greece or any other ally 
indicative of a change in Turkish foreign policy.80 “Turkey had no intentions over 
Cyprus other than seeing the co-partnership independent Cyprus Republic become a 
success, a peaceful country and a bridge of friendship between the two motherlands.”81 
The Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Averoff, too, 
strongly bolstered the 1959 settlement up with the purpose of normalizing the Turco-
Greek relations the significance of which transgressed the Cyprus question. Thereby, for 
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Kızılyürek and various authors it was clear that this was an anti-communist consensus 
aiming at preventing the involvement of the Soviets in the issue.82 However, it is quite 
difficult to claim that the 1959 settlement was adopted and internalized by the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriot leadership with the same degree of enthusiasm. The following 
statement of Rauf Denktaş, who was still in favor of the partition of the island, to the 
first Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus Emin Dirvana is quite striking as it reveals his 
disbelief and distrust in independent Cyprus Republic: “When the day comes and 
Makarios annihilates the Agreements, we wish you to leave Cyprus as a governor to 
which you were appointed as an ambassador.”83    
Eventually there appeared a series of discords in Cyprus politics some of which 
could be distinguished as the ones  
over Turkish Cypriot insistence on maintaining the separate municipalities in the 
five major towns (as provided for in the Constitution), over the guarantee of 
thirty per cent of civil service posts for the Turkish Cypriots, over the exclusion 
of the Turkish vice-President from foreign affairs, and over separate, or mixed 
army units.84  
 
When Makarios presented a proposal to revise various provisions of the constitution on 
30 November 1963 the crises over the taxation and administration issues deepened and 
widened in such a way as to endanger the independent Republic of Cyprus. These 
amendments “that virtually have left the Turkish Cypriots with no more than minority 
rights”85 were categorically rejected by both the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey. 
The revisions articulated by Makarios included the abrogation of the Vice-President’s 
veto power, “a virtual abandonment of a bi-communal army, separate municipalities, 
the 70:30 ratio in civil service jobs, and the parliament’s authority to pass any tax 
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laws.”86 Turkish authors favoring the official state line allude to these proposed 
amendments as a means employed by Greek Cypriots to reach their ultimate goal of 
Enosis87. This they do by establishing a direct correlation between the refusal of the 
amendments by Turkish Cypriot community and the launch of Greek attacks to 
implement the Akritas Plan “aiming at abrogation of the Agreements, extermination of 
Turkish Cypriot community and the union of Cyprus with Greece.”88   
By the end of December 1963, just after the refusal came, the island began to 
witness a new spell of bi-communal fightings. While the Enosist Greek Cypriots’ 
attacks were transforming into a widespread military campaign, the Turkish leadership 
decided to leave all the official posts occupied by Turks in the state apparatus. “As the 
conflict continued, various security council resolutions seeking to stem the fighting 
were approved in 1964 and 1965.”89 This time the UN, which adopted 7 Security 
Council resolutions during two years, was much more involved in the Cyprus dispute at 
the Security Council level. The most remarkable of these was the Resolution 186 passed 
on 4 March 1964 with which the Security Council called upon member states “to refrain 
from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign 
Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace.”90 The Resolution also 
recommended stationing of a UN peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) in the island and 
appointment of a UN mediator charged to submit a report to the Council on the conflict. 
Since then UNFICYP’s mandate has been extended every six months.  
Along with the deepening of the bi-communal clashes, the Cyprus issue came to 
reoccupy the center of the political agenda in Turkey as a “national cause”. On 13 
                                                 
86 Bölükbaşı, Süha, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, p. 511.  
87 Ertekün, Necati M., The Cyprus Dispute and The Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, pp. 
9-11.  
88 Soysal, Mümtaz and Necati M. Ertekün, “Federal Solution for Cyprus”, Foreign Policy, Vol. XIV No. 
3-4, p. 18.  
89 Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, “The Cyprus Question and the United Nations 1950-1986”, p. 177.  
90 Ibid., p. 177.  
 162 
March 1964 the İnönü government delivered “an ultimatum to Makarios threatening 
military intervention if the attacks did not stop.”91 That the intercommunal armed 
conflicts persisted despite Turkey’s continuous threat to intervene even after UNFICYP 
landed on the island rendered the bi-communal Cyprus state inoperational. The Turkish 
government was of the opinion that international community showed a lack of 
sensitivity toward the violence experienced by the Turkish Cypriots who “were in a 
very weak and depressed condition.”92 The Prime Minister İnönü in an interview on 15 
April 1964 complained about the United States’ Cyprus policy as it adopted “a hands-
off attitude”93 on the issue particularly after the UNFICYP landed on the island. It is in 
this interview that İnönü conveyed his striking message targeting both the domestic and 
world public opinion through the following famous words: “If our allies do not change 
their attitude, the Western alliance will break up… a new king of world will then come 
into being on a new pattern, and in this new world Turkey will find herself a place.”94 It 
would be fair to claim that this message was a manifestation of the Turkish state elite’s 
endeavors both to diversify Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy and also to control and 
manipulate the ever-increasing anti-Greek and anti-Western sentiments in the domestic 
politics.  
On 1 June 1964 the Cyprus Parliament, in a meeting where its Turkish members 
did not participate, “enacted a conscription law authorizing the ‘government’”95 to 
establish a new army. The İnönü government, who found this decision unacceptable 
convened on 2 June 1964 and “decided to land forces in Cyprus to establish ‘a political 
and military beachhead’”96 The government was convinced that “UN forces were not 
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providing adequate protection for the Turkish community on the island”97 When the 
government informed the United States about its intent to send troops to Cyprus and 
occupy one part of the island, the immediate response of the United States came on 5 
June 1964 in the form of a letter signed by the American President Lyndon Johnson. 
The letter, which is claimed to have prompted frustration among the Turkish state elite 
particularly with its style, has long been debated and consistently criticized by analysts 
sympathetic to the Turkish thesis. “The letter, written in an almost patronizing style, 
categorically rejected İnönü’s argument that all peaceful means had been exhausted.”98 
“In 1964 Turkey was forcefully and brusquely dissuaded from intervening militarily by 
President Lyndon Johnson.”99 According to Johnson administration, as Turkey’s ‘right 
to take unilateral action is not yet applicable’ under these circumstances, she should not 
accept her NATO allies to come to her aid in case of either the direct involvement of the 
Soviet Union to the dispute or the outbreak of an armed conflict between Turkey and 
Greece.100 In the letter Johnson also manifestly expressed that “the United States cannot 
agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish 
intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.”101 Not surprisingly, after the 
receipt of such a letter the Turkish government cancelled its decision of landing troops 
on the island and Premier İnönü required Johnson to be more actively involved in the 
dispute in order to achieve a settlement.102  
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However, it can be argued, as some authors do103, that the Johnson’s letter 
symbolizing the foreign hand that prevented Turkey from intervening in Cyprus was 
utilized by İnönü in reconfiguring the internal political balances in such a way as to 
consolidate the legitimacy of the government and its policies. To this line of thought, as 
Turkey was not militarily and politically prepared, İnönü created the incentives for such 
a letter by the American administration. An external impediment of this kind also 
facilitated for the Turkish state elite the reproduction of the strong state rhetoric vis-à-
vis the society. İnönü in his response to Johnson had already wrote that he would “let 
[the] public know that [the] intervention had been put off on [the] urging of [the] USG 
[United States Government] and that the US would endeavor to solve the crisis.”104 
Hence, the letter was partially “leaked to the Turkish press almost immediately upon its 
receipt.”105  
If the failing initiative of Dean Acheson, who was the former Secretary of State 
of the US, is left aside, there occurred a relative stagnation on the diplomatic front until 
the end of 1967. The Acheson’s plan roughly foresaw the unification of Cyprus with 
Greece in return for cessation of a territory on the Carpas Peninsula to Turkey  “[o]ver 
which it would have sovereignty and which would be regarded as an indivisible part”106 
of it. This plan, which “sought to secure US interests by removing the Cyprus problem 
without the direct participation of the Cypriots themselves”107, was rejected by 
Makarios claiming that it meant a disguised partition of the island.108 On the military 
front inter-communal tension continuously escalated with the attacks of Greek Cypriots 
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to the Turkish enclaves in Kokkina109. This led to Turkish aerial bombardment and 
reconnaissance which continued “until the status quo ante bellum was restored in the 
area.”110 That in 1967 inter-communal strives flared up provoked Turkey to intervene 
militarily in the island, which in turn deteriorated Turco-Greek relations. Fortunately 
enough, through a settlement reached after a relatively fruitful negotiation process the 
aggravation of the crisis was deterred. The parties compromised in the return of nearly 
10.000 Greek troops to Greece in tandem with General Grivas and lifting the embargo 
on Turkish Cypriot enclaves.111  
The inter-communal negotiations, which lasted on and off between 1968-74 
were aiming at “exploring various possibilities for the solution of the constitutional 
problem on the basis of an independent, integral state.”112 These talks came to a 
stalemate mainly owing to the uncompromising attitude of the negotiating parties, 
which was disguisedly endorsed by the ‘motherlands’ too. The problems on the state 
structure and the exercise of sovereignty were the issues subject to the most arduous and 
persistent debates at the negotiating table. The Greek Cypriot leadership advocated a 
unitary state where the central authority exercised its power over the whole territory of 
the island; whereas the Turkish Cypriot administration was sympathetic to a more 
federalistic resolution in which the Turkish community did not share its sovereignty 
rights and local autonomy with the central authority as far as possible. Months before 
the 1974 Greek and Turkish military interventions to the island “the newly elected 
Turkish Premier Bülent Ecevit” made it clear that “the only solution acceptable to 
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Turkey was “federation”, a slogan that caused Clerides to withdraw from the 
negotiating table.”113  
 
 
5.2.6. Turkey’s Military Intervention of July-August 1974 in Cyprus    
The relations between the pro-enosists military junta in Greece and Makarios, 
who had been defending an independent state of Cyprus since a couple of years, had 
further deteriorated when the year 1974 ushered in114. “From 1970 to 1974 there were 
numerous unsuccessful plots against Makarios, which most people assumed were being 
planned by the EOKA-B under the direction of Grivas,”115 supported by the fascist 
Greek junta. The Cyprus president, who was not abstaining from aligning himself with 
“the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and some of the Arab and nonaligned states”116 
(namely non-Western powers), was perceived by both the American and Greek 
administrations as “a red priest and the Castro of the Mediterranean”117.  
On 15 July 1974 the pro-enosist forces namely “the National Guard, which was 
widely known to be controlled by the Greek junta”118 in Athens engineered a coup with 
the purpose of overthrowing Makarios after which he fled to Britain. Nicos Sampson, 
who was the leading figure in orchestrating the pro-enosist coup, declared the 
unification of the island with Greece along with his presidency to the Cyprus Republic. 
However, the coup offered “a golden opportunity”119 for Turkey “having prepared itself 
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for such a development”120 for a long period of time. The Turkish Premier Bülent 
Ecevit, who avoided a unilateral action, attempted to convince the British government 
for a joint intervention as guarantors. Upon receiving the British refusal and the failure 
of the American diplomacy, Turkey decided to initiate a unilateral military intervention 
in Cyprus on 20 July 1974121. When Turkish troops began to land on Cyprus the 
Turkish Prime Minister was expressing the purpose of the operation as “not to wage war 
but to bring peace, not only to the Turks, but also to the Greeks on the island.”122 For 
Ecevit and other Turkish officials Turkey was implementing its commitments and 
responsibilities of “restoring peace, fraternity and liberty in Cyprus”123 emanating from 
the guarantorship agreements of 1959. The first declarations by Turkish Prime Minister 
justifying the military operation were full of motives of a reactionist discourse blaming 
the Greek government in a vehement tone124:  
they [Turkish Armed Forces] are in Cyprus for Peace not War. They are there 
not to invade Cyprus but to put an end to invasion. This latest Greek action on 
the island is not simply a coup, it is intended to destroy the independence of the 
Cyprus state and to undermine the international agreements on which the Cyprus 
Republic was founded.125  
         
In the wake of the immediate call of the UN Security Council for a cease-fire, 
Turkey’s military action was suspended for a short spell of time. On 22 July both the 
junta government in Greece and the enosist Cyprus regime collapsed. With the 
breakdown of tripartite Geneva Conferences (convened between 25-30 July 1974 and 
resumed from August 8 to 14) Turkey began to stage the second phase of its military 
warfare. She was aiming at both strengthening its military position on the island and 
also gaining “the political concessions it had failed to achieve through negotiations 
                                                 
120 Dodd, Clement H., “A Historical Overview”, p. 9.  
121 Teziç, Erdoğan, Murat Sarıca et. Al. (ed.), Kıbrıs Sorunu, (İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1975),  pp. 
185-192. 
122 Birand, Mehmet Ali, 30 Hot Days, (London: K. Rüstem & Brother, 1985),  p. 66.  
123 İsmail, Sabahattin, 20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences, p. 182.  
124 See Appendix A and B. 
125 İsmail, Sabahattin, 20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences, p. 182. 
 168 
since 1964.”126 On 16 August 1974 the Turkish state announced a unilateral cease-fire 
by highlighting its readiness to return to the negotiating table, which was refused by 
both Great Britain and Greece. “After fighting ceased a Turkish Cypriot system of 
government was established in 1975 (…) calling itself the Turkish Federated State of 
Cyprus.”127  
Between the years 1975 and 1983 there came various inter-communal 
negotiations and international missions including Vienna Talks of 1975-76, the Clifford 
Mission of 1977, the ABC Proposals of 1978 and the inter-communal talks of 1979-
83,128 none of which yielded fruitful results for a prospective settlement of the Cyprus 
dispute. During 1977 summit meetings between Denktaş and Kyprianou the parties had 
seemingly agreed on a federal solution to the problem. In the communiqué issued after 
these negotiations the parties stated that they were “seeking an independent, non-
aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.”129 However owing to disagreements in other 
territorial, societal and economic issues the meetings ended without bringing any 
desirable outcome.          
Similarly the intercommunal negotiations of 1983 under the auspices of the UN 
came to a deadlock with the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(TRNC) on 15 November although a substantial progress had seemed probable by the 
summer of this year. Within the conventional reactionist discourse this declaration was 
alleged as a response “to the persistent internationalizing of the Cyprus issue by Greece 
and the Greek Cypriots after local negotiations had stalled.”130 The proclamation of the 
TRNC prompted fervent reactions within the international community; for instance the 
United Nations Security Council condemned the proclamation as ‘purported secession 
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of part of the Republic of Cyprus’ by underlining its illegal nature. The Council, which 
demanded the withdrawal of the proclamation also called on all the members of 
international community not to recognize ‘any Cypriot state other than the Republic of 
Cyprus’131. For Greece the announcement of TRNC, contrary to the 1960 Accords, was 
manifestly threatening the “unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity” of the Cyprus 
Republic. However, Turkey advocated the legitimacy of such an announcement by 
asserting that it “amounted to a restoration of the bi-communal status of Cyprus, which 
had been destroyed by the Greek Cypriots, and was in accordance with the principle of 
self-determination.”132 Even after the establishment of the TRNC international efforts, 
especially under the auspices of the United Nations such as Proximity talks of 1984-
1986, the Davos Process of 1987-1988, and ‘Set of Ideas’ in 1992, persisted in the post-
1983 period; yet did not suffice to revive the hopes for a peaceful settlement.  
 
5.2.7. Involvement of the European Union in the Cyprus Question and Other 
Developments in the 1990s   
Meanwhile in 1988 the President of the Cyprus Republic Vassiliou declared the 
intent of his government to apply to the European Community full membership, “to 
which the North immediately rejected” on the grounds that “the Greek Cypriot 
administration, representing only one community, did not have the authority to apply on 
behalf of the whole of Cyprus.”133 The Cyprus Republic had already signed “a customs 
union treaty with the European Community in 1987 that became effective on 1 January 
1988.”134 The application of the Cyprus Republic for full membership came on 4 July 
1990. On 30 June 1993 the European Commission reported that the Cyprus Republic 
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was eligible for membership. In the European Council summit of 24-25 June 1994 in 
Corfu the Council made it public that “the next phase of the enlargement of the Union 
will involve Cyprus and Malta.”135    
In 1992 the stagnant inter-communal negotiations gained impetus with the ‘Set 
of Ideas’ submitted by the UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali. Even though 
the Turkish Cypriots asserted having accepted various provisions (91 out of 100)136 of 
the UN plan, they voiced their objections on a number of crucial points. The central 
reason behind the Turkish rejection of the UN document was that it established a federal 
system in which the sovereignty and the right to self-determination of the Turkish 
Cypriot people were not recognized137. Although in the Set of Ideas it was maintained 
that ‘sovereignty emanated equally from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities’138, the Turkish Cypriot leadership took a firm stance on the recognition of 
the fact that “the sovereignty of each state in the proposed federation could only be 
limited in those areas given to the authority of the federal state”139. In 1993 another 
initiative of the UN called confidence-building measures came into effect with the aim 
of reopening Nicosia (Lefkoşa) International Airport (closed since 1974) and 
reconsidering the status of the Varosha (Maraş), which did not yield any concrete result.      
The Turkish political scene became very much occupied once more with the 
debates on the Cyprus question in the year 1995. The signing of the Customs Union 
agreement between Turkey and the EU on 6 March and the general elections of 24 
December were the two crucial events triggering the revival of those debates. During 
both the Parliamentary discussions on the ratification of the Customs Union treaty in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly and the political parties’ general election campaigns 
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the issue has turned out to be the fundamental subject of the political debates and 
struggle between the coalition government and the opposition parties. The discourse of 
abandoning and ‘selling out’ Cyprus namely the “national cause, national interests” was 
once more utilized to undermine the legitimacy of the political rivals in Turkey. The 
opposition parties adamantly accused the coalition government of selling out the 
Turkish Cypriots in return for signing of the Customs Union treaty140. The Turkish 
press, for the most part, contributed enthusiastically to the gaining dominance of the 
discourse of “selling out” in the political debates regarding the Cyprus dispute.141  
On 28 December 1995 Turkey and the TRNC signed a joint declaration 
“providing a security guarantee to the TRNC in every respect”. The declaration came at 
the time when especially the opposition parties in Turkey expressed their concerns “on 
possible negative effects of the Customs Union on the TRNC’s economic and political 
situation.”142 It is safe to propose that the joint declaration the signing of which is 
claimed as a response to the Greek Cypriots’ confrontational rearmament policy was a 
message sent by the Turkish state elite and the TRNC administration to both the 
domestic and world public opinion. Among the main traits of the declaration 
illuminating also Turkey’s official approach to the EU membership of Cyprus were: 
a) Joining the EU without finding a solution in Cyprus cannot be 
considered 
b) Turkey’s role as guarantor on the island will continue 
c) The Turkish Cypriots will enjoy equal sovereignty with the Greek 
Cypriots 
d) Cyprus cannot join the EU while Turkey is outside of the Union143.  
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There came an American attempt to settle the longstanding Cyprus problem at 
the beginning of 1996. This effort initiated by “the bright diplomat” of Dayton 
Agreement the US assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke resulted in an 
absolute failure mainly owing to the outbreak of Kardak/Imia crisis between Turkey and 
Greece. This crisis that heavily increased the tension in the Aegean and escalated the 
military confrontation “over an uninhabited 10-acre outcrop” was utilized by the then 
Prime Minister Tansu Çiller “to enhance her popularity and strengthen her hand in the 
coalition-building negotiations.”144 By the same token Tözün Bahçeli also argues that 
 
indeed with an eye to garnering domestic electoral support, Çiller subsequently 
exploited both Cypriot and Aegean tensions and adopted a populist line. Taking 
advantage of tensions created by the violence along the green line that resulted 
in the death of one Turkish Cypriot and four Greek Cypriots she visited the 
TRNC in September 1996 to attend the funeral of the slain Turkish Cypriot.145  
 
Nevertheless, it will be a reductionist and inadequate analysis to associate these kinds of 
attempts on the part of the leaders of political parties solely with their calculations on 
gaining power vis-à-vis their rivals, for there exist other and admittedly more significant 
root causes rendering the Cyprus issue integral to the power/domination relations in 
Turkish politics. At this juncture, suffice it to say that a number of politicians including 
Turgut Özal, Tansu Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz employed, in various occasions, the 
discursive totality overloaded with intensive nationalistic motives as regards the Cyprus 
question so as to legitimize and consolidate their position vis-à-vis the bureaucratic 
establishment in Turkey. It is possible to read such efforts of these political figures as 
their preference “to handle Cyprus policy primarily through the Prime Minister’s office 
rather than the Foreign Ministry” and the bureaucratic establishment “where Denktaş 
enjoyed greater support”146 from the outset of the Cyprus problem.  
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At the very beginning of 1997 the security and military dimension of the Cyprus 
dispute utterly overshadowed all other aspects of the issue with the announcement of the 
government of the Republic of Cyprus to purchase “S-300 surface to air missiles from 
Russia.”147 This initiation which “deeply concerned the military and the government” in 
Turkey was expressed by the Greek Cypriot government as a requirement of their 
defense vis-à-vis the strategic supremacy of the Turkish side. For them, 
the S-300 missiles could only make sense as a defensive ground to air weapon 
not as an offensive system. Given Turkey’s reluctance to accept a no-fly zone 
over Cyprus the vulnerability of Cypriot airspace and its constant violation the 
S-300 would have constituted a minor correction in the Republic’s vast military 
disadvantage vis-à-vis Turkey or a bargaining chip to be exchanged for the de-
militarization of the island.148  
 
In tandem with the S-300 crisis, further progress observed in Greek/Greek Cypriot Joint 
Defense Doctrine, which was concluded between these two in 1993, was also perceived 
by the Turkish bureaucratic and political elite as “a direct military threat to Turkey.”149 
Within this period that the discourse of threat and security was persistently employed by 
all the concerned parties bore the Cyprus issue in to the field of ‘the vital’ and ‘the 
existential’.  
The year 1997 also earmarked the inception of a new era in which the European 
Union began to be more actively and deeply involved within the Cyprus question. At 
the Luxembourg Summit (12-13 December 1997) the European Council decided “to 
launch an accession process comprising the ten Central and East European applicants 
States and Cyprus”150. In the wake of the Summit “where among other things Cyprus 
received a date for accession talks while Turkey was not promised accession even in the 
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long run”151 Turkey expressed her decision to cut off dialogue with the EU concerning 
political matters. The Turkish state elite was of the opinion that the Greek-controlled 
Cyprus Republic cannot join the Union “without the consent of the Turkish Cypriots or 
before Turkey is itself admitted.”152 To illustrate the enormity of the disillusionment and 
frustration, which the Luxembourg decisions of the European Council induced on the 
part of the Turkish state, the statement below from the web site of the Turkish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs is in order: 
Turkey and the TRNC have, at every opportunity and at all levels, been  
emphasizing their views on and objections to the Greek Cypriot efforts to join 
the EU in the aftermath of its unilateral and illegal application, thus putting on 
record their legal and political objections in this regard. In this context, we have 
been stressing at every opportunity and at all levels that if the membership of the 
Greek Cypriot Administration to the EU is realized, it will have adverse 
ramifications on peace and tranquility both on the Island and in the Eastern 
Mediterranean region and that due to its historical and treaty-based rights and 
interests, Turkey would never accept this, would not compromise over Cyprus 
and Turkey’s response to such a development would have no limits.153 
 
What is more, another decision of the Turkish state announced by the Foreign 
Ministry on 16 December 1997 mounted the tension in Turkey’s relations with both 
Greece and the EU. In conformity with this announcement every step to be taken 
towards the integration of Cyprus into the Union would have been counterbalanced with 
the efforts that would proceed the TRNC’s integration with Turkey. However, this 
policy that was also recommended by the National Security Council on 20 January 
1998154 was never materialized and with the Justice and Development Party 
government, who ascended to power in late 2002, gave out its long-lasting primary 
position in the political agenda. 
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Eastern Mediterranean”, in Greek-Turkish Relations In the Era of Globalization, Dimitris Keridis and 
Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds.), (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2001), p. 194.  
152 Veremis, Thanos, “The Protracted Crisis”, p. 48.  
153 See http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/dev.cyprus.htm.  
154 Veremis, Thanos, “The Protracted Crisis”, p. 49.  
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On 31 August 1998 Denktaş formally submitted a set of proposals for 
confederation “as a final effort to achieve a mutually acceptable lasting solution in 
Cyprus”155. In effect, Denktaş had been favoring a confederal system of governance 
instead of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federalism since the onset of 1990s; this was, 
however, the first instance where he formally declared his intention of establishing a 
confederal structure in Cyprus. This Declaration of historic significance, which gave 
rise to fervent reactions and frustration in both Greeks and Greek Cypriots, foresaw 
establishment of a confederated structure “composed of two peoples and of two states of 
the island supported by symmetrical agreements with the two respective motherlands 
and guarantor states”156 and maintenance of special relations of the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots with their ‘motherlands’. As regards the accession of Turkey and Cyprus to the 
European Union the proposal put forward that  
the Cyprus Confederation may, if both parties jointly agree, pursue a policy of 
accession to the EU. Until Turkey’s full membership of the EU, a special 
arrangement will provide Turkey with the full rights and obligations of an EU 
member with regard to the Cyprus Confederation.157 
 
5.2.8. The New Millennium and Latest Developments in the Cyprus Issue  
The United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan’s statement of 14 November 
1999 intending to prepare the ground for negotiations to achieve a peaceful settlement 
to the Cyprus dispute gave a fresh impetus to the intercommunal dialogue and led to 
five rounds of proximity talks between 3 December 1999 and 10 November 2000158. 
The talks commenced in a positive atmosphere by virtue of the Secretary General’s 
reaffirmation that the two peoples on the island were politically equal and that the 
                                                 
155 Theophanous, Andreas, “The Cyprus Problem and Its Implications for Stability and Security in the 
Eastern Mediterranean”, p. 195.  
156 Ibid., p. 195.  
157 Ibid., p. 195.  
158 Ertuğ, Osman, “The Turkish Cypriot View in the Aftermath of Proximity Talks- Confederation or Two 
States”, in Two Peoples and Two States in Cyprus At the Eleventh Hour, Proceedings of a seminar held at 
the Turkish Embassy in London, (London: Turkish Embassy, 2001), pp. 10-11.  
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representatives of two communities were invited to conduct negotiations as equal 
parties not representing each other. However this atmosphere turned to negative with 
Denktaş’s insistence that any settlement of the Cyprus conflict necessarily entailed the 
recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus159 and with the Oral Remarks 
presented to both parties on 8 November 2000 which were assessed as far from meeting 
the basic political needs of the Turkish side, leading finally to the breakdown of the 
proximity talks160. The failure of these talks was intended to be compensated for in the 
five rounds of direct talks between 16 January 2002 and 14 January 2003161. These UN-
led face-to-face negotiations covered a wide range of core issues including the territorial 
issue, the executive and legal authority of a central state still with a very dim prospect 
for a solution162.  
Landmark in these negotiation processes was the ‘Basis for Agreement on a 
Comprehensive Settlement on the Cyprus Problem’ conveyed to the two sides by the 
UN Secretary General on 11 November 2002 envisaging to “establish a common State 
along the lines of the Helvetic Confederation and two constituent States, one Greek the 
other Turk, each exercising all the powers that the Constitution does not delegate 
explicitly to a common State”163. Asked by Kofi Annan to give an initial response to the 
plan in a week’s time, Clerides replied on 18 November 2002 indicating his readiness to 
start peace talks on the basis of the proposed framework. Denktaş, on the other hand, 
submitted his response with a delay of nine days (that is on 27 November 2002) 
                                                 
159 Turkish Daily News, electronic edition, 9 March 2000, 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/09_03_00/for.htm.  
160 Developments Regarding Cyprus accessible at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/dev.cyprus.htm.  
161 Ibid.  
162 No Sign Of Resolution To Cyprus Talks, EuropaWorld accessible at 
http://www.europaworld.org/week89/nosignof5702.htm.  
163 Deloy, Corinne, “Presidential Elections in Cyprus, A Round-Up 30 Days Before the Vote”, The 
Robert Schumann Foundation accessible at http://www.robert-
schuman.org/anglais/oee/chypre/default.htm.    
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accepting the document as a basis for negotiations164. Considering the objections and 
further proposals from both parties Annan submitted a revised version of the framework 
on 10 December 2002 and demanded the two leaders to act swiftly and wisely to reach a 
conclusion “so that a reunited Cyprus could accede to the European Union”165.  
The UN plan, the Annan plan in popular parlance, prompted ongoing feverish 
debates in Turkish as well as Turkish Cypriot public opinion. During these debates the 
conventional state/security based understandings together with the Denktaş leadership 
began to be criticized ever extensively than before in the Turkish media. Massive 
demonstrations in favor of the Annan’s plan and accession to the EU and counter-
demonstrations turned out to occupy the political agenda in North Cyprus. Meanwhile, 
Annan’s proposal to submit the plan to separate public referenda on 30 March 2003 was 
rejected by Denktaş and the newly elected Greek Cypriot leader Papadapoulos166.  
Another momentous event in the course of modern Cyprus history arrived on 16 
April 2003 when the Greek-controlled Cyprus Republic signed the Treaty of Accession 
to the European Union167. This historic development acquires even greater significance 
if seen in the light of the fact that the Turkish-controlled sector of the island has already 
been isolated from the accession process due to the failed efforts towards the unification 
of the island. Practically one week after the signing of the Treaty, the president of the 
TRNC Denktaş announced the opening of the Green Line on 23 April 2003 separating 
the two communities on the island for 29 years. This decision taken within the context 
of confidence building measures not only eased the tension between the peoples 
inhabiting the island but also sparked, to a certain extent, revitalization of the island in 
economic and political terms. The upcoming parliamentary elections in the Turkish 
                                                 
164 Resumption of Intercommunal Talks, Annan Plan, The Republic of Cyprus, 
http://www.pio.gov.cy/cyissue/latest_development_001.htm.  
165 Ibid.  
166 Turkish Daily News, electronic edition, 1 March 2003.  
167 Application for Membership, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, at 
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa.nsf/EUAppForMembership?OpenForm.  
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Republic of Northern Cyprus on 14 December loom as a vital threshold in the fate of 
the island as well as the future course of the Cyprus problem. It is anticipated by 
analysts and scholars that the outcome of these elections will also have a fundamental 
role to play on the future of Turkey-EU relations as well as Turkey’s integration process 
to the Union.168    
                                                 
168 The analyses establishing a strong linkage between the outcomes of the forthcoming elections in 
Cyprus and the future of Turkish-EU relations began to be repeatedly articulated by various journalists, 
academics, ex-ambassadors, politicians and other experts of the issue on various platforms in Turkey.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CYPRUS AS AN UNFINISHED SECURITY PROJECT OF THE TURKISH STATE 
 
6.1. Introduction 
For any scholar searching for the role and functioning of ‘foreign’ policy 
discourses and representations in restructuring and/or ensuring the domestic order 
within a given socio-political context, examining how the Cyprus issue is approached 
and articulated by the Turkish state and academic “elite” constitutes a very pertinent 
model. It is a non-deniable fact that decoding the discursive and representative economy 
espoused by the state apparatus in foreign political matters yields substantial insights in 
bringing into daylight the specifities of the processes through which state identity and 
state society relations are continuously redefined within a given polity. In this sense, a 
thorough analysis of the conventional official Cyprus discourse in Turkey is similar to 
climbing up a tree laden with fruit for those aspiring to explore the relationality between 
the maintenance of domestic power relations and the modes in which ‘foreign’ political 
issues are represented. Having analyzed the process through which the Cyprus issue has 
turned out to be a ‘national cause’ and an indispensable strategic asset for Turkey, even 
the existence of which was denied at the outset by the political and state elite, one can 
explicitly theorize the share of ‘foreign’ policy in the reproduction of Turkish state 
identity as a ‘modern nation state’. As David Campbell correctly argued, ‘foreign’ 
political discourses and representations based on the constant articulation of danger, 
threat and security are both integral to state identity construction and functional in 
securing the standards of this identity1. They are also operational in defining and 
                                                 
1 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, (rev. ed.),  
(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1998), p. 13.  
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determining the criteria of being allowed into the political center or being marginalized 
and excluded from the socio-political domain.  
These introductory remarks provoke us to recontemplate on ‘foreign’ policy 
functioning as boundary producing, disciplinary, and securitizing practices or as 
integral part of domestic power relations. Re-approaching foreign policy in this manner 
also reminds us the need for rethinking state society relations as a structure continually 
transforming and reproducing itself. The classical paradigms have generally assumed 
those relations as relations between a completed agent (the state) and its social/national 
formation, which are shaped through the interests of state elite, some interest groups or 
classes2. They generally deemed those as one-layered relations occurring within a 
definitely bounded political space. This inadequate conceptualization misses the 
discursive and representative practices of the state apparatus through which the core 
assumptions and characteristics of state society relations are redefined and/or 
reconfigured in accordance with changing sociopolitical circumstances. Thus the social 
theory has to reconsider state society relations as a multi-layered discursive space 
embracing also foreign policy representations of the state and corresponding responses 
of domestic society. 
In this sense this chapter maintains that the discursive economy constituted 
around the Cyprus question and premised on the constant assertion of such concepts as 
‘the national cause’, ‘national defense and security’, ‘national unity and integrity’, 
‘sovereignty’, ‘geo-strategic importance’, and ‘vital threats’ is very operational in 
inscribing the legitimate boundaries of ‘the political’ in Turkey. The main reason 
making the Cyprus issue so central to the power relations and state identity construction 
in Turkey stems from the security language intensely employed by the Turkish civilian 
and military bureaucratic establishment in such a way as to help consolidate their 
                                                 
2 Alford, Robert R., “Paradigms of Relations Between State and Society”, in The State Critical Concepts 
Volume I, John A. Hall (ed.), (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 63-76.   
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hegemonic status within the system. Therefore the main burden of this chapter will be 
to unfold this security discourse constituted around the Cyprus issue.  
To comprehend this discursive totality better fixing the Cyprus issue as an area 
of bureaucratic specialty and competence, the chapter will concentrate on Turkey’s 
official Cyprus discourse bearing the issue directly to the field of ‘security and vitality’. 
In this context I will reveal some ways of securitizing the issue at stake within its 
official representation through scanning of a wide range of official declarations and 
written and oral statements extracted from different historical epochs of the Cyprus 
dispute. As it was previously stated in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, 
some statements of Rauf Denktaş, the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC) will also be included in the discursive analytical terrain of the study. 
For, his approach and discourse concerning the Cyprus question, which is in full 
conformity with those of the Turkish bureaucratic and foreign policy establishment, are 
constantly disseminated by Turkish media in a way as to deeply influence the public 
debate. Such issues as the representation of the island of Cyprus as a geopolitical asset 
and natural extension of Anatolian heartland, centrality assigned to its geopolitical 
significance from the viewpoint of Turkey’s national survival, equation of Turkey’s 
security with that of the TRNC and the discourse on the necessity of a sovereign 
Turkish Cypriot state in the island will constitute the sub-concerns of this section. To 
sum up, this chapter will focus on the discursive and representative performances of the 
Turkish state elite situating the Cyprus issue in a statist context where institutional 
needs and objectives of the state are prioritized vis-à-vis other agents, i.e. different 
societal groups, and their expectations.    
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6.2. Securitizing Official Discourse on the Cyprus Question 
 
Turkey has a multitude of soft and hard security concerns. Owing to 
historic, cultural, economic and strategic linkages, and the location of Turkey 
at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, as well as the Mediterranean and Black 
Sea Basins, these concerns are increasingly interconnected with security in 
the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Caspian region, the Persian Gulf and the 
Middle East. The most pressing concern for Turkey, however, is the bundle of 
disagreements with Greece. The Cyprus question is the knot that binds the 
bundle.3   
 
Should the state project of security be successful in the terms in which it 
is articulated, the state would cease to exist. Security as the absence of 
movement would result in death via stasis. Ironically, then, the inability of the 
state project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the state’s continued 
success as an impelling identity.  
The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not 
a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility.4 
 
 
Whilst expatiating Turkey’s security discourse on the issue at stake I have two 
pivotal aims to achieve within this section of the chapter. First, I will strive to explore 
and concentrate on the modes in which the Cyprus issue has been represented and 
articulated by the Turkish state elite primarily and particularly as an issue of geo-
strategy and security. In this sense, I will exemplify the discourse of “geopolitics-threat 
and encirclement” recurrently applied through the Cyprus question throughout different 
historical stints in Turkish politics. Secondly, I will allege that the constant emphasis on 
the island’s geopolitical and strategic vitality and indispensability for Turkey’s national 
interests and security concerns have led to the heavily securitization of the issue in a 
way as to move it out of the sphere of normal politics. In this regard I will also contend 
that the heavily securitized representation of the Cyprus question in the domestic 
politics has unique and seminal impacts on the state society relations and the state 
identity construction in Turkey as a disciplinary practice conditioning and limiting the 
scope and content of ‘the political’. 
                                                 
3 Olgun, Mustafa Ergün, “Turkey’s Tough Neighbourhood Security Dimensions of the Cyprus Conflict”, 
in Cyprus The Need for New Perspectives, Clement H. Dodd (ed.), (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 
1999), pp. 231-32.  
4 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, pp. 12-13.   
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In the official state line, the heavily securitization of the Cyprus issue is realized 
through various modes of representation bearing the issue to the field of “the vital, the 
existential, the imminent”. The official discursive economy imposing certain patterns of 
understanding and explaining and thus inscribing and limiting the political imagination 
concerning the Cyprus issue is built upon the persistent repetition of some arguments 
taken for granted as pre-given facts. Some of the motives recurrently asserted in the 
official Cyprus discourse can be stated as: the identification of the security of Turkish 
Cypriots with that of the ‘mainland’ Turks through the metaphor of ‘motherland’ and 
‘babyland’ and the inseparability of the security of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC); representation of the island of Cyprus as ‘natural extension 
and/or continuation of Anatolia’ from the geological/geographical, economic and 
cultural perspectives; the vitally important status of the island for Turkey’s national 
defense and security due to its centrality and pre-dominance within Eastern 
Mediterranean region; the overriding position of Cyprus on the crossing of the trade and 
water ways and oil routes; representation of the island as a geopolitical asset or a 
‘floating military base’; the persistent articulation of the fear of encirclement and so 
forth. It should be noted that throughout different historical epochs some of these 
motives were picked up and highlighted within the official discourse depending on the 
changes in the global conjuncture and Turkish political landscape. In this part of the 
study my attempt is to discuss and exemplify the main tracks of the securitizing 
discursive strategy applied by the foreign policy establishment as regards the Cyprus 
question. However, before unearthing this discursive strategy and certain modes of 
representation embedded in it I would like to deal with the issue of geopolitics 
intermingled with securitization in our case of Cyprus.  
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6.2.1. Geopolitics As Part of Social Reality 
Trailing the research avenue of historical sociology, geopolitics should be 
treated as another key term to comprehend and unfold fully the impact of the Cyprus 
policy adopted by the state elite on the system reproduction in Turkey. The constant 
articulation of geopolitical vitality of the island of Cyprus from the viewpoint of 
Turkey’s security objectives and priorities within ‘the military exigencies’ of 
international politics is quite elucidating to understand the unique place allocated by 
Michael Mann and other historical sociologists to geopolitics in theorizing state action. 
For Mann, who insistently mentions the distinguished nature of geopolitical 
organization from other power organizations, geopolitics, in effect, “[i]s an essential 
part of social life and it is not reducible to the ‘internal’ power configurations of its 
component states”5. This analysis which deems geopolitical circumstances as an 
independent variable determining the international dimension of state’s behaviors, in 
turn, paves the way to critically question how and to what extent the geopolitical 
representation of a ‘foreign political issue’ can condition the modes in which it is 
articulated within domestic politics. For instance, the representation of the island as an 
invaluable geopolitical asset vital to the maintenance of Turkish ‘national security and 
interests’ served to the articulation of the Cyprus issue as a question of ‘existential 
threat’6 both to Turkey and to Turkishness itself.        
In the same vein, other historical sociologists whose prominent aim is defined as 
“bringing the state back in” to the analytical scene as stated in the previous chapter 
attribute paramount importance to the international dimension of state’s behaviors and 
geopolitical circumstances for the full comprehension of the unique nature of the 
modern nation state and its agential capacities. In this sense, the historical sociological 
                                                 
5 Mann, Michael, The Sources Of Social Power, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 2. 
6 Wæver, Ole, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, in: Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1995).  
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attempt sets out its analysis by establishing a direct correlation between domestic and 
international agential capacities of the state. To this paradigmatic framework, 
international dimension of state action stemming from its territoriality, namely the 
territorially bounded context of its performances, ensures state autonomy and 
independence vis-à-vis the social formation to which it belongs. In other words, 
historical sociologists emphasize the necessity of considering state’s international 
capacities, policy objectives and maneuvers (meaningly the external dimension of its 
sovereignty) while examining its relations with the domestic society. For them, that the 
state is a “Janus-faced entity”7 functioning in relation to both their own territory and the 
boundaries with other states renders it operational outside and above the civil society. 
Thus geopolitics among the factors molding external policy choices and actions of the 
state emerges as a seminal variable in the reproduction of state society relations within a 
given polity. Drawing on this approach to which I referred, to some extent, in 
formulating the problematique of this thesis work, international relations i.e. the 
‘foreign’ political initiatives of the state are inherent “to the process of the very 
constitution of the modern state as a nation state”.8  
In the same direction, the constructivist IR theory also foregrounds the notion 
that foreign political performances and representations of statecraft are deeply involved 
in the normative processes through which the modern nation state is created as a 
territorially sovereign entity. By taking the analysis one step further, the 
poststructuralists claim that foreign political representations and discourses of the state 
functioning as a disciplinary practice are inherent to the constitution and maintenance of 
state identity and its privileged status as the only sovereign and autonomous subject 
within a given socio-political context. As various post-structuralist scholars indicated, 
                                                 
7 Skocpol, Theda, States and Revolutions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 110. 
8 Keyman, Fuat E. , Globalization, State, Identity/ Difference Toward A Critical Social Theory of 
International Relations, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997), p. 81. 
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the ideological and organizational function of geopolitics “as an essential part of social 
life”9 and the subjective articulation of geopolitical circumstances serves to the 
consolidation of state’s autonomy and power vis-à-vis domestic society. Building upon 
the post-positivist research avenue it is fair to suggest that any critical inquiry on the 
role of geopolitics in state identity-making should necessarily embrace “demonstration 
of the metaphysical or ideological character of the presuppositions relied on, and the 
determination of their place in a wider system of metaphysical or ideological values.”10 
Such an analytical approach refutes, from the outset, to presumably accept geopolitical 
circumstances as given, objective, and unchanging realities and calls us to reconsider 
geopolitical representations as an integral part of state’s strategies toward increasing 
national cohesion and unity in support of its ‘foreign’ political choices and national 
security conception.  
In line with these arguments I strongly propose that an adequate analysis of 
Turkey’s Cyprus policy preconditions the unfolding and problematization of centrality 
assigned to geopolitics in the official account and the relevant discursive economy built 
around it while handling the dispute. In this context, the strong relationality between the 
geopolitical representation of the island and the securitization of the Cyprus issue and 
thereby its moving out of the spheres of ‘normal politics’ will be extensively elaborated 
on in the ensuing sections of this thesis. At this point, I shall content myself with saying 
that the securitization of the Cyprus issue due to its geo-strategic vitality is achieved via 
“the discourse of threat and security internal to foreign policy”11 and thus to state 
identity. Following Campellian analysis, in the next sections of this chapter my central 
purpose will be to problematize the discursive economy espoused by the Turkish state 
                                                 
9 Mann, Michael, The Sources Of Social Power, p. 2.  
10 Bartelson, Jens, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 20.  
11 The internality of the discourse of danger, threat and security to foreign political representations of the 
state is addressed by David Campbell in the introduction of his book Writing Security United States 
Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, pp. 1-13.   
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elite as to the Cyprus question by considering its implications on the processes through 
which the state identity and the state society relations are reproduced in Turkey.  
However a few remarks on the salience of its geopolitical positioning in the history of 
the island are in order before setting out this examination.  
It would not be an exaggeration to propose that as “an island confined merely 
within its geographical traits”12 Cyprus’s geopolitical and strategic asset has turned out 
to be the most appealing incentive for the occupying forces throughout its political 
history. The island’s centrality and pre-dominance within Eastern Mediterranean region 
in close proximity to the Middle East, extending practically at the same distance from 
Europe, Asia and Africa and enjoying an overriding position on the crossing of the trade 
and water ways rendered it an indispensable asset from the viewpoint of geo-strategy in 
the eyes of countless occupiers from the Ottomans, from the Venetians and from the 
British. In modern times the geo-strategic value assigned to the island of Cyprus 
increased dramatically parallel to the subordination of international politics to nation 
state-centric interest perceptions, security concerns and threat calculations.  
Particularly along the Cold War years the island, due to its geopolitical and geo-
strategic positioning, was one of the hottest areas within the global East-West 
competition. Rather than concerned with the socio-political demands and expectations 
of the Cypriot people, the Western great powers approached the question, first and 
foremost, as an issue of military/security within the context of the maintenance of 
NATO’s control in the Eastern Mediterranean region vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact. As a 
matter of fact, the foundation of 1960 independent Cyprus Republic was a concrete 
outcome of global competition within the bi-polar Cold War world. The Cyprus 
Republic, where Britain has insistently preserved its two sovereign military bases for 
                                                 
12 Hasgüler, Mehmet, Kıbrıs’ta Enosis ve Taksim Politikalarının Sonu, (İstanbul, İletişim Yayıncılık, 
2000), pp. 17-18.  
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strategic reasons13 and the sovereignty of which was restricted by the guarantership 
rights of three NATO powers (Greece, Turkey and Britain) was imposed by the United 
States and Great Britain in order not to jeopardize the stability of NATO’s southeastern 
flank. To various authors, the geo-strategic location of the island attracted also the 
Soviet Union to be actively involved in the conflict with the aim of benefiting from the 
political tensions and disturbances inside the NATO. As it will be indicated in the 
ensuing part, various IR academics and strategists converge on the idea that with the 
end of bi-polarity the island’s geo-strategic salience has gained new dimensions due to 
increase of regional politics.            
 
6.2.2. Centrality of Geopolitics in Turkish Security Discourse on Cyprus  
Atatürk, who had been following a military manouvre in Southern Turkey, asked 
the officers around him: ‘Suppose Turkey has been invaded again and Turkish 
forces are fighting only in this region. What are our routes of supplies? The officers 
gave a great number of views and thoughts. Atatürk listened all of them with great 
patience and then he pointed out Cyprus on the map and said, ‘Sirs, as long as 
Cyprus is in the possession of the enemies, the supply routes of this area are 
blocked. Pay attention to Cyprus, it is very important for us’.14  
 
This famous anecdote told with pride in various ‘academic’ and non-academic 
texts where nationalistic motives and aspirations prevail implies, at first glance, two 
things. First, examining Turkey’s Cyprus policy and its implications in the domestic 
politics impels scholars to be familiar with the burning issue of ‘geopolitics and 
strategy.’ And second, the island’s geo-strategic vitality and indispensability to 
Turkey’s ‘national security and defence’ has been assigned a unique salience by the 
Turkish state elite.  
                                                 
13 Dodd, Clement, “The Historical Background” in Clement Dodd (ed.), The Need for New Perspectives, 
p. 6.  
14 Manizade, Derviş, Kıbrıs: Dün, Bugün, Yarın, (İstanbul:, Yaylacık Matbaası, 1975), p. 13 quoted and 
translated in Sabahattin İsmail, 20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences, 
(İstanbul: Kastaş Ltd. Co. Publications, 1989), pp. 170-1. 
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However, the centrality of geopolitics does not only emanate from geo-strategic 
importance of the island of Cyprus, which is geographically located in close vicinity 
with Turkish southern coasts. Yet more importantly it is due to its instrumentalization in 
injecting some degree of legitimacy to the securitizing official discourse on Cyprus. 
Mainly owing to the centrality of geopolitics “the ‘strategic element’ has continued to 
be of the utmost importance in Turkish calculations”15 since the existence of the Cyprus 
problem was formally recognized in Turkey. In the ‘specific rhetorical structure’ 
adopted by the Turkish ‘foreign’ policy establishment the Cyprus issue involving 
“Turkey’s vital national and strategic interests”16 has Janus-faced implications in 
Turkey’s strategic calculations and threat perceptions: the geographical proximity of the 
island to the Anatolian heartland is utilized to represent the issue in domestic politics 
either as a source of imminent, fatal and persistent threat to Turkish nation and state or 
as an indispensable element and integral part of Turkish national security. 
 
6.2.3. Cyprus As A Source of Existential Threat to Turkey and The Fear of 
Encirclement  
…Turks are apt to remind foreigners that Cyprus is only 40 miles from the 
southern coast of Turkey. This fact alone goes a long way to explain Turkish 
interest in the island. Indeed, there is a consensus among writers of Turkey’s 
involvement in Cyprus that its primary interest in the island has been strategic17. 
 
While depicting how such an urgent and persistent threat Greeks and Greek 
Cypriots constitute to Turkey’s and “Turkish Cypriots’ rights and existence”18 the 
discourse of encirclement has been recurrently referred to by the official and 
                                                 
15 Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, in Thomas Diez (ed.), The 
European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict Postmodern Union, (New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2002), p. 58.  
16 Republic of Turkey Turkish Embassy at Washington D.C. accessible at 
http://www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/issuescyprus.htm.  
17 Bahçeli, Tözün, “Cyprus in the Politics of Turkey Since 1955”, in Norma Salem (ed.), Cyprus A 
Regional Conflict and its Resolution, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 62.  
18 Mustafa Ergün Olgun, “Turkey’s Tough Neighbourhood:  Security Dimension of the Cyprus Conflict”, 
p. 232.  
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mainstream argumentation. From military documents, declarations and other official 
statements to editorials, newspaper columns, leaflets and brochures the imminent threat 
of encirclement was constantly asserted throughout all the phases of the Cyprus 
question. “Stuck in its southern underbelly, Cyprus is a major source of concern for 
Turkey”19 and “it is the final, southern element in the containment of Turkey, which is 
already encircled by the Greek islands in the Aegean.”  The island which has a 
“strategic position to control the important Turkish harbours of Iskenderun and Mersin, 
as well as Syrian and Israeli harbours”20 can easily be utilized by the hostile power as a 
“springboard for the conquest of Anatolia from the South”. Therefore, the island as a 
‘naval fortress’ or “a natural aircraft carrier in the Eastern Mediterranean”21 is of vital 
importance for Turkey’s national defence and security. “It is an ‘unsinkable’ aircraft 
carrier, missile launching pad, and a ‘control tower’ on the air and maritime routes in 
the Eastern Mediterranean.”22  
It could be claimed with some degree of accuracy that the main reason 
underlying the discourse and fear of encirclement bearing the issue directly to the field 
of ‘vitality’ and ‘emergency’ is that the implied occupying force is regarded by Turkey 
as Greece itself. A lengthy quotation from the then Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu 
suffices to summarize the mainstream and official Turkish argument on the issue at 
stake: 
from the military perspective the island of Cyprus has to be in the hands of a 
state, which is concerned in the fate of Turkey and the surrounding Middle 
Eastern states. … The dominant power on the island would have a position of 
control over Turkey’s harbours. If this dominant power is also the same 
dominant power on the islands to the west [of Turkey], Turkey would be de 
facto encircled by this power. Turkey thinks that it is convenient to maintain the 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 232.  
20 Torumtay, Necip, Değişen Stratejilerin Odağında Türkiye, 2nd ed., (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1997), 
pp. 88-96; A. Cural,’S-300 Füze Krizi ve Düşündürdükleri’, Silahlı Kuvvetler Dergisi, 356, (Ankara: 
Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1998), pp. 64-65; C. Evcil, Yavru 
Vatan Kıbrıs’ta Zaferin Hikayesi, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1999), p. 1. Quoted and translated in 
Işıl Kazan, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 58. 
21 Balancar, Ferda, Last Tango In Cyprus, http://www.turkishtime.org/aralik/40_1_en.htm.  
22 Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 58.  
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current status quo of the island. If it is going to be changed, then it must be 
returned to Turkey… Turkish people cannot think differently about the future of 
an island which is existentially important to the defence of its country. 23 
  
Almost all columnists writing in mainstream newspapers and various book 
publishers and authors converge, particularly in the course of 1950s and 1960s, on the 
idea that Greeks and Greek Cypriots fostering the desire of reviving the Byzantine 
Empire for the materialization of Megali Idea, in reality, wish to complete the 
encirclement of Turkey from both south and west by unifying Cyprus with Greece (see 
Figure 1).   
By the same token, Pan-Turkist journals of those years (Orkun, Bozkurt and 
Toprak) foregrounded the idea that in case of this unification (Enosis) “what they 
describe as a “noose to strangulate Turkey””24 was to be created. The discourse and fear 
of encirclement may also be manifestly observed while listing the reasons underlying 
Turkey’s ‘intervention’ in Cyprus in July 1974:  
Turkey’s Aegean coast is blockaded because of the possession of the 
Dodeconese Islands by Greece. As a matter of fact Turkey’s only free access to 
the sea is its southern shores. About 40 miles away from these shores is the 
island of Cyprus. Possession of Cyprus by Greece through Enosis, would have 
meant the encirclement of the southern shores of Turkey as well. Therefore 
Turkey had to destroy the de facto situation created by the coup of 15 July with 
the military intervention of 20 July25. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The map illustrating the encirclement of Turkey by Greece.  
                                                 
23 Bilge, A. Suat, “Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Türkiye Sovyetler Birliği Münasebetleri”, in Mehmet Gönlübol 
(ed.), Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995, 9th ed., (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), p. 335-427. 
Translated in Işıl Kazan, ‘Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey’, p. 58. 
24 Christos P. Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish 
Province, (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas Publisher, 1991), p. 63-64.  
25 Sabahattin İsmail, 20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences, p. 171.  
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Below this figure, which appeared in a book edited by Prof. Dr. Derviş 
Manizade, president of the İstanbul branch of the Cyprus Turkish Cultural 
Association reads26: 
 
Dark Circle: As a result of the granting of the Dodeconese Islands as a gift by 
Italy to Greece in the aftermath of the World War II, a Greek circle came to 
existence stretching from Kapıkule to Meis. In an attempt to materialize the 
Megali Idea, Greece harbors the strong desire of encircling Turkey from both 
south and west by further expanding this circle in a way as to include Cyprus 
therein.        
 
Even though the end of bi-polar rivalry, emergence of new political/economic 
actors, and strengthening of supranational institutions and the appearance of new risks 
such as terrorism, micro-ethnic conflicts dramatically altered the parameters of security 
and being secure in the global scale, ascendancy of the discourse of encirclement 
remained intact in Turkey’s official Cyprus policy. It was persistently imagined as “the 
cornerstone of Greece’s policy of enveloping Turkey with a strategic belt of hostile 
states.”27 For instance the signing of military and technical cooperation agreements 
between Armenia and the Greek-controlled sector of Cyprus has been interpreted by 
both Turkish bureaucratic and foreign policy establishment and the ministries of foreign 
affairs and defense of the TRNC as a new stride towards this envelopment/encirclement 
policy. Soon after the conclusion of these agreements it was made public by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense of TRNC that  
there is no doubt that this action is part of an attempt at the encirclement of 
Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by the hostile forces 
within the framework of the "Joint Military Doctrine" formed between the Greek 
Cypriot side and Greece.28 
 
In the same vein, the remarks by the chief of General Staff General Hilmi Özkök 
in January 2003 regarding the recent developments in Cyprus in the light of the UN 
Secretary-General Annan’s peace plan are stunningly revealing. According to the leader 
                                                 
26 Manizade, Derviş, Kıbrıs: Dün, Bugün, Yarın, p. 200. The translation belongs to Esra Kaliber.  
27 Olgun, Mustafa Ergün, “Turkey’s Tough Neighbourhood:  Security Dimension of the Cyprus Conflict”, 
in Cyprus The Need for New Perspectives, Clement H. Dodd (ed.), (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 
1999), p. 243. 
28 Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence of TRNC, 1 March 2002, accessible at 
www.trncinfo.com/ENGLISH/PRESSRELEASE/010302.htm.  
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of Turkish military in case of the acceptance of Annan’s proposals “the entrapment of 
Turkey in Anatolia” would have been completed29. This rather fervent rhetoric 
qualifying Annan’s plan as a threat to Turkey’s security stands out as a perfect 
illustration of the securitization of an issue political in nature.               
As it can be deduced from all these quotations the centrality assigned to the geo-
strategic salience of the island from the viewpoint of Turkey’s encirclement was 
constantly asserted and overemphasized within official and popular discourses 
throughout all the phases of the dispute. Within this ossified and prosaic discursive 
economy its geographical proximity to Turkey refers to a mark indicating the magnitude 
and urgency of the threat with which Turkey is faced. The geographical vicinity of 
Cyprus to Turkey when compared with Greece is frequently alluded to so as to 
underscore the non-Greek character of the island. “Cyprus has never been part of the 
Greek state. It lies 40 miles from the coast of Turkey, and Turkish people have 
inhabited the island since the 12th century. Cyprus is 250 miles from the nearest Greek 
island (Rhodes), and Athens is 460 miles away.”30  
During the long history of the Cyprus question in declarations of some 
politicians, newspaper articles and in booklets published by student unions such as 
Turkish National Student Federation (TNSF), and such associations as Cyprus is 
Turkish and Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association most of whom have organic and 
sound links with the officials of the state apparatus, the island of Cyprus is invoked “as 
the geopolitical right of Turkey.”31 This notion was echoed very recently and strikingly 
by Rauf Denktaş, President of TRNC, within the context of debates on Annan’s plan. 
The author of this dissertation is of the opinion that the below affirmation of Denktaş 
                                                 
29 Güven, Erdal, “Kıbrıs’ta Yeni Politika Bekleyelim, Görelim”, Radikal, (Turkish daily), 10 January 
2003; Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Davutoğlu’nu Okumak”, Yeni Şafak (Turkish Daily), 28 January 2003; 
“Turkish Cypriots Prepare Protest” Kathimerini English Edition (Greek Daily), 10 January 2003.   
30 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/briefing.htm  
31 President Denktash: “People trying to tie Cyprus to the EU cannot come to the power”, Kıbrıslı 
(Turkish Cypriot daily), 13 June 2003 accessible at http://www.cyprusmedianet.com/EN/article/6743.  
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not only exemplifies the conventional state-centricist outlook to Cyprus question, which 
is also widely shared by Turkish foreign policy establishment, but also exhibits the 
disciplinary and exclusionary nature of the state’s foreign policy discourses: 
I cannot think any of Turkish Cypriots who would sign the Annan Plan in order 
to join the EU without Turkey and thus forfeit Turkey’s geopolitical rights in 
Cyprus along with the end of the dispersal of the Turkish Cypriots. I don’t think 
of any Turkish Cypriot who would cause this damage to Turkey.32 
 
To this argument, signing of Annan’s plan and joining the EU without Turkey 
are unthinkable even if most sectors of society wish to do so. This is precisely because 
such a deed will inevitably damage Turkey’s ‘geopolitical rights’ over Cyprus and 
thereby tears down its defense and security. This mode of designating the problem, 
bearing the issue to the field of ‘state security’ prevents it from being debated in public 
sphere with the active involvement of society. The words “I cannot think any of Turkish 
Cypriots” and similar phrases employed within Turkey’s conjuncture totalizes the 
society as a homogenous and organic unity by inscribing the limits of political 
imagination as regards the issue at stake.          
 
6.2.4. Cyprus As An Indispensable Element of Turkey’s National Security 
… The importance of Cyprus to Turkey does not arise from a single cause; it is a 
necessity which emanates from the exigencies of history, geography, economy 
and military strategy, from the right to existence and security, which is the most 
sacred of every state, in short, from the very nature of things33. 
 
These utterances quoted from the speech of the then Turkish Foreign Minister 
Fatin Rüştü Zorlu at the Tripartite Conference on Cyprus held in London at the end of 
August 1955 are quite elucidating to unveil the basic tenets of Turkey’s official outlook 
to the Cyprus question. This line of argumentation, which proved its durability from the 
1950s up to the present time, hinges upon the notion that Cyprus is an inexorable and 
                                                 
32 Kıbrıs (Turkish Cypriot daily), 13 June 2003 accessed at 
http://www.cyprusmedianet.com/EN/article/6743.  
33 Accessible at http://www.hellas.org/cyprus/trexpand.htm.   
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integral part of Turkey’s national defense and security. This mode of representation 
coding the Cyprus question primarily as an issue of ‘national security’ has also been 
disseminated through printing press, books, brochures and other media in the course of 
the historical stint indicated above. The popular discourse produced and reproduced 
through these instruments incessantly reminds to the Turkish society the vitality of the 
Cyprus question for its ‘rights, existence and security’. It also intends to alert the society 
to preserve its unity and national cohesion against thwarted and deviant ideas and 
desires. “Turkish people cannot think differently about the future of an island which is 
existentially important to the defense of its country”34. It should be noted that the 
security language that the Turkish bureaucratic and political establishment have used 
proved its success until the recent years in preventing the occurrence of public debate as 
regards the Cyprus question. To illustrate this fact, if Turkish Worker’s Party’s (TİP) 
declaration in 1967 is left aside, Turkish politics has not witnessed any radical criticism 
of Turkey’s official Cyprus policy.35 It is worthy of note that TİP voiced its criticisms 
only in the second half of 1960s when indignation and aversion against the USA and the 
NATO were prevalent in Turkish public opinion.  
However to better comprehend to what extent security considerations have been 
determining the episteme underlying the Turkish state’s approach to the Cyprus issue, 
one should necessarily assess the lengthy quotation below. This statement of Turan 
Güneş, who was the Turkish foreign minister in the left-leaning Ecevit cabinet during 
Turkey’s military intervention of July-August 1974 in Cyprus, also reveals how the 
Turkish state elite understands and expresses the nature of the Cyprus question.                     
Cyprus is as precious as the right arm of a country which cares for 
her defence or her expansionistic aims if she harbours any. If we don't keep 
this strategic importance of Cyprus we cannot understand the 
                                                 
34 Bilge, A. Suat, “Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Türkiye Sovyetler Birliği Münasebetleri”, pp. 335-427 quoted 
in Işıl Kazan, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 58.  
35 Fırat, Melek M., 1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1997), 
pp. 159-60.  
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peace operation of 20 July or rather it is impossible to understand the entire 
Cyprus crisis... Many states, to a certain extent because it suits their interest, 
want to see the Cyprus problem merely as our desire to protect the Turkish 
community on the island. Whereas the actual problem is the security of 45 
million Turks in the motherland together with the Turks in the island and the 
maintenance of the balance of the Middle East36. 
 
The foundation and survival of a separate Turkish Cypriot state through which 
Turkey’s military control over the island could be guaranteed was deemed both as a 
requirement and necessity of Turkey’s strategic calculations. The increased insistence of 
the Turkish side on a settlement based on the existence of two separate and sovereign 
states and the absolute separation of the two communities on the island can partly be 
explained by the dominance of geo-strategic calculations and security concerns in 
formulating Turkey’s official Cyprus policy. In a joint declaration between Turkey and 
the TRNC on 20 July 1997 it was stated that  
taking into account that the massive build-up of arms and the support given to 
terrorism in south Cyprus has reached a level which constitutes a threat directed 
against Turkey, both sides have emphasized the increasing importance of the 
TRNC for the security of Turkey, while Turkey continues to provide effective 
guarantee for the TRNC37. 
The rhetoric equating the security of the Turkish state with that of the TRNC intensified 
in the years 1997-98 when the S-300 missile crisis outbroke. 
With its arms and armaments, air assault fields, Russian military experts and S-
300s, the Greek Cypriot administration has attempted to threaten not only the 
TRNC but Turkey as well. The security of the TRNC is directly the same as the 
security of Turkey. Any threat, provocation or aggression against the existence 
of the TRNC will be treated as directly targeted against Turkey38. 
This line of thought was also echoed by the civilian and military top brass and the then 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit throughout this period: “we now believe that not only is 
                                                 
36 Hürriyet, (Turkish daily), 20 July 1980.  
37 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement By The Republic Of Turkey And The Turkish 
Republic Of Northern Cyprus - 20 July 1997 accessible at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/doc4.htm.  
38 Statement By Foreign Minister Ismail Cem At A Press Conference During His Visit To The TRNC - 30 
March 1998, The Turkish Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/doc14.htm. 
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Turkey guarantor of the security of the TRNC, but at the same time we consider the 
existence of the TRNC to be a necessity for the security of Turkey.”39 
 
6.2.5. The ‘Motherland’-‘Babyland’ Metaphor and Representation of Cyprus As A 
Natural Extension of Anatolia 
The days that you will, once again, be tested against hardship and agony, 
are awaiting you. They are not only awaiting you but us as well. We, as your 
brothers in Motherland Turkey, are by your side. I want you to remember that 
whatever circumstances and difficulties you face, we will stand by your side. I 
want you to know that at every stage of your struggle, whatever your need, 
obligation or decision will be, we are by your side40. 
 
The geographical proximity of Cyprus to Turkey as opposed to Greece is 
recurrently employed as a fundamental reference point by the authors favoring Turkey’s 
official thesis concerning the issue in order to inject a degree of legitimacy into their 
arguments. In those texts whether academic or non-academic as well as in official 
statements, the geographical location of the island, stretching out only 40 miles away 
from Turkish southern coasts, is made use of to indicate the historical, economic, 
strategic and cultural linkages between the Cyprus and ‘the mainland’ Turkey. As 
evident in the statement quoted above the unity of the mainland Turks’ and “our 
Turkish Cypriot consanguinities’” fate and destiny is persistently articulated in the 
declarations by official and political figures.   
One step forward in describing the maternal relationality between the island and 
Anatolia is the representation of the island as a natural extension of the Anatolian 
heartland. To prove the allegations about the existence of indissoluble and sacred 
linkages connecting the Baby to her Mother historical, geographic, geological and 
demographic findings are also benefited from. For many columnists, authors, 
academics, politicians and bureaucrats as Cyprus “is a natural extension of Anatolia” 
                                                 
39 Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 61.  
40 Statement by the then Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem At A Press Conference During His Visit 
To The TRNC, 30 March 1998 accessible at www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/doc14.htm. 
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the existence of these historical bonds legitimizing Turkey’s involvement in the Cyprus 
dispute turns out to be an undeniable truth41.  
Cyprus is a natural continuation of Anatolia, indeed geologists always 
stress that it is an extension of the Taurus Mountains. It formed part of the Hatay 
province of Anatolia during the first part of geological history, but was later 
separated from the mainland due to the cracking and crumbling of the earth’s 
crust42.   
 
The thesis that “Cyprus is geographically part of Anatolia” and thereby is “an 
integral part of Turkish national defense and security” has been articulated by many 
Turkish politicians, bureaucrats and prime ministers throughout the long history of 
events and developments in Cyprus. To illustrate this point, a telling quotation from a 
message delivered in 1954 by the then main opposition leader İsmet İnönü can be made: 
Cyprus has been ceded to Britain in return for undertaking to ensure Turkey’s 
territorial security. Turkey’s territorial security is, indeed, of primary concern in 
today’s conditions as well. … None of our equitable friends could expect us to 
overlook neither the fate of Turks in Cyprus nor the utmost strategic importance 
of the Island for the integrity of our country. Cyprus is admittedly vitally 
important for us as well.43         
        
This line of thought was echoed by Adnan Menderes, the then Prime Minister, on 24 
August 1955: “Cyprus is but the continuation of Anatolia and constitutes one of the 
pivotal elements as regards its security.”44 To this argument throughout the long 
centuries of history of the region “nations who controlled Anatolia or the North African 
coast and wished to be dominant in the Mediterranean had all wanted to add Cyprus to 
their list of possessions.”45 This contention predicated upon the presumption that any 
state capturing the island will necessarily have a strong say on Turkey’s fate has also 
been articulated in various international conferences by Turkish official delegations. 
                                                 
41 This understanding is strongly asserted in various newspaper columns quoted in Fahir Armaoğlu’s 
book entitled Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1963)    
42 İsmail, Sabahattin, 20th July Peace Operation: Reasons, Development and Consequences, p. 10.  
43 Armaoğlu, Fahir, Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959, p. 64. Translated by Esra Kaliber. 
44 AYIN TARİHİ, August 1955, (261), pp. 170-73 quoted in Fahir Armaoğlu, Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959, 
(Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1973), p. 133.   
45 İsmail, Sabahattin, 20th July Peace Operation, p. 12.  
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“Strategically located only 40 miles off the Turkish coastline, an unfriendly power 
lodged in Cyprus could easily strike the nation’s Anatolian heartland.”46 To give 
another example, in the London Conference of August-September 1955 organized 
among Turkey, Greece and Britain persistently referred to this fact by affirming that 
“Cyprus is, from geographical point of view, but a continuation of Anatolian heartland. 
As a matter of fact, civilizations dominating Anatolia throughout history have naturally 
become dominant over Cyprus as well.”47        
Another commonality between the authors of the mainstream Turkish thesis is 
the direct relationality established between the maintenance of Turkey’s involvement in 
the island and the sustenance of NATO’s control in the East Mediterranean. In line with 
this thesis articulated particularly until the midst of 1960s, in which Turkey’s reliance 
on the Western Alliance was eroded, the island of Cyprus is vital not only to Turkey’s 
national defense but also to that of the “free world”. Those who allowed the unification 
of the island with Greece tolerating the communist and pro-communist forces in Greek 
Cypriots and also endorsed Makarios, who strove to remain out of NATO and to verge 
on the Soviet Union and the non-aligned states would unavoidably create deficits and 
cause destabilization in NATO’s southern flank. Therefore, secession of Cyprus, which 
is so geo-strategically indispensable an island for the defense of the “free world”, can 
render it ‘the Cuba of the Mediterranean’. In accordance with this argument, which will 
be addressed more comprehensively in sections to come, Enosis (unification with 
Greece) must have definitely been prevented for the sake of “peace loving” and “free 
nations”.  
The centrality assigned to the geo-strategic salience of the island and the 
discursive economy constituted around it by the Turkish state elite have continued to 
                                                 
46 Ibid., p. 137. 
47 AYIN TARİHİ, September 1955, (262), pp. 166-67 quoted in Fahir Armaoğlu, Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-
1959, p. 146.  
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manifest itself throughout all the phases of the Cyprus dispute. Rather than diminishing, 
the dominance of geopolitics in which Cyprus was perceived primarily as a geopolitical 
asset or a “floating military base” boosted in the post-bipolar international system.  
 
 
 
6.2.6. Increase of Regional Level Politics 
According to a widespread analysis within the discipline of IR, with the end of 
the Cold War era, namely the end of global competition between the Eastern and 
Western blocs, regionalist concerns and calculations have come to dominate the 
international politics48 precisely because states have begun to focus “increasingly on 
regional conflicts and co-operation.”49 In this sense, by using the “regional security 
complex theory”50 introduced into the literature by Barry Buzan, Işıl Kazan argues that 
“… the geo-strategic importance of Cyprus to Turkey has increased in parallel with the 
changing of the ‘geography’ of Turkish threat perceptions, which has shifted from the 
‘north’ to the ‘south-east’ of Turkey, and from the global to the regional and domestic 
levels.”51 In the same vein, Ahmet Davutoğlu, one of the prominent political advisers of 
the current Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, exemplifies the increase of 
regional level politics by stressing the intensifying interrelatedness between the Balkan 
and the Middle Eastern regions.52 To him, unlike the bipolar Cold War landscape in 
which these two regions seemed isolated from one another, in the contemporary 
                                                 
48 Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security A New Framework For Analysis, (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 9.  
49 Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 55. 
50 Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
War Era, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Hemel Hempstead; Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).  
51 Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 54.  
52 Davutoğlu, Ahmet, Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiye'nin Uluslararasi Konumu, (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 
2001), p. 177.  
 201 
circumstances of global politics the fates of those are ever bound to each other.53 
Therefore, there may not exist, for Turkey, a policy of the Balkans and of the Middle 
East segregated from each other. Nonetheless, she needs a new policy for the regions at 
the center of which the inner balances of the Eastern Mediterranean have been struck.54  
In this formula, Cyprus, due to its geo-strategic location, indubitably plays the 
key role as one of the “basic instruments of this new policy.”55 For him, any regional or 
global power nurturing strategic calculations and interests in “the Middle East, the 
Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and in the Gulf” 
cannot fail to pay heed to the island of Cyprus, enjoying the capacity of directly 
influencing all those regions56. Thereby Turkey should consider it as the key element of 
a general naval strategy concerning the adjacent sea belt surrounding her57. By the same 
token, a news analysis which appeared on 5 March 2003 in a Turkish daily Turkish 
Daily News, reputed to be close with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was quite 
interesting. According to the paper, ‘some military analysts’ were maintaining that  
whatever the strategy the AK Party headquarters could produce, as was laid 
down clearly at the latest Feb. 28 National Security Council (MGK) meeting, 
Turkey must be ready for new possible tensions in the entire southern front from 
Cyprus to Iraq, and must act with the awareness that every stone in that front is 
linked with each other. "We must know that the loss of one playing piece may 
bring about a total defeat," a leading source commented, stressing that a "retreat" 
from the Cyprus position could land Turkey in a position to "retreat" in all 
fronts, including the EU.58  
 
Another notion intensely highlighted within the discourse of geopolitics 
particularly with the midst of 1990s is the close proximity of the island to the oil-riched 
Middle East and also its critical position within the new routes of oil transportation 
stretching out from Caucasus to Europe. Thus, if Turkey desires to have a strong saying 
                                                 
53 Ibid., p. 177.  
54 Ibid., p. 177.  
55 Ibid., p. 177.  
56 Ibid., p. 180. 
57 Ibid., p. 180.  
58 Turkish Daily News, electronic edition, ‘Denktaş arrives for crucial Cyprus summit’, 5 March 2003.  
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both on the sharing of this huge and seductive oil cake and the political future of the 
region vis-à-vis its “immediate neighbors” (namely Russia and Greece), it has to 
adamantly cling on to its involvement within the island. As a matter of fact, as stated by 
Mustafa Ergün Olgun, Undersecretary of TRNC presidential office, this region “will 
become even more important once the pipelines from the Caspian Basin to Ceyhan 
materialize.”59 By the same token, many recent analyses were published evaluating the 
S-300 missile crisis of 1997 in the context of Turkish-Soviet rivalry as regards the 
transportation of the Caucasus oil to the West. To this analysis what mostly motivated 
Russia to sell these missiles to the Cyprus Republic was to weaken Turkey’s hand in the 
rivalry by destabilizing and disturbing the strategic balances in the Mediterranean 
region60.  
  All these statements quoted above unequivocally reveal the fact that in the 
mainstream Turkish view and/or in the official conceptualization Cyprus issue is 
perceived first and foremost as a question of geopolitics and security. As addressed in 
Kazan’s cited article, this line of thought was manifestly demonstrated in 1970s in “A. 
Váli’s seminal work on Turkish foreign policy: ‘Ankara, it was said, would have 
opposed Enosis for strategic reasons even if there had been no Turks on Cyprus’.”61 To 
this argument, which is echoed by Davutoğlu, practically 30 years later, the island has a 
vital geo-strategic importance to Turkey independent from the national belongings of 
the peoples inhabiting it. Therefore, 
the second axis of the Cyprus issue rotates around the geo-strategic salience of 
the island by virtue of its geographical location. Independent from the residents 
of the island, this axis is vitally important per se. There has to exist for Turkey a 
problem of Cyprus as such even if not a single Muslim Turk lives there. No 
country can remain indifferent toward such an island located at the very heart of 
                                                 
59 Olgun, Mustafa Ergün, “Turkey’s Tough Neighbourhood:  Security Dimension of the Cyprus Conflict”, 
p. 243.   
60 Davutoğlu, Ahmet, Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu, p. 177-78.  
61 Váli, F. A., Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey, (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1971), quoted in Işıl Kazan, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from 
Turkey”, p. 58.         
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that country’s life space. Hence apart from its human dimension Turkey has to 
pay heed to Cyprus in strategic terms in the same way as the significance of 
Dodeconese Islands, on which live only an inconsiderable number of Turks, 
does not expire in the eyes of Turkey and in the same way as the Unites States is 
directly involved and interested in Cuba and other Caribbean islands although it 
does not enjoy any commonalities in terms of population with those islands.62 
 
 
 
6.2.7. Turkish Cypriot Population As A Strategic Asset 
The allegation that there is massive immigration of Turkish nationals from 
Turkey to Cyprus with the purpose of hanging the demographic character of the 
island within a pre-planned partition project is not only completely contrary to 
the truth but also a distortion of the actual facts. All that is taking place is that 
skilled technicians and workers are being imported from Turkey on a temporary 
basis as “guest workers” to meet the immediate needs of the economy63. 
 
The debates with regard to the ethno-demographic structure of such a little 
Eastern Mediterranean island, the total population of which has never transcended 1 
million64 even at present, have persistently taken place at the core of the ‘discursive 
battle’ among the parties to the Cyprus dispute. In this respect, such issues as 
Population Exchange Agreements, immigrations to and emigrations from the island, 
status of Anatolian settlers and returning of displaced Cypriots have ranked high on the 
political agenda of intercommunal negotiations particularly since 1975. The fact that all 
the concerning parties approach the population inhabiting the island as a strategic 
element legitimizing and strengthening their positions has impeded reaching reliable 
data on the ethno-demographic structure of Cyprus in the long history of the dispute.  
Population may be qualified as another discursive area where the state-
centricism of the official and popular Cyprus discourses in Turkey can manifestly be 
observed. As Işıl Kazan explicitly pointed out “Turkey’s twin security concerns in 
                                                 
62 Davutoğlu, Ahmet, Stratejik Derinlik, p. 179. Translated by Esra Kaliber.  
63 It is quoted from the letter sent by TFSC Representative to the UN Vedat Çelik to UN Secretary 
General Kurt Waldheim, 24 October 1975. The letter is cited in Christos P. Ioannides, In Turkey’s Image 
The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province, p. 3.   
64 According to the statistical data provided by the government of the Greek-controlled Cyprus Republic 
the total population of the island was 573.000 in 1960, 714.000 in 1992 and 759.000 in 2000. Data are 
accessible at http://www.pio.gov.cy/cyprus/people.htm.     
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regard to Cyprus” (namely its own security and that of the Turkish Cypriot community) 
have remained intact during all the phases of the Cyprus problem and “have not 
changed even after the Turkish-Greek rapprochement born out of the earthquakes in the 
summer of 1999, and the official acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy for membership by 
the Union after the Helsinki summit of December 1999.”65 In Turkey’s security 
discourse on Cyprus the Turkish Cypriot population is envisioned as a strategic asset 
both necessitating and legitimizing Turkey’s existence and control on the island and 
involvement in the dispute.  
Cyprus is an island which pierces the middle of Turkey like a dagger. It is 
extremely vital from the viewpoint of our security. This island should not be 
in enemy hands. The existence of the Turks in northern Cyprus is a 
guarantee in this direction66. 
 
Particularly in the popular discourse Cyprus is geographically and historically an 
extension of Anatolia as much as the Turkish Cypriot community an extension and/or 
part of the entire Turkish nation. Thereby there is nothing as natural as imagining that 
the security of Turkish Cypriots and of Turkey are intimately associated with each 
other: "Naturally Turkey has strategic interests in Cyprus. It is fortunate for Turkey that 
the Turkish Cypriot community exists here.”67  
Besides its existence, the size of the Turkish Cypriot community is also of 
greatest importance, in strategic terms, for the maintenance of “Turkey’s twin security 
concerns” in the island. Therefore, to many analysts “Ankara has secured the 
immigration of tens of thousands of settlers from Turkey since 1974” with the aim of 
changing “the island-wide demographic balance in favor of Turkish Cypriots.”68 As a 
consequence of this policy while Turkish Cypriots were generally constituting one fifth 
                                                 
65 Kazan, Işıl, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 61.  
66 “The Long Term Turkish Policy on Cyprus”, Human Rights Action, accessible at http://www.hr-
action.org/chr/Tpolicy.html.  
67 Quoted from the statement of Rauf Denktaş in Turkish daily Milliyet, 23 July 1985.  
68 Bahçeli, Tözün, “Turkey’s Cyprus Challenge: Preserving the Gains of 1974”, in Greek-Turkish 
Relations In the Era of Globalization, Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds.), (Dulles, VA: 
Brassey’s, 2001), p. 214.   
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of the island’s overall population, as is the case in 196069, currently this ratio has risen 
to 30% of the total population70. To many authors, on the other hand, settlement of large 
numbers of mainland Turks soon after Turkey’s military intervention of July-August 
1974 cannot only be explained with the motivation of boosting the population of TRNC 
vis-à-vis the Greek-controlled Cyprus Republic. To them, another strategic reason 
behind this movement of migration is to be able to support the Denktaş leadership and 
the right wing and nationalist parties within the TRNC, the policy objectives, and 
interest perceptions of which are not contradictory with Turkey’s security 
understanding. “Both Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership have been pleased that 
the Anatolian settlers have tended to vote for the nationalist parties in TRNC elections. 
However, this has upset” the center-left opposition which has been “critical of Turkey’s 
influence in the TRNC” and has been “more amenable to reaching a political settlement 
with Greek Cypriots based on a bizonal federation.”71 As a matter of fact, the debates as 
regards the Turkish settlers have recently flared up both in the island and Turkey. 
During those debates the Turkish Cypriot government was blamed for by-passing the 
Immigration Law and granting citizenship to thousands of mainland Turks by decree of 
the Council of Ministers with the intend of winning the forthcoming elections on 14 
December 2003.           
 
6.3. Discourse of Sovereignty  
In conformity with the aimed contributions of the sixth chapter, this section 
focuses on the discourse of sovereignty increasingly occupying Turkish political agenda 
with regard to the Cyprus question. While analyzing the sources of utmost state-
                                                 
69 Ibid., p. 214.   
70 According to the statictical data provided by The State Planning Organization of Turkey the figure of 
Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus amounted to 215.000 in 2002. Source: 
http://www.devplan.org/MEVZUAT/YATIRIM/TUR/REH1.html#COGRAFİ. The overall population of 
Cyprus was estimated at 650.000.    
71 Bahçeli, Tözün, “Turkey’s Cyprus Challenge: Preserving the Gains of 1974”, p. 215.  
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centricism of Turkey’s conventional and mainstream outlook to the Cyprus issue, one 
should never overlook the concept of sovereignty predominating the official discourse 
particularly soon after Turkey’s military intervention of July-August 1974. In this 
context, this part of the study suggests that the concept of sovereignty and the desire of 
having a separate and sovereign Turkish state in Cyprus as a guarantee for “the existence 
and survival of Turkish Cypriots” and of “Turkey’s own security” can be cited amongst 
the factors reproducing state/security centricist essence of the official and mainstream 
approaches to the issue in Turkey. To put forward that the main underlying reason for 
this mind-set is the identification of sovereignty with the nation state itself would be a 
simplificationist analysis. What is more, it does not suffice to examine and explain all the 
complex connotations of the concept as for the Cyprus issue. The focal task of this little 
section can also be described as striving to decipher these connotations rendering 
sovereignty so central a concept in the securitization and statification of the question at 
stake both in Turkish and Northern Cyprus’s domestic politics. In this part of the 
dissertation it is finally proposed that the discursive economy on the necessity of a 
sovereign Turkish Cypriot state has a bearing on the reconstruction of the issue of 
Cyprus as the “cause” of the entire Turkish nation. Nationalist narrative in which the 
TRNC referred to the 17th Turkish state presumes sovereignty as the sine qua non of any 
viable solution to the dispute through which the absolute equality and survival of Turkish 
Cypriots vis-à-vis the ‘Greek side’ can be guaranteed. 
 
6.3.1. Sovereignty As the Defining Characteristic of the Nation State   
Sovereignty as the “defining characteristic”72 and/or “property”73 of the modern 
state simultaneously constitutes the basic vantage point of modern analytical discourses 
in explaining contemporary international system. Thus in modern world sovereignty is 
                                                 
72 Bartelson, Jens, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, p. 3.  
73 Ibid., p. 23.  
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the essence not only of the nation state as the “historically incontestable as the original 
fact”74 but also of the very “basis of interstate order and intrastate order.”75 As Bartelson 
drew upon, to many modernist theoreticians of International Relations such as Hedley 
Bull “the presence of international relations is conditioned- logically as well as 
historically- by sovereignty.”76 It is presumed that the existence and conduct of foreign 
policy as a phenomenon unique to modern politics is possible only with the existence of 
the state “or independent political communities, each of which possesses a government 
and asserts sovereignty in relation to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a 
particular segment of the human population”77 The “historical incontestability” and 
thereby naturalness and inevitability attributed to sovereignty as the operational code of 
interstate system renders it the very foundation of identity of the modern state, which 
paradoxically has to reproduce itself continually. 
The modern nation state “as an introvert and extravert existence”78 is presumed 
sovereign mainly in two domains of political activity: internal and external. 
On the one hand, states assert, in relation to this territory and population, what 
may be called internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other 
authorities within that territory and population. On the other hand, they assert 
what may be called external sovereignty, by which is meant not supremacy but 
independence of outside authorities.79 
 
These two major dimensions of state’s sovereignty help the state to reproduce itself as a 
territorially bounded entity normatively independent from and equal to other states 
enjoying the same sovereignty rights. 
 
6.3.2. Sovereignty As A Guarantee to National Survival 
                                                 
74 Aron, Raymond, Peace and War, p. 738.  
75 Ibid., p. 738.  
76 Bartelson, Jens, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, p. 23.  
77 Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (London: Macmillan, 1977), 
p. 8 quoted in Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, p. 23. 
78 Karatekelioğlu, Petek, The Impact of the European Union on the Modern Nation-State, (Ankara: 
Bilkent University Master’s Thesis, 2000), p. 10.   
79 Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, quoted in Jens Bartelson, A 
Genealogy of Sovereignty, p. 23.  
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 “We are fighting for our dignity, for our rights, for our political equality, for our 
right in the sovereignty of Cyprus, which we did not allow Greek Cypriots to sweep 
away and to make it theirs!”80 As implied in this quotation from Rauf Denktaş, the 
President of the TRNC, the concept of sovereignty has eventually situated itself at the 
core of conventional discourses on the Cyprus question. Any researcher can observe the 
fact that the desire of having a separate and sovereign state began to be increasingly 
pronounced especially with the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus 
(TFSC) on 13 February 1975. When Denktaş began to stand for a confederal system of 
governance instead of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federalism with the onset of 1990s, the 
discourse on the necessity of having a sovereign state culminated within the official 
argumentation.  
The difference between “federation” and “confederation” may be blurred, but it 
has been clear for some years that the Turkish Cypriots have been moving away 
from the original agreement in favor of two sovereign states with equal rights to 
self-determination. This was confirmed in March 1990 by Rauf Denktash in 
discussion with the then UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar81.     
 
As a matter of fact, on 30 August 1998 Denktaş formally submitted a proposal on 
the creation of a “confederal structure composed of two peoples and two states of the 
island”82 respecting for the special relations of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots with their 
‘motherlands’. After the EU Helsinki Summit of December 1999 “Ankara reaffirmed its 
support”83 for this new settlement foreseeing a looser partnership between the two 
communities of the island and the existence of two sovereign states. To the official 
discourse, a viable solution not contradicting with “the realities of Cyprus” can only be 
reached in accordance with the principle of confederalism:  
The bizonality that was finalized through the Population Exchange Agreement 
in 1975 has since evolved into a two-State situation. The reality of the separate 
                                                 
80 Denktaş, Rauf, Opening Remarks in the Inaugural Session for the Conference on “New Horizons of 
Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000 and Beyond”, Foreign Policy, Vol. XXIV 2000, No: 1-2, p. 12.  
81 Crawshaw, Nancy, “Cyprus: A Crisis of Confidence”, World Today (April 1994): p. 72.  
82 See Appendix E for Denktaş’s proposals for confederation on 31 August 1998.   
83 Bahçeli, Tözün, “Turkey’s Cyprus Challange: Preserving the Gains of 1974”, p. 220.  
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geographical and political existence of the two peoples and their respective 
States has to be acknowledged and respected. You may ask why confederation? 
A confederation enables the politically sovereign states to accommodate 
themselves to today’s realities, such as the growing interdependence among 
various states or the desire of distinct peoples to cooperate in a new structure, 
allowing them to preserve their separate national identities and existence.84 
 
Another crucially important point which should necessarily be highlighted within 
this lengthy quotation is the linkage established between the confederal system and the 
preservation of “separate national identities and existence”. This analysis takes for 
granted the absence of any common Cypriot identity and the existence of two ethnically 
differentiated peoples as extension of the Turkish and Greek nations. The analysis also 
presumes that the “distinct peoples” of the island cannot preserve their national identities 
unless they have their own sovereign states. The discourse directly associating the 
survival of the Turkish national identity in the island of Cyprus with sovereignty not only 
reproduces state-centricist episteme of the official and mainstream approaches but also 
imposes a certain understanding of national identity denying Cypriotness in favor of 
Turkishness.            
The official argument vigorously advocated by Turkish bureaucratic and foreign 
policy establishment also foregrounds the notion that a separate and independent 
Turkish Cypriot state will serve as the guarantor of the Turkish Cypriots’ rights and full 
equality. To this thesis, a confederal system “envisaging the separate sovereignty of the 
two sides according to which both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots would respect 
each other’s rights of sovereignty”85 is a precondition of any just solution to the dispute. 
In other words, to the official rhetoric the only way of securing the “absolute equality 
between the separate states and the two sides”86 is the acknowledgement of TRNC as a 
                                                 
84 Ertuğ, Osman, “The Turkish Cypriot View in the Aftermath of Proximity Talks- Confederation or Two 
States”, in Two Peoples and Two States in Cyprus At the Eleventh Hour, Proceedings of a seminar held at 
the Turkish Embassy in London, (London: Turkish Embassy, 2001), pp. 16-17.  
85 Manisalı, Erol, “What Happens if Cyprus Joins the EU Without Turkey?”, in Avrupa Birliği Kıskacında 
Kıbrıs Meselesi: Bugünü ve Yarını, İrfan Kaya Ülger and Ertan Efegil (eds.), (Ankara: s.n., 2001), p. 74.  
86 Ibid., p. 75. 
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sovereign entity within a confederal solution to the dispute. The factor rendering the 
discourse of sovereignty integral to the reproduction of state-centricism of the official 
rhetoric on Cyprus is the ever-increasing identification of the security and existence of 
the Turkish Cypriots with the recognition of the TRNC as a sovereign state.  
Now I call on the whole world, particularly on those who, even if with good 
intentions, would like to rush the Turkish Cypriots into a federation and; to those 
who see but could not observe and hear but could not understand: The real 
intention of Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration, as stated by 
Mr.Pangalos, is to reduce the status of the Turkish Cypriots to that of a 
defenceless minority. What is tailored for purpose, in the name of a "federation", 
for the Turkish Cypriots is reducing them to a defenceless minority in a hostile 
environment87. 
 
As expressed in this statement delivered by the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affirs 
İsmail Cem, the establishment of a federal regime in Cyprus poses a direct threat for 
Turkish community since it will downgrade their status to a “defenceless minority” vis-
à-vis Greeks. To this line of thought, the only solution to “bring permanent peace to the 
island” is the confederal one precisely because “statehood of the North will suffice to 
put an end to Greek Cypriot aspirations of making Cyprus a Greek Cypriot Republic 
again.”88  
 
6.3.3. The UN Plan and Debates on Sovereignty  
 
The document fails to meet in full neither the "separate sovereignty" and "equal 
partnership" status of the Turkish Cypriot side and, with constant references to 
the 1960 regime, gives the impression that it is more in line with the Greek 
Cypriot thesis that the new state ought to be a continuation of the Cyprus 
Republic. Whereas the new state ought to succeed both the Greek Cypriot and 
the Turkish Cypriot states.89 
 
                                                 
87 Statement By Foreign Minister Ismail Cem At A Press Conference During His Visit To The TRNC - 30 
March 1998, The Turkish Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs accessible at 
www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/add/doc14.htm.   
88 Denktaş, Rauf, Opening Remarks in the Inaugural Session for the Conference on “New Horizons of 
Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000 and Beyond”, pp. 13-14.  
89 Kanlı, Yusuf, “The Glass is Half Full”, Turkish Daily News, electronic edition, 21 November 2002.   
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Soon after the UN Secretary General conveyed his proposals entitled ‘Basis for 
Agreement On A Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyrus Problem’, the debates on the 
sovereignty rights of Turkish Cypriots once more flared up and occupied the center of 
the political discourse. The UN plan at the basis of which lay “the principle of land in 
exchange for sovereignty”90 foresees the creation of a new state of Cyprus “in the form 
of an indissoluble partnership, with a common state government and two equal 
component states, one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot.”91 In the eyes of 
Turkey’s foreign policy establishment and bureaucratic elite “the vague ‘component 
states’ terminology”92 making implicit references to the sovereignty of these 
‘component states’ is far from meeting the expectations of the ‘Turkish side’ as regards 
sovereignty. To this view, the plan stating that “within the limits of the Constitution” 
component states “sovereignly exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the 
‘common state’ government”93 diluted the meaning of the concept. This was precisely 
because there is a difference between ‘being sovereign’ and ‘exercise powers 
sovereignly’94. Nonetheless, in the proposed framework there were references to the 
separate sovereignty of the ‘component states’ “without using the word "sovereignty" 
because of the semantics problem between the two sides on Cyprus.”95 However, to the 
line of thought articulated in Turkey particularly by nationalist circles and bureaucratic 
elite, the UN plan destroys “the existence of the state [of the TRNC], its sovereignty, 
and inseparable unity of the country”96, and dilutes Turkey’s guarantorship rights. 
                                                 
90 Balancar, Ferda, “Last Tango in Cyprus”, Turkish Time. The article is accessible at 
http://www.turkishtime.org/aralik/40_1_en.htm.  
91 Kanlı, Yusuf, “The Glass is Half Full”, Turkish Daily News, electronic edition, 21 November 2002.   
92 Ibid.  
93 ‘Basis for Agreement On A Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem’ accessible at 
www.abhaber.com/nt_hbr_2002/annankibrisplani.doc.   
94 Kanlı, Yusuf, “The Glass is Half Full”, Turkish Daily News, electronic edition, 21 November 2002.   
95 Ibid.   
96 “Constitutional Crime”, Volkan, (Turkish Cypriot Daily), 4 March 2003.  
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Therefore, to them the UN proposal forces the Turkish Cypriot side to surrender their 
state established “after an honorable struggle.”97  
In line with this analysis approaching sovereignty primarily as an issue of 
security and/or ‘life or death’, an independent and sovereign Turkish Cypriot state is the 
guarantee of the equal status and security of the Turkish Cypriot community. Thus any 
order that can prevent the repetition of violent attacks to which Turkish Cypriots were 
exposed between the years 1963-1974 may only be established “with a strong state”98 
ensuring its equal status vis-à-vis the Greek community.   
If we give up our state we become the minority of Greek Cypriots and 
everybody knows what that eventuality would be. If we give up our state we 
give up our spirit and honor, too. Our martyrs will never forgive us. Neither the 
history, too. Thanks god we would live under our flag, guarantorship of Turkey 
and Turkish military. You could look at the future hopefully. 99 
 
As implied in this quotation, in the conventional rhetoric the existence of a sovereign 
and independent Turkish state in the island is justified through a conception of national 
history imbued with atrocities, grievances, tortures, mass killings and other forms of 
aggression. In this historiography Greeks refer to the historical ‘other’ threatening the 
national identity and survival of the Turkish Cypriot community in the past, today and 
in the future. “In the event of an agreement made on paper, which was not based on 
sovereignty, the Greek Cypriots would find the opportunity to repeat what they did in 
1963”100.  
As an indicative of this Weltanschauung, a demonstration was “organized by the 
Committee of National Solidarity” and backed by the Denktaş leadership and the two 
parties of the TRNC government with the name of “Sovereignty and Peace”101. The 
                                                 
97 Denktash: “If we give up our state we shall become minority under Greek Cypriots sovereignty”, 
Volkan, 26 June 2003.  
98 Yeni Düzen 27 August 2003.  
99 Denktash: “If we give up our state we shall become minority under Greek Cypriots sovereignty”, 
Volkan, 26 June 2003. 
100 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot News 20 May 2002 accessible at 
http://www.trncwashdc.org/News/02_05_20.html.   
101 Halkın Sesi, 7 March 2003.  
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meeting also supported by the military top brass and the foreign policy establishment in 
Turkey was inviting only the people “who want an honorable and viable peace with 
sovereignty, do not want Greeks among them, and do not want to migrate.”102 This 
double exclusionary rhetoric not only identifies “the outside” with threat and danger yet 
simultaneously marginalizes those who, for instance, wanted Greeks among themselves. 
The message is clear: The ones whose conception of sovereignty and understanding of 
settlement to the Cyprus problem does not overlap with that of Denktaş leadership are 
in the service of foreigners who want to eradicate Turkish national identity in the island. 
As a matter of fact, for the Denktaş administration and its supporters in Turkey the 
forthcoming elections of 14 December 2003 “would mean a choice between Enosis and 
the continued struggle with the help of Turkey, for an independent TRNC.”103 The 
natural consequence of this rhetoric widely used in Turkey as well is the declaration of 
some sectors of society as ‘deviant’, ‘dangerous’ and ‘non-national’ both in the 
‘Babyland’ Cyprus and ‘Motherland’ Turkey.                       
 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
  
At the heart of this statist and state-centered, monist approach lie the ignorance 
and even the exclusion of other societal, cultural and economic dimensions of the 
Cyprus issue. Prioritizing state-based national security understanding, this approach 
serves to reproduce the state’s de facto primacy to the detriment of other institutions and 
particularly the society itself. In this analysis, other socio-political, economic or cultural 
aspects of the issue are treated as worth analyzing if and only when they are in 
compliance with the priorities and expectations ascertained by the state apparatus. The 
official discourse on “extremely vital” importance of Cyprus “from the viewpoint of our 
                                                 
102 Ibid.  
103 Yeni Düzen “Enosist Test” 27 August 2003.  
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security” portrays it as an island “that pierces the middle of Turkey like a dagger.”104 
Mainly owing to its geo-strategic position, geographical proximity to Anatolian costs, 
the island is both a source of persistent and existential threat and also an invaluable 
naval base that should be taken hold of at all costs by Turkey. That the island is 
inhabited by 200.000 Turkish Cypriots in tandem with practically 650.000 Greek 
Cypriots harboring intimate relations with the imminent neighbor of Greece also 
increases considerably the vitality and indispensability of Cyprus for Turkey’s “national 
defence and interests”.  
 This securitizing discourse of the state elite locates military considerations, 
strategic calculations and threat perceptions into the center of the analysis and hence 
fixes the Cyprus issue as a perpetual security project of the state. Continuance of this 
project of security by virtue of new risks and/or failures in satisfactorily meeting the 
needs and priorities articulated in the state’s new security agenda turned out to be the 
guarantors of the continued success of the state “as an impelling identity.”105 The 
security language and the statist geopolitical discourse that the Turkish state elite has 
employed on the Cyprus question has a two-fold function. First, it has helped the state 
to consolidate its privileged status as an agent and/or subject within the domestic 
politics vis-à-vis the Turkish society. This security discourse secondly facilitated the 
moving out of the issue at stake from the spheres of normal politics and public debate. 
As such the domestic society may not actively be involved in the processes of 
discussion, assessment and decision-making as a real political subject. De-politicization 
through securitization consolidates the state’s autonomy and independence from the 
domestic society and thus secures the reproduction of the relations between these two in 
its conventional and hierarchical structure.  
                                                 
104 “The Long Term Turkish Policy on Cyprus”, Human Rights Action, accessible at http://www.hr-
action.org/chr/Tpolicy.html.  
105 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, p. 12.  
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In line with all the theoretical clarifications and statements recited above, it is 
fair to propose for our issue of Cyprus that the securitizing practices of the Turkish state 
elite in unison with Rauf Denktaş bearing the issue directly to the field of existential and 
perpetual threat made the interrogation of state/security based policies impossible in the 
public space during the long history of the dispute. The specific and securitizing 
rhetoric employed by the political and bureaucratic foreign policy establishment has 
enabled the state to reinscribe the boundaries of the political imagination and thinking 
on the issue at stake in Turkish politics.  
“Cyprus is an issue involving Turkey's vital national and strategic interests. A 
great amount of commitment and sensitivity is attached to it both on the public and 
official level.”106 As implied in this expression extracted from the web page of Turkish 
Embassy at Washington D.C., the Turkish state elite has successfully securitized the 
Cyprus issue through the recurrent application of the discourse of geopolitics, 
intermingled with and feeding on the fear of encirclement and the existence of a 
persistent threat both to Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. As I tried to indicate, a thorough 
analysis of the securitizing practices and discourses of the state elite is of profound 
importance so as to discuss and problematize the implications and reflections of the 
Cyprus issue on the Turkish domestic politics. In this respect, it can correctly be argued 
that the security discourse and representations of the Turkish state elite as regards the 
Cyprus dispute by restricting, to a considerable extent, the public debate on the issue 
became the integral part of the practices securing the sustenance of state society 
relations in its conventional, hierarchical terms. Furthermore, the official discursive 
totality locating the state’s strategic interests or threat perceptions into the center of the 
analysis imagines them as objective and intransigent realities. In this mode of 
representation the Turkish state as a coherent self and unitary actor struggles for the 
                                                 
106 Republic of Turkey, Turkish Embassy at Washington D.C., Cyprus Information Note accessible at 
http://www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/issuescyprus.htm.  
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maintenance of the given national interests and the security of the Turkish society. 
Consequently, the Cyprus problem as a ‘vital’ foreign policy and security issue serves 
to consolidate the autonomy of the state from the society in Turkish political landscape.   
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CYPRUS AS THE CAUSE OF TURKISH NATION  
 
REPRODUCING ‘THE SELF’ AND ‘THE OTHER’ THROUGH THE CYPRUS 
QUESTION  
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Our souls are one and united when it comes to the national issues. The 
government’s policy is our national policy; our national policy is the 
government’s policy as regards the national issues1.  
 
What are the roles and functions of state’s foreign policy discourses and 
representations in the symbiotic and ideological reproduction of nationhood and 
national consciousness within a given sociopolitical context?  
“Is there a connection between the daily activities of a domestic government 
agency” and the political practices “we traditionally associate with foreign 
policy”2?  
What is the dialectical relationship between imagining ‘them’, ‘the foreign’, ‘the 
alien’ and imagining ‘us’ and ‘our unique nation’? 
How and to what extent foreign political discourse and performances of the state 
apparatus are instrumental in persistently reminding ‘us’ the fact that we live in a 
nation with its own peculiarities and unique culture amongst other nations?  
What is the significance of state-based foreign policy in creating and recreating 
the national unity and cohesion in such away as to ensure both the autonomy of 
the state vis-à-vis the domestic society and reproduction of the relations between 
these two as the relations of subjugation and dominance?        
                                                 
1 Yücel, Hasan Ali, Kıbrıs Dolayısile, Cumhuriyet (Turkish daily), 23 Aralık 1956 quoted in Fahir 
Armaoğlu, Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1963), p. 283.     
2 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, (rev. ed.),  
(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1998), p. 36.  
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How and in what ways foreign policy issues are operationalized by the nation 
state in specifying and declaring internal others and in drawing boundaries 
demarcating ‘the national’ and ‘non-national’, ‘the legitimate’ and ‘the 
illegitimate’ within the domestic politics?     
What is the role and significance of securitization of foreign political matters by 
the state elite in securing the domestic political community and national identity 
and also in reconstructing the state as the only legitimate power that can protect 
its nation against all internal and external enemies?   
It is a well-known and unfortunate fact that neither the conventional theories of 
international relations nor most of the analytical enterprises on nationalism and nation 
state do satisfactorily deal with the questions raised above and the like. Save for a few 
academic works, the relationality between foreign policy and reproduction of 
domestic/national identity has not caught as much attention of most scholars as it 
deserved. Thus there rises an emergent need for brand new literature which will 
critically and adequately assess the share and significance of foreign policy in the 
consolidation of subjective interpretation of history privileging the nation state vis-à-vis 
other political subjects and privileging the nation and nationalism vis-à-vis other forms 
of political community. This undertaking necessitates an increase in the number of 
studies “not being constrained by the boundaries of specific academic disciplines and 
adopting an eclectic approach”3 in studying foreign policy and nationalism.  
As to the Turkish foreign policy and Turkish nationalism the lack of this 
interdisciplinary scholarship marks one of the main limitations and weaknesses of the 
literature dedicated to the issue. To illustrate, the contemporary scholarship on Turkish 
foreign policy displays, for the most part, the proclivity to view foreign policy just as a 
state-centric phenomenon and/or diplomatic procedures and bureaucratic activities that 
                                                 
3 Özkırımlı, Umut, Theories of Nationalism A Critical Introduction, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
2000), p. 197.  
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are and should be formulated only by the state elite to pursue Turkey’s national interests 
and security. As was stated in the previous chapters within the state-centricist 
epistemology of the literature, foreign policy refers to an area of bureaucratic 
competence and external actions of the state toward others in the name of the whole 
Turkish society. Thus the mainstream international relations scholarship in Turkey does 
needs to discuss and problematize neither the precise nature of state and its reproduced 
identity nor the implications and impacts of the state’s foreign policy discourses and 
representations in the maintenance of domestic power relations.  
The literature on Turkish nationalism, on the other hand, even if more receptive 
of other social disciplines such as sociology, cultural studies and comparative politics, 
still suffers from some impasses particularly in analyzing the salience and impacts of 
“external dynamics” on Turkish nationalism. While intensely concentrating on the inner 
dynamics behind the emergence and development of Turkish nationalism and the idea 
of Turkish nationhood, adequate academic works and due emphasis are not dedicated to 
the analysis of the outer sources and incentives. Furthermore, it does not 
comprehensively address and theorize the role and significance of the official foreign 
policy discourses in reproducing the nationalist meta-narrative in Turkey. This is all the 
more true for the studies examining the Cyprus question which are afflicted with similar 
limitations and inadequacies. For instance, the official and mainstream academic 
rhetorics on the Cyprus question where the phrases beginning by the adjective ‘national’ 
were recurrently asserted were not hitherto subjugated to any inclusive inquiry: an 
inquiry associating the Cyprus issue with the construction of the standards and 
boundaries of Turkish national identity. What is more, the literature on Cyprus does not 
take issue with the ethnicist and state-centricist modes of understanding and explaining 
and replicates the idea that there exists no Cypriot identity and that Turkish Cypriots are 
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integral part and branch of the greater Turkish world4. I am convinced that any attempt 
to comprehend diverse and complex connotations of the Cyprus question with respect to 
Turkish national identity will also make substantial contribution to the development of a 
more comprehensive analytical framework on Turkish nationalism.  
At this point I should immediately state that the burden of this part of the thesis 
work is neither to reveal all the limitations of the literature on Turkish foreign policy 
and Turkish nationalism nor to develop a brand new approach satisfactorily 
encompassing the answers to the questions raised above. However I am convinced that 
this attempt will be a further stride towards this end. Within the scope of this section my 
objective is to strive to reveal how and in which ways the Cyprus dispute is utilized in 
securing and maintaining the Turkish national identity. With the help of some 
theoretical clarifications, this chapter seeks to ask the critical question whether the 
Cyprus issue has become instrumentalized in reinscribing the boundaries and standards 
of Turkish nationalism and national identity; if so in which ways and to what extent it 
has assumed particular roles in and exerted influence on the socialization of nationalist 
and even Pan-Turkist discourses within Turkish public sphere. This chapter answering 
the first question with an undoubted ‘yes’ maintains that, though with varying levels of 
intensity, the official and mainstream rhetoric on the Cyprus issue has always become 
inherent to the reproduction of domestic/national political identity. Hence this part of 
the dissertation is dedicated to the exploration of different ways within which the 
Cyprus question has had a role to play in the consolidation of a national identity 
securing the unity, cohesion and homogenization of Turkish nation. 
In line with this goal, the chapter will first delineate the process through which 
the Cyprus issue has turned out to be ‘the cause of the nation’ around which 
maintenance of the national unity is necessarily required. At this juncture, the study 
                                                 
4 Bora, Tanıl, “Milli Dava Kıbrıs Bir Velayet Davası Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Kıbrıs”, Birikim No: 77, 
September 1995, pp. 18-26.  
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establishes a parallel between the centralization of nationalism in Turkish politics and 
the articulation of the issue at stake as ‘the national cause’ in the public sphere. In this 
respect, it will be highly interesting to look into a less-known report prepared by RPP 
on minorities in Turkey from which valuable evidences can be derived as to the 
exclusionary nationalist tendencies of the period. The active involvement of the Pan-
Turkist and other nationalist associations and student organizations in the process 
through which the issue has been declared as the ‘cause of the nation’ will also be put 
under scrutiny in this part.  
The seventh chapter aiming at discussing and exploring the role and significance 
of the Cyprus question in the reproduction of Turkish national identity shall secondly 
deal with the problematic of the ‘other’. In this sense, the modes in which the Cyprus 
issue has been articulated and represented by the Turkish state elite will be rendered the 
object of critical inquiry with regard to their role and impacts on the definition of the 
‘self’ (Turkish national identity) in relation to the ‘other’. In this respect the study 
intends to search for how and in what ways the Cyprus question was functionalized by 
Turkish bureaucratic and political establishment in specifying and declaring 
communism, communists, Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey as the ‘other’ of the 
Turkish nation. The anti-Greek riots of 6-7 September 1955, the expulsion of the Greek 
minority from Turkey in 1964-65, the intense anti-communist discourse of 1950s and 
1960s will be the points of reference while expatiating the issue at stake. Against this 
background, the chapter arrives at the conclusion that Turkey’s official and mainstream 
rhetoric on the Cyprus dispute has a bearing on the consolidation of Turkish national 
identity the boundaries and content of which have been defined in relation to the ‘other’. 
Thus the national foreign policy rhetoric on Cyprus operating through ‘othering’ 
strategies and repressive practices has substantially contributed to the reproduction of 
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the relations between ‘the ruling’ and ‘the ruled’ in Turkey as the relations of 
subjugation and dominance.          
  
7.1.1. Foreign Policy and Nationalism 
The notion of identity as a never finished, nor pre-ordained and unstable 
phenomenon or as an artificial construct has been one of the pillars and sources of 
inspiration for such a thesis work. To this argument largely acknowledged by critical 
scholars  
[i]dentity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. Perhaps instead of 
thinking identity as an accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then 
represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a ‘production’, which is never 
complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, 
representation.5  
 
Thus if it is to persist, any identity, whether individual or collective, has to be 
reconfigured within a relatively coherent narrative imposed by an agent or a range of 
agents. In addition, each and every identity needs a self-evident discursive formation as 
an “epistemological framework in which statements are possible.”6 As Jonathan Bach 
reminds us any discursive totality desiring to achieve narrative coherence  
necessitates an actor which is capable of imposition. Discourses do not impose 
themselves: a community uses social pressure, institutions create frameworks for 
the legitimated use of power, groups of persons can use violence or control 
information- the methods are manifold.7   
 
Without overlooking other possible actors and/or mechanisms the modern nation 
state can be cited as the very agent having the capacity of imposing the 
domestic/national identity. Of course there exist numerous mechanisms through which 
the national ‘we’ is constituted and maintained as a unique identity. “Nevertheless, 
while a polity must meet a set of preconditions to form a nation, it is interaction with the 
                                                 
5 Hall, Stuart, Cultural Identity and Diaspora, in J. Rutherford (ed.), Identity: Community, Culture and 
Difference, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990), p. 222.  
6 Bach, Jonathan, P.G. Between Sovereignty and Integration: German Foreign Policy and National 
Identity After 1989, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 49.  
7 Ibid., p. 50.  
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outside world, namely the acceptance or rejection of “the other”, that allows polities to 
develop a sense of national uniqueness.”8 As Michael Billig and various other scholars 
imply the national ‘we’ and its uniqueness cannot be imagined only with reference to 
the characteristics attributed to that identity.  
If ‘our’ nation is to be imagined in all its particularity, it must be imagined as a 
nation amongst other nations. The consciousness of national identity normally 
assumes an international context, which itself needs to be imagined every bit as 
much as does the national community: or at least the imagination has to become 
frozen in a habit of thought. Thus, foreigners are not simply ‘others’, 
symbolizing the obverse of ‘us’: ‘they’ are also like ‘us’, part of the imagined 
universal code of nationhood9.    
 
  Rising of the nation as a “superior code of inclusion”10 within 17th and 18th   
century Europe has become possible with the simultaneous constitution of ‘the 
international’. Within the dialectical relationship between these two, international 
relations have appeared “as an arena of practice in which some subjects emerged with 
the status of actors, who are sustained by a variety of practices that establish the 
boundaries of legitimate meaning and naturalize a particular order.”11 The construction 
of an international politics the content and scope of which are claimed to be constituted 
and determined by interactions among the nation states naturalized and normalized a 
particular political order. An order the existence and sustenance of which is grounded 
on the survival of nation state as a sovereign presence and on strengthening the national 
‘we’ as a new type of collectivity. Imagining international politics as a precisely 
anarchic structure in which “the struggle for power is universal in time and space”12 has 
served to the reproduction of state’s legitimacy and nationalism as its founding 
paradigm in two ways: first, through the discourse of national foreign policy certain 
actors and events are declared as foreign, dangerous and threat to the so-called national 
                                                 
8 Prizel, Ilya, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and 
Ukraine, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 16.   
9 Billig, Michael, Banal Nationalism, (London: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 83. 
10 Bach, Jonathan, P.G. Between Sovereignty and Integration, p. 57. 
11 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity, p. 39.  
12 Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations, (New York: Knopf, 1985), pp. 328-29. 
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unity and survival. As David Campbell correctly discussed what is at stake is the 
“attempt to screen the strange, the unfamiliar, and the threatening associated with the 
outside from the familiar and safe, which are linked to the inside.”13 Second, 
consciousness about national identity and nationhood has to assume an international 
context in which the nation can imagine itself as part of a whole composed of nations as 
like-units. “Nationalists live in an international world, and their ideology is itself an 
international ideology. Without constant observation of the world of other nations, 
nationalists would be unable to claim that their nations meet the universal codes of 
nationhood.”14 Imagining an international world of nations helps to consolidate the 
separation between the national and the non-national as categories having their own 
particularities. Therefore “in the age of nation states and nationalism”15 ‘the foreigner’ 
does not only refer to ‘the other’ threatening ‘us’ but also defines the characteristics of 
the one who is not belonging to ‘our’ nation. The quotation from Julia Kristeva cited in 
Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism perfectly puts the point. To Kristeva with the 
establishment of nation states “we come to the only modern, acceptable and clear 
definition of foreignness: the foreigner is the one who does not belong to the state in 
which we are, the one who does not have the same nationality.”16  
Nations also need to be recognized by other established nations as a community 
meeting fully the criteria of being a nation. The nation “has to resemble other nations to 
gain their recognition. It must adopt conventional symbols of particularity, which, 
because of their conventionality, are simultaneously symbols of the universality of 
nationhood.”17 Hence having a national flag, national anthem, national currency and so 
forth is for both to declare its uniqueness and to prove its capacity of being a nation vis-
                                                 
13 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity, p. 36.  
14 Billig, Michael, Banal Nationalism, p. 80.  
15 Ibid., p. 79. 
16 Kristeva, Julia, Strangers to Ourselves, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 96.  
17 Billig, Michael, Banal Nationalism, p. 85.  
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à-vis other nations. Thus it can be claimed with some degree of accuracy that there 
exists a dialectical relationship between nationalism and internationalism as the 
nationalist discursive totality embraces both “the universalization of particularism, and 
the particularization of universalism.”18 This notion articulated by various scholars also 
refuses the existence of a pre-given international system predating the outbreak of the 
modern nation state. On the contrary the nation state and the interstate system as co-
emergent entities19 are simultaneously integral to the creation and recreation of the 
modern nationalist discourse.  
The very modern concept of citizen has, in turn, appeared as a relatively new 
category through which the dialectical relationship between the domestic and the 
external, the national and the international is maintained. For instance Campbell 
establishes a direct linkage between the transformation of the “organizations bearing the 
appellation “foreign” and “external”” to the form of “large-scale bureaucracies with 
global scope”20 by the early 20th century and the concentration of power in the hands of 
the nation state. To him both the emergence of large-scale foreign policy bureaucracies 
and other developments which led to the increase of state power and autonomy within 
the domestic order “produced the category of “citizen”, and established nationalism as 
the primary form of social identity by the time of World War I”21. As a new type of 
collectivity or belonging citizenship has also created “a new category of outsider: the 
foreigner as member of another state and also those designated “non-citizen” within the 
state.”22 The strengthening of the category of citizenship as a salient identity has 
resulted in defining ‘self’ and ‘other’ more closely in relation to the nation. All these 
                                                 
18 Robertson, R., Social Theory, Cultural Relativity and the Problem of Globality, in A.D. King (ed.), 
Culture, Globalization and the World System, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 73.   
19 Der Derian, James, The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations, in J. Der 
Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds.), International/Intertextual Relations, (Lexington MA: Lexington 
Books, 1989).  
20 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity, p. 68.  
21 Ibid., p. 68.  
22 Bach, Jonathan P.G., Between Sovereignty and Integration, pp. 59-60.  
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indubitably paved the way for the centralization of the nationalist discourse within 
modern politics as a narrative “as constitutive of collective identity and as constitutive 
of the context in which politics is played out.”23             
These theoretical deductions aiming to decipher the relations among the state-
based foreign policy discourse and nationalism as an ideology and “construct of the 
state in pursuit of its legitimacy”24 need to be developed further. Leaving this 
undertaking to more experienced scholars at least for the time being, let me try to 
address and reveal this linkage within the context of our issue of Cyprus. The author of 
this dissertation is of the opinion that the official and popular discourses on the question 
has always been very functional in the reproduction of discourse of national unity and 
integrity and also of nationalism as a type of collectivity vis-à-vis other types of 
belongings and meta-narratives.       
 
7.2. Cyprus As A ‘National Cause’  
 The term ‘national cause’ has been widely used in Turkish political discourse as 
to emphasize the vitally important nature of a particular issue i.e. Turkey’s full 
membership to the European Union and the two subsequent economic crises of 
February and November 2001. Yet in the collective memory of Turkish society it is the 
Cyprus issue with which the term ‘national cause’ has more often than not been 
associated. In this part of the dissertation I shall try to concisely delineate the process 
through which the Cyprus issue has begun to be articulated as the national cause of each 
and every Turk.  
The Pan-Turkist and Turanist political movements, which became quite vocal 
during the beginning of 1940s were liquidated by the state elite within a process 
proceeding in parallel to the defeat of Germany in the World War II. Nevertheless, this 
                                                 
23 Ibid., p. 44. 
24 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity, p. 11.  
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did not suffice to decrease very strong nationalist and anti-communist tones in 1940s 
Turkey25. These years can be evaluated as a kind of transitional period in which 
nationalism began to be popularized26 as the hegemonic discourse in the public space, 
which had remained as the ideology of a relatively narrow state elite in the course of the 
first two decades of the Republican era. In such a political atmosphere, despite its all 
losses Pan-Turkism “remained a latent force in Turkish politics during the 1950s”27 
mainly owing to its vigorous activism in the Cyprus question. This activism reached its 
peak in the late 1940s and early 1950s when the Cyprus dispute had been “one of the 
pet issues of Pan-Turkists in Turkey.”28  
The plebiscite organized by the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church at the very 
beginning of 1950 came out as a rare opportunity for the Pan-Turkist and nationalist 
circles to consolidate their legitimacy29 within the system, which was previously 
impaired along with the defeat of Germany. Furthermore, the potent support conferred 
upon AKEL by Greek Cypriots enabled an anti-communist agitation on the part of these 
circles. As it will be revealed in the ensuing pages in a more detailed manner, soon after 
the World War II and in tandem with the Cyprus issue, anti-communism became part 
and parcel of Turkish nationalism. 
Based on strong nationalist sentiment and anti-Soviet feeling in the years 
immediately after the end of the Second World War, several nationalist 
associations sprang up of a marked Pan-Turk character. Perhaps the most 
noteworthy ones were the Türk Kültür Çalışmaları Derneği (“Association for 
Studies on Turkish Culture”) and the Türk Gençlik Teşkilatı (“Group of Turkish 
Youth), both set up and led by university students in 195630. These and several 
others were established with the goal of promoting historically-hallowed Turkish 
                                                 
25 Kızılyürek, Niyazi, Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 206.  
26 Kızılyürek, Niyazi, Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs, pp. 205-6.  
27 Ioannides, Christos P., In Turkey’s Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish 
Province, (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, Publisher, 1991), p. 62.  
28 Landau, Jacob M., Pan-Turkism From Irredentism to Cooperation, (Bloomington and Indianapolis : 
Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 135.  
29 Kızılyürek, Niyazi, Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs, p. 207.   
30 Here there should be publication error since later in the book the author states that these organizations 
fused in May 1951. 
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ideals, encouraging and assisting Outer Turks, and resisting the spread of 
communism in Turkey.31    
 
 All nationalist groups fusing under the name of Türk Milliyetçiler Derneği 
(Association of Turkish Nationalists) in May 1951 established intricate ties “with 
various groups and organizations defending the cause of the Turkish minority in 
Cyprus. Indeed, the identification of many Turks on the mainland with their brethren in 
Cyprus injected a more palpable element of Pan-Turkism into the activist milliyetçi 
groups.”32 Throughout the period from 1950 to 1955 the Cyprus problem proved to 
remain the first and foremost item of nationalists’ political agenda33. Those years have 
also witnessed the foundation of various associations, concerned with the Cyprus issue, 
the core staff of which was composed of the Pan-Turkists of 1940s. Among these 
associations were Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association (CTCA) (Kıbrıs Türk Kültür 
Derneği)34, Society for the Protection of Cyprus (Kıbrıs’ı Koruma Cemiyeti)35, Cyprus 
is Turkish Society (Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti) and Cyprus Turkish Culture and Aid 
Association (Kıbrıs Türk Kültür ve Yardım Cemiyeti)36.  
In order to acquaint the [Turkish] people with the Cyprus cause and get them to 
adopt it wholeheartedly, our Cypriot brothers together with patriotic citizens 
having espoused the Cyprus issue as a national cause have established 
associations with regard to Cyprus.37  
 
The activities of these associations were generally conducted and organized either by 
Turkish Cypriots living in Turkey maintaining close ties with nationalist circles such as 
                                                 
31 Landau, Jacob M., Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1974), pp. 200-201.  
32 Ibid., p. 201.  
33 Bora, Tanıl, “Milli Dava Kıbrıs Bir Velayet Davası Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Kıbrıs”, p. 21.   
34 Landau, Jacob M., Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism, (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 
1981), p. 150.   
35 For detailed information on the association see Darendelioğlu, İlhan E., Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik 
Hareketleri: Toplantılar, Mitingler, Nümayişler, (Toker y.y., 1968), p. 216 ff. He names this association 
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36 Ibid., p. 215.  
37 Darendelioğlu, İlhan E., Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik Hareketleri: Toplantılar, Mitingler, Nümayişler, p. 
215.  
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Halil Fikret Alasya, Hasan Nevzat Karagil38, Derviş Manizade39 or by student union 
leaders and particularly by renowned journalists i.e. Sedat Simavi, Ahmet Emin 
Yalman, Hikmet Bil40.  Like these associations such student unions as Turkish National 
Student Federation (TNSF) and National Turkish Student Union (NTSU) were also 
under the strict control and manipulation of the political authority. To illustrate, 
throughout 1950s in the same direction with the Democrat Party government’s policies, 
the three major issues with which these unions were mostly preoccupied were fight with 
communism, loyalty to Atatürk and Cyprus.41 
“The ideology that Cyprus is Turkish has been the driving force behind the 
actions of Pan-Turkish groups” and other nationalist associations and student unions “in 
Turkey since the early 1950s.”42 They published numerous brochures and booklets, 
issued declarations and organized meetings and demonstrations contending that “Cyprus 
is Turkish soil”. In the booklets published by these organizations the historical, 
geographical, economic, cultural and other reasons why the island ‘belonged to Turkey’ 
and thus why it should be returned to Turkey were spelt out43. All these groups by and 
large maintained organic ties with the Democrat Party government and some of them 
also enjoyed close relations with the opposing Republican People’s Party (RPP). In 
these booklets and demonstrations it was defended that “as can never be denied” Cyprus 
was “a Turkish island having no connection and affinity with Greece from historical, 
                                                 
38 Ioannides, Christos P., In Turkey’s Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish 
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geographical, economic, and geological viewpoint.”44 It was further contended that 
“Greeks are but a minority vis-à-vis 30 millions of Turks.”45 In other words, as Turkish 
Cypriots were an integral part of the Turkish nation and also the island was but the 
external extension of the ‘homeland’ territory, then Cyprus was a cause, which should 
forcibly be of interest to each and every Turk.  
By the beginning of 1954, in the meetings organized by student unions and 
numerous Cyprus associations the heroic/nationalistic dose of speeches and declarations 
extensively increased. In those meetings, which generally received great publicity form 
mass-circulated newspapers, Greeks were called upon to remember the outcomes of the 
Turkish war of independence.46 Meanwhile the daily Hürriyet began to publish series of 
articles about the ill-treatment to which the Turks of Dodeconese Islands and Western 
Thrace were exposed by the Greek administration.47 Towards the midst of 1950s the 
Cyprus campaigns orchestrated and led by those organizations and extensively 
supported by the Turkish press increasingly gained impetus throughout Turkey. 
The Cyprus campaigns correspond to a vantage point in the [Turkish] state’s 
fascistic practices directed at encouraging and organizing the civil mobility for 
the national causes and at making the public opinion unite around that very 
national cause. In a country taking giant strides in her way towards capitalist 
modernization these campaigns made substantial contributions to the 
popularization and modellization of mobility mechanisms towards creating a 
national public opinion.48        
 
Those campaigns were hinged upon three major motives: 1) The slogan “Cyprus is 
Turkish and Turkish it shall remain” 2) A strongly anti-Greek discourse, and 3) a 
vehement anti-communism. During those campaigns it was insistently required that the 
society should espouse the Cyprus question as its ‘national cause’ around which it 
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should unify. “Each and every pure-blooded Turk should be interested in Cyprus.”49 
Mainly owing to these campaigns “Turkish public opinion was aroused and kept in state 
of nationalist agitation for months.”50  
In the midst of 1950s the official rhetoric on Cyprus coalesced with the popular 
discourse of these campaigns and Turkish dailies portraying Cyprus as the ‘national 
cause’. As such the process in which the Cyprus issue was imprinted as a national cause 
in the collective conscious of the Turkish society was completed. From 1950s on, the 
term has been persistently and extensively used by almost all political figures, 
intelligentsia, printed and visual media and more importantly by the ‘ordinary man’ in 
some cases even interchangeably with the Cyprus question itself. The Cyprus issue, 
which figured for the first time in the fourth Menderes government’s program, 
established on 9 December 195551 was articulated as ‘the national cause’ under the 
foreign policy rubric of the programs prepared by almost all Turkish governments52. In 
the joint declarations issued by the Turkish Republic and the TRNC, in the resolutions 
declared by Turkish Grand National assembly, in the official statements and informal 
speeches delivered by the Turkish civilian and military top brass and Rauf Denktaş it 
has been consistently emphasized that the Cyprus cause is “the national cause of Turkey 
and the TRNC”. “It has been implemented, from the outset, by joint decisions and 
actions. This is the way it should continue and shall continue…”53 Thereby, to the ninth 
president of Turkish Republic Süleyman Demirel, “as the hero of the national cause” 
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“the struggle of Denktas in Cyprus has been one of defending Turkish identity, the 
Turkish flag and Turkish national awareness.”54      
The rhetoric of ‘national cause’ that eventually evolved into a meta-narrative in 
Turkish political discourse as a boundary producing practice has had a two-fold 
function: one disciplinary and the other exclusionary. It is disciplinary in the sense that 
it imposes one and subjective way of perceiving the issue on Turkish society as an 
indubitable, undebateble and objective reality. This objectification is predicated on the 
exclusion of both other subjective ways of interpreting and of those who do not deem 
the Cyprus issue as a national cause. This disciplinary attitude has served to the 
homogenization, fixation and stabilization of Turkish society and its political identity. 
This, in turn, led to the confinement of the domestic political community within strictly 
constructed boundaries as an organic totality.  
It is also exclusionary on the grounds that the term ‘national cause’ embraces an 
a priori division from the outset between ‘the national’ and ‘the non-national’, ‘the 
domestic’ and ‘the foreign’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. As the post-structuralist IR theory 
reminds us this a priori division created by the nation state’s elite is geared towards 
constructing a world of others: a world of others appearing as threatening the security of 
both the state and its domestic society. As such, a foreign policy discourse functioning 
through ‘othering’ strategies facilitates the securitization of issues political in nature in 
such a way as to secure the mobilization of the masses around the official policies. The 
division between the national and the non-national also entails identification of one or 
several sectors of the domestic society such as ethnic minority groups and individuals 
opposed to the official understanding with non-national (gayri milli) elements. The long 
history of the Cyprus dispute is laden with examples of inventing internal ‘others’ 
identified with the threats originating from the ‘external enemies of Turkish nation’.  
                                                 
54 Turkish Daily News, “Ankara reiterates support for Denktas ahead of KKTC elections” electronic 
edition, 21 March 2000.  
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For instance, though with varying levels of intensity, the Greek minority in Turkey and 
the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul were perceived and represented by the Turkish state 
elite as the “fifth column” (beşinci kol) threatening the security of Turkish state and 
society. Especially in the period between late 1940s to 1980s in tandem with 
communists, they were blamed for cooperating with ‘Turkey’s enemies in Cyprus’. This 
reminds the notion stressed by Campbell that state identity “can be understood as the 
outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the 
“inside” are linked through a discourse of “danger” with threats identified and located 
on the “outside””55. Through the existence of internal and external others the state “is 
able to confer the appearance of unity upon the ‘self’ – i.e. a domestic population.”56 
The ensuing pages of this chapter are dedicated to expatiate the role and impact 
of the official and mainstream Cyprus discourses in specifying and declaring ‘the 
internal enemies of Turkish state and society’. In this respect, it is fair to propose that 
the Cyprus question was instrumentalized by Turkish civilian and military 
establishment to constantly warn the society against the inimical others such as 
communism, Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey. However, prior to the critical 
assessment of the official and mainstream discourses on the issue from this perspective, 
I would like to deal with a less-known report prepared by the Republican People’s Party 
in 1940s. Even though it is not directly related to our issue of Cyprus, the report is a 
seminal resource from which sound evidences can be gleamed as to how the minorities 
were perceived by the Turkish state elite as a danger that should necessarily be 
eliminated.                                    
 
 
                        
                                                 
55 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, p. 68.  
56 Hobson, John M., The State and International Relations, p. 159.  
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7.3. RPP’s Report on Minorities 
 A less-known yet very interesting report prepared by the Ninth Bureau of the 
Republican People’s Party responsible for the minorities and the distribution of income 
in Turkey ostensibly exemplifies the intense nationalistic and xenophobic 
Weltanschauung of the then Turkish state elite. The report estimated to have been 
written in 194457 stresses the urgency of developing a systematic official policy 
regarding different nationalities in the country58. According to the report, the target of 
the RPP should be “the creation of a political and societal formation composed of 
citizens coalesced around their culture and ideal and speaking a single language” and 
“the creation of a unified nation with a single mother tongue and a single ideal within 
the boundaries of the homeland.”59 The only way of materializing this goal was the 
imprint in the consciousness of the masses that “each and every honor and benefaction 
in this country is for the unique use and benefit of those who speak Turkish, who feel 
themselves Turk and who are only loyal to”60 the Turkish nationhood. In the report 
assimilation is explicitly articulated among the measures that should be taken for the 
creation of a ‘unified nation’ (birlik bir millet). In the same vein, the report did not 
avoid listing certain techniques of assimilation such as displacement and dispersing of 
different minority groups to different regions of the country and their subordination in 
economic terms61. 
 The document classifies minorities mainly into two groups: 1) non-Muslims the 
mother tongue of whom is other than Turkish (Greeks, Armenians and Jews)62; and 2) 
                                                 
57 Akar, Rıdvan, ““Bir Resmi Metinden” Planlı Türkleştirme Dönemi”, Birikim No: 110, June 1998, p. 
69.   
58 Ibid., p. 69.  
59 Bulut, Faik, Kürt Sorununa Çözüm Arayışları, (Istanbul: Ozan Yayıncılık, 1998), p. 174. The full text 
of this report can be found in this book between the pages 166 and 192.    
60 Ibid., p. 174.  
61 Ibid., pp. 175-76. For instance in the report it is suggested that the Armenian minority as a whole be 
cleansed from Anatolia and be transferred to Istanbul see p. 178.    
62 For a concise account of the population movements of these groups between 1935-50 see Akar, Rıdvan, 
““Bir Resmi Metinden” Planlı Türkleştirme Dönemi”, pp. 171-72. 
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Muslim groups that are not ethnically Turk (Circassians, Lazes, Georgians, Albanians, 
Bosnians, Pomaks, Arabs and Kurds). For the author, which remains anonymous, the 
existence of non-Muslim minority groups, the total population of which was estimated 
at 250.000, was an obstacle before and threat to63 the realization of the RPP’s target 
regarding the unity of language, culture and ideals (dil, kültür, ülkü birliği). Owing to its 
highly securitizing and chauvinistic discourse, the report seemed to herald the anti-
Greek riots of 6-7 September 1955 and the extradition of Istanbul Greeks in 1964-65. 
As a matter of fact, the report set Istanbul Greeks as the very target for the Turkish 
public. As Anatolia was purged of Greeks as a potential danger, from then on attention 
should have been summoned only to Istanbul. The objective was crystal clear: “not a 
single Greek should exist in Istanbul at the 500th anniversary of the conquest of the 
city”64 by the Ottoman. As Rıdvan Akar argued in his article, “the prophecy of the 
bureaucrat, who prepared the report for the RPP, was to be materialized in 1955 though 
with a two-year delay.”65   
       
7.4. 6-7 September 1955 Riots   
Time and again during my stay in Turkey, I was confronted by angry Turks 
heatedly trying to convince me that “Cyprus is Turkish”. Their main argument 
was hardly ever of a strategic or military nature. If such considerations figured 
at all, they were invariably combined with, and usually overshadowed by, anti-
Greek sentiment. I would hear countless stories of Greek atrocities against 
Turkish villagers in the bitter war of 1919-1923, followed with the assurance 
that the Turkish minority in Cyprus might expect similar treatment. My 
informants sometimes went so far as to assert that the Greeks still harbored 
ambitions for the re-establishment of the Eastern Roman Empire with its capital 
at Constantinople.  
 
The outbreak of the riots of 6-7 September 1955 in Istanbul and Izmir, called by many 
as anti-Greek riots, can be evaluated as a vantage point with regard to the development 
                                                 
63 Bulut, Faik, Kürt Sorununa Çözüm Arayışları, p. 177. 
64 Ibid., p. 178. 
65 Akar, Rıdvan, ““Bir Resmi Metinden” Planlı Türkleştirme Dönemi”, p. 72. 
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of the Cyprus question. As will be evident in the course of the chapter, these riots were 
the culmination of a set of events beginning by the British call for a Tripartite 
Conference on Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean to be held in London on 29 June 
1955.  
The provocative and anti-Greek editorials and the nationalist tone in Hürriyet’s 
(an Istanbul daily) news as regards Cyprus in June and July 1955 served to create a 
sense of Greek hostility and an increase of interest in the fate of Turkish Cypriots in 
Turkish public opinion. The mass-circulated daily’s campaign against the Patriarchate 
in July 1955 injected a religious fervor into the already inflamed public opinion and 
aggravated anti-Greek sentiments in Turkey66. On 18 July Hürriyet published a 
declaration directed at Patriarch Athenagoras, questioning “how he could remain so 
indifferent to the atrocities and calamities in Cyprus” and called him to condemn 
“blood-shedder EOKA terrorists.”67 In reply to this provocative challenge, The 
Patriarch expressed the goodwill and friendly attitude recently displayed towards him 
by the Istanbul governor and the Menderes government. Hürriyet, in reply, called him 
not to seek refuge in government authorities and not to disregard the Turkish public 
opinion “which was indeed far more superior than the government itself.”68 To Fahir 
Armaoğlu, by undertaking this Hürriyet’s objective was twofold: on the one hand, an 
indirect, intimidating message was sent to the government. On the other, the Turkish 
public opinion was flattered by placing it above the government authorities.69 “While 
both the government and the opposition press in general kept up the anti-Greek 
campaign, Hürriyet and Vatan played a leading role in it as they raised the specter of 
Greek armies marching to reconquer Constantinople and Anatolia. The Turkish press 
                                                 
66 Armaoğlu, Fahir, Kıbrıs Meselesi, p. 124.  
67 Ibid., p. 124.  
68 Hürriyet, 21 July 1955.  
69 Armaoğlu, Fahir, Kıbrıs Meselesi, p. 125.  
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reported that the Megali Idea was imminent.”70 Within this atmosphere of heightened 
tension, a rumor came out on 28 August 1955 and was disseminated through the 
printing press in Turkey.  
Greek terrorists in Cyprus are planning to attack on and massacre the unarmed 
Turkish Cypriots. This will take place on 28 August. On that day Greek Cypriots 
will organize a massive meeting to protest against the Tripartite conference in 
London. This massacre will be carried out on 28 August.71        
 
This rumor became the top priority in the Turkish press and public opinion so 
much so that it proved impossible to investigate its source and reliability. According to 
well-documented verdicts of the Martial Law Courts in Istanbul the epicenter of the 
rumor was Fazıl Küçük72, the leader of Turkish Cypriots, who wrote a letter to Hikmet 
Bil (editor of Hürriyet and president of Cyprus is Turkish Society) on 13 August 1955, 
which read:  
My request to you of this is that, as soon as possible, you inform all branches [of 
Kıbrıs Türktür] of this situation and that we get them to take action. It seems to 
me that meetings in the mother country would be very useful. Because these 
Cyprus Greeks will hold a general meeting on August 28. Either on that day or 
after the conclusion of the Tripartite Conference they will want to attack us. As 
is known, they are armed and we have nothing.73  
 
Upon the receipt of the letter Bil sent a circular to all branches of Cyprus is Turkish 
Society and instructed them to take whatever action they saw appropriate against the 
massacre and to intimidate London and Athens “by the manly voice arising in the 
mother country.”74 At that point, it will be very useful to briefly touch upon the Cyprus 
is Turkish Society (Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti) by opening a wide parenthesis. 
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 The Cyprus is Turkish Society that “played a more important role than any other 
organization in Turkey with regard to the Cyprus issue”75 became very successful in the 
manipulation and conditioning of Turkish society and its political imagination. To 
comprehend the reasons of this success, it suffices to glance over the members of its 
executive council comprised of prominent journalists and editors of very influential 
dailies of the time together with the leaders of the student unions.76  In the charter of the 
organization its objectives were stipulated as “to acquaint world public opinion with the 
fact that Cyprus is Turkish, to defend the rights and privileges of Turks with regard to 
Cyprus and [do it] from every point of view, and to condition Turkish public opinion.”77 
Cyprus is Turkish Society, founded on 2 October 1954, was welcomed with great 
enthusiasm by the whole Turkish press and official circles.      
However, the weight and power of the society did not solely originate from the 
strong approval and blessing it received from the government; more importantly it was 
reflecting a consensus reached at the top of the state among the Turkish political elite. 
For instance, two members of the executive council Orhan Birgit and Hikmet Bil were 
known to have maintained intricate ties with the RPP leadership. The following words 
of Adnan Menderes quoted by Orhan Birgit explicitly reveals this consensus on such a 
‘national cause’: “The Greeks should see how the opposition and the ruling party are 
united on the Cyprus issue.”78 In the aftermath of its foundation the organization spread 
quickly throughout Turkey and established 50 branches in 12 provinces including 
Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.79 The fact that the Society did not experience any difficulty 
in printing large quantities of placards, handbills and in organizing and coordinating 
                                                 
75 Ibid., p. 76.  
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different activities led to the speculations that it enjoyed financial and other assistance 
from the state itself. Nevertheless, it goes without doubt that Cyprus is Turkish Society 
as a ‘semi-official’80 organization made strategic contributions to the socialization of the 
discourse of the ‘national cause’ with regard to Cyprus in Turkish public sphere.  
Turning again to the the period preceding the 6-7 September riots, in view of the 
forthcoming Tripartite Conference what the Ankara government strove to demonstrate 
to the international public opinion was that the Turkish society was increasingly 
preoccupied with the Cyprus issue and the imminent threat of massacre of Turkish 
Cypriots and that the government was not in a position to yield concessions during the 
Conference in such a national issue.81 National vigilance and frustration culminated in 
the wake of the speech delivered by the acting Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in a 
farewell dinner for the Turkish delegation to the London Conference. Menderes gave 
credence to the massacre rumor by stating that  
the attitude and statements of provocators as regards the Cyprus issue 
understandably lead us to nurture concerns… They, in a terrorist fashion, declare 
continually that 28 August will be a day of massacre for our friends in Cyprus… 
We are therefore obliged to take seriously into account the possibility of an 
attack by them [Greek terrorists], which might be so sudden as to take the 
[British] administration unaware.82 
 
Menderes’ speech received wide coverage in the Turkish press the next day and arose 
nationalist emotions of the public to its utmost degree. That very day the statement 
made by the RPP leader İnönü gave the hints on the convergence of the two political 
parties vis-à-vis ‘the imminent threat of massacre in Cyprus’. İnönü, in full support of 
the government stressed that “during the time that the government is busy with the 
Cyprus issue, our domestic politics shall be impregnated with this issue as well.”83   
                                                 
80 The definition belongs to the author of the dissertation.  
81 See Ioannides, Christos P., In Turkey’s Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish 
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These utterances of the outstanding political figures foregrounding a discourse 
of ‘national unity’ was accompanied by a provocative campaign of Turkish press 
against Patriarch Athenagoras and the Greek minority. For instance on 28 August 1955, 
when the massacre was thought to be launched, stirring news appeared in Cumhuriyet. 
Tha daily claimed that the Patriarch was hiding “secret anti-Turkish agents” and that in 
an attempt to send financial assistance to EOKA activities, Greeks of Istanbul and 
Greek Orthodox priests had saved “millions of liras”. To make the atmosphere worse, 
Hürriyet gave a bitter message to Turkish as well as world public opinion by stating that 
“if Greeks dare attack our brothers in Cyprus, there are plenty of Greeks in Istanbul to 
retaliate upon.”84 Turkish press was portraying the Greek minority both as an immense 
source of threat for Turkish nation and as a ‘trump’ to be employed, when necessary, 
against Greece looming as the ‘historical enemy’ of Turks. This rhetoric, which was 
going to be loudly echoed by the Turkish state elite practically ten years later, was 
based on the total externalization of Greeks of Istanbul. Hence they were asserted as 
‘different’, ‘alien’, ‘pernicious’ and ‘marginal’ elements to Turkish society. In this line 
of thought, the Turkish governments grappling with and neutralizing the Greek minority 
came to be seen as defending the ‘national interests’ and the ‘security of the Turkish 
nation’.       
Although on 28 August there occurred no attacks against Turkish Cypriots, 
“what happened in Cyprus and Turkey in July and August of that summer set the stage 
for the anti-Greek riots of 6 September 1955 in Turkey. It was during this period that 
the activities of Kıbrıs Türktür reached their peak.”85 “With some encouragement from 
the government and provocation from abroad” and from the press,  
public discussion of the Cyprus issue in the summer of 1955 became permeated 
with sentiments of anger and frustration. By the time Turkish interests in the 
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dispute were formally recognized with the calling of the Tripartite Conference in 
London late in August, feeling within the country had reached fever pitch. It was 
in this atmosphere that serious rioting broke out in the cities of Istanbul and 
Izmir on September 6, 1955. This explosion of feeling was highly indicative not 
only of the nature of the Cyprus dispute, but of the character of the nationalist 
sentiments involved in it.86 
 
The spark that started these rallies was the news of a bomb explosion at Atatürk’s 
birthplace in Salonica on 6 September 1955. ‘This unexpected incident’ caused extreme 
indignation in Turkish society when the bombing appeared on the headline of pro-
government newspaper Istanbul Ekspres. The daily announced the event in an extra 
edition with the largest headline of its history which read: “Atatürk’s House Damaged 
by Bomb”87. In the wake of the statement of Cyprus is Turkish on the newspaper, the 
Society became the motor-force of upcoming events and demonstrations. The statement 
by the Secretary General of the Society read: “Those who dared lay their hands on our 
sacred Atatürk shall pay very dearly.”88 Both Cyprus is Turkish and TNSF issued 
declarations putting the blame of bombings on Greeks and regarding the event “as the 
drop which made the cup overflow”. They stated that it was no longer possible to 
control their patience, called Turkish citizens to be aware of the doings of those who did 
not belong to them and to “repeat the national oath: Cyprus is Turkish and shall remain 
Turkish.”89 This declaration was soon circulated among thousands of people and 
culminated the anti-Greek emotions of the Turkish public.  
 It was no later than the preparations carried out by Cyprus is Turkish Society in 
the evening of 6 September had thousands of people rallied in Taksim square in 
Istanbul. Other groups of demonstrators soon appeared with Atatürk pictures, Turkish 
flags and iron bars at their hands chanting this slogan: “Demolish and break the 
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property of the infidels; they are the enemies of Muslims; no killing”90. This mass riot 
continued in several districts in Istanbul and Izmir with looting, demolishing the Greek 
shops, schools, restaurants, churches, homes and so forth91. (See Figure 2)   
 
 
Figure 2. The 6-7 September 1955 riots in İstanbul92 
 
“What seemed to have begun as a noisy demonstration of Turkish opinion on Cyprus 
turned into a destructive free-far-all. The leading element became the 
lumpenproletariat, the bootblacks, porters, kapicis, and mendicants.”93 Each of the 
groupings justified their actions in the name of nationalism; thus nationalism became 
the common denominator of demonstrators.  
On 7 September when the army finally intervened in the demonstrations a 
serious blow had been dealt to the Greek minority in Istanbul. As for the instigators and 
organizers of these anti-Greek riots, Hikmet Bil, the editor of Hürriyet, wrote in his 
book Kıbrıs Olayı ve İç Yüzü94 that in the evening of 5 September 1955 a meeting was 
held in Menderes’s residence. While Menderes was talking about the Tripartite 
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Conference in London, “he told me that he received a crypto from [Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Fatin Rüştü] Zorlu. Zorlu states that he should be able to tell the delegates that 
we can no longer subdue Turkish public opinion in the Cyprus issue. He wants us to be 
more active … The Conference will either acknowledge our cause or will be torpedoed 
by Zorlu.”95 Bil alleges in his book that 6-7 September riots were organized by 
Menderes government and the Istanbul Police Chief that very night after he left the 
residence. To expand the circle of instigators further, a retired full general Sabri 
Yirmibeşoğlu confessed in an interview to Fatih Güllapoğlu that “6-7 September riots 
were organized by the Special Warfare Department (Özel Harp Dairesi). This was a 
good organization indeed. They hit the very target.”96 
 Nevertheless, soon after a Martial Law was declared in Istanbul on 7 September 
1955 (which was to be prolonged several times until 6-7 June 1957), Menderes, in his 
speech on the state’s radio, accused “the secret communist organization and leftist 
elements” of instigating the 6-7 September riots. Not surprisingly, leftist writers, 
intellectuals and laborers previously registered by the police were arrested and kept 
prisoner for ungrounded reasons. On 10 September 1955 the Commander of Martial 
Law Lieutenant General Nurettin Aknos held a press conference and announced the 
following prohibitions:97 
1) It is prohibited to report news that could cause agitation and provocation 
in the public. Parliamentary meetings shall not be reported should they 
have potential to cause agitation. 
2) It is prohibited to criticize the government.  
3) It is prohibited to make any coverage that could badly affect the 
government’s functioning.  
4) It is prohibited to report news as to the Martial Law.  
5) It is prohibited to report news as to the NATO states. 
6) It is prohibited to report news as to shortages and scarcities in the 
country.  
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7) It is prohibited to report news and write comments claiming that the 
events of 6-7 September were organized by groups other than 
communists. 
8) News and comments as regards the events of 6-7 September are not 
allowed. 
9) News and pictures in the magazine sections of newspapers that could 
cause agitation and provocation in the public are not allowed. 
10) Second editions of newspapers are prohibited.  
 
In the wake of these prohibitions, every day new ones were announced by phone to 
newspaper editors. For instance, on 12 September 1955 it was prohibited to report any 
news and give pictures on the developments in Cyprus. It was not allowed to report 
news on investigations carried out with regard to student unions and other associations 
(13 September). News regarding the courts of the Martial Law were prohibited (17 
September). The publication of various newspapers such as Ulus, Tercüman and 
Hürriyet, each charged with contravening different prohibitions were disallowed for a 
period of 15 days or for an indefinite period of time.  
 Although no evidence proved culpability of “communists” in the riots, various 
Turkish authors and newspapers seemed unreservedly convinced that 6-7 September 
riots were communist-provoked. Fahir Armaoğlu unquestioningly asserts in his book 
that the events of 6-7 September originally began as righteous, innocent and well-
intentioned demonstrations incited by “national excitement” but later turned out to go 
beyond its objectives due to “a premeditated communist organization and 
provocation.”98 All major newspapers were in harmony blaming and degrading 
“communists”. To illustrate, Ömer Sami Coşar in Cumhuriyet wrote that “these 
provocative groups [communists] abusing people’s feelings behaved in such a way as to 
do a great harm to the Turkish nation and its causes and thus distorted the 
demonstrations.”99 Like Akşam, Ulus wrote that an “evil plan” (iblisane tertip) was 
concocted by foreign powers aiming at impairing Turco-Greek friendship and at 
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dismembering the Balkan Pact100. Milliyet went as far as to impute the responsibility of 
not only 6-7 September events but also the breakdown of Turco-Greek relations, 
provocations in the Cyprus issue and the bombing of Atatürk’s house in Selonica on 
“communists”. 101 While student unions issued declarations reproaching and protesting 
the events of 6-7 September, TNSF regarded these unlawful movements as “organized 
by secret hands.”102 
 Despite the two-day attacks and looting against the Greek minority in Istanbul, 
the number of Greeks leaving Turkey after 7 September 1955 was quite small. 
According to statistical data compiled by Mehmet Demirer the total number of Greeks 
residing in Turkey was 80.000 before 6 September 1955. This figured decreased to 
75.000 in 1960 and to 48.000 in 1965. Contrary to the general opinion, the events that 
marked the end of Greek presence in Istanbul were the systemic expulsion of the Rum 
minority by the Turkish government in the years 1964 and 1965. The burden of the 
subsequent section will be to expand upon this extradition policy as a consequence of 
which the number of Greeks in İstanbul declined vastly to 3000 in 1995.    
 
7.5. Extradition of the Greek Minority in 1964-65   
While historicizing the treatment and oppression experienced by the Greek 
minority in Turkey, it is common practice to refer to the anti-Greek riots of 6-7 
September 1955 and the imposition of the Tax on Wealth (Varlık Vergisi) in 1942 on 
Greek as well as Jewish and Armenian minority groups in the country. As has been 
widely elaborated in the previous part, the riots of 6-7 September were a manifest attack 
organized with the involvement of the Turkish state itself103 and had intricate 
connotations with the Cyprus issue. Quite interestingly, the deportation of Istanbul 
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Greeks in 1964 with a government decree, which had as much crucial implications on 
Turkish domestic politics as did the events of 6-7 September, has not attracted the 
academic interest it deserves. This government-led deportation movement remains as an 
under-studied area partly due to the fact that the official documents, registers and 
information on Greeks in Turkey are meticulously classified by the government 
apparatus. Perhaps a less important factor can be said to lie in the amnesia, wittingly or 
unwittingly, of scholars overlooking this enigmatic period of Turkish history.  
Against this background, the mass exiles of Greeks in 1964 acquires even 
greater significance if evaluated as the last stage of the governments’ deliberate moves 
since 1914 toward annihilating the Greek minority in Turkey within a four-step process. 
This rather jingoistic move, which went hand in hand with the ‘Turkification’ policies, 
originated in 1914 under the rule of the Committee of the Union and Progress and 
aimed at eliminating the impact exerted by the minority bourgeoisie on the Ottoman 
economic and commercial life. Turkification policies were, in Aktar’s terms 
an effort toward consolidating the hegemony of Turkish ethnic identity and its 
bearers over every field of societal life from the every day language and the 
official account of history to be taught at schools, from the course of commercial 
transactions to the recruitment policies for official posts104. 
  
As striking statistical data, whilst prior to the World War I the minorities constituted 
approximately 18% of the population, in 1924 nearly just one out of every 40 persons 
was minority belonging in Turkey105.  
The second stage occurred in the Population Exchange Agreement concluded 
between Turkey and Greece in the aftermath of the Treaty of Lausanne. A tax law 
adopted in 1942 set the ground for the third step of the Turkification process under the 
guise of Tax on Wealth. In his comprehensive book on Tax on Wealth Ayhan Aktar 
reclaims this tax not as a mere implementation of a newly-adopted law but more 
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importantly as an inherent part of the ‘Turkification’ policies of the government in the 
early years of the Republican era. In this context, the Tax on Wealth, which imposed a 
much more severe burden on Greek, Jew and Armenian minority belongings when 
compared with Turkish nationals, can also be read as a continuation of the ‘anti-
minority’ policies in Turkey106.  
Turning again to the expulsion of Greeks from Istanbul in 1964 and 1965, it is 
fair to suggest that this policy of extradition can be evaluated as the final stage of 
Turkifying the economic, societal, and cultural life in the country. This part of the 
dissertation aims to elaborate on the process through which the decision of expulsion 
was taken and implemented by the governments of the time. Owing to the scarce 
literature on the issue at stake, I will mostly draw on Hülya Demir and Rıdvan Akar’s 
book and on the daily press of the time. As the corollary of the policy of expulsion it is 
estimated that an approximate total of 30.000-40.000107 Greeks of Turkish and Greek 
nationalities left Turkey. As it will be more evident in the pages to come, this policy 
had, from the beginning, been championed by the press in full harmony with the 
Turkish government. Not unlike the state elite, the press and the student unions 
maintaining organic ties with the government devised a xenophobic, chauvinist, 
exclusionary and degrading discourse against the Greek minority mostly living in 
İstanbul.  
 Given the undeniable linkage between the trajectory of the Cyprus dispute and 
the domestic political maneuvers of the İnönü government108, it is worthwhile to point 
briefly to the political atmosphere in the island and its repercussions on the Turkish 
society. In November 1963 Archbishop Makarios proposed 13 amendments in the 
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Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. To the official argument it was no later than 
Turkish Cypriots opposed to the amendments had the Greek Cypriot attacks been 
launched to destroy houses and properties in 103 Turkish Cypriot villages109. It then 
became a daily practice to read in newspapers violently murdered, missing and captured 
Turkish Cypriots. Such was the frustration of Turkish public opinion against Greek 
Cypriots exercising economic embargo, legal restrictions and conducting onslaughts 
that the fate of Cypriot ‘brethren’ became the hottest issue110. At the very beginning of 
1964 Turkey had exhausted all political means at her disposal for a solution in Cyprus at 
the international level. This desperation found expression in Turkish Foreign Minister 
Feridun C. Erkin’s statement that “the key for the resolution of the Cyprus problem was 
in the hands of Greece.”111 At this juncture when Turkey was in urgent need of gaining 
new trumps vis-à-vis Greece, the Greek minority resident in Turkey came to be seen as 
a means for ‘retaliation’112 in the Cyprus conflict. Hence a project concocted by the 
Prime Minister İsmet İnönü envisaged employing the Rums in Turkey as ‘hostages’ for 
the acceptance and materialization of Turkish thesis as regards the Cyprus dispute113.  
Turkish press turned out to be a willing instrument for legitimizing the 
government’s policy in the eyes of Turkish citizens. News and articles in the daily press 
after reminding the common ethnic, religious and cultural origins of the Greek minority 
in Turkey and the Greek Cypriots contended that direct financial and other assistance 
were provided by the Rums in Turkey to Archbishop Makarios and ‘EOKA 
terrorists’114. A large number of columnists in dailies set out to create an anti-Greek 
discourse portraying Greeks as the “fifth column” encircling Turkey since the Ottoman 
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111 Toker, Metin, Demokrasinin İsmet Paşalı Yılları, İnönü’nün Son Başbakanlığı (1961-1965), (Istanbul: 
Bilgi Yayınevi, 1992), p. 195. Quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri, p. 
26.  
112 Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri, p. 27.  
113 Ibid., p. 27.  
114 Ibid., p. 27.  
 249 
period. In the newspaper columns the Greeks were also referred as genetically flawed 
and ruthless bloodshedders115, and as the evil, historical enemy of Turks116.  
A significant point should be highlighted with regard to the government’s 
operation of eliminating the Greek minority. The Turkish Assembly was used as a 
stepping stone by the then Prime Minister İsmet İnönü to pre-empt the allegations that 
an illegal and undemocratic operation was underway117. In effect, the second stepping 
stone was the formation of a responsive and harmonious public opinion by the activities 
of student unions and Turkish press. This double-edged strategy had once more been 
used in 1942 to implement Tax on Wealth by the same political cadres as in 1964. On 
14 February 1964 a parliamentary question was submitted by a deputy from RPP to the 
Prime Minister. The content of the question was as follows:  
1) What is the total population of the Greeks of Turkish nationality 
residing and working in Turkey? 
2) What is the proportion of those liable for income tax?  
3) What is the total amount of income tax levied from the Greeks of 
Turkish nationality? 
4) What is the amount of income tax per Greek in Turkey?  
5) Has any measure been taken against those avoiding income tax?  
6) Has the government been closely monitoring the economic and social 
activities of the Greeks of Turkish nationality? 
7) Will the residence permits of the Greeks of Turkish nationality be 
revised and the necessary measures be taken?118  
 
After this set of questions two seminal statements preceded the adoption of an expulsion 
decision for the Greek minority. As covered in daily Milliyet, İnönü complained about 
the activities of those detrimental to the society, evading somehow punishment and 
pointed to the urgency of taking governmental action against them to safeguard the 
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society119. The implied unpunished “malignants” were later clarified by Ahmet Kabaklı 
as follows:  
The deportation of Greeks in Turkey to Greece can easily be negotiated. If there 
are people among those who wish to emigrate in their own will, our government 
and even Turkish people are ready and willing to pay ample compensation to 
them … Should our patience reach its limits not only Cyprus but also all Turkish 
island in the Aegean, Western Thrace and even Marmara islands shall be 
returned to their original owner [Turkey].120  
 
According to Akar, there exist two underlying references in this conservative 
columnist’s article. By proposing to pay compensation to Greeks to be expulsed from 
the country he was making allusion to the compensation which had been paid to the 
Greek minority in the wake of anti-Greek riots of 6-7 September 1955. Nevertheless, 
this proposition should not be read as a legal entitlement but rather as a covert threat 
against the Rums of Istanbul. Equally important was his expression that Marmara 
islands (e.g. Büyükada, Kınalıada) the population of which was mostly composed of 
non-Muslims, could be regained by Turkey. This had long been the dream cherished by 
certain chauvinist circles in the country yearning for the return of ‘lost lands’121.  
 On 16 March 1964 the İnönü government annulled the Agreement on Residence, 
Commerce and Navigation signed between Greece and Turkey on 30 October 1930 and 
thus announced the extradition of Greeks of Turkish nationality residing in Turkey in 
six months’ time. The unilateral annulment of the agreement was cheered in the Turkish 
public opinion as it amounted to “the second War of Independence vis-à-vis the 
Greek.”122 As further announced by Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs these forcefully 
banished Greeks could return to Turkey on the condition that Greece yielded 
concessions in the Cyprus issue.123 Nevertheless, Article 16 of the agreement stipulated 
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that the minority groups be swiftly expulsed from their resident country should the 
security of the parties to the Agreement be at stake. This presented a legitimate ground 
for Turkish government to implement the decision of expulsing the Greek minority 
without delay. In view of the fact that the course of events in Cyprus had further 
aggravated it was evaluated as unwise to wait six months to purge the Greeks in Turkey 
and to cleanse the society from “the evil-doings of Greeks”124.  
The daily press made its own contribution to the anti-Greek atmosphere in 
Turkey by giving wide coverage to the crimes and offences of the Greek minority and 
accentuating the ethnic origins of those arrested: “A Greek murderer and smuggler was 
arrested”, “Two Greek tradesmen defrauded the market”125. Not surprisingly the first set 
of Greek businessmen were to be expulsed by reasons of “security concerns” and were 
claimed to have been conducting detrimental activities against Turkey126. This 
allegation pointed to the enemies from inside looming as “an insidious threat” both 
above the Turkish economy and Turkish society as a whole127. “The first set of Greeks 
of Turkish nationality involved in such misdeeds as establishing illegal associations, 
gathering money with the purpose of providing arms to Greek Cypriots, making anti-
Turkish propaganda and using fake invoices will be expulsed today.”128  
In the ensuing days the government accelerated the extradition policy to purge 
the Greeks of Greek nationality “seeking to deal a blow to Turkey from within and 
conducting detrimental activities as the fifth column.”129 As a matter of fact the basis of 
the government’s extradition policy was hinged upon the existence of a clandestine 
organization through which Turkey was to be weakened and financial aid was 
                                                 
124 Ibid., p. 66.  
125 Son Havadis 13 January 1964 and Akşam 15 May 1964 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, 
İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri, p. 65.  
126 Ibid., p. 68.  
127 Ibid., pp. 68-69.  
128 Vatan 30 March 1964 quoted in Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri, p. 69.  
129 Demir, Hülya & Rıdvan Akar, İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri, p. 73.  
 252 
transferred to Greek Cypriots130. Minister of Internal Affairs İlhan Öztrak announced to 
the public that the 95% of expulsed Greek businessmen were members of an illegal 
association ‘Eleniki Enosis’ and were “imperiling the internal as well as external 
security of Turkey”.131 These allegations which remained unsubstantiated were 
enumerated in a document which was to be forcefully signed by Greeks subject to 
extradition. Anyone signing the document necessarily acknowledged that he/she:  
a) violated laws, 
b) held membership in the Eleniki Enosis, which is convicted of organizing 
political activities against Turkey, 
c) transferred money to Greek terrorists in Cyprus, 
d) consented to leave Turkey in his/her own will.132 
 
During the accelerated process of expulsion, student organizations after having stated 
their appreciation arising from “the government’s latest felicitous decision”, expressed 
their demands from the government as follows133: 
1) The urgent expulsion of the Greek nationals engaged in commercial 
activities by virtue of the annulment of the agreement depriving them 
from the right to do business in Turkey, 
2) The abolishment of the educational privileges of minority schools 
opposing the unity of language and thought in Turkey, 
3) The reform of religious institutions134. 
 
Quite interestingly, all these demands welcomed at the government level were to be 
fulfilled in a certain spell of time. Meanwhile student unions had already initiated on 15 
April 1964 a campaign to end business activities with Greeks in Turkey and another 
campaign named as “Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş”.  
 Of the principal motives of anti-Greek propaganda and rhetoric in early 1964 
was the comparison of Istanbul Greeks and their living conditions with the Turks of 
Western Thrace. In this sense, newspapers published series of articles depicting the 
‘extreme poverty’ and ‘misery’ of ‘oppressed’ Turks in Western Thrace while stressing 
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the economic and social welfare and privileges of Rums in Turkey135. The political 
authority was certainly in favor of these campaigns articulating Greeks as the inimical 
other deserving to be expelled from the country. It ventured to gain support for its 
policies through an inflammatory propaganda in Turkish press and anti-Greek activities 
of various organizations. In consequence, the government’s operation of expelling the 
Greek minority and expropriating their securities and real properties throughout 1964 
proved to be a systemic elimination of Rums in Istanbul and their weight in the national 
economy.  
 
7.5.1. Economy As A Sphere To Be Turkified 
The Rhetoric of National Economy          
 Among the major objectives of the newly born Turkish Republic was the 
dissemination of the ‘consciousness of Turkishhood’ among Turkish citizens in order to 
forge a nation state composed purely of Turks. This required at the second stage the 
elimination of non-Muslim minorities and their weight and influence in economic 
sphere. In this sense, the İnönü government established an analogy between the material 
wealth and well-being of the minorities and their ethnic identity through a specific 
rhetoric setting them as a manifest ‘danger’ to Turkish national economy. As such the 
exclusionary and securitizing official approach has been born to the sphere of economy 
as well. The rhetoric on national economy championed also by Turkish press, labor 
unions particularly TÜRKİŞ and the youth organizations was geared toward mobilizing 
the domestic society around the official policies in such a way as to secure the national 
unity and cohesion.  
What we call national economy corresponds to a system where capital is 
accumulated in the hands of virtuous and patriotic Turks. If the state reclaims a 
national economy it should not grant loans to those transferring their earnings 
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secretly to the enemies of Turks and helping to provide arms to kill our brethren 
… People with national consciousness do business only with honest and 
honorable Turkish merchants.136 
 
In this atmosphere, the annulment of the Agreement on Residence, Commerce and 
Navigation by the İnönü government on 16 March 1964 was claimed to be cheered by 
Turkish people even though they had hardly any information about its content.137 
These fully-fledged creatures [Greeks] have established their hegemony in 
Istanbul market and have been sucking our blood by making use of the 
advantages of 1930 Agreement, our tolerance and the absent-mindedness of the 
authorities so much so that they have been nourishing our enemies and their 
hostility … We, on the other hand, cannot supply employment to our own 
Turkish citizens in the country. It is high time we became extremely vigilant and 
stop feeding those malign, ungrateful people.138  
 
As a matter of fact, in this period “which turned out to be a hysteria for national 
independence, all agreements, whether major or minor, concluded with Greece began to 
be questioned”139 and articulated as a threat to Turkey’s national interests. 
 On 15 April 1964 three government-led student organizations Turkish National 
Youth Organization (TNYO), Turkish National Student Federation (TNSF), National 
Turkish Student Union (NTSU) launched an anti-Greek campaign to stop all business 
activities with Greek merchants. Their joint declaration as regards the campaign read: 
“GREAT TURKISH NATION keeping in mind that each lira” they earn by exploiting 
you will turn out to be arms directed at “your brethren in Cyprus, the best thing you can 
do in the service of Turkishhood is to cut off all business with those exploiting us 
economically” (…) “At this period of economic warfare if you do not wish to be the 
slaves of world nations” become a volunteer in this campaign140. (See Figure 3) The 
campaign that could not gain the backing of Turkish society as much as desired was 
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stopped immediately after the message of the then Minister of Interior Affairs. This 
constitutes another proof that these youth organizations were strictly controlled and 
manipulated by the government itself.  
 
 
Figure 3. A leaflet published by the Turkish National Student Federation 
(TNSF) and the National Turkish Student Union (NTSU) in 1964. Its publication 
details and translation is provided above141.   
 
To the printing press in Turkey what had been imposed on the Greek minority through 
these campaigns and economic boycotts were normal and tolerable. 
The financial and moral pressure exerted on our Rum citizens and Greek 
nationals by way of the recent events in Cyprus is normal. This pressure has not 
yet exceeded its normal limits. Nevertheless, as long as the wound of Cyprus 
bleeds, this situation might be expected to grow worse.142     
 
In consequence, it was a common inclination of the government-controlled press 
to establish direct linkages between the situation of the Greek minority in Turkey and 
the developments in the island of Cyprus. This ready-made correlation constitutes a 
very pertinent model of the exclusionary practices in which one sector of the society is 
marginalized and identified with the threats “located on the “outside””. As a matter of 
fact, the society was called upon to behave unilaterally vis-à-vis the Greeks of Turkey 
presented as existential and imminent threat to the survival of Turkish national 
economy. Thus apart from the degrading and exclusionary nature of the ‘civil’ 
campaigns and official policies directed against those, the government’s policy of 
expulsion can also be read as an attempt toward the Turkification of the economy. In 
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materializing this goal, the first exiled group was consisting of wealthy and influential 
Greek businessmen whose properties were immediately confiscated by the state. 
Thereby it can easily be argued that the Cyprus issue was instrumentalized by the 
bureaucratic and political establishment in Turkey as a means in their long-lasting 
policy of Turkifying the national economy.     
 
7.5.2. Campaigns Against the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate     
It is fair to propose that at times when Turkish domestic politics was 
preoccupied with the Cyprus question and Turkish Cypriots, Turkish press and political 
figures such as members of the cabinet and deputies from both the ruling party and 
opposing parties kept a vigilant eye on the status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in 
Istanbul and Patriarch Athenagoras. To illustrate, immediately before the anti-Greek 
riots of 6-7 September 1955 subsequent agitative articles appeared in dailies particularly 
in Hürriyet and Vatan. In April 1957 and later in 1958 various columnists suggested the 
transfer of the Patriarchate from Turkey to Greece. The daily Yeni İstanbul initiated a 
survey among the members of Turkish ‘intelligentsia’ and announced that the 
overwhelming majority of participants enthusiastically approved this transfer143. In 
1958 the campaign in favor of moving out of the Patriarchate from Turkey was revived 
by youth organizations and backed by various columnists such as A. Şükrü Esmer in 
daily Ulus. It was contended that the Orthodox Church in Turkey had moved far from 
its Ecumenical status and been Greekified144.  
As was indicated in the previous section as well, throughout 1950s in various 
occasions Turkish dailies had exerted pressures on Patriarch Athenagoras to condemn 
Makarios by virtue of his religious authority. In the same vein, at the very beginning of 
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1964 parallel to the government’s decision of extradition, Turkish press resumed its 
pressures on the Patriarch to deliver statements favoring Turkey’s official policy in the 
Cyprus conflict145. However, this time the demands for the condemnation of Makarios 
was accompanied by the accusations imputed on the Patriarchate. Athenagoras and the 
Greeks of Istanbul were claimed to maintain good relations with Makarios and the 
Greek Cypriots and to donate 10 million dollars per year to ‘the mainland’ Greece146. 
(See Figure 4)  
Meanwhile, the government’s usual strategy of addressing parliamentary 
questions was once more materialized on 4 April 1964 to take a firm stance against the 
institutional personality of the Patriarchate. An RPP deputy submitted a parliamentary 
question to the Turkish Grand National Assembly raising the following questions: 
whether the government was aware of the fact that the Patriarchate was engaged in 
politics since the Treaty of Lausanne, what was the stance of the Patriarchate 
concerning the Cyprus issue, did Athenagoras display an attitude favoring the Greek 
thesis during his negotiations with the Pope. Soon after this parliamentary question  
giving way to severe measures against the Orthodox Church147, the printing house of the 
Patriarchate was closed down on the grounds that its operation was an infringement of 
the Treaty of Lausanne148. The legal basis for the closure of the printing house was 
announced to the Patriarchate as the violation of the Act 5681 entitling only legal and 
physical persons to own printing houses.149 This amounted to the declaration of the 
printing house and its periodicals as illegal.       
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Figure 4. Two nationalist brochures from 1967 and 1955. They are intended for 
“revealing the secret and pernicious activities of the Greek Pathriarchate 
working in collaboration with protagonists of Megali Idea and internal enemies 
of Turks”- namely the Greeks of Istanbul.”150 
               
 In parallel to the government’s ‘measures’ and the exclusionary language it 
used, some agitative articles appeared in the press implying that there existed no 
difference between the secret agents and the personnel of the Patriarchate working in a 
way as to damage “the political security in Turkey.”151 Though limited, this view 
gathered further support from the media and some political figures. The Greco-Turkish 
tension, which persisted in 1965, was by no means alleviated by the new S. H. Ürgüplü 
government as well. He decided to expulse all Greeks of Greek nationality in Turkey 
without delay and to audit the accounts of the Patriarchate by the government.152 
Accordingly, an audit commission was formed to prepare a report on the financial 
situation and transactions of the Patriarchate. Although the conclusions of the report 
was not announced to the public, the speculative news were manifold in the press: “The 
investigation reached the conclusion that the Patriarchate had been engaged in politics 
and had been conducting activities as regards the Cyprus issue since the onset of the 
problem.”153 In effect, this accusatory rhetoric had already been employed by the 
President of the Republic Cemal Gürsel on 8 April 1965: “Since its very inception the 
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Patriarchate has been following an illegal path and has never been solely engaged in its 
religious duties … The fate of the Greek minority is closely associated with the Cyprus 
issue and Turco-Greeks relations.”154  
In the following months due to the onset of bilateral negotiations between 
Turkey and Greece the pressures on the Patriarchate and Greek minority seemed to be 
alleviating although the public opinion and the press were not keen enough to renounce 
its firm stance against the Rum minority in the country155. The common feature of these 
anti-Greek and anti-Patriarchate campaigns conducted in different stints is the 
perception of the Orthodox Patriarchate as a threat to Turkey and representation of 
Archbishop Makarios, as a religious figure, as the sole responsible of the onslaught of 
Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus.            
 
7.6. Cyprus As A Base In the Defence of the “Free World” 
Our membership in NATO is, first of all, an important stride in our 
westernization movement. We have obtained a place and a say within the 
Atlantic community. The frontiers of Europe now begin from Eastern Turkey. In 
the context of our historical development, this constitutes an important 
achievement and a milestone. In this world of ours that has been made smaller 
due to advances in … technology, nations are compelled to come together and 
form solidarity groups … The countries which have similar political systems, 
and close values and views of life and common interests generally come 
together. The cooperation … grows in time and creates an atmosphere of 
community. This has been the case in NATO.156 
 
As implied in this lengthy quotation from former Turkish foreign minister 
Kamran İnan, throughout the Cold War years Turkey’s membership in NATO has been 
directly associated with its will and efforts to be a member of the Western society by 
Turkish state elite. 
NATO membership symbolizes Turkey’s Westernness, its dedication to 
modernity, democracy and human rights. It became a means for drawing 
boundaries between internal (the West) that manifested enlightened civilization 
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and development and the external (the East) that represented autocracy, 
underdevelopment and corruption.157      
 
The Turkish state elite perceiving and representing NATO membership as a new step in 
Turkey’s westernization and modernization process elevated it to the status of a 
civilization project for Turkey as has been the very case in the United States158. 
According to the prevailing idea among the state elite and intelligentsia, Turkey, by 
partaking in NATO, contributed not only to the defence of the Western world in 
military terms but also to the defence of Western values against the communist bloc.  
 In the decade following the World War II, anti-communism became the integral 
part of the nationalist and modernizing discourse of Turkish bureaucratic and political 
establishment. Hence it was incorporated in the processes through which the Turkish 
state identity had been redefined as a modern Western state. The existence of a 
communist threat emanating from the imminent neighbor USSR was also 
instrumentalized to fix and stabilize the domestic political community and to confine its 
political imagination within a sphere the boundaries of which were inscribed only by the 
state elite itself. As such the discursive economy devised on the struggle with 
communism has always been deeply embedded in and inherent to the state society 
relations in Turkey especially during the Cold War years.  
 
7.6.1. Communism: A Threat Coming from the Eastern Mediterranean  
 For such a dissertation intended for analyzing the Cyprus question from the 
perspective of internal power relations and particularly the relations between ‘the 
ruling’ and ‘the ruled’ in Turkey, the vehemently anti-communist nature of the Cyprus 
campaigns figures as a very fertile and interesting area of study. I am convinced that 
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any analytical attempt addressing and searching for the implications and reflections of 
the Cyprus question on the inner political dynamics in Turkey should necessarily take 
into account the prevalent discourse of anti-communism reproduced with respect to the 
Cyprus issue. It is a non-deniable fact that the anti-communist Cyprus campaigns the 
first implications of which can be traced back to late 1940s drastically conditioned the 
political approach and imagination of Turkish society regarding the issue at stake. In 
this context, this section of the seventh chapter suggests that the articulation of Cyprus 
as a “communist base” threatening both Turkey and the rest of “peace-loving nations” 
of the “free world” cannot solely be associated with Turkey’s self-location among the 
members of the Western society. Yet more importantly the rhetoric of anti-communism, 
as has been in the Cyprus case, has been inherent to the maintenance of state society 
relations in Turkey as the relations of subjugation and dominance.           
 In May 1951 a number of associations displaying nationalist and Pan-Turkist 
proclivities such as Hearths of Turkish Culture, Association for Turkish Culture and 
Turkish Youth Organization convened to form the Association of the Nationalists of 
Turkey.159 The two common purposes amalgamating all these associations were to 
struggle with communism and to defend the cause of Turkish minority in Cyprus160. 
“Such was the predominance of anti-communism in the discourse adopted by these 
associations that it outweighed the hostility against Greeks.”161 Various booklets 
published by different student organizations and nationalist associations drew attention 
to the ‘communist danger’ and called upon Turkey and Greece to jointly fight against 
this imminent threat. This vociferous call fully coincided with the anti-communist 
discourse of the Democrat Party government. According to Fahir Armaoğlu, “Turkish 
youth has been evaluating the Cyprus issue directly from the perspective of the danger 
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of communism.”162 In the rallies organized especially by Pan-Turkist student and youth 
organizations the leaders of these unions were delivering fervent speeches on the “red 
imperialism” (kızıl emparyalizm) threatening the whole world and particularly the entire 
Turkish nation163. Today millions of Turks “who fell under the clutches of the reds 
[Azeris, Kirgizes etc. under the hegemony of USSR] had been bemoaning and 
lamenting desperately. Now the red disaster is seeking to plague Cyprus.”164 “It is a 
certain and regretful fact that the great majority of Greek citizens are communist.” The 
communists “in their cause for Enosis” united with Greek nationalists, “under the 
directives of Moscow”, in order for Russia to capture Cyprus. The conviction that 
Greeks and communists were collaborating against Turkey was broadly articulated in 
the rallies as well as in books and brochures published and disseminated in 1950s and 
1960s. (See Figure 5) 
 
 
Figure 5. The cover of an anti-communist book by Fethi Tevetoğlu 
written in 1966 under the name Cyprus and Communism. 
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7.6.2. The State’s Struggle with Communism 
 The struggle against communism and other ‘extreme leftist movements’ had at 
all times figured high on the political agenda of the bureaucratic establishment and 
political elite in Turkey throughout the Cold War years. In 1950s, when Turkey was in 
an enthusiastic search of finding herself a place in the ‘Western family’, the accent on 
anti-communism in government programs and official statements was enormously high. 
For instance, in the government program of the first Democrat Party cabinet which was 
announced on 29 May 1950, only two weeks after the general elections were held, the 
necessity of fighting with communism and extreme leftist political movements “for the 
preservation of our reforms unreservedly embraced by our people”165 was allocated a 
seminal place. As such the government speaking on behalf of the whole Turkish nation 
was declaring communism and communists as a threat for the society presumed to be an 
absolutely unified and homogenous totality. By this program the government publicly 
announced that “the necessary legal measures would be taken” “to thoroughly 
eradicate” the extreme leftist movements devastating the country from inside.166 
Furthermore, the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes did not avoid in the course 
of parliamentary debates criticizing former RPP governments for having failed to 
conduct a judicious and satisfactory struggle against communism.  
 
7.6.3. The Anti-communist Rhetoric of Turkish Press 
 Among the main parameters conditioning the outlook of Turkish press to the 
Cyprus question figured the interests of the Western alliance167 particularly in the first 
two decades of the Cold War years. To illustrate this, during 1950s when the Turkish 
state had been seeking herself a place within the Western bloc Turkish press had an 
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inclination of assessing almost all developments in Cyprus such as the organization of a 
plebiscite for Enosis by the Greek Orthodox Church with the backing of AKEL168, the 
demand for self-determination asserted by Makarios and supported by Greece, the 
commencement of EOKA activism in the island from the perspective of maintaining 
and advocating the interests of the Western alliance and the “free world” vis-à-vis the 
communist bloc. This attitude overlapping with the mindset of the Turkish bureaucratic 
and political establishment resulted in persistent and systematic publications about the 
‘danger of communism’. The press identifying Turkey’s national interests with those of 
the West did not avoid adopting an inflammatory language as to the threats posed by 
communists directed towards the survival of “Turkish nation and other free nations.” 
The Turkish press maintained this extremely Westernist posture until the midst of 1960s 
when the political elite began to express loudly its disillusionment due to the lack of 
support it had expected from the West as regards its thesis on the Cyprus question. To 
the press a Greekified Cyprus would inexorably fall under the domain of influence of 
the communist dictatorship and this would, in turn, constitute a threat to the neighboring 
Middle Eastern countries169. In this way, Turkish press took its part in the processes in 
which communist ideology and communists were demonized and declared as ‘other’, 
‘alien’ and ‘deviant’ inside and outside the country. There is no doubt that the 
dramatization of the Cyprus issue as an imminent and existential threat through an 
intense and vehement anti-communist rhetoric was substantially instrumental in the 
mobilization of the masses around such a national cause. 
 In both the official and mainstream discourses on Cyprus the existence of a vital 
threat of communism was another factor justifying the return of the island to Turkey in 
case of a change in the status quo. To this view articulated by various columnists, 
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politicians and other state authorities Greece had neither the capacity nor the will to 
avert such a looming danger. For instance, for Sedat Simavi  
the determination and resolution Turkey displayed in the Korean War is 
indicative of how she is able to safeguard the Mediterranean region. The United 
States has come to understand who has the real capacity of defending such a 
base as Cyprus. Once each acre of these lands belongs to Turkey, it will not fall 
on the red priest [Archbishop Makarios] to discuss the issue in the presence of 
the US.170 
 
Not unlike Turkish press, other forms of published materials i.e. brochures, leaflets and 
books were stressing the necessity as to defending the interests of the Western alliance 
on Cyprus171. The maintenance of British sovereignty over the island and/or its return to 
Turkey were expressed as the two most appropriate ways of guaranteeing the strategic 
interests of Turkey and the “free world” against the “communist calamity”.  
In a probable war Turkey could receive the aid to be extended to her within the 
framework of NATO via Mersin and İskenderun harbors. Should Cyprus be in 
the hands of Greece not willing to hamper communist activities, Turkey is bound 
to be faced with serious dangers and risks in view of the fact that 60 % of the 
Greeks on Cyprus are communist.172 
 
Parallel to the fierce anti-communism of the Democrat Party government, 
Turkish press with its most part “devoted a great deal of editorial space to apocalyptic 
articles highlighting the grave danger to Turkey that a “Greek and communist” Cyprus 
would pose.”173 It is a well-known fact that throughout the Cold War period at no time 
did Turkish press spare its backing from Turkish governments and bureaucratic 
establishment in foreign policy issues especially if such ‘national causes’ as Cyprus was 
at stake. A brief glance at the overall attitude of the press toward Cyprus question along 
1950s suffices to reveal and exemplify this ascertainment. Turkey’s official policy as 
regards Cyprus had been of maintaining the status quo between 1950-1956, of 
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advocating the partition of the island (taksim) between 1956-1958 and the existence of 
an independent Cyprus Republic from the end of 1958 onward. During the decade when 
Turkey defended three different official thesis on Cyprus the press was utilized as a 
kind of discursive space to make the Turkish society espouse the current thesis. The 
threat and danger of communism always operated as the common denominator and the 
major theme of articles and editorials occasionally defending contradictory solutions to 
the Cyprus problem such as the partition of the island and the foundation of an 
independent Cyprus Republic. For instance, in the first half of 1950s in full conformity 
with the government, Turkish dailies were publishing articles calling Turkey and 
Greece to collaborate and jointly struggle vis-à-vis the danger of a “communist 
Cyprus”174. In these articles Greece was also warned “not to cut the branch it sat on”175. 
By the same token, the daily Zafer known as the mouthpiece of the Menderes 
government having imputed the generation of the problem on communists drew 
attention to the danger of Cyprus being a “communist post under the command of the 
Cominform.”176 As stated before in the years between 1956 and 1958 Turkey formally 
advocated the partition of the island “as the final sacrifice” that it could make for the 
sake of a resolution to the problem. This time the mass-circulated dailies allocated large 
editorial space in an attempt to legitimize this policy switch of the Turkish elite and the 
government by foregrounding the necessity of the partition as regards the national 
security of Turkey and the “free world”. According to the editor of daily Vatan, A. E. 
Yalman, Cyprus was “our defence front against Greek imperialism and Moscow’s 
aspirations.” 
In view of the solidarity in the free world, the utmost sacrifice that we could 
make is the partition of the island to the effect that Turkey’s security on the 
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island is guaranteed and that our 120.000 brothers there shall continue to live in 
peace and tranquility on Turkish soils in Cyprus as Turkish citizens.177            
 
On 19 June 1958 Britain announced its resolution plan for Cyprus after having 
evaluated the Turkish and Greek sides’ views. However before the announcement of the 
plan, its details had already been leaking to Turkish press from the beginning of June 
1958. In view of these preliminary assessments in the press which did not seem to 
satisfy the priorities and expectations of the Turkish government, it strove to increase 
the level of national support and enthusiasm built around its official thesis of taksim. To 
this end the Menderes government, for the first time since 1955, allowed the 
organization of pro-taksim demonstrations throughout the country. Along this period 
student unions and nationalist Cyprus associations, working diligently for the Cyprus 
cause and expansively utilized by government authorities for the socialization of the 
policy of partition, organized and coordinated massive demonstrations where the slogan 
of “partition or death (ya taksim ya ölüm)” was relentlessly articulated. They also issued 
pro-partition declarations and published and disseminated brochures and booklets. The 
main purpose underlying these demonstrations waging in numerous provinces and 
districts of the country was to influence the British proposals and to make them coincide 
with the policy of partition as far as possible. The Turkish government, on the other 
hand, was concerned with manipulating and employing the domestic public opinion 
through official declarations:   
1. Our government is resolved to materialize the partition as the sole formula for 
solution reflecting the national will of our consanguinities in Cyprus and 
assuring the security of the homeland.             
2. (…) Our cooperation with the British government which is underway for quite 
a long time will hopefully last in the coming days. We strongly wish that our 
citizens will cherish the same hope as ours. It is an undoubted fact that the 
realization of our cause in Cyprus depends first and foremost on our national 
will178. 
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As can be inferred from the above declaration by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 8 
June 1958 the government desired Turkish society to behave as a unified totality by 
revealing its strong support to the official policies. By affirming partition as the “sole 
formula” around which the national will and unity should be secured, the government 
sought to avert and de-legitimize the outbreak of any opposition from the outset. These 
demonstrations were covered on the headlines of newspapers which read i.e. “300.000 
citizens in Istanbul took the oath for the partition of the island on behalf of 26 million 
Turks”179 and were accompanied by intimidating articles directed at Britain and the US.     
Cyprus is our national cause of top priority from the viewpoint of Turkey’s 
defence and of the well-being and survival of our Cypriot consanguinities. At 
this fragile and fundamental corner of the free world a solution should be and 
could be reached by taking into consideration Turkey’s natural and legal rights 
and by avoiding any harm to the collaboration between free nations.180 
 
7.6.4. Cyprus As “The Cuba of the Mediterranean”    
Since the end of the Second World War, Soviet Russia has maintained close 
interest in the developments on Cyprus. The active role played by the Cyprus 
Communist Front Organization AKEL in the enosis campaign initiated soon 
after the war by Cypriot Greeks must therefore, be evaluated within the 
framework of the over-all Soviet policy aiming at having access to the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. During those years the British presence in 
Suez and Cyprus was an important obstacle for the Soviet entry into the Middle 
East and the Mediterranean. Considering the civil war in Greece during 1946-
1949 and the substantial communist strength in Greece, placing Cyprus in the 
hands of a weak Greece rather than a strong Britain would secure significant 
benefits for Soviet designs181. 
 
 During the hottest years of the Cold War a metaphor was in vogue among almost 
all columnists in both left and right-leaning Turkish dailies182. This metaphor espoused 
also by the political183 and academic elite184 was devised to define the magnitude and 
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urgency of the communist threat with which Turkey and the “free world” were faced. 
To the argument articulated through this metaphor, Cyprus was running the risk of 
being “the Cuba of the Mediterranean.”185 Furthermore, a Cyprus with the majority of 
its Greek population who were communist or sympathetic to communist movements 
posed an immense threat both to the security of the countries in the region186 and also of 
the Western alliance. “Northern, northwestern and northeastern Turkey has been 
encircled by communists.” Thereby, Cyprus is of vital importance “for us” to maintain 
Turkey’s security from the south187. Consequently, “not only Turkey and the free world 
but also the whole NATO community are faced with the policy and view seeking to 
transform Cyprus into another Cuba.”188 
 This threat analysis of Cihat Baban (Istanbul deputy of RPP and a prominent 
journalist) was extensively acknowledged by academics and foreign policy writers. 
According to Fahir Armaoğlu writing on 4 March 1964 in the daily Cumhuriyet, 
“Soviets cherished two main concerns in their Cyprus policy”: First, the survival of the 
independent Cyprus Republic as a non-aligned state and a rather weak administration 
that could easily fall under the Soviet influence. As such it may continue to operate as a 
“valuable base” through which the USSR could conduct its “communist activities in 
both Greece and the Middle East.”189 Second, “as long as the Cyprus problem 
prolonged, the gulf between” Greek and Turkish nations “would be further expanded. 
This would, in turn, impair the effectiveness of NATO’s right flank and even weaken 
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it.”190 In the same vein, for Tevetoğlu, who was another vehement anti-communist 
political figure, there existed four targets of communist Russia:  
1. to ensure the continuation of the crisis and exploit it toward the 
dismemberment of Western defence force in Eastern Mediterranean, 2. to 
hamper the annexation of Cyprus to Greece, 3. To hamper the resolution of the 
Greek problem by way of reaching an agreement with Greece, Turkey and the 
representatives of the people of the island, and 4. to create a totally independent 
and impartial Cyprus state having no affiliation with Greece and Turkey and 
particularly with NATO and the Western world.    
 
Henceforth, to the prevailing idea in Turkey Cyprus was no longer an internal affair of 
the Cyprus Republic but rather was an inter-bloc problem within the East-West 
competition191. 
 
7.7. Conclusion           
 It would not be an exaggeration to claim that throughout the long history of the 
Cyprus dispute the official rhetoric offers countless examples of inventing and declaring 
internal ‘others’ who are in the service of ‘external enemies’ of Turkey ‘seeking to 
devastate the country from the inside’. The official discourse coding and fixating 
Cyprus primarily as an issue of security and ‘national cause’ has figured among the 
factors impeding the emergence of a real public debate concerning the issue in Turkey 
until the last few years. This totalitarian approach imposing one conception of the 
question on Turkish society has presumed different ways of understanding and 
explaining other than the official state line as dangerous and illegitimate. As I tried to 
indicate in this chapter, this resulted in the exclusionary and disciplinary policies 
through which some sectors of the domestic society have been marginalized due to their 
opposing views and beliefs and/or different ethnic origins. In this sense the objective of 
the seventh chapter was formulated as the exploration of different ways within which 
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the Cyprus dispute was instrumentalized for the consolidation of a national identity 
securing the unity, cohesion and homogenization of Turkish nation.      
Throughout the Cold War era Turkey adopted a security regime in full 
conformity with the US-based threat perceptions and strategies. In this regime, where 
the domestic politics was subjugated to “the national defence considerations”, anti-
communism “had a key role to play”192. In the securitizing practices and the nationalist 
discourse of the state elite, communism proved to be the first and foremost ‘enemy’ 
threatening Turkey’s both internal and external security. In the official rhetoric, the 
communists who were easily associated with the Soviet threat were blamed for carrying 
out subversive and disruptive activities at the expense of Turkey. Besides, the Greek 
communists working under the directives of Moscow were serving for the objectives of 
the Soviet Russia, who aimed at ‘having access to the hot waters of the Mediterranean’ 
by capturing Cyprus.  
In the doctrine known as Atatürkist nationalism, communism has been labeled as 
an “alien ideology” to Turkish society193. “The fundamental characteristic of 
Atatürkism, on the contrary, is that it has been the only national”194 and hence the only 
legitimate ideology in Turkey. It is worthwhile to remember the fact that the then Prime 
Minister İsmet İnönü had accused Pan-Turkism also of being “an imported ideology” 
under the service of the foreigners but not of the Turkish nation in his famous speech of 
19 May 1944195. In the eyes of the Turkish state elite all political postures remaining 
outside the well-defined and standardized boundaries of Atatürkist nationalism 
corresponded to the ‘non-national’ and ‘the dangerous’. The fiercely anti-communist 
rhetoric employed in Turkish public sphere within the context of the Cyprus question 
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offers an elucidating example of the direct relationality established between ‘the non-
national’ and ‘the dangerous’. Thus the duality constructed between the national and 
non-national entails identification of one or several sectors of the domestic society with 
non-national elements and external threats. 
In this context, the Greek minority in Turkey along with communists became 
another sector of the society identified with the non-national and the menacing. As 
indicated in this chapter of the dissertation, in the official and mainstream discourse the 
Greek minority and the Greek Patriarchate were referred to as the “fifth column” 
seeking to deal a blow to Turkey from within. Owing to their common ethnic, religious 
and cultural origins with Greek Cypriots, the Greek minority was marginalized as the 
inimical other against which the society should be safeguarded and be kept alert. They 
were also acknowledged as hegemons in the Istanbul market sucking the blood of 
impoverished Turkish people and transferring its economic resources to external 
enemies.     
As such what could easily be associated with the imminent/existential threats to 
Turkey became the inimical and historical ‘other’ against which the core assumptions of 
Turkish national identity were defined. The natural corollary of this has been the 
marginalization of communists and the Greek minority within Turkish society declared 
as ‘deviant’, ‘alien’, and ‘enemy’ of both the society and its state. Particularly in the 
period extending from late 1940s to 1980s the Cyprus question was intensely utilized by 
Turkish civilian and military establishment to constantly warn the society against the 
communist and Greek threat. In consequence, the paramount importance attached to the 
unity and cohesion of Turkish nation vis-à-vis these threats has always constituted one 
of the fundamental elements of the nationalist rhetoric reproduced through foreign 
policy. The securitizing and nationalist narrative created and recreated with respect to 
the Cyprus issue presented the state the legitimacy and power it needed to reinscribe the 
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boundaries and the core assumptions of the identity of domestic political community. 
As such the Cyprus question has become one of the fundamental spheres allowing the 
reproduction of state society relations in Turkey as the relations of subjugation and 
dominance from ideological to practically every level of public life.  
As argued thoroughly in the third chapter of this dissertation, the post-
structuralist IR theory conceives foreign policy as a double exclusionary and 
disciplinary practice of the state through which the internal and external others are 
specified and declared to the domestic society. Thus the national foreign policy rhetoric 
of the state apparatus operates through ‘othering’ strategies in which the ‘self’ is 
negatively defined against the threatening ‘other’. The construction of ‘self’ and ‘other’ 
as antonymous categories justifies for the power holders to marginalize and exclude the 
internal and external ‘other’ from the socio-political context. In consequence, ‘the 
different’ is denied and negated through a specific rhetoric of threat and danger for the 
insurance of a ‘coherent’ and ‘unified’ national identity- namely the self. As such the 
practices homogenizing the domestic community are achieved through establishment of 
strict boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’, ‘national’ and 
‘non-national’ and mainly owing to these boundaries within the domestic society the 
internal ‘others’ are silenced, punished and marginalized.  
Subjugation of the society to the state apparatus is secured via the 
encouragement of “the people to form “a more perfect Union” and “insure domestic 
Tranquility””196. The constitution and maintenance of the domestic political community 
as a unified collectivity enables the state to speak as the one and only representative and 
signifier of this “imagined” unity in both internal and international context. Thereby 
forming “a more perfect Union” through the consolidation of the national ‘we’ is a 
necessity for the state to implement its national agential capacity on behalf of the social 
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formation in which it is embedded. At this stage, the state apparatus needs to build an 
image of international politics through which danger, threat and anarchy are 
externalized and presumably imagined as the characteristics of the ‘outside’. In this 
imagining, the state itself and/or its territorially bounded sovereignty operates as if an 
invisible boundary demarcating ‘outside’ (the realm of violence, hostility and 
insecurity) from the ‘inside’ (the realm of harmony, unity, and security). The modern 
state apparatus desiring to secure the maintenance of internal power relations disciplines 
the domestic society via dangers and threats originating from the so-called chaotic 
nature of inter-state system.  
To sum up, as a double exclusionary practice the function of national foreign 
policy rhetoric of the state is two-fold: first, strengthening the national ‘we’ and national 
cohesion at the expense of social groups and individuals that cannot be included within 
the well-defined boundaries of the national identity. Second, creating an illusion to 
naturalize and normalize the absolute division between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘internal’ 
and ‘international’, ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’. In the rhetoric of national foreign policy 
the state corresponds to the only power having capacity to challenge possible dangers 
and threats both in internal and international political realms and hence assuring the 
security of its society. As regards our issue of Cyprus, the official discourse devised and 
socialized by the Turkish bureaucratic and political establishment perfectly illustrates 
the double exclusionary rhetoric of foreign policy functioning through ‘othering’ 
strategies.                          
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 
Among the most paramount outcomes of the process beginning by the 1980 
military coup and the subsequent legal and constitutional amendments was the 
abstraction of ‘the societal’ from ‘the political’ as a technique of de-politicization of 
politics in Turkey. Throughout this process, the profound impacts of which are 
noticeable even at present, the legitimate boundaries of the political sphere were 
reinscribed and narrowed unprecedentedly. In this political order defined by Ahmet 
İnsel as the “September 12 regime”, “an authoritarian and conservative statist 
conception of politics”1 was imposed on the Turkish society. The regime did not avoid 
immensely restricting all political rights and liberties, which it deemed conflicting with 
its understanding of security. The “September 12 regime” where the political center was 
totally occupied and even reconstructed by the state perceived the society “as a threat 
besieging the center” and regarded all kinds of “authoritarian methods legitimate in 
defending itself against that threat.”2 Hence especially the military establishment 
deemed it as a matter of state security to distance the society from the political center by 
eradicating the organic ties of the political parties with the most part and sectors of the 
society such as the youth, the women and the laborer.  
Within the statist conception of politics ‘the political’ was reduced to the 
institutional survival and security of the state. The maintenance of political stability and 
social stagnation was considered by the military and civilian establishment as the only 
insurance for the security of the regime and the state itself. As political polarizations, in 
effect the politics itself, were perceived as an ‘existential threat’ to such stability, the 
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political and public sphere were totally restructured through the securitizing policies of 
the civilian and military bureaucracy. In the course of 1980s and 1990s the bureaucratic 
establishment, with İlkay Sunar’s terms, “has been the political anchor of Turkish 
political life.”3 Particularly the role and weight of the military establishment 
dramatically increased as “a strategic group involved in the formulation and 
implementation of development policies, the mobilization and allocation of resources”, 
designation and conduct of the national security and ‘foreign’ policy “as well as the 
regulation of many other aspects of national life”4. Throughout this period Turkish 
politics witnessed the swift pervasiveness of the discourse and practices of the Turkish 
state elite bearing almost all ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ issues into the field of security 
and vitality. As Ümit Cizre correctly pointed out “since the second half of the 1990s, a 
new security discourse in Turkey sanctifies security over democratic and developmental 
objectives.”5  
This not only posed a major obstacle in the insertion of a wide range of socio-
political issues into the political space but also set the proper ground for the ‘National 
Security Council’ (MGK) to increase its power and authority in such a way as to 
intervene in the whole aspects of socio-political and cultural life. Thus the governmental 
rationality prevailing throughout this period served to reemphasize the monolithic 
structure and state-centeredness of Turkish political modernity the sustenance of which 
was fundamentally predicated on the reproduction of state society relations as the 
relations of subjugation and dominance. As such within the “September 12 regime” 
security began to substitute politics and was 
conceived of as synonymous with public policy, thus granting the military a free 
entry into policy making. This is made possible by letting the national security 
                                                 
3 Sunar, İlkay, State and Society in the Politics of Turkey’s Development, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi 
Basımevi, 1974), p. 122.  
4 Ibid., p. 122.  
5 Cizre, Ümit, “Demythologyzing The National security Concept: The Case of Turkey”, Middle East 
Journal, Volume 57, No. 2, p. 213.  
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concept influence codification of laws pertaining to internal security, anti-
terrorism, and maintenance of public order, criminalizing certain political 
activities, constraining public debate and expanding military jurisdiction over 
civilians. It is the translation of national security into laws, decrees, and 
regulations that, in fact, gives the Turkish military a wide latitude in policy- 
making and law enforcement6.     
 
As it was previously argued in the concluding section of the fourth chapter, the 
sphere of foreign policy, which is quite open to the securitizing policies, has always had 
a distinctive role to play in the maintenance of state society relations in its conventional 
and hierarchical structure in Turkey. As the Turkish bureaucratic and foreign policy 
establishment have conceived foreign policy as a vital space to ward off external threats 
directed against national unity and integrity, in the Republicanist tradition the sphere of 
foreign policy has been heavily securitized. This led to the exclusion of the domestic 
society and its elected representatives from the decision-making processes on ‘foreign’ 
political issues in such a way as to narrow the political sphere in Turkey. However the 
narrowing effect of ‘foreign’ policy on Turkish politics may not be limited with the 
exclusion of the society and even the political parties from the decision and policy-
making.  
It is a gainsaying that criticizing the substance and/or fundamentals of official 
‘foreign’ policies remained as problematic in the history of modern Turkish state until 
the recent years. In ‘foreign’ political matters the governments generally had no 
alternative other than to pursue the already formulated polities by the Turkish 
bureaucratic elite beyond the political authority especially if they are labeled as ‘state 
policies’.  
If an aggressive move directed against us through our community turns into a 
dispute, we shall not hesitate for a moment to implement the predetermined 
elements of our policy on the subject. I am certainly not saying these in the sense 
of a threat. This is the basis of our established policy fixed for years as a Nation 
                                                 
6 Ibid., p. 219.  
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and State. Governments have changed, and may change but policy of Turkey on 
Cyprus does not change.7 
 
These utterances of H. Bayülken, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, 
embrace two crucially important points from the viewpoint of this dissertation. First, it 
presumes the existence of a pregiven and unproblematic relationship of representivity 
and identicalness between the Turkish state and society. Second, it posits the limitations 
before the political authorities to implement and/or change foreign policy in Turkey. 
The Minister is speaking of “pre-established” policies as regards the Cyprus dispute 
“fixed for years as a Nation and State”. These words take for granted an absolute unity 
and unproblematic identicalness between the state and society and also imagines the 
latter as an organic, unified and homogenous totality. They deny, from the outset, the 
existence of possible differentiations both between the state and society and within the 
society itself. Bayülken by implying a unity between ‘the ruled’ and ‘the ruling’ in 
Turkey also delegitimizes any opposition as regards the substance of the predetermined 
policies just as did another Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs F.R. Zorlu stating that 
“Turkish people cannot think differently about the future of an island which is 
existentially important to the defence of its country.”8 By affirming that “Governments 
may change but policy of Turkey on Cyprus does not change” Bayülken not solely 
imagines Turkey as a homogenized and unified totality with its state and nation but also 
provokes questions about the effectiveness and capacity of the governments as the 
political authority in the formulation and conduct of foreign policies. If the governments 
do not have the capacity of changing the “predetermined” policies by for instance the 
                                                 
7 Quoted from an interview given by Ümit Haluk Bayülken, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
editor of Milliyet published in Foreign Policy of Turkey At The United Nations Between the Years 1966-
1972 vol. 1, Yüksel Söylemez (ed.), (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973), p. 297.    
8 Bilge, A. Suat, “Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Türkiye Sovyetler Birliği Münasebetleri”, in Mehmet Gönlübol 
(ed.), Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995, 9th ed., (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1996), pp. 335-427. 
Translated in Işıl Kazan, “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, seen from Turkey”, p. 58. 
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bureaucratic establishment, this leads one to the inference that foreign policy decisions 
are taken by ‘non-political’ institutions.  
This, on the one hand, limited the ruling parties’ capacities to govern and on the 
other it gave the governments a proper ground on which they could easily delegitimize 
the opposition since criticizing ‘governments’ policies’ amounted to criticizing the 
regime and the state itself.  More or less radical criticisms directed to the official state 
line tend to be evaluated as an opposition to “the state’s indivisible identity with the 
country and the nation”9 especially if these are related to the issues either cited among 
the fundamental priorities of the state or directly associated with the national security 
(one being the Cyprus dispute). Thereby the securitizing official discourse on ‘foreign’ 
policy where the phrases beginning by the adjective ‘national’ are recurrently applied 
serves to define also the prerequisites of being loyal to the Turkish state and the 
Turkishness itself as is the case in the Cyprus question. As to the questions labeled as 
‘national cause’, our problematic of reconsidering the role and significance of foreign 
policy in securing the domestic order gains a profound importance. The term ‘national 
cause’ as a self-referential term is predicated on a fundamental demarcation between 
‘the national’ and the ‘non-national’ and thereby ‘the legitimate’ and the ‘illegitimate.’ 
As such ‘foreign’ policy has turned out to be the area where ‘the national’ and ‘the 
secure’ are simultaneously sanctified and the demands and priorities differing from and 
conflicting with those of the state are marginalized and declared as distractive to the 
domestic order. Such analysis provokes us to contemplate the central function of 
‘foreign’ policy in Turkey as a “boundary producing and disciplinary practice”10 
demarcating ‘the national’ and ‘the non-national’, ‘the legitimate’ and ‘the illegitimate.’  
The term national cause, which was widely and frequently used within the 
context of the Cyprus question in Turkey, takes as read the existence of a cause around 
                                                 
9 Bora, Tanıl “National Discourses in Turkey”, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 102:2/3, p. 438.  
10 Campbell, David, Writing Security United States Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity, p. 62.  
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which the unity and cohesion of a homogenized society should be secured. This 
provides a proper ground for the state on which it can delegitimize the views and 
opinions conflicting with its policy objectives and practices. Labeling and fixation of an 
issue as a national cause serves to its isolation from political processes through which 
the discourses and policies of the state elite could be interrogated by different sectors of 
the society. As such it narrows the political space at the expense of the society and 
confines its active involvement in the political processes within strictly constructed 
boundaries by the state. In consequence, both the securitization of an issue political in 
nature and its declaration as a national cause contribute substantially to the reproduction 
of state’s autonomy and independence from and supremacy over its domestic society.  
 This dissertation mainly ventured to re-examine and problematize the modes in 
which the Cyprus issue is articulated and represented within the official and mainstream 
narratives in Turkey. The study assuming a dialogical interplay between the internal and 
external political processes aimed at critically questioning the role and impact of these 
narratives both in the reproduction of state identity and the state society relations in 
Turkey. Thus, if it is to be reminded, the dissertation approaches foreign policy as part 
of governmental structure and incorporates the state’s foreign policy initiatives and 
discourses into the dynamics forming the domestic political regime in Turkey. Thereby, 
by drawing on the post-structuralist theory and its research agenda the study strove to 
analyze to what extent and in what ways the Cyprus question was instrumentalized by 
the bureaucratic and political establishment in Turkey in the consolidation and 
maintenance of the core characteristics assigned to the state, society and the relations 
between these two- namely the domestic political regime. Doing this, the dissertation 
intends to introduce a brand new approach to the literature on the Cyprus question in 
Turkey analyzing the issue from the perspective of internal power relations.  
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 In materializing its goals expressed below the dissertation primarily illuminated 
the historical background within which the Cyprus issue has turned out to be a multi-
partite international question. How specific events and phenomena as regards the 
Cyprus issue were historicized and narrativized by the official and political figures and 
also the academic and non-academic analysts were put under scrutiny to trace the main 
tracks of this discursive positioning. The study secondly indicated how and in what 
ways the Cyprus question has been securitized within the Turkish official discourse 
mainly owing to the vitality assigned to the island’s geo-political location. In this 
context, it reached the conclusion that the securitizing rhetoric of the Turkish state elite 
locates military considerations, strategic calculations and threat perceptions into the 
center of the analysis and hence fixes the Cyprus issue as a perpetual security project of 
the state. The security language and the geopolitical discourse that the Turkish civilian 
and military bureaucracy have used on the Cyprus question has a two-fold function. 
First, it has helped the state to consolidate its privileged status as an agent and/or subject 
within the domestic politics vis-à-vis the Turkish society. This security discourse 
secondly facilitated the moving out of the issue at stake from the spheres of normal 
politics and public debate. This has prevented Turkish society from being actively 
involved in the processes of discussion, assessment and decision-making as a real 
political subject. As such de-politicization through securitization has consolidated the 
state’s autonomy and independence from the domestic society and thus secured 
reproduction of relations between these two as the relations of subjugation and 
dominance.       
The dissertation finally dedicated itself to delineate and reveal the role and 
impact of the official and mainstream Cyprus narratives in inscribing and reinscribing 
the standards and boundaries of the Turkish national identity. In this context, the 
dissertation arrived at the conclusion that the disciplinary and exclusionary discursive 
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economy devised with respect to the Cyprus question functioning through ‘othering’ 
strategies has substantially contributed to the construction of boundaries demarcating 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’, ‘national’ and ‘non-national’, 
‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ in Turkey. Throughout the Cold War years what could 
easily be associated with the imminent/existential threats to Turkey became the inimical 
and historical ‘other’ against which the core assumptions of Turkish national identity 
were defined and redefined. In this respect, the Cyprus question was utilized by Turkish 
civilian and military establishment to constantly warn the society against the inimical 
others such as communism, Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey. Thereby the 
securitizing and nationalistic narrative created and recreated with respect to the Cyprus 
issue presented the state the legitimacy and power it needed to inscribe the boundaries 
and the core assumptions of the identity assigned to the domestic political community. 
As another crucially important point I should state that the Turkish mainstream 
scholarship on Cyprus has not only replicated the basic tenets of the official discourse 
but also has substantially contributed to its reproduction as the hegemonic Cyprus 
discourse in Turkish public sphere. The conventional literature has more often than not 
adopted the official state line on the question at stake rather than problematizing it. I am 
of the opinion that a thorough analysis of the Turkish academic discourse on Cyprus 
will be quite interesting since it will enable to unfold the parallelisms and common 
denominators between the official and the conventional literature on the issue. This 
undertaking of rendering the mainstream academic discourses on Cyprus the object of 
critical inquiry transcends the scope and limits of this thesis work. However, such 
examination and problematization of the Turkish conventional literature on Cyprus in 
this sense will constitute a crucial part of my future studies.          
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A Few Words For A Hopeful Future 
Nevertheless, to limit the role and function of foreign policy in general and the 
Cyprus issue in particular only with the act of boundary producing in contemporary 
Turkish politics is a reductionist stance in which the society is presumed as a passive 
bearer vis-à-vis the state apparatus. For, it is possible also to speak about the inclusive 
function of the Cyprus issue, which, I hope, will be more influential in the restructuring 
of Turkish politics by the beginning of the new millennium. In Turkey the beginning of 
the new millennium symbolizes a gradual change of the rationale on which state society 
relations are grounded in the country. ‘Foreign’ policy, which was intensely 
instrumentalized to restrict political rights and liberties, this time became the area where 
the boundaries demarcating the political from the societal began to dissolve. 
Publicization and socialization of ‘foreign’ political matters created an unignorable 
chance for political mobilization. Here by socialization of ‘foreign’ policy I refer to the 
fact that Turkish ‘foreign’ political relations and matters have turned out to be part and 
parcel of the debates in the public sphere in stark contrast with the experiences of the 
past. Hence the new millennium came with various signs of the dawn of a new era for 
Turkish politics characterized by the rapid intensification of the interactions between the 
internal and international political processes. The reviving Turkish-EU relations in the 
post-Helsinki era, the offspring democratization reforms in domestic politics, the 
resurgence of efforts to find a viable solution to the Cyprus problem due to the Annan’s 
plan, the economic stability program conducted with IMF and the political liquidation 
occurred with the November 3 general elections heralded the inception of this new era.  
The reviving Cyprus negotiations and Turkey’s integration process into the EU 
have become the two fundamental subjects of those debates socializing ‘foreign’ policy 
in Turkey in such a way as to shatter and erode the conventional approaches conceiving 
‘foreign’ policy just as heavily securitized bureaucratic activities. Those debates have 
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also facilitated the articulation of differentiated social expectations and priorities by 
civil societal organizations some of which have criticized the homogenizing effect of 
Turkey’s “strong state tradition”11, fixing the society as an organic and unified totality. 
For instance Turkey’s official Cyprus policy has been borne into the public fora and 
begun to be criticized ever extensively than before. The active involvement of different 
sectors of Turkish society in those debates has flared up the democratization of the 
relations between the ruling and the ruled in Turkey as it enabled the critique of official 
policies as comprehensively as has never been in the past. These critiques have the 
potential to force the Turkish government and the foreign policy establishment to 
review and modify, to some extent, the official understanding where strategic and 
security concerns of the state were prioritized at the expense of other dimensions of the 
issue. This is the point where desecuritization, namely repolitisization of ‘foreign’ 
political issues by rendering them part and parcel of public debates gains paramount 
importance for the democratic transformation of state society relations in Turkey. The 
author of this article is of the opinion that every attempt to desecuritize in other words 
‘to move issues out from the threat-defense sequence into the ordinary public sphere’12 
will substantially contribute to such democratization and erosion of the state-centered 
structure of Turkish political modernity. The active involvement of Turkish society in 
the debates on ‘foreign’ political matters presents it a chance to relocate itself within the 
system as a real political subject vis-à-vis the state. Yet this is only possible should a 
radical paradigmatic change and epistemological break occur in the state society 
relations in Turkey. Who knows this little island of Cyprus may be the place from 
where such a change and break can be translated into life.   
                                                 
11 See Heper, Metin, The State Tradition in Turkey, (North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1985).   
12 Buzan, B., O. Wæver and J. de Wilde, Security A New Framework For Analysis, (Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 29.  
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APPENDIX A 
TURKISH GOVERNMENT COMMUNIQUÉ 
20 July 1974 
 
A coup d’état has been carried out in Cyprus by both the Greek contingent 
stationed in the Island and the unconstitutional Greek National Guard which is under the 
complete command and control of officers from the mainland Greece. Since the forces 
involved in the coup are the military units under the direct command of a foreign state, 
the independence and the territorial integrity of Cyprus have been seriously impaired as 
a result of this action. The present situation on the Island, as has emerged from the coup, 
has completely darkened the future of the independent State of Cyprus. In these 
circumstances it is hoped that all States which are favoring the independence and the 
territorial integrity of Cyprus will support Turkey in her action aimed at restoring the 
legitimate order in the Island, undertaken in her capacity as a state which guaranteed the 
independence of Cyprus under international treaties.  
 
After having fully evaluated the recent events which took place in the Island and 
in view of the failure of the consultations and efforts it undertook in accordance with the 
Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 as one of the guarantor powers, the Government of the 
Republic of Turkey has decided to carry out its obligations under Article 4/2 of the said 
Treaty, with a view to enable Cyprus to survive as an independent State and to 
safeguard its territorial integrity and the security of life and property of the Turkish 
Community and even that of many Greek Cypriots who are faced with all sorts dangers 
and pressures under the new Administration.  
 
The purpose of our peaceful action is to eliminate the danger directed against the 
very existence of the Republic of Cyprus and the rights of all Cypriots as a whole and to 
restore the independence, territorial integrity and security and the order established by 
the basic articles of the Constitution. Turkey, in the action she undertook as the 
Guarantor Power shall act with the sincere desire of cooperation with the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Force in the Island in the restoration of conditions of security. On 
the other hand, because of the above-mentioned aim of the action, those Greek Cypriots 
who are wholeheartedly attached to the independence of Cyprus and to the rule of 
democracy in the Island, need not be concerned. Turkey’s aim is to restore security and 
human rights without any discrimination whatsoever among the Communities.  
 
Our purpose in Cyprus, a bicommunal state, is to get the intercommunal talks to 
start as rapidly as possible in order to restore the situation prior to the coup and the 
legitimate order. But it is natural that we cannot consider as interlocutor the present de 
facto Administration which seized power by the use of brutal force and which is not 
representative of the Greek Cypriot community.  
 
Following the restoration of constitutional order, Turkey will strictly abide by 
what is required from a guarantor power which fulfilled its treaty obligations.    
 300 
APPENDIX B 
 
MESSAGE BY BÜLENT ECEVİT  
PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY 
 
20 July 1974 
 
 
The Turkish Armed Forces have started a peace operation in Cyprus this 
morning to end decades of strife provoked by extremist and irredentist elements. At the 
last stage of the Cyprus tragedy, these extremist elements has started massacring even 
their own people- the Greeks.  
 
It is acknowledged in the entire world that the coup which recently took place 
was manufactured by the dictatorial regime of Athens. In fact it was much more than a 
coup. It was the forceful and flagrant violation of the independence of Cyprus Republic 
and of the international agreements on which this Republic was based.  
 
Turkey is a co-guarantor of the independence and constitutional order of Cyprus. 
Turkey is fulfilling her legal responsibility by taking this action. The Turkish 
Government did not resort to armed action before all the other means were tried, but to 
no avail.  
 
This is not an invasion, but an act against invasion.  
 
This is not aggression, but an act to end aggression. 
 
The Turkish Armed Forces are not going to open fire unless they are fired at. 
The Turkish planes are throwing not bombs but messages of goodwill to all the people 
of Cyprus.  
 
The operations of peace that started with the breaking of the day, this morning, 
will bring an end to the darkest period in the history of Cyprus.  
 
The victory of the Turkish Armed Forces will be a victory for justice, for peace, 
for freedom.  
 
I appeal to all Greeks in Cyprus who have suffered the atrocities of terrorism and 
dictatorship. Bury with the past dark days the intercommunal enmities and strives that 
were the making of those same terrorists. Join hand in hand with your Turkish brothers 
to speed up this victory and together build a new, free and happy Cyprus.  
 
We are there to help you, not to hurt. 
 
We are there with love, not with hate.  
 
We are there not to fight you but to end your plight.      
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APPENDIX C 
THE CYPRUS QUESTION 
AND THE VIEWS OF THE TURKISH UNIVERSITIES 
 
 
 
Dear colleague, 
 
 The Turkish Universities desire to appeal to universities thoughout the world to 
consider the following points so that a full understanding of the facts concerning the 
Cyprus Question is ensured.  
 
1-It is common knowledge that the series of events which finally led to the 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus by the Zurich and London Agreements 
of 1959 originated in the year 1954 while the sole purpose of Greece and the 
Greek Cypriot community during the intervening period had been the total 
annexation of Cyprus to Greece: the so-called policy of “Enosis”. Fully 
supported and, indeed, directed by the Greek governments of the time, the Greek 
Cypriots behaved most unscrupulously, resorted to all kinds of bloody and 
ruthless means in their power and chose terrorization as their principal weapon 
for the achievement of their purpose. The murderous attacks of the Greeks were 
not directed at the representatives of the protectorate alone, but also against the 
Island’s Turkish community, which had no aim other than that of living in peace 
and freedom.  
 
2- The Turkish Cypriot community welcomed the foundation of the independent 
Republic of Cyprus, established in accordance with the provisions of the Zurich 
and London Agreements of 1959, as the opening of a new phase in the island’s 
history, but the Greek community was never satisfied with the new state. 
Whereas some of the Greek Cypriots were opposed to the new state because 
they saw it as blocking the path which led to Enosis, others who were less 
impatient, saw the new Republic of Cyprus as a first step on the path which must 
ultimately lead to Enosis. Among the latter was Archbishop Makarios, the 
President of the Republic of Cyprus, and in speeches and statements made on a 
variety of occasions in the years from 1960 to 1963 the Archbishop stated this 
view in the clearest of terms pointing to the fact that Enosis had not been 
forgotten as ultimate objective, for the island would, sooner or later, unite with 
Greece. Such declarations of the Archbishop are frequent in the documents of 
that period.  
 
3- The Cyprus Crisis of 1963-64 was the outcome of a ruthless plot prepared in 
collusion by Archbishop Makarios and the government in Athens. Its aim was to 
annihilate the Turkish community by widespread massacres and thus facilitate 
the annexation of the island by Greece. It was in order to achieve this aim that so 
many members of the Turkish community, men, young and old, women and 
even children were slaughtered with indiscriminate brutality on New Year’s 
Day, 1963. Such atrocities continued throughout 1964 and will be remembered 
as among the most savage acts of genocide in history. The terrible events of the 
syears 1963 and 1964 were a source of deep anxiety in Turkey, concerned as she 
has always been for the survival and freedom of the Turkish Cypriot community.  
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4- Realizing that she would never be able to achieve her aim of Enosis through 
the Greek Cypriot community under the Makarios administration, Greece sought 
the fulfillment of her objective by military means and from the summer of 1964 
onwards sent as many as 12,000 troops to Cyprus in contravention of the terms 
of the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements which had allowed Turkey to 
maintain 650 soldiers on the island while Greece was allowed 950 of her own. It 
is difficult to interpret the silence of those who now advocate the independence 
and national sovereignty of Cyprus, in the face of that flagrant violation of the 
principles of international legal agreements.  
 
5- Having come to power by a coup d’état in April 1967, the Greek Military 
Junta also visualized a policy of genocide as the only means of securing the 
objective of Enosis and after a series of massacres, the second Cyprus crisis 
occurred in that same year. Even the Greek publications revealed that the acts of 
aggression against the Turkish Cypriots were the product of a joint plan drawn 
up by Archbishop Makarios and the military regime in Athens.  
 
      Although the crisis of 1967 subsided through Turkey’s firm attitude, by the 
withdrawal of Greek forces from Cyprus and the removal of General Grivas 
from the island, Greece sent Grivas back to Cyprus in August 1971, and used 
both the 2,000 troops and officers which she had left in Cyprus and the Greek 
National Guard under the command of Greek officers for the realization of 
Enosis, a cause which she has never given up.  
 
6- It became apparent during the intercommunal negotiations conducted between 
1968 and 1973, which had as their object the establishment of a new 
constitutional status Cyprus, that the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements and 
the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus which recognized the existence 
of distinct Turkish community on the island, were sources of dissatisfaction to 
the Greek community. This was owing to the fact that the recognition of the 
Turks on the island as a distinct community constituted an important barrier to 
the realization of plans for Enosis. What Greece and with her the Greek Cypriots 
wanted was that the Turkish community should be treated as a minority group, 
thus ensuring that they would remain under the hegemony of Greek Cypriots to 
facilitate the subsequent annexation of the island as a whole to Greece. For 
Greece and the Greek Cypriots’ territorial ambitions were of greater importance 
than the rights of the Turkish people on the island or their desire to lead decent, 
honorable lives.  
 
7- Recent events have disclosed that while international talks were in progress, 
Greece, together with the Makarios government, violating both the Agreements 
and the Constitution, organized an army of 40,000 men, provided with officers 
all of whom were sent from Greece. What explanation can those who today 
uphold the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus offer for their indifference 
to such open intervention on the part of Greece? How could anyone ignore the 
role of Makarios in this intervention? 
 
8- It was this 40,000 strong Greek military force in Cyprus that set in motion the 
events of July 1974. the overthrow of President Makarios with the aid of Greek 
intervention and the accession to power of Nikos Sampson by force were 
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evident preliminaries to a further attempt at Enosis the means to which would 
once again be massacres which, if resisted, would result in the annihilation of 
the Turkish community. So many proofs of this have been forthcoming that their 
repetition is, we feel, unnecessary when we address ourselves to any 
independent judge. The vary fact that the man who was then made President of 
Cyprus, was a cold-blooded killer and former terrorist leader, who had gloried in 
his crimes, is sufficient to indicate the more than probable fate of the Turkish 
community under any regime led by him.  
 
9- The course which the events in Cyprus have followed during the last twenty 
years has revealed certain incontrovertible facts. First, the annexation of Cyprus, 
i.e. Enosis, is the supreme national ideal of Greece and the Greek Cypriot 
community. Neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriot community has ever had any 
faith in independent and sovereign Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, they consider 
such a republic to be an obstacle to Enosis. As a further obstacle, indeed the 
greatest obstacle of all, there is the Turkish Cypriot community and in view of 
their consideration to this end, both Greece and the Greek Cypriot community 
have consistently striven to remove that community by terrorization and 
massacre as the methods most likely to answer their evil purposes. While Greece 
and Greek Cypriots have acted in contravention to the Zurich and London 
Agreements, ignored Human Rights and the provisions of international law, the 
Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey herself have been most careful to abide 
by those same agreements and the rule of law, limiting themselves to the rights 
accorded to them by such rules and always seeking for the peaceful solution to 
the crises brought about by the acts of violence resorted to by the other side. 
 
10- The peace-keeping operation undertaken in Cyprus on Turkey’s part 
between 20th July and 14th August 1974 should be judged in the light of the 
above facts alone. It was upon the Greek intervention in the internal affairs of 
Cyprus on July 15th that Turkey exposed yet another Greek attempt at Enosis 
and in order to prevent the imminent collapse of the independent and sovereign 
state of Cyprus, and to protect the Turkish community on the island against 
possible acts of aggression and subsequent massacre or even genocide, invited 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to act jointly with her 
in accordance with Article Four of the 1960 Guarantee Agreement to which 
Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the United Kingdom were all signatories.  
 
         As the government of the United Kingdom evaded the issue and refused to 
assume its responsibility, Turkey using the right given to her under Article Four 
of the Guarantee Agreement began her peace operation on the island to prevent 
the annexation of Cyprus by Greece and genocide of the Turks on the island.  
 
         Turkey’s peace operation has revealed all too clearly Greece’s readiness to 
realize her dual aim of Enosis and genocide. Monasteries, churches, and 
hospitals had been used for military purposes and equipped by the Greeks with 
heavy guns thus constituting military positions while churches and hospitals 
were turned into centers for the training of terrorists whose sole purpose was 
slaughter.  
 
11- The preamble to the United Nations Charter states that one of the principal 
aims of the Organization is “to establish conditions under which … respect for 
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the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained.” Regardless of this statement, one of the distinctive features of 
Greek foreign policy has been to evade the terms of treaties which she has 
signed. The latest example of such behavior is connected with the agreement 
signed in Geneva on July 30th, 1974, Greece completely ignored the obligations 
which she had undertaken in fulfillment of this agreement: hundreds of Turkish 
villages and tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots were surrounded by the 
EOKA-B Organization and the Greek Cypriot forces, under the command of 
Greek officers, and threatened with annihilation. Turkey was once again forced 
to a realization that the Turkish community in Cyprus was in grave danger and 
this was one of the main reasons for the second peace operation, which was 
initiated on August 15th, 1974.  
 
12- The operation undertaken in Cyprus on the part of Turkey is fully in keeping 
with agreements which have also been registered by the United Nations 
Organization and it has one object and one object only- the protection of the 
Turkish community in Cyprus from attack by Greek Cypriots and Greece, from 
aggression amounting to massacres and even genocide. It aims at the 
establishment of order, of safety and the security of dignity. The developments 
of the twenty years have shown that the most effective way of ensuring such a 
regime of security will be the establishment of a geographical federation, based 
on the principle of the recognition of the separate existence of the two 
communities. In view of the fact that the federal solution has proved effective in 
such multi-national states as the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the 
Republic of Switzerland and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
opposition to the application of this solution to the Cyprus problem would 
appear to be due to insufficient goodwill.  
 
13- Greece has complained that forty percent of the island is under the control of 
the Turkish peace-keeping force. However, the fact is that some thirty five 
percent is actually concerned, while it should not be forgotten that when the 
Cyprus problem became an international issue in 1954, Turkish Cypriots earning 
their living by agriculture possessed some thirty three percent tillable land. Since 
then the acts of aggression, terrorization and massacres which have occurred 
steadily over the years have forced many Turkish Cypriots to the dire necessity 
of abandoning their lands and the homes in which they have lived for so many 
years. It is indeed a regrettable fact that those who appear so concerned about 
the problem of Greek refugees now, have not shown an equal concern for the 
fate of those large numbers of Turkish Cypriots who, for many years past, have 
been driven from their lands and homes and deprived of their livelihood.  
 
           The purpose of Turkish intervention in the Cyprus issue is not the 
acquisition of land or the extension of her territories, as is the case with Greece. 
Her aim is to provide the 120,000 Turks living on the island with safety of life 
and security of livelihood consistent with human dignity. In Cyprus, as in all 
international relations, peace can neither be established nor made durable in the 
absence of security. A civil order which will bring this security and therefore 
lasting peace to both communities will be achieved only if Turkey and Greece, 
the two countries directly involved, meet at the conference table and negotiate a 
settlement. Greece has so far eschewed all talks. It is customary, is it not, for 
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well-intentioned people who are seeking solution to a problem to come together 
and talk their positions over? 
 
            My dear colleague, although the Cyprus problem is primarily the 
problem of my country, it is also an international problem and I have therefore 
attempted to submit for your consideration the facts of the inhuman treatment to 
which Turkish Cypriots have for long been subjected by Greece and their Greek 
Cypriot neighbors, with the serious objectivity which is alone worthy of a 
scholar, regardless of his nationality.      
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Prof. Tahsin Özgüç 
    Rector of the University of Ankara                        
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APPENDIX D 
TÜRKİYE MİLLİ GENÇLİK KOMİTESİNİN 12 TEMMUZ 1952’DE 
GENEL KURUL KARARI İLE YAYINLADIĞI KIBRIS BEYANNAMESİ  
 
(The Cyprus Declaration Issued By the Turkish National Youth Committee 
on 12 July 1952) 
 
 
 
12 Temmuz 1952’de toplanan Türkiye Milli Gençlik Komitesi Genel Kurulu, 
Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonunun teklifi ile gündemindeki bir çok önemli işleri geri 
bırakarak günün mevzuu olan Kıbrıs meselesi üzerindeki görüşlerini aşağıdaki 
beyanname ile dünyaya ilan ederken ayrıca Kıbrıs’lı Türk kardeşlerimize kongrenin 
sıcak sevgilerini sunmağa ve kaderleri ile Türk milletinin öz kaderi imiş gibi candan 
ilgilendirdiğini bildirmeye karar vermiştir.   
 
Başkanlık divanı, beyannamenin müzakeresi sırasında, kongrede şahlanan 
çoğunluk ve emsalsiz tezahüratı, kardeşin kardeşi, Anayurdun yavru yurdu sinayeti 
şeklinde tespit ve hülasa ettiğini Kıbrıs Türk’lüğüne sevgi ile bildirdikten sonra şu 
beyannameyi yayınlamıştır:  
 
 
KIBRIS BEYANNAMESİ 
 
Kıbrıs adasının mukadderatı ile ilgili olarak, Türkiye Milli Gençlik Komitesi ve 
bu komiteye dahil teşekküllerle diğer gençlik teşekkülleri, aşağıdaki hususları Türkiye 
ve dünya umumi efkârına arz etmeyi uygun görmüşlerdir:   
 
19 uncu yüzyıl sonlarına doğru, Anavatanı şimalden gelen tehlikelere karşı 
korumak endişesiyle, muvakkat İngiliz işgaline terk etmek zorunda kaldığımız, güney 
sahillerimizin bekçisi, dört asırlık Türk toprağı, Yeşil Kıbrıs Adası, son zamanlarda 
Balkan tipi bir küçük emperyalizmin hedefi olmaya başlamıştır. Bilindiği gibi adada 
yaşayan yerli Rumlar, ilim ve mantık haysiyetini haiz her türlü mesnetten mahrum, hissi 
birtakım iddialarla Adanın Yunanistan’a ilhakını istemektedirler. Bu maksatla teşekkül 
etmiş olan cemiyetler ve bilhassa Kıbrıs Rum Ortodoks Kilisesi bu tahrikâtı idare 
etmektedir. Yüz bine baliğ olan Kıbrıs Türk Topluluğu, müstemlekeci İngilizlerin 
lâkayt gözleri önünde, müteassıp, Türk düşmanı Rum çoğunluğu tarafından daimi bir 
tedhiş havası içinde bulundurulmakta ve her türlü baskı ve işkence tehdidine maruz 
bırakılmaktadır. Bu faaliyet, Yunanistan’da resmi ve gayri resmi bütün teşekküller 
tarafından desteklenmekte ve bizzat Yunan hükümetince tahrik ve teşvik edilmektedir.  
 
İkinci Dünya Harbi sonlarına doğru, İtalyan ve Alman işgalinden kurtarılan 12 
adanın Yunanistan’a devri sırasında, Türkiye’nin tamamen pasif bir politika takip etmiş 
olmasının, “Kıbrıs’ı ilhak” kampanyasında Yunanlılara bir hayli cesaret verdiği ve 
Yeşilada üzerindeki mesnetsiz Yunan iddialarının gittikçe artan bir taşkınlıkla ileri 
sürülmesine yol açtığı inkâr edilemez bir hakikattir. O zamandan beri Yunan 
politikacıları, Kıbrıs’ın bir Yunan adası olduğunu pervasızca iddia etmişlerdir ve 
ihtiyatsız hareket ve beyanatlarıyla Kıbrıs meselesini Yunan umumi efkârının en çok 
meşgul olduğu mevzulardan biri haline getirmişlerdir. Geçenlerde Türk milletinin 
misafiri olarak Başkentimize gelmiş olan Elen Kralı Majeste Paul’ün, Atina’da kurulan 
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“Kıbrıs’ı İlhak Cemiyeti”nin fahri başkanlığına deruhte etmesi, Yunanistan’da Kıbrıs 
davasına yeni bir “Megali İdea” hüviyeti vermiş bulunuyor. Bu gün, Kıbrıs meselesi, 
müfrit sağdan müfrit sola kadar bütün Yunan basını ve siyasi partileri için bir istismar 
mevzuu olmuş ve Yunan iç politikasına müessir bir hale gelmiştir. Yunan halkı bir 
“Enosis-ilhak” isterisine tutulmuş bir vaziyettedir.  
 
Komşumuz ve dostumuz Yunanistan’daki bu falsolu hareketleri Yunan 
hükümetinin zaman zaman gizlemeye gayret etmesine rağmen Atina Parlamentosunda 
Kıbrıs için her vesileden istifade edilerek yapılan tezahürat, Yunan hükümeti adına 
bizzat Ekselans Venizelos tarafından verilen demeçler ve meselenin Birleşmiş Milletler 
İnsan Hakları ve Vesayet Komisyonlarında müzakeresini temin maksadiyle Yunan 
delegeleri tarafından sarf edilen gayretle, Türk Gençlik Teşekküllerinin gözünden 
kaçmamış; 8 Mayıs ve 4 Temmuz 1952 tarihlerinde Atina’da tertiplenen sokak 
mitingleri ile bunları takip eden Parlamento nümayişlerini ve Dışişleri Bakanı Ekselans 
Venizelos ile yardımcısı Ekselans Averoff’un son faaliyet ve beyanatını Türk gençliği 
dikkatle takip etmiştir.  
 
Bütün bu hadiseler, ve nihayet Yunan Dışişleri Bakanlığının bir tebliğ 
yayınlayarak Kıbrıs davasının resmen ele alındığını ilan etmesi, bugüne kadar Kıbrıs 
için yapılan tahrikatta dost Yunan hükümetinin doğrudan doğruya methaldar ve hatta 
müşevvik rolünde olduğunu, ve bu faaliyetlerin Türk-Yunan münasebetlerini ihlâl 
etmek isteyen komünist tahrikçi unsurların eseri olduğu yolundaki kanaat ve iddianın 
hakikatle hiçbir ilgisi bulunmadığını tevil götürmez bir şekilde ortaya koymuştur.                
 
Hakikat şudur ki Doğu Akdeniz’de huzursuzluk yaratmak ve bir taraftan İngiliz-
Yunan, diğer taraftan Türk-Yunan münasebetlerini bulandırmak maksadiyle hareket 
edenlerin, Kıbrıs mevzuundan faydalanarak yaptıkları tahrikler muvacehesinde, Türk 
Millet ve Hükümetinin takip etmeği ihtiyar ettiği basiretkar hareket hattını Yunanlı 
dostlarımız istismar etmeğe yeltenmekte ve sükutumuzdan istifade ederek, Kıbrıs’ın 
Yunanistan’a ilhakını bir emrivaki haline getirmeğe çalışmaktadır. Bu gün, Kıbrıs 
mevzuu ile meşgul olmadığı bir iç politika zarureti olarak ileri süren Yunan 
Hükümetinin samimiyetine inanmak güçtür; çünkü, halihazır durumu meydana getiren 
bu hükümetin bizzat kendisidir.  
 
Bu hakikatları böylece tesbit ettikten sonra, Kıbrıs mevzuundaki görüşümüzü bir 
defa daha açıklayalım: Bütün Dünyaya en gür sesimizle bir defa haykırıyoruz ki bugün 
müttefikimiz Britanya’nın işgalinde bulunan Kıbrıs Adası herşeyden evvel bir Türk 
toprağıdır. Yunanlı dostlarımızın şu realiteleri iyi bilmeleri ve daima gözönünde 
bulundurmaları, hakiki Türk-Yunan dostluğunun temel zaruretlerinden biridir. Kıbrıs 
Adası, her şeyden evvel bir Türk toprağıdır. Çünkü: 
 
1- Kıbrıs coğrafya itibariyle küçük Asya’ya bağlıdır. 9.283 
kilometrekareden ibaret küçük bir adanın bağlanacağı ana ülkenin 
tayininde itibar nazarına alınması lazım gelen en esaslı faktör, 
coğrafya faktörüdür. (Kıbrıs Adası küçük Asya’ya 44, Yunanistan’a 
ise 1,100 mil mesafededir). Ege denizinde kara sularımız içinde 
bulunan adaların, Milli Mücadele şartları ve zaruretleri altında Milli 
Misak hudutlarımız dışında bırakılmış olması ve İkinci Cihan 
Harbinin sonlarına doğru yine kara sularımız içinde bulunan On İki 
Adanın Türkiye’ye iade edilecek yerde Yunanistan’a verilmiş 
bulunması bu argümanı asla zayıflatamaz. Hiçbir zaman değişmeyen 
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coğrafya faktörüne aykırı olarak Yunan hakimiyetine terk edilmiş 
olan bu adaların mukadderatının yeniden bahis mevzuu olup 
olmaması, Türk-Yunan dostluğunun istikbaline bağlıdır.  
2- Kıbrıs, fetih hakkı itibariyle Türk’tür. 1571’de har karış toprağını 
Türk kanıyla sulayarak fethettiğimiz ve 307 sene hukuken ve fiilen 
hükümran olduktan sonra, 1878’de siyasi ve askeri zaruretlerle 
emaneten İngiltere’ye terkettiğimiz Kıbrıs, tarih ve medeniyetimizin 
ebedi damgasını taşımaktadır. Kıbrıs’ta her adım başında bir şehit 
mezarına rastlanır. Mabedlerimiz, tarihi abide ve eserlerimiz, beş 
milyon sterlin değerindeki evkaf tesislerimiz, adanın Türk 
karakterinin şahididir. 1923 Lozan Sulh Anlaşmasiyle ve o zamanın 
zaruret ve icaplarına uyarak, Ada üzerindeki hükümranlık haklarımızı 
İngiltere’ye devretmiş olmamıza rağmen, Türk milleti, değişmez 
coğrafi yakınlığımız ve tarihi haklarımız dolayısiyle Kıbrıs’a karşı 
daima en kuvvetli alakayı duymuştur. Yunanistan’ın ise, Kıbrıs’la 
tarihi hiçbir ilgisi yoktur. Çünkü Kıbrıs tarihte hiçbir zaman 
Yunanistan’a ait olmamıştır.  
 
3- Kıbrıs Adası, iktisaden Anadolu’ya bağlıdır. Tabii kaynakları zayıf 
olan ve kendi kendine yeten bir ekonomiye sahip olmayan Kıbrıs, 
tarih boyunca iktisaden daima Anadolu’ya tabi kalmıştır. İkinci Cihan 
Harbi sırasında İngiltere’nin müstemleke ve dominyon 
İmparatorluklariyle Ada arasındaki ticari münakalenin ınkıtaa 
uğradığı zamanlar, Kıbrıs’ın bilhassa gıda maddeleri ve bazı sınai 
mamüller itibariyle Türkiye’ye dayanmış olması, bu iddianın en 
kuvvetli delilidir. Kıbrıs’ın Yunanistan’a ilhakı, iktisaden mahvı 
demek olur. Nitelim, On İki Adanın Yunanistan’a bağlanması, ora 
halkı için ekonomik bakımdan feci neticeler vermiştir. Dostumuz 
Yunanistan, maalesef, fakir bir memlekettir ve tabii kaynakları o 
kadar mahduttur ki daima fakir kalmaya mahkumdur. Bunun içindir 
ki, Kıbrıs gibi Yunanistan’da her zaman nüfus ihraç eden bir 
memleket olmuştur. Türkiye ise bu bakımdan son derece müsait bir 
durumdadır. Zengin kaynakları, süratle inkişaf eden sanayii ve nüfus 
kabul etme kabiliyetiyle ancak Türkiye Kıbrıs için bir anavatan 
olabilir.  
 
4- Kıbrıs, askeri ve stratejik bakımdan Türkiye için büyük bir önemi 
haizdir. Doğu Akdeniz’de kilit mevkiini işgal eden ve Türkiye’nin 
güney kanadını himaye eden Kıbrıs Adasının zayıf bir devletin eline 
geçmesine Türkiye asla müsaade etmez. Çünkü, Kıbrıs’ın düşman 
tarafından istilası, Türk emniyet sisteminin kökünden sarsılması 
demek olur. Yunanlı dostlarımız unutmasınlar ki, İkinci Dünya 
Harbinde Ege denizindeki Yunan adalarının düşman hakimiyetine 
geçmesiyle, Türkiye Batıdan, tamamiyle tecrit edilmiş ve ancak 
Kıbrıs’ın dost ve kuvvetli bir elde bulunması sayesinde Güneyden 
nefes almak imkanını bulabilmiştir. Yunanlı dostlarımız şunu da 
unutmasınlar ki Türkiye, NATO çerçevesi içinde, Kıbrıs’taki İngiliz-
Amerikan üslerinin muhafazası şartiyle dahi, Adanın Yunanistan’a 
devrine razı olamaz. Çünkü, Türk milleti, askeri ve stratejik 
ehemmiyeti bakımından Kıbrıs meselesini yalnız bugünün şartları 
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içinde değil, uzun bir geleceğin değişik şartları içinde mütalâa 
etmektedir.       
 
5- Kıbrıs’ın Yunanistan’a ilhakını isteyenlerin ileri sürebildikleri yegâne 
argüman, Adadaki nüfus çokluğunun Yunanistan’ı istediği iddiasıdır. 
Bu argüman, halkların kendi mukadderatlarının kendilerinin tayin 
etmeleri (Auto-détérmination) prensibine istinat ettirilmeğe 
çalışılmakta ise de, bunun bir demagojiden başka bir şey olmadığı ve 
ilmi ciddiyet ve değerden tamamen mahrum bulunduğu aşikârdır. 
Kıbrıs, başlı başına bir (Entité) sayılamaz. Coğrafi, tarihi, ekonomik, 
askeri ve stratejik sebeplerle Küçük Asya’ya bağlı olan ve Anadolu ile 
bir bütün teşkil eden Kıbrıs Adası, nüfus bakımından Küçük Asya’dan 
ayrı olarak mütalâa edilemez. Bu böyle olunca, Kıbrıs Rumlarının, 
Küçük Asya ve Orta Doğu’daki Türk-İslam âlemi içinde küçük bir 
ekalliyetten başka bir şey olmadıkları kolayca anlaşılır.  
 
Bundan başka, unutulmamalıdır ki, Küçük Asya’daki bu küçük Rum 
ekalliyetinin yarısı komünisttir ve Kıbrıs komünistleri Yunanistan’ı istemekte samimi 
değillerdir. Bunların hakiki maksatlarının Doğu Akdeniz bölgesinde huzursuzluk 
yaratmaktan başka bir şey olmadığı malumdur. Kıbrıs komünistinin reyini Kıbrıs’ın 
mukadderatını tâyin etmesine Türkiye asla razı olmayacaktır. Yunanlı dostlarımızın 
iddia ettikleri gibi, Adanın mukadderatının tayininde plebisite müracaat edilmesine 
hiçbir suretle müsaade edemeyiz. Kıbrıs’ın mukadderatı, coğrafi, tarihi, ekonomik, 
askeri ve stratejik faktörlere ve Türkiye’nin emniyeti mülahazalarına göre hal 
edilecektir. Yunanlı dostlarımızın da, Kıbrıs’ın Rum sekenesiyle mahalli ilhakçı 
tahrikâtı idare eden papazların da bunu böyle bilmeleri gerekir.  
 
Beyanatımıza son vermeden evvel şu noktayı bilhassa belirtmek isteriz ki, Türk 
gençliği, Türk-Yunan dostluğunun ehemmiyetini müdriktir ve bugünkü dünya şartları 
içinde bu dostluğun bir zaruret olduğuna kanidir. Ancak, dostluğun icaplarına riayetin, 
bir taraflı olarak yalnız bize düşen bir vazife olmadığını da Yunanlı dostlarımızın takdir 
etmeleri icap eder. 
 
Türk Milleti, Türk-Yunan dostluğuna önem verdiği içindir ki, düpedüz haksızlık 
olduğuna kani bulunmasına rağmen, Oniki Ada’nın Yunan hakimiyetine terkedilmesine 
itiraz etmemiştir. Fakat hiçbir mesul Türk Hükümeti, Yunan dostluğunun hatırı için, 
Anadolu’nun ayrılmaz birer parçası olan bu özbeöz Türk topraklarının birbiri peşinden 
Yunanistan’a ihsan edilmesine müsaade edemez. Hiçbir mesul Türk Hükümeti, yüz bin 
kişilik Kıbrıs Türk kütlesini dört asırlık Türk düşmanlığının insafına terkedemez. Türk 
Gençliğinin, gerekirse Türk-Yunan dostluğunu dahi feda ederek Kıbrıs için çarpışmak 
kararında olduğunu, mesul Türk Hükümeti hesaba katmak zorundadır. Yunanistan’ı 
idare edenlerin Türkiye realitelerini iyi bilmeleri ve tehlikeli Kıbrıs mevzuu ile 
oynamaktan biran evvel vazgeçmeleri, Türk-Yunan dostluğunun istikbali nâmına 
temenniye şâyandır.  
 
Türk Gençlik teşekkülleri, bu beyannameleri ile Türkiye umumi efkârına 
tercüman olduklarına emindirler; ve Yunanlı dostlarımız pekâlâ bilirler ki, Türk umumi 
efkârının temayülleri demokrat Türk Hükümetinin üzerinde kuvvetle müessirdir. 
 
Türkiye Milli Gençlik Komitesi Genel Kurul Başkanı İlhan Yetkin; Türkiye 
Milli Gençlik Komitesi Genel Sekreteri Vedat Özsan; Türkiye Milli Talebe 
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Federasyonu Genel Başkanı Ali İhsan Çelikkan; Ankara Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği 
Başkanı Öznur Taylan; Ankara Yüksek Tahsil Talebe Birliği Başkanı Ahmet Çakıroğlu; 
İstanbul Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği Başkanı Turgut Şedele;  İstanbul Teknik 
Üniversitesi Talebe Birliği Başkanı Hulusi Çetinoğlu; İstanbul Yüksek Okullar Talebe 
Birliği Başkanı Demirtaş Celal Bayar; İzmir Yüksek Ekonomi ve Ticaret Okulu Talebe 
Cemiyeti Başkanı Ergun Göksan, Zonguldak Teknik Okulu Talebe Cemiyeti Başkanı 
Necdet Baş; Lozan Türk Talebe Cemiyeti Başkanı Orhan Aldıkaçtı; Türk Devrim 
Ocakları İstanbul İl Başkanı Rıza Serhatoğlu; Türk Kadınlar Birliği İstanbul Başkanı 
İffet Halim Oruz; Yeşilay Gençlik Kolu Başkanı Aytekin  
Ozan; Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Birliği Başkanı Y. Mehmet Ali Pamir; Kıbrıs Türk Kültür ve 
Yardım Cemiyeti Başkanı Dr. Derviş Manizade.  
 311 
APPENDIX E 
DENKTAŞ’S PROPOSALS FOR CONFEDERATION  
 
31 August 1998 
 
 
 
As a final effort to achieve a mutually acceptable lasting solution in Cyprus I 
propose the establishment of a Cyprus Confederation based on the following 
arrangement: 
 
1) A special relationship between Turkey and the TRNC on the basis of 
agreements to be concluded. 
2) A similar special relationship between Greece and the Greek Cypriot 
Administration on the basis of symmetrical agreements to be 
concluded.  
3) Establishment of a Cyprus Confederation between the TRNC and the 
Greek Cypriot Administration.  
4) The 1960 Guarantee System shall continue.  
5) The Cyprus Confederation may, if both parties jointly agree, pursue a 
policy of accession to the EU. Until Turkey’s full membership of the 
EU, a special arrangement will provide Turkey with the full rights and 
obligations of an EU member with regard to the Cyprus 
Confederation. The ultimate aim of the negotiations will thus be a 
partnership settlement which will be a confederated structure 
composed of two peoples and of two states of the island supported by 
symmetrical agreements with the two respective motherlands and 
guarantor states. All rights and powers which are not referred to the 
confederal state/entity will reside with the two confederated states. 
The agreement to be reached as a result of the negotiations will be 
submitted for approval in separate referenda. By participating in these 
negotiations the parties will acknowledge that the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot sides are two sovereign and equal states, each with its own 
functioning democratic institutions and jurisdiction, reflecting the 
political equality and the will of their respsctive peoples. They will 
also acknowledge that the authorities of one party do not represent the 
other. We believe that only this structure will provide for the security 
of both sides, will safeguard their identity and well-being. If the 
Greek Cypriots agree to this final basis, we are ready to begin 
negotiations to establish the Cyprus Confederation.  
 
 
